CHAN KIN SING v. THE OMBUDSMAN AND ANOTHER

HCAL 232/2026

[2026] HKCFI 4104

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 232 OF 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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A. Introduction

1.  By Form 86 dated 21 January 2026, the Applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge the Ombudsman’s decision dated 4 November 2025 (“Impugned Decision”).  By the Impugned Decision, the Ombudsman refused to investigate, follow up or review the Applicant’s complaints and imposed administrative restrictions limiting contact to written notice only.

2.  By way of relief, the Applicant mainly sought orders of certiorari to quash the Impugned Decision, and requiring the Ombudsman to reconsider the Applicant’s complaints in cases 2025/2478 and 2025/2756 (“Complaints”).

3.  Contrary to the mandatory requirement under Rules of the High Court (“RHC”) Order 53 rule 3(2), no affidavit was filed by the Applicant together with the Form 86 and verifying the facts relied on.  Instead, the Applicant stated that the affirmation would follow as directed by the Court.  When chased, the Applicant subsequently requested an extension of time until 15 August 2026 to complete and file the supporting affidavit.  By my direction dated 19 May 2026, I stated that (1) I would not put off consideration of this application beyond 22 June 2026, and (2) whether or not any affirmation is filed by the Applicant before that date, I would address the merits of the application for leave on whatever information is by then available.  Eventually, the Applicant filed an affidavit sworn on 17 June 2026, with a large number of exhibits.

4.  Having considered the materials, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to deal with this case on the papers.  This is my Decision.

B.  The Background

5.  The Applicant’s underlying dispute is with Citibank (Hong Kong) Ltd (“Bank”), concerning replacement of his credit card. That is the background to explain his complaints to the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (“HKMA”) and the Ombudsman.

6.  In July 2025, Applicant lodged two complaints with the HKMA concerning (1) what he described as the “unauthorised conversion” of his credit card from VISA to MasterCard, and (2) what he described as the “significant communication barriers” with the Bank, where 22 consecutive telephone calls were diverted to voicemail without connection to any staff member.

7.  The Applicant says that between late July and early August 2025, a series of subsequent correspondence was exchanged between him and the HKMA, chasing for substantive reply is in progress updates.  Crucially, he says, these communications ultimately yielded no substantive progress, as both the HKMA and the Bank “rigidly maintained their respective positions without addressing the core elements of” his grievances.

8.  On or about 11 August 2025, the Applicant lodged formal complaints with the Ombudsman, being 2025/2478 and 2025/2756, i.e. the Complaints.  In the context of dealing with the Complaints, the following matters occurred:

(1)  On 18 September 2025, the Ombudsman replied that there was no evidence of maladministration by the HKMA and decided not to pursue the Complaints further.  As regards 2025/2478, the Ombudsman considered that the HKMA had explained the reasons for consolidating the two complaints made to it, and that approach had not caused the Applicant any substantive adverse impact or unfairness, and there was no apparent unreasonableness.  As regards 2025/2756, the Ombudsman considered that the HKMA had handled the complaint in accordance with the established procedures described by it, and there was no impropriety. Further the HKMA was still processing the complaint made to it.

(2)  On 22 September 2025, the Applicant sought a review of that decision.

(3)  On 8 October 2025, the Ombudsman maintained his position and, amongst other things, accepted the HKMA’s explanation for consolidating the complaints made to it, namely for handling complaints more efficiently and within a shorter timeframe.  As there was no evidence to show the HKMA had committed any maladministration, the Ombudsman would take no further action on the Complaints.

(4)  On 13 October 2025, the Applicant requested the matter to be handled under the direct supervision of the Ombudsman, and raise concerns regarding staff attitude, lack of reasons, consolidation of the complaints, the HKMA’s handling of the matter, and the adequacy of the review procedure.

(5)  On 23 October 2025, the Applicant attended the Ombudsman’s office without an appointment to make enquiries.  This led to a brief verbal disagreement with staff.  The Ombudsman staff regarded the Applicant as disruptive.  After leaving the office, the Applicant wrote a formal letter of complaint to the Ombudsman regarding the conduct of the staff during the visit.

9.  The Applicant then received the Ombudsman’s letter of 4 November 2025, i.e. the Impugned Decision.

C.  The Impugned Decision

10.  It is perhaps helpful to set out the terms of the Impugned Decision in full, as follows (in translation from the original Chinese):

Re: your complaints against the Hong Kong Monetary Authority

[1.] Earlier, you lodged two complaints with us against the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA). You alleged that the HKMA should not have consolidated your two related complaints (Our Ref: 2025/2478) against a certain bank (the Bank Concerned) and expressed dissatisfaction that the HKMA failed to handle your case (Our Ref: 2025/2756) urgently, as you had requested. After reassessing the case, in our reply letter to you dated 18 September this year ("Reply Letter I"), we stated that (we) find no evidence of misfeasance by the HKMA in handling your case. Accordingly, we will take no further actions on the two aforementioned complaints.

2.  On 22 and 23 September, you emailed us to express your disagreement with our reply letter that closed the case(s).  In our reply letter to you dated 8 October ("Reply Letter II"), we reiterated the reasons and grounds for taking no further action on the two complaints.

Your recent email

3.  On 13 October, you emailed us, reiterating your dissatisfaction with the bank concerned and the HKMA and restating your disagreement with our conclusions.

Result of Our Reassessment

4.  Firstly, we must point out that we have examined all the information you provided.  All the reply letters (including this one) issued to you by us were approved and issued by the Ombudsman or an officer authorized by him.  They represent our position rather than the personal opinion or decision of an individual staff member.

5.  Regarding your two complaints against the HKMA, we have examined the information and grounds you submitted.  In Reply Letter I and Reply Letter II, we already explained our position and the reasons for taking no further action on the two complaints.  Having reassessed the cases, we uphold our decision to take no further action on them.

6.  By this letter, we have replied to your complaints three times and have no further comments to add.  In light of resource optimization, should you bring the same matters to us again, no further response will be provided.

Other matters

7.  In your letter dated 13 October, you expressed dissatisfaction that during a telephone conversation, the case officer suggested you submit the relevant views or requests regarding the case(s) in writing, and that our hotline staff failed to answer your enquiries about the case(s) and transferred your call to the case officer.  You requested that we provide you with a written apology for the staff’s handling of the matter ("Matter 1").

8.  Furthermore, in your email to us dated 23 October, you questioned our delay in replying to your email dated 13 October and expressed dissatisfaction that during your visit to our office on the 23^rd day of the same month to request a meeting with the case officer’s supervisor, you were met only by a staff member of equivalent rank to the case officer (the "staff member concerned") instead.  You were also dissatisfied that the staff member concerned, together with another staff member, warned and demanded that you leave our office before you had completed your enquiry into another case (Case File No.: 2025/2125), which you considered insulting ("Matter 2").

Our Response

9.  Regarding Matter 1, we handle complaints in writing. Generally speaking, we require complainants to submit complaints in writing.  Upon completion of a case, we will notify the complainant of the result in writing. Should the complainant be dissatisfied with the result of the case or our handling of it, they are also required to submit their concerns to us in writing.  Concerning your case(s), the case officer’s advice to you to submit your relevant views or requests regarding the case(s) in writing was consistent withour established handling procedures and did not constitute misfeasance.  Furthermore, we must also point out that the case officer was authorized by us, in accordance with established procedures, to handle your complaints and to communicate with you directly on our behalf. Should you have any enquiries or dissatisfaction regarding the case(s), we would arrange for the case officer to communicate with you. (Therefore,) there was nothing inappropriate in the hotline staff’s action in transferring your enquiry to the case officer for handling.

10.  Regarding Matter 2, we provide services to members of the public during office hours.  Should a complainant wish to meet with a case officer regarding their case, they are required to schedule an appointment with us in advance.  According to our records, you visited our office without an appointment at approximately 4:30 pm on 23 October.  You requested to meet with the relevant staff member regarding your HKMA case and another case.  The reception staff indicated to you that the case officer handling the HKMA matters was on leave and explained to you that an appointment was required to meet with a staff member.  However, you demanded to meet with the case officer’s supervisor immediately.  We must point out that we assign appropriate staff to handle enquiries from members of the public on a case-by-case basis. After considering your request, we exercised our discretion to arrange for the staff member concerned to meet with you.  The staff member explained to you that your email dated 13 October was under review and that a response would follow.

11.  Subsequently, you indicated you still wished to enquire about your other case mentioned above.  As it was after our office hours, the staff member concerned suggested that you continue your enquiry within office hours or schedule an appointment with the staff member.  However, you refused to do so, remained in our reception area, and caused a disturbance.  Therefore, the staff member concerned issued a warning to you and asked you to leave, but you still refused to comply.  In light of this, we assigned another staff member to join the staff member concerned in reiterating the above circumstances to you and requesting you to leave once more.  Having reviewed the relevant circumstances, we find that the staff member concerned handled your request appropriately and clearly explained the reasons for asking you to leave the office premises.  (We also find that) no unreasonable conduct was observed.

12.  Regarding your allegation of our delayed response to your email dated 13 October, in accordance with our service pledge, we endeavour to complete a reassessment and respond to the complainant within one to two months of receiving their request.  For the two aforementioned cases, we have completed the reassessment and are notifying you of the results (with this letter) within the specified timeframe.  (Therefore,) no delay was involved.

13.  Lastly, we must point out that visitors are not to engage in any conduct that disrupts our operations.  Otherwise, disturbance will be caused to our staff or other complainants.  In case of such circumstances, we shall cease providing services, require the visitor in question to leave, and take other appropriate follow-up actions.  Having considered the circumstances of your visit to our office on 23 October, we find that your conduct disrupted our office operations.  Therefore, we will now communicate with you solely in writing. Should you call or visit our office in person, our staff will not speak with you on the phone or meet with you. Should you wish to make any enquiries, lodge any complaints, or provide any supplementary information to us in the future, please do so in writing.

11.  It seems to me that most impartial and fair readers of that letter would think that, on its face, it politely explained to the Applicant how his original Complaints have been dealt with, as well as the request for review, and the circumstances of the meeting on 23 October 2025.  The letter also politely pointed out that the Ombudsman had responded to the Applicant three times, that any dealings should only occur through written communications, and that Ombudsman office staff would not speak to the Applicant on the phone or in person.

D.  The Intended Grounds of Review

12.  The Form 86 seeks to advance four intended grounds of judicial review as follows:

(1)  Ground 1: Illegality: failure to provide adequate and intelligible reasons.

(2)  Ground 2: Procedural Impropriety and Irrationality: misrepresentation and stigmatising characterisation.

(3)  Ground 3: Irrationality and Disproportionality: restriction appears to be of an indefinite duration, and stigmatising.

(4)  Ground 4: Illegality and Irrationality: unlawful exercise of discretion to refuse investigation.

13.  I can deal with these grounds each in turn.

E.  Ground 1

14.  This intended ground is based upon the fact that the Ombudsman responded to the Applicant’s complaints with what he describes as only vague words to the effect that there was no unfairness or no maladministration, without clearly explaining the specific reasons for refusal or how the discretion under section 10 of the Ombudsman Ordinance Cap 397 was exercised.  The failure also persisted despite the Applicant’s repeated written request for clear explanations, and the failure included a failure to engage with the specific requests for clarification.

15.  The Applicant suggests that such conduct may breach the common law duty to give adequate and intelligible reasons, and may undermine transparency and accountability expected of an independent oversight body, and may render the decision is unlawful.

16.  As can be seen from the description of the Ombudsman’s original response on 18 September 2025 (see above), and the terms of the Impugned Decision which expressly referred to that original response, there is nothing in this intended ground of review.  A clear and succinct explanation was given of the reasons why the Complaints were refused.  That explanation also fell to be read in the context of the complaint made by the Applicant, which he knew.  Further, making or repeating a request for clarification, when no clarification is in fact necessary, does not create a ground of judicial review.

17.  Ground 1 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

F.  Ground 2

18.  This intended ground is based upon the description of events on 23 October 2025 as given in §§10-11 of the Impugned Decision (see above).  The Applicant suggests that the characterisation of the Applicant’s conduct as disruptive behaviour “may inaccurately portray and/or may overstate a single verbal disagreement that arose only after a protracted meeting had overrun public office hours”.  This rather tentative suggestion is followed by the Applicant’s complaint that he was not afforded an opportunity to respond to the allegations or to provide his own account of the incident before unilaterally applying a label that may carry a serious stigmatising and exclusionary effect, in breach of the principles of natural justice.

19.  There is nothing in this intended ground of review either.  As can be seen, §§10-11 of the Impugned Decision give a concise and dispassionate description of the events occurring on 23 October 2025, and the explanation as to why the Applicant was asked to leave the office, despite having earlier refused to comply with a similar request.  All of this is in the context that complaints (and any reconsideration requests) are normally required to be made in and responded to in writing.

20.  It is not reasonably arguable to suggest that fairness or natural justice required the Applicant in these particular circumstances to be afforded any opportunity to respond to the Ombudsman’s description of the events.  Further, even in his affidavit, the Applicant does not really contest that there was a verbal disagreement between himself and the staff members before the Applicant left the premises.

21.  Ground 2 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

G.  Ground 3

22.  This intended ground of review is based upon §13 of the Impugned Decision (see above).  The Applicant suggests that imposing a restriction of dealing only in writing, barring telephone contact and in person access, “may constitute a form of severe” restriction, of indefinite duration, and stigmatising interference with his ability to seek redress through ordinary channels.

23.  Again, there is nothing in this ground of review.  As was clearly explained in §13 of the Impugned Decision, it was in the context of the previous difficulties which occurred in person that the requirement to communicate solely in writing was put forward.  But it was also made clear that the requirement did not prevent making any enquiries or lodging any complaints or providing any supplemental information in future.  There was, therefore, no severe form of restriction or any real interference with the Applicant’s ability to seek redress through ordinary channels – where §9 of the Impugned Decision also identifies that complaints made in writing handled in response in writing is the generally adopted approach.

24.  Ground 3 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

H.  Ground 4

25.  This intended ground of review is based upon the Applicant’s suggestion that the Impugned Decision “appears in substance to be an exercise of its discretion not to investigate” under section 10 of the Ordinance.  He also suggests that it “may have been exercised unlawfully and/or irrationally, insofar as it refused to investigate and/or further review the Applicant’s complaints regarding the HKMA” – and that the Ombudsman “may have failed to take into account relevant considerations”.

26.  This tentatively expressed ground is based upon a factual misconception, and there is nothing in it.  The Impugned Decision was not a refusal to exercise the discretion to investigate; it was informing the Applicant that his Complaints had been investigated and then reassessed.  In reality, the Applicant is merely disagreeing with the result of the investigation and reassessment.

27.  Ground 4 is not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospect of success.

I.  Delay

28.  It is trite – and the Applicant has himself expressly recognised – that an application for leave to apply for judicial review must be made promptly, and in any event within a ‘long-stop’ three-month period, unless there is a good reason to extend time.  As I indicated at the beginning of this Decision, RHC Order 53 rule 3(2) mandates that the application for leave to apply for judicial review must include an affidavit verifying the facts relied upon, underpinning the intended grounds of review said to support the claimed relief.  An application which comprises only the Form 86, and does not have the necessary verifying affidavit, is incomplete.

29.  In this case, the Form 86 was filed within three months of the Impugned Decision, but the verifying affidavit was not filed until a further five months later.  This means that the complete and/or properly formed application was not made promptly.  That the Court set a deadline for an affidavit, and refused to entertain the kind of substantial delay suggested by the Applicant, did not amount to a waiver of that defect (though it afforded the Applicant an opportunity to address the timing point).

30.  Nothing in the affidavit that was eventually filed could not have been provided at the time the Form 86 was filed.  Therefore, there is no apparent good reason for extending time.  In those circumstances, the Court would have been entitled to refuse the application for leave to apply on the basis of delay alone.

J.  Result

31.  In addition to the significant delay in constituting a properly formulated application for leave to apply for judicial review, the Applicant has failed to identify any reasonably arguable public law grounds of review with any realistic prospect of success.

32.  Therefore, the application for leave to apply for judicial review is dismissed.  I make no order as to costs.