1994 MP No. 3037
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF Hong Kong
HIGH COURT
____________
BETWEEN
(1)
THE ASSOCIATION OF EXPATRIATE CIVIL SERVANTS OF HONG KONG
Applicants
(2)
FERDINAND TROMP
(3)
GEOFFREY PAUL BACH
(4)
PATRICK CHARLES EDWARD WILSON
(5)
ROBIN GORDON TOES
and
(1)
THE SECRETARY OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
Respondents
(2)
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL
____________________
Before: The Hon Mr. Justice
Keith in Court
Date of Hearing: 14th - 15th,
18th - 22nd, 25th - 29th September, 2nd
& 4th October 1995
Date of Handing Down Judgment: 31st October 1995
HEADNOTE
(1) On an application for judicial review made by a representative
body on behalf of its members, the body has the standing to make the
application if it is possible that at least one of its members (a) is, or will
be, affected by the decision challenged, and (b) wishes the body to challenge
the decision on his behalf. It is
not necessary for the body to identify such a member, unless it would be
easy to do so.
(2) The right of access to the Civil Service protected by Art.
21(c) of the Bill of Rights includes access to the terms and conditions of
service and the opportunities for promotion enjoyed by other civil servants.
(3) A restriction on the right of access to the Civil Service
amounts to an infringement of Art. 21(c) if that restriction is attributable to
one of the distinctions prohibited by Art. 1(1) or is otherwise
unreasonable. The test to be
applied to determine whether a restriction on the right of access to the Civil
Service is reasonable is whether it was reasonably open to the Secretary for
the Civil Service to conclude that the restriction was reasonable.
(4) The words “permanent resident” in Art. 21 of the Bill of
Rights refer to a person with the right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration
Ordinance (Cap. 115).
(5) In construing an ordinance, no weight can be attached to what
purports to be an authoritative statement of legislative intention if it is not
possible to discern what the legislative intention actually was.
(6) The conventional view that mere proposals (which might not be
put into effect) are not susceptible to judicial review has not been affected
by the decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Secretary of State
for Employment ex p. Equal
Opportunities Commission [1994] 2 WLR 409 that there does not have to
be a “decision” for a dispute to be amenable to judicial review.
_______________
JUDGMENT
_______________
INDEX
Topic
Introduction
The localisation of the Civil Service
The Civil Service Regulations
The enactment of the Bill of Rights
The decision challenged
Delay
Standing
The proper construction of Art. 21(c) of the Bill
of Rights
The original transfer scheme
(1) The definition of permanent
resident
(2) Non-transferring officers
(3) Deadlines for applications
(4) Carrying forward untaken leave
(5) Outward passage back to Hong Kong
(6) School passage and overseas
education allowance
(7) Transfer to the permanent
establishment
(8) Proficiency in Chinese
(9) Officers whose agreements had expired
by 30th July 1993
The modified transfer scheme
(1) The selection exercise
(2) Promotion before transfer
(3) Promotion after transfer
(4) Reduction in the length of the new
agreements
(5) The limit on the length of the new
agreements
The opening-up scheme
(1) Transfer to the permanent
establishment
(2) Promotion before transfer
(3) Language training
The Principal Official posts
The uniform terms scheme
The offers to the four individual Applicants
Conclusion
INTRODUCTION
1. Civil
servants in Hong Kong are employed on either overseas or local conditions of
service. The existence of these
two sets of conditions reflects Hong Kong’s historical status as a colony of
the UK, and are in part the legacy of an unquestioned assumption, prevalent
until the Second World War, that English-speaking British expatriates were best
equipped to administer Hong Kong, at least in the higher echelons of the Civil
Service. The existence of
different sets of conditions for different civil servants has been described by
the Secretary for the Civil Service as “anachronistic”, and the Government has
for some time recognized the need to bring uniformity to the contracts of civil
servants. However, interim
measures which the Government has taken towards the adoption of a common set of
conditions of service have been met with resistance from expatriate civil
servants. In these proceedings,
those measures, to the extent that they increase the pace of the localisation
of the Civil Service, are the subject of a sustained legal challenge.
THE LOCALISATION OF THE CIVIL SERVICE
2. The
policy of successive British Governments. Most people think that the policy of localising the Civil
Service in Hong Kong is a recent phenomenon, made necessary by the historical
imperative of the impending change in Hong Kong’s sovereignty. That is not the case. By the end of the Second World War, the
policy of the British Government was to encourage and promote the recruitment
of local people to the Civil Service in the territories administered by the
Colonial Office. “[T]he public
services [of the territories administered by the Colonial Office] …must to the
greatest possible extent be staffed by local people. It is a fully accepted principle that there should be no
barrier to the appointment of … a locally recruited public servant to any post
which he is qualified to fill.”[1]
3. However,
it was recognized “that for a long time to come many [of the territories
concerned would] not be able to find from their own resources enough suitably
qualified staff to fulfil all the requirements of modern administration.”[2] It was acknowledged, therefore, that
the recruitment of local staff would have to be supplemented, especially in the
higher grades, by officers from overseas.
It was accepted that such officers should continue to enjoy certain
benefits which reflected their expatriate status, such as the provision of
accommodation, home leave and assisted passages – the rationale for such
benefits being “to increase the amenities and attractiveness of the Colonial
Service and to maintain the discomforts and disadvantages which work[ing abroad
was] liable to entail.”[3]
4. It
was also contemplated that officers from overseas would be appointed “on the
usual permanent basis”, though there would also be “appointments on contract
for a term of years”.[4] However, the long tenure of officers
from overseas restricted recruitment opportunities for the increasing numbers
of qualified local candidates. In
the course of time, therefore, the proportion of officers from overseas being
appointed on agreement terms increased by a significant margin. By 1960, the emphasis was to appoint
officers from overseas on agreement terms “wherever this [could] be done
without prejudice to the essential staffing requirements of the territory.”[5]
5. The
application of these policies in Hong Kong. The policy of local recruitment wherever possible was
quickly recognised in Hong Kong.
In 1947, it was recommended that if “genuine Hong Kong candidates whose
roots are in [Hong Kong] … are available with the necessary qualifications they
should be given preference over other candidates who come into [Hong Kong] from
outside.”[6] By 1961, the policy had become
sufficiently established for the acting Colonial Secretary to report that the
policy of the Hong Kong Government was “to appoint local officers whenever
qualified candidates [could] be found, and to engage overseas candidates only
when qualified local candidates [were] not available.”[7]
6. However,
it was recognised that the recruitment of local officers, particularly to the
professional and senior technical grades, was not proceeding rapidly. That was not surprising in view of the
limited opportunities for tertiary education and the obtaining of professional
qualifications in Hong Kong.
Accordingly, a series of measures were announced which were designed to
increase the intake of local officers.
These measures included (a) the modification, if possible, of the
qualifications required to accord with those obtainable locally, (b) the institution
of courses designed to provide local candidates with such qualifications as
were required, and (c) the selection of suitable local candidates for overseas
training. If, despite these
measures, it was necessary to appoint an officer from overseas, he should be
appointed on agreement terms to bridge the gap for the time being: whereas recruitment on pensionable
terms had been the norm in the past, recruitment on pensionable (and the
transfer of a serving officer to pensionable terms) would normally only be
resorted to where there was no prospect of a local candidate becoming available
within the foreseeable future.[8] With the exception of appointments to
the Police Inspectorate and the Administrative Service (where the policy was to
recruit regularly a proportion of officers from overseas), this remained the
Government’s recruitment policy throughout the 1960s and 1970s.
7. The
promotion of serving officers.
While suitable and qualified local candidates were given preference at
the recruitment stage , it was notthe Government’s policy to give
preference to local officers for advancement in the Civil Service. Local and overseas officers were
considered equally for promotion irrespective of the terms on which they
reserved.
8. The
retention of serving officers.
An officer from overseas who was recruited on agreement terms could only
have his agreement renewed if there was not a suitable local officer available
to take over from him in his present post. However, consideration would be given to the renewal of the
officer’s agreement if he would still be needed to meet expansion in his
present rank or to fill an existing or future vacancy in a higher rank. Moreover, the Government recognised the
need to maintain a sufficient level of expertise in the grade concerned as a
whole, and that meant that a good and experienced officer (irrespective of his
terms of appointment or whether he was a local or overseas officer) should not
be replaced by an inexperienced one.[9]
9. The
impact of the Joint Declaration.
In December 1984, the British and Chinese Governments signed the
Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong (“the Joint
Declaration”). Amongst other
things, it required the elimination of privileged treatment for foreign
nationals.[10] That provision resulted in the decision
to abandon the policy of recruiting a proportion of officers from overseas to
the Police Inspectorate and the Administrative Service. It also resulted in a review of the
terms of employment of officers from overseas. The upshot of that review was that all appointments of
officers from overseas would be on agreement terms. Moreover, serving officers from overseas on agreement terms
would be given a once-and-for-all option to apply for transfer to the permanent
establishment. The deadline for
the making of such an application was subsequently extended on a number of
occasions.
THE CIVIL SERVICE REGULATIONS
10. The
conditions of service of officers in the Civil Service are governed by the
Civil Service Regulations (“the CSRs”).
The power to make the CSRs is vested in the Secretary for the Civil
Service (“the SCS”).[11] In order to see how the Government’s
policies relating to the recruitment, promotion and retention of civil servants
have been implemented, it is necessary to identify the relevant CSRs.
11. The
appointment of new recruits.
The status of a new recruit must be established before he is offered
appointment.[12] CSR 115(1) provides that he will be
offered overseas conditions of service only if he
“(a) is not habitually resident in Hong Kong, Macau, China or
Taiwan; and
(b) has his general background or social
ties somewhere other than Hong Kong, Macau, China or Taiwan; and
(c) if appointed on local conditions,
would suffer a material degree of dislocation or up-rooting from an environment
to which he belongs.”
All other recruits are offered local conditions of
service. A recruit who is
appointed on overseas conditions of service is known as an “overseas” officer[13] ,
and all other recruits are known as “local” officers.[14] The fact that the status of a new
recruit must be established before he is offered appointment has meant that the
transfer to local conditions of service, and vice versa , has not been
allowed. However, a person from
overseas will not be offered appointment at all unless the conditions of CSR
100(13) are satisfied. CSR 100(13)
provides :
“Localisation policy. The policy under which an overseas
person is appointed only if a fully qualified and suitable local person is
unavailable and the qualifications for appointment cannot be modified to enable
a local, in preference to an overseas, appointment.”
12. Pensionable
and agreement terms. On their
recruitment to the Civil Service, officers are appointed on either pensionable
or agreement terms. Pensionable
terms are “terms which attract pension benefits under the Hong Kong pension
legislation”.[15] The officer is then spoken of as being
on the permanent establishment of the Civil Service, and contrasts with an
appointment on agreement terms, which is described as a “short-term
appointment”, and is “usually for 2½ years’ or 3 years’ service”.[16]
13. Appointment
on, or transfer to, pensionable terms. Since 28th March 1985, overseas officers have not
been allowed to be appointed to the permanent establishment: they have only been able to join the
Civil Service on agreement terms.[17] Serving overseas officers on agreement
terms fared better. Those who had
been appointed before 28th March 1985 continued for a while to be
able to transfer from agreement terms to the permanent establishment[18] ,
but that was subject to the proviso that it had to be established “in
accordance with the localisation policy that a suitable local candidate [was]
not likely to be available within the next five years or so.”[19] Eventually, even this limited option
became unavailable to them: from
30th June 1992, even those overseas officers on agreement terms who
had been appointed before 28th March 1985 were not permitted under
any circumstances to transfer to the permanent establishment.[20] On the other hand, local officers are
eligible for appointment to the permanent establishment when they are
recruited, and local officers on agreement terms may apply “for transfer to the
permanent establishment at any time during their agreement.”[21]
14. Renewal
of agreements. The renewal of
the agreement of an officer on agreement terms is governed by CSR 281(1), which
provides :
“The offer of further employment
to an agreement officer is subject to –
(a) service need;
(b) continued satisfactory conduct and efficient performance of his
work;
(c) continued physical fitness …”
CSR 281(1)(d) adds an important additional limitation to
the renewal of the agreement of an overseas officer: the renewal is also subject to “the lack of a qualified and
suitable local replacement.”
15. A
summary of the regulations. It
can be seen, therefore, that the localisation of the Civil Service has been
implemented through the CSRs by four significant regulations:
(i) CSR 100(13) prohibits the recruitment
of an overseas person if a qualified and suitable local is available;
(ii) CSR 112(4) prohibits the recruitment
of an overseas person to the permanent establishment;
(iii) CSR 121(2)(c) prohibits the transfer
of an overseas officer to the permanent establishment; and
(iv) CSR 281(1)(d) prohibits the renewal
of an overseas officer’s agreement if there is a qualified and suitable local
replacement.
16. Fringe
benefits. On the other hand,
the CSRs still provide for overseas officers to receive fringe benefits which
were originally intended to reflect their expatriate status and to enable them
to retain their links with their home countries. These include better housing benefits, baggage allowances,
additional leave and assisted passages.
There has been some equalisation of terms at the more senior levels of
the Civil Service, but disparities continue to exist in the more junior
grades. These differences have
long been a source of contention between overseas and local officers.
17. Promotion. However, when it comes to promotion,
overseas and local officers compete on equal terms :
“Selection of officers for promotion … is decided on the
criteria of character and ability, any qualifications prescribed for the
promotion rank, and experience;
when on this basis, no candidate stands out clearly as the most
suitable, seniority should be given due weight. All eligible officers, irrespective of their terms of
service, are considered on equal terms.” [22]
THE ENACTMENT OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS
18. The
localisation policy implemented through the CSRs has, not surprisingly, been a
matter of some concern to overseas officers. They have had no quarrel with the policy relating to the recruitment
of officers from overseas as implemented through CSR 100(13) and CSR
112(4). Their concern has related
to their continuing job security which was threatened by (a) the rule embodied
in CSR 281(1)(d) permitting the renewal of an overseas officer’s agreement only
if there is no qualified and local replacement, and (b) the inability of
overseas officers to avoid the effect of CSR 281(1)(d) by transferring to the
permanent establishment. However, whatever overseas officers may have thought
about the implementation of the Government’s localisation policy through the
CSRs, they had, prior to 1991, no legal recourse to challenge it. That was because (a) the SCS has the
power to amend the CSRs unilaterally[23] ,
and (b) civil servants have no legitimate expectation of being consulted over
proposed changes to their conditions of service: the constitution of the relevant consultative body, the
Senior Civil Service Council (“the SCSC”), provides that changes in conditions
of service may be made without consultation if the Government is satisfied that
the public interest so requires.[24]
19. However,
on 8th June 1991, the Hong Kong Bill of Rights (“the BOR”) came into
force. Art. 21 of the BOR
provides, so far as is material, as follows :
“Every permanent resident shall
have the right and the opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned
in article 1(1) and without unreasonable restrictions - …
(c) to have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in
Hong Kong.”
“[T]he distinctions mentioned article 1(1)” is a
reference to the fact that the rights protected by the BOR are to “be enjoyed
without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.” To the extent, therefore,
that it was arguable that the Government’s localisation policy infringed Art.
21(c) of the BOR, overseas officers who were permanent residents of Hong Kong
became entitled to challenge the legality of the CSRs through which the policy
was implemented. Indeed, credible
threats of legal action were being made in March 1993 by the Association of
Expatriate Civil Servants of Hong Kong (“the AECS”), the overseas officers’
trade union.[25]
THE DECISION CHALLENGED
20. By
1993, therefore, the Government recognised that the continued existence of
different conditions of service for overseas and local officers was
unnecessarily divisive: some local
officers resented the fringe benefits which overseas officers enjoyed, and a
number of overseas officers resented the greater job security which local
officers enjoyed. In addition, it
was necessary to prepare the Civil Service for the transfer of sovereignty in
1997. Thus, to ensure a smooth and
orderly transition of power, it was thought to be desirable for the conditions
of service of civil servants in due course to be compatible, and converge, with
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (“the SAR”) of the
People’s Republic of China (“the PRC”), which had been adopted by the National
People’s Congress in April 1990.
21. The
long-term solution. The long
term solution which the Government decided to adopt to these problems was the
introduction of a common set of terms and conditions of service for all
civil servants, thereby eliminating the distinction between overseas and local
conditions of service. A
consultation document containing the Government’s proposals was published in
October 1993.[26] Views on the proposals were received from
members of staff, the Civil Service advisory bodies and the Legislative Council
Panel on Public Service (“the LegCo Panel”). After studying those views, the Government re-affirmed the
thrust of its proposals, but modified some of those relating to specific
conditions of service. The
modified proposals were published in June 1994.[27] I shall refer to these proposals as
“the uniform terms scheme”. Two of
the “decisions” challenged in these proceedings relate to two features of the
uniform terms scheme. The
finalised proposals were passed to the Chinese side of the Sino-British Joint
Liaison Group (“the JLG”) for discussion in November 1994.[28]
22. The
interim measures. In the
meantime, however, the Government had to find a solution to the problem posed
by the AECS’s credible threats of legal action over the alleged incompatibility
between the Government’s localisation policy as implemented through the CSRs
and Art. 21(c) of the BOR. The
AECS was arguing that if the agreement of an overseas officer on agreement
terms, who was a permanent resident of Hong Kong (and therefore covered by Art.
21(c)), was not renewed because of the availability of a qualified and suitable
local replacement, his right of access to the Civil Service in Hong Kong on
general terms of equality would be infringed. The AECS was suggesting that overseas officers on agreement
terms should be allowed to transfer to local terms: in that event, they would not be liable to be replaced on
“localisation” grounds in accordance with CSR 281(1)(d), because they would
themselves be treated as if they were local officers.
23. For
its part, the Government had received independent legal advice which “strongly
suggested” that the localisation policy (to the extent that it applied to
permanent residents of Hong Kong) was not compatible with the BOR.[29] Indeed, at a meeting of the SCSC in
August 1993, the Government had said that the advice which it had received was
that a legal challenge “was almost certain to succeed”.[30] It was against that background that the
Governor-in-council decided to lift the prohibition on overseas officers
transferring to local conditions of service. In the future, overseas officers on agreement terms who were
permanent residents of Hong Kong would be allowed to transfer to local conditions
of service. This decision was
announced on 30th July 1993[31] ,
and I shall refer to the scheme to which this decision related as “the original
transfer scheme”. The decision was
not really made to reward those overseas officers who had committed themselves
to Hong Kong by working in Hong Kong and serving the community, as the
memorandum which announced the decision suggests. It was made in an attempt to remain within the law.
24. Reactions
to the original transfer scheme.
The original transfer scheme was welcomed by the AECS. Although its response was a cautious
one[32] ,
I suspect that within the AECS itself the scheme was being privately hailed as
a historic victory for its members.
Although its members might have to give up some or all of the fringe
benefits which overseas officers enjoyed, those of its members who qualified as
permanent residents of Hong Kong would in future be spared the worry of their
agreements not being renewed simply because of the availability of a qualified
and suitable local replacement.
25. However,
two ominous developments began to give the AECS cause for concern. First, the original transfer scheme met with a hostile reception
from associations representing local officers.[33] That was not surprising. Many local officers had expected
to inherit the posts held by overseas officers on agreement terms when the
latter’s agreements were not renewed because qualified and suitable local
officers were available to replace them.
Local officers had seen the localisation policy as a form of affirmative
action, and they regarded the Government’s change of policy as a severe setback
to their career prospects.
Secondly, following the announcement of the Government’s change of
policy, the SCS published details of the terms on which transfer to local
conditions of service would be permitted.[34] The AECS became concerned that fewer
overseas officers would be permitted to transfer than it had expected, and that
the benefits to be derived from transfer might be illusory. A number of the decisions challenged in
these proceedings relate to some of the features of the original transfer
scheme.
26. The
legislative freeze on the original transfer scheme. Among those who opposed the original
transfer scheme were members of the LegCo Panel. They decided to promote a Private Member’s Bill to freeze
the proposals. On 29th
October 1993, a Bill proposing the freezing of the proposals was published, but
despite an impassioned plea by the acting SCS when the Bill was debated on its
resumed second reading[35] ,
the Public Officers (Variations of Conditions of Service) (Temporary
Provisions) Ordinance (No. 95 of 1993) (“the Ordinance”) was enacted on 17th
December 1993. The Government had
little option but to return to the drawing-board.
27. Its
task was an unenviable one. It had
to steer a course between (a) the retention of a localisation policy which the
Government had always deemed to be necessary for the advancement of the career
prospects of local officers, and on which the maintenance of good industrial
relations with local officers depended, and (b) the need to remain within the
law and to avoid perpetuating what was said to be unfavourable treatment for
overseas officers which the BOR was alleged to outlaw. It is no exaggeration to say that the
Government was caught between the devil and the deep blue sea. Something akin to the judgment of
Solomon was called for.
28. The
modified transfer scheme.
After many months of discussions, the Government presented its revised
proposals to the LegCo Panel.[36] The only evidence before me of the
reaction of the LegCo Panel to these revised proposals is a statement in an
affidavit that the LegCo Panel “indicated support for the new package”[37]
, though it is a fact that the Legislative Council allowed the Ordinance to
lapse on 6th July 1994, paving the way for the Government to
implement its revised scheme. The
details were announced on 28th July 1994[38] ,
and I shall refer to this scheme as “the modified transfer scheme”.
29. Under
the modified transfer scheme, an overseas officer on agreement terms was no
longer permitted to apply for transfer to local conditions of service. Instead, he was permitted to apply for
transfer to terms modelled on local conditions of service. Moreover, if there was a qualified and
suitable local officer available to replace him, and if a local officer was
recommended for promotion, the overseas officer would be offered appointment on
terms modelled on local conditions of service at one rank below his existing
rank, though he would retain his existing salary. The AECS had reluctantly been prepared to go along with this
scheme (even though it could result in many of its members being demoted): its members at least had job security
(in the sense they could not be replaced by local officers on localisation
grounds), even if demotion would result in less job satisfaction. For its part, the Senior Non-Expatriate
Officers Association (“the SNEOA”), the local officers’ trade union, had
regarded it as “a pragmatic initial step in the right direction”. However, as a condition of accepting
the proposal, the AECS insisted that the SNEOA accepted the scheme as
well. As it was, there were
features of the scheme which the SNEOA was still opposed to.[39] Accordingly, when the scheme was
announced, the AECS announced its opposition to it, and a number of the
decisions challenged in these proceedings relate to various features of the
scheme – not only those features announced on 28th July 1994, but
also to one of the features of the scheme announced on 14th October
1994.[40]
30. The
opening-up scheme. When the
Government announced the modified transfer scheme, it added that it was
actively studying the feasibility of a scheme under which the posts of officers
on agreement terms (whether overseas or local officers) in promotion ranks,
i.e., all ranks other than basic ranks, would be opened up for competition on
the expiry of their agreements.
The Government’s motives for considering such a scheme have been
questioned in these proceedings, but under the scheme the incumbent officer and
officers one rank below would compete for the post, and the most meritorious
officer would be appointed.[41] Outline proposals as to how the scheme
would work were made known in September 1994[42] ,
and the decision to introduce the scheme, together with the details of its
implementation, were published on 19th December 1994.[43] A number of the features of the
opening-up scheme are challenged in these proceedings.
31. The
principal Official posts. The
Basic Law identifies a number of senior posts which can only be held by Chinese
citizens who are permanent residents of the SAR with no right of abode in any
foreign country.[44] The Government believes that, in order
to secure a transfer of power as smooth and seamless as possible, these posts
should be filled, well before 1997, by officers who are, at least potentially,
able to continue in these posts after 30th June 1997. Thus, it was decided that steps should
be taken in the Administrative Service and in the Attorney-General’s Chambers
to ensure that there was a sufficient pool of officers who were potentially
eligible for these posts.
Accordingly, (a) a decision to limit the number of overseas officers who
would be promoted to certain senior posts in the Administrative Service was
announced in June 1994[45] ,
and (b) the Attorney-General announced the introduction of a Succession Posts
Scheme accelerating the promotion of local officers in the Attorney-General’s
Chambers to the senior directorate.[46] These two decisions are also challenged
in these proceedings.
DELAY
32. I
have summarised the broad sweep of the decisions which are challenged in these
proceedings because of the allegations of delay which have been levelled
against the Applicants. These
proceedings were commenced on 27th October 1994. That was when the Applicants (the AECS
and four of its members) filed their Notice of Application seeking leave to
apply for judicial review of the various decisions which had by then been
made. The Notice was subsequently
amended on 17th January 1995, amongst other things, to seek leave to
apply for judicial review of subsequent decisions, viz. the decisions relating
to the opening-up scheme which were announced in December 1994. The Respondents – namely, the Secretary
for the Civil Service (in whose name all but one of the decisions challenged
were made) and the Attorney-General (in whose name the decision relating to the
Succession Posts Scheme was made) – contend that the challenge to some of the
decisions complained of should have been launched much earlier.
33. Section
21K(6) of the Supreme Court Ordinance (Cap. 4) provides :
“Where the High Court considers
that there has been undue delay in making an application for judicial review,
the Court may refused to grant –
(a) leave for the making of the
application; or
(b) any relief sought on the application,
if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be
likely to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the rights
of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration.”
Section 21K(6) reproduces section 31(6) of the Supreme
Court Act 1981. In Casewell
v Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales [1990] 2 AC 738,
the House of Lords gave the words “undue delay in making an application for
judicial review” in section 31(b) a restrictive meaning. It was held that the words referred to
a failure to comply with the requirements of Ord. 53 r. 4(1) of the Rules of
the Supreme Court in the U.K. That
provides :
“An application for leave to
apply for judicial review shall be made promptly and in any event within three
months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the
Court considers that there is good reason for extending the period within which
the application shall be made.”
Ord. 53 r. 4(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court in
Hong Kong is in identical terms.
The challenge to the decisions relating to the uniform terms scheme, the
original transfer scheme and the limited promotion scheme in the Administrative
Service was made more than three months after the dates when grounds for the
application first arose. In
relation to those decisions, therefore, there was “undue delay” on the part of
the Applicants in applying for judicial review of them, unless “there is good
reason for extending the period within which the application [should have been]
made.”.
34. The
fact remains, however, that I gave the Applicants leave to challenge those
decisions. In those circumstances,
Mr Philip Dykes for the Applicants argues that section 21K(6) limits the extent
to which I can now give effect to any delay on the part of the Applicants. It is only if the delay has caused
hardship, prejudice or detriment to good administration, he says, that I can
give effect to that delay, and then only by refusing to grant the Applicants
any relief relating to these decisions.
35. The
argument may well be correct in the usual run of applications for judicial
review, but in my view it wholly ignores the unusual, if not unique, features
of the present application. It is
true that the leave was granted following an inter partes hearing. However, the number of decisions being
challenged, the relationship between each of them and the volume of the
material before me made it quite impossible for me to reach an informed and
concluded view at the leave stage as to whether there was “good reason for
extending the period” within which the application for leave to apply for
judicial review should have been made.
Indeed, the Respondents rightly recognized at the leave stage that the
determination of that question could only properly be made at the substantive
hearing. It was for that reason
that, with the exception of some earlier decisions relating to schemes operated
within the Attorney-General’s Chambers, I did not address that question at all
at the leave stage. It is only now
that I have a clear understanding of (a) the nature of each of the decisions
being challenged, (b) the grounds on which each of them are being challenged,
(c) the background against which each of the decisions challenged were made,
and (d) the relationship of each of the decisions challenged to each other,
that I can make an informed assessment as to whether a sufficient explanation
for the delay has been made so as to justify extending the Applicant’s time for
challenging all or any of the decisions complained of.
36. In
normal circumstances, it would be necessary for me to consider the question of
delay separately in relation to each of the decisions challenged. However, the various decisions
challenged were all made in the context of a continuing process by the
Government to revise its employment policies. It was the ultimate product of that process which the
Applicants finally regarded as unacceptable. I have no doubt that it was reasonable for the
Applicants to delay their challenge to individual components of the
Government’s revised employment policies until they could see the final form
which the implementation of those policies was to take. I agree with them that it would have
been premature for them to lodge a challenge to particular features of the
various schemes in their embryonic form during their gestation when, for all
the Applicants knew, the measures in their final form might have been
acceptable to them. It must not be
overlooked in this context that the AECS was still being consulted by the
Government over the revision of its employment policies, and that the
Government was forced by the Legislative Council to revise its original
proposals. In these circumstances,
I am satisfied that a sufficient explanation for the delay has been made out by
the Applicants.
STANDING
37. Section
21K(3) of the Supreme Court Ordinance provides :
“The Court shall not grant leave
[to apply for judicial review] … unless it considers that the applicant has a
sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates.”
This provision has been incorporated into Ord. 53 r.
3(7) of the Rules of the Supreme Court.
Identical provisions in the Supreme Court Act and the Rules of the
Supreme Court in the U.K. were considered by the House of Lords in Inland
Revenue Commissioners v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small
Businesses Ltd. [1982] AC 617.
One of the effects of the decision of the House of Lords in that case
has been summarised, in my view correctly, as follows:
“The testing of an applicant’s standing is thus made a
two-stage process. On the
application for leave (stage one) the test is designed to turn away hopeless or
meddlesome applications only. But
when the matter comes to be argued (stage two), the test is whether the applicant
can show a strong enough case on the merits, judged in relation to his concern
with it.”[47]
Accordingly, the leave I granted to the Applicants to
challenge the various decisions complained of does not prevent me from
revisiting the issue of standing in the light of all the evidence which I now
have.
38. THE
AECS. A particular issue has
arisen in relation to the standing of the AECS. The AECS undoubtedly has the standing to challenge decisions
which affect its members. The
questions is what has to be established to show that its members are affected
by a particular decision. On that
issue, I expressed a provisional view in the judgments which I delivered on 18th
and 23rd January 1995.
What I said was that the following proposition was sufficiently arguable
:
“… it is not necessary for the
AECS to have to furnish evidence that at least one of its members is affected
by [the] decisions [under challenge] and wishes the AECS to challenge the
relevant decision on his behalf.
It is sufficient that the AECS represents a class of officers, at least
one of whom is likely to be affected by the decisions under challenge.”
The Respondents do not accept that proposition: all their detailed arguments on the
standing of the AECS have been predicated on the assumption that it is
necessary for the AECS to identify at least one of its members who is affected
by a particular decision and wishes the AECS to challenge it on his behalf.
39. My
provisional view on this issue has become a concluded one, though I would now
substitute the word “possible” for “likely”, and add one additional
requirement, viz. that it has to be possible that at least one of its members
wishes the AECS to challenge the relevant decision on his behalf. All the decisions which I gave the AECS
leave to challenge are in terms which contemplate their blanket application to
a class of persons, namely overseas officers, who are entitled to be members of
the AECS. The AECS is a
representative body, and its challenge to decisions which apply to the class of
persons it represents has all the hallmarks of a class action. In these circumstances, it is for the
Respondents to demonstrate that the challenges to their decisions are academic
by showing that, despite the terms of the particular decision and the breadth
of its application, no member of the AECS could be affected by it. It is nothing to the point that, in
relation to particular decisions, the AECS has not identified one of its
members actually affected by those decisions. The fact that the AECS has not done so goes only to whether,
as a matter of fact on the available evidence, there is one of its members who
could have been affected. That is
a question of fact which I will determine when I deal with each of the
decisions separately.
40. The
four individual Applicants. In
order to determine which of the decisions complained of the four individual
Applicants have the standing to challenge, it is necessary to identify their
individual circumstances :
41. (i) Mr Ferdinand Tromp
joined the Hong Kong Government as an overseas officer on agreement terms in
October 1981. In September 1993,
he applied, under the original transfer scheme, for transfer to local
conditions of service. On 5th
September 1994, following the introduction of the modified transfer scheme, he
was offered a new agreement, for the period 28th September 1994 to 1st
July 1996, on terms modelled on local conditions of service, Mr Tromp accepted
that offer without prejudice to his right to challenge its legality. In January 1995, Mr Tromp was informed
that he would continue to serve at his current rank for the balance of his
agreement since there was no qualified and suitable local officer available to
replace him. However, Mr Tromp has
recently been told that, as a result of a selection exercise under the
opening-up scheme, his current agreement will not be renewed on its
expiry. Accordingly, if that
decision is ratified, Mr Tromp will be leaving the Civil Service on 1st
July 1996.
42. (ii) Mr Geoffrey Bach
joined the Hong Kong Government as an overseas officer on agreement terms in
July 1979. In September 1993, he
applied, under the original transfer scheme, for transfer to local conditions
of service. On 4th
August 1994, following the introduction of the modified transfer scheme, he was
offered a new agreement, for the period 9th October 1994 to 14th
March 1997, on terms modelled on local conditions of service. Mr Bach refused his offer, challenging
its legality, and he left the Civil Service on 12th December 1994
when his current agreement, as extended, expired.
43. (iii) Mr Patrick Wilson joined the Hong Kong
Government as an overseas officer on agreement terms in January 1992. In August 1993, he applied, under the
original transfer scheme, for transfer to local conditions of service. In due course, following the
introduction of the modified transfer scheme, he was offered a new agreement on
terms modelled on local conditions of service. He accepted that offer without prejudice to his right to
challenge its legality. However,
there is a dispute as to the precise nature of the offer which he received, and
in the course of hearing I ruled that that dispute (which raises issues of fact
and construction) should be resolved at a later hearing. The dispute is whether the new
agreement (a) runs from 7th October 1994 to 28th December
1996 or from the 27th October 1994 to 17th January 1997,
and (b) prohibits him from applying to join the permanent establishment.
44. (iv) Mr. Robin Toes joined the
Hong Kong Government as an overseas officer on agreement terms in May
1975. In September 1993, he
applied, under the original transfer scheme, for transfer to local conditions
of service. On 4th
August 1994, following the introduction of the modified transfer scheme, he was
offered a new agreement, for the period 9th September 1994 to 5th
February 1997, on terms modelled on local conditions of service. The offer informed Mr Toes that he
would continue to serve at his current rank pending determination as to whether
there was a qualified and suitable local officer available to replace him. Mr Toes accepted this offer. In the event, Mr Toes was informed on
20th August 1994 that with effect from the commencement date of his
new agreement, he would serve at the next lower rank, but that he would retain
his existing salary. There is no
evidence before me as to the reason for that, but I assume that it was
determined that there was a qualified and suitable local officer
available to replace him, and that a local officer was recommended for
promotion.
THE PROPER CONSTRUCTION OF
ART. 21(c) OF THE BOR
45. In
applying Art. 21(c) of the BOR to the particular decisions challenged, I have
borne in mind the following considerations :
46. (i) It is the right of access
to the Civil Service which Art. 21(c) protects. It is common ground that this does not relate only to
initial entry to the Civil Service.
It includes access to the terms and conditions of service enjoyed by
other officers. The right of
access to the Civil Service is therefore restricted if some officers are
employed (a) on agreement terms and do not have access to the permanent
establish, or (b) on overseas conditions of service and do not have access to
local conditions of service. What
is in dispute is whether the right of access to the Civil Service includes
access to the opportunities for promotion enjoyed by other officers. I have no doubt that it does. If it did not, the right protected by
Art. 21(c) would be little more than a dead letter. What is the value of guaranteed access to employment in the
Civil Service if normal career progression through the ranks is
restricted? It is no answer to say
that the Basic Law denies equality of access to promotion to the Principal
Official posts: the mere fact that
there is a tension between the Basic Law and Art. 21(c) of the BOR in that
respect is no reason at all for construing the BOR so as to be compatible with
the Basic Law.
47. (ii) The right of access to the
Civil Service which Art. 21(c) of the BOR protects is on general terms
of equality. Equality in absolute
terms is not required. That means
two things. First, identical
treatment for overseas and local officers is not required. Secondly, equality of treatment for all
overseas and local officers is not required. Thus, if overseas officers are treated equally with all but
a few local officers, the fact that they have not been treated equally with a
few local officers does not necessarily mean that their right of access to the
Civil Service on general terms of equality has been restricted.
48. (iii) A restriction on the right of
access to the Civil Service amounts to an infringement of Art. 21(c) if that
restriction is attributable to one of the distinctions prohibited by Art.
1(1) is otherwise unreasonable . I use the word “otherwise” advisedly. That, I think follows from the language
of Art. 21 itself that the rights which it protects are to be enjoyed without
any of the prohibited distinctions and without unreasonable
restrictions. Examples of
restrictions on the right of access to the Civil Service which would be reasonable
are restrictions on the grounds of age or literacy. It is for the Government to determine what restrictions are
reasonably necessary, and the Court’s powers of intervention are limited. That is because, to adopt a phrase used
by European human rights lawyers, the Government has “a margin of appreciation”
in the determination of what is reasonable. Provided that the reasonableness of a restriction is
within the range of reasonable views which the Government can form, the Courts
cannot substitute their own view for that of the Government.
49. (iv) A departure from the right
protected by Art. 21(c) does not amount to an infringement of Art. 21(c) if the
departure can be justified. The decisions of the Court of
appeal in R. v. Sin Yau Ming [1992] 1 HKCLR 127 [1993] AC 95
establish that it is for the Government to justify any departure from the
rights protected by the BOR, and the grounds of that justification have to be
cogent and persuasive. What has to
be shown is that (a) the exercise of the rights protected by the BOR would have
been irreconcilable with the achievement of an important objective on the part
of the Government, and (b) that
objective could not have been achieved by means which did not involve a
departure from constitutionally entrenched rights. The interests of the individual have to be balanced against
the interests of society generally, with a bias towards the interests of the
individual. However, in attempting
to strike the right balance between the individual and society as a whole,
rigid and inflexible standards should not be imposed on the Government’s
attempts to resolve the problems with which it is faced.
50. The
leading case on preferential and discriminatory treatment in relation to those
rights protected by the BOR which provide for equality of treatment is the judgment of the Court
of Appeal in R. v. Man Wai Keung (No.2) [1992] 2 HKCLR 207. The principle was pithily expressed by
Bokhary J. (as he then was) at p. 217 :
“Clearly, there is no requirement of literal equality in the sense of
unrelentingly identical treatment always.
For such rigidity would subvert rather than promote true
even-handedness. So that, in
certain circumstances, a departure from literal equality would be a legitimate
course and, indeed, the only legitimate course. But the starting point is identical treatment. And any departure therefrom must be
justified. To justify such a
departure it must be shown: one,
that sensible and fair-minded people would recognize a genuine need for some
difference of treatment; two, that
the difference embodied in the particular departure selected to meet that need
is itself rational; and, three,
that such departure is proportionate to such need.”
The only modification which needs to be made to that to reflect the terms
of Art. 21(c) is that not even Art. 21(c) requires literal
equality: general terms of
equality are its yardstick.
However the requirement that the difference in treatment should be
proportionate to the need which justifies it is important. The difference in treatment must be as
limited as possible; it must not
merely be rational, but rationally connected to the need which justifies
it; and it must be no more
extensive than is necessary to achieve the objective which made some difference
in treatment necessary.
THE ORIGINAL TRANSFER SCHEME
51. A
number of the decisions relating to the original transfer scheme are
challenged. They all relate to the
detailed arrangements on which transfer to local conditions of service would be
permitted. Although the original
transfer scheme was subsequently modified, all the decisions relating to the
original transfer which are challenged continued to form part of the modified
transfer scheme. I propose to deal
with each of the decisions in turn, though it must at all times be remembered
that under the modified transfer scheme, the transfer which was permitted was a
transfer to terms modelled on local conditions of service.
(1) THE DEFINITION OF
PERMANENT RESIDENT
52. The
definition adopted by the SCS.
The relaxation of the prohibition on transfer to local conditions of
service was limited to those overseas officers on agreement terms who were
permanent residents of Hong Kong.
That was because the right of access to the Civil Service on general
terms of equality accorded by Art. 21(c) of the BOR is limited to “permanent
residents”. The BOR, however, does
not contain a definition of “permanent resident”, nor do the words “permanent
resident” appear elsewhere in the BOR.
In these circumstances, the SCS decided that only persons who are “Hong
Kong permanent residents” within the meaning of Sch. 1 to the Immigration
Ordinance (Cap. 115) should be treated as permanent residents within the
meaning of the BOR.[48] Such persons are the only persons with
the right of abode in Hong Kong.[49] Only the AECS has leave to challenge
this decision. The basis of the
challenge is that the definition adopted by the SCS is unduly restrictive, and
prevents some overseas officers who are permanent residents on a wider
definition of the words “permanent resident” from transferring to local
conditions of service.
53. The
persons included in that definition.
Three classes of persons are identified in Sch. 1 as Hong Kong permanent
residents :
(i) any
person of the Chinese race who has at any time been ordinarily resident in Hong
Kong for a continuous period of at least 7 years,
(ii) any
British Dependent Territories citizen (“a BDT citizen”) who either has a
connection with Hong Kong or is married to someone who has,
(iii) any
Commonwealth citizen who immediately prior to 1st January 1983
was a Hong Kong belonger.
If an overseas officer is to have a right of abode in Hong Kong under the
Immigration Ordinance, he would (unless his personal circumstances are out of
the ordinary) have to apply for naturalisation as a BDT citizen. Broadly speaking, he could only do that
if he had lived in Hong Kong for five years, and intended to make Hong Kong his
home.[50]
54. The
reasoning of the SCS. In
equating the words “permanent resident” in the BOR with those who have the
right of abode in Hong Kong, the SCS was not asserting that that was
necessarily correct. He accepted
that who were permanent residents within the meaning of the BOR may ultimately
have to be decided by the Court, but he adopted the right of abode in Hong Kong
as a good working definition for a variety of pragmatic reasons.[51] They included (a) his belief that it
would include or overlap completely with all those who were permanent residents
under the BOR on any foreseeable definition, (b) the undesirability of adopting
a definition which might pre-empt the discussions which it was then hoped would
shortly be taking place in the JLG relating to the alignment of the definition
of “Hong Kong permanent resident” in the Immigration Ordinance with the definition
of “permanent resident” in the Basic Law, and (c) the fact that determining
whether a person had the right of abode in Hong Kong did not involve, for the
most part, the making of any valued judgments about a person’s status. Some of these reasons have been
criticised b Mr Dykes, but it is unnecessary for me to resolve that
debate. That is because I am not
concerned with the reasons why the SCS adopted the test which he did: I am only concerned with whether the
test which he adopted was the correct one in law.
55. The
ICCPR. Section 2(3) of the
Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance (Cap. 383)(“the BORO”) provides :
“In interpreting and applying this Ordinance, regard shall be had to the
fact that the purpose of this
Ordinance is to provide for the incorporation into the law of Hong Kong of
provisions of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights [‘the
ICCPR’] as applied to Hong Kong …”
Art. 21 of the BOR reproduced
Art. 25 of the ICCPR. However,
Art. 25 refers to “citizen” rather than “permanent resident”. The reason why the word “citizen” was
not reproduced in Art. 21 can only have been because Hong Kong citizenship is
not a concept which the law of Hong Kong recognises. If the word “citizen” had been retained, and interpreted as
a citizen of the existing sovereign power,
(a) the large number of people who have
always lived in Hong Kong but who are not British citizens would have been
excluded from the rights protected by Art. 21 prior to 30th June
1997, and
(b) the large number of people who have
always lived in Hong Kong but who are not Chinese citizens would have been
excluded from the rights protected by Art. 21 after 30th June 1997.
56. The
inferences to be drawn from the adoption of the words “permanent resident”. In my judgment, the selection of the
words “permanent resident” in Art. 21 to replace “citizen” in Art. 25 is very
telling. For two reasons, it is a
very compelling indication that the rights protected by Art. 21 were intended
to be granted to those who have the right of abode in Hong Kong :
57. (i) The words “permanent
resident” do not appear in any Ordinance apart from the BORO. The closest which any other Ordinance
gets to using the words “permanent resident” is the phrase “Hong Kong permanent
resident”. That phrase appears in
the Immigration Ordinance, of course, but the only other Ordinance in which it
is used assigns the same meaning to it as that given in the Immigration
Ordinance.[52] Since the words “permanent resident” in
the BOR can only refer to a permanent resident of Hong Kong, there should be no
material difference between “permanent resident” and “Hong Kong permanent
resident” (although I accept that the position would have been even clearer if
the phrase “Hong Kong permanent resident” had been used in Art. 21). Since the phrase “Hong Kong permanent
resident” denotes in both the Ordinances where the phrase occurs a person with
a right of abode in Hong Kong, the phrase “permanent resident” in the BORO
should be construed as also denoting a person with a right of abode in Hong
Kong.
58. (ii) Arts. 8(4) and 9 of the BOR
mirror Arts. 12(4) and 13 of the ICCPR.
Art. 8(4) of the BOR provides:
“No-one who has the right of
abode in Hong Kong shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter Hong
Kong.”
That is to be compared with Art.
12(4) of the ICCPR which provides :
“No-one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter his own country.” (My emphasis).
Again, Art. 9 of the BOR provides
:
“A person who does not have the
right of abode in Hong Kong but who is lawfully in Hong Kong may be expelled
therefrom only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law …”
That is to be compared with Art.
13 of the ICCPR which provides :
“An alien lawfully in the
territory of a State Party to the [ICCPR] may be expelled therefrom only in
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law …”
A person’s own country for the
purpose of Art. 12(4) can only be the country of which he is a citizen as
defined by that country’s nationality laws. Similarly, an alien in a particular country for the purpose
of Art. 13 can only be a person who is not a citizen of that country as defined
by that country’s nationality laws.
Moreover, the category of persons envisaged by Art. 25 of the ICCPR
(“citizens”) must also be those persons defined as citizens by the nationality
laws of the country concerned. In
other words, the persons to whom Arts. 12(4) and 13 of the ICCPR relate are the
persons who are or are not citizens within the meaning of Art. 25 of the
ICCPR. In the light of section
2(3) of the BORO, in particular the words “as applied to Hong Kong”, the words
“permanent resident” in Art. 21 of the BOR should be construed as relating to
those persons to whom Arts. 8(4) and 9 of the BOR relate. Since Arts. 8(4) and 9 relate to persons
who have or do not have the “right of abode” in Hong Kong, the words “permanent
resident” in Art. 21 should be construed as a person having a right of abode in
Hong Kong.
59. There
was a third argument which I was at one stage attracted to. The words “permanent resident” are
used in a number of places in the Basic Law. In particular, Art. 24 identifies six classes of person who
will be the permanent residents of the SAR. The point, though, is that Art. 24 then distinguishes
between permanent residents and non-permanent residents by reference to the
conferment of the right of abode in Hong Kong on permanent residents only. The BORO was enacted after the
promulgation of the Basic Law.
Since one of the declared aims of the Government has been to converge the
laws of Hong Kong in due course with the Basic Law, the adoption of the words
“permanent resident” in the BOR can only have been to grant the rights
protected by Art. 21 to persons with a right of abode in Hong Kong. However, the fallacy in this beguiling
argument, in my view, is that the conferment of the right of abode in Hong Kong
on persons who are the permanent residents of the SAR is the consequence
of those persons being the permanent residents of the SAR. Art. 24 does not seek to define who will
be the permanent resident of the SAR by reference to persons having the right
of abode in Hong Kong. Indeed,
persons who now enjoy the right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration
Ordinance are just one of the six classes of persons who will be the permanent
residents of the SAR.[53]
60. The
problems with equating “permanent resident” with the right of abode. There are two possible problems created
if the words “permanent resident” are equated with the right of abode in Hong
Kong under the Immigration Ordinance :
61. (i) There is a judicial debate as
to whether the BOR is a constitutional document.[54] However, there is no doubt that the BOR
is a yardstick against which pre-existing and subsequent legislation is
tested. Could the legislature have
intended the words “permanent resident” in Art. 21 of the BOR to be defined by
reference to the statutory definition of the right of abode, which could be
amended simply by resolution of the Legislative Council?[55] In my view, the answer is “Yes”. A number of the rights protected by the
BOR are undoubtedly tied to the definition of the phrase “Hong Kong permanent
resident” in the Immigration Ordinance, namely the rights protected in Arts.
8(4) and 9.
62. (ii) Persons who enjoy the right
of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance are defined by criteria
which include race and nationality.
It is arguable that these criteria do not lie comfortably with the list
of distinctions prohibited by Art. 1(1) of the BOR. I do not agree.
The ICCPR itself imported nationality into the rights protected by Art.
25 by granting those rights to “citizens”. The concept of citizenship in the ICCPR can only be defined
in each country which adopts the ICCPR by reference to its own criteria for
determining who should be its citizens.
These criteria may include racial or nationality criteria.[56] If it is permissible to include at
least some of the distinctions prohibited by the ICCPR in order to determine
who is a citizen of a country for the purpose of Art. 25 of the ICCPR, it is equally
permissible to include them in the criteria for the corresponding exercise for
determining who is a permanent resident of Hong Kong within the meaning of Art.
21 of the BOR.
63. The
other possible definitions.
Against that background, I turn to the other possible definitions of the
words “permanent resident” in Art. 21 of the BOR. They are :
(i) persons
having the right to vote in Hong Kong,
(ii) persons
who come within the ordinary common law meaning of “permanent resident”,
(iii) persons
who are identified in the Basic Law as permanent residents of Hong Kong.
64. The
rights to vote. The
Applicants’ case is that the words “permanent resident” in Art. 21 of the BOR
refers to persons having the right to vote in Hong Kong. They rely, in particular, on what the
Chief Secretary told the Legislative Council when he moved the second reading
of the Hong Kong Bills of Rights Bill :
“ … the use of the
term ‘citizen’ is inappropriate for Hong Kong because the concept of a Hong
Kong citizen is unknown to our law.
What we need is a generic term which has a sufficiently wide meaning to
embrace the whole range of persons in Hong Kong who now have the right to
vote and stand for election.
We have concluded that ‘permanent resident’ is such a term and it also
mirrors provisions in the Basic Law.”
(My emphasis.)[57]
I accept that this remark was intended to be an authoritative statement of
legislative intention, but what the legislative intention actually was is not
possible to discern. The right to
vote and stand for election in Hong Kong is granted only to persons who are
registered as electors.[58] However, it is not possible to regard
the Chief Secretary’s words as applying to those “who now have the right to be
registered as electors”, because that would not give effect to his words “and
stand for election”, since not all persons who are entitled to be registered as
electors are entitled to stand for election. The persons who are entitled to be registered as electors
are, broadly speaking, persons aged 18 or over, who have either acquired the
right of abode in Hong Kong under the Immigration Ordinance, or been ordinarily
resident in Hong Kong for at least seven years.[59] The person who were entitled in 1990 to
stand for election were, broadly speaking, persons aged 21 or over, who had
been ordinarily resident in Hong Kong for at least ten years.[60]
65. The
existence of two entirely different statutory regimes for determining who are
entitled to be registered as electors and who are entitled to stand for
election makes it difficult to identify the class of persons to whom the Chief
Secretary was referring. The
problem is that I have no way of knowing whether the word “and” in the Chief
Secretary’s phrase “the right to vote and stand for election” is disjunctive or
conjunctive. If it is disjunctive,
i.e. if it means “or”, the person concerned qualifies as a permanent resident
if he satisfies either of the two statutory regimes. If it is conjunctive, i.e. if it means
“and”, the person concerned qualifies as a permanent resident only if he satisfies
both of the statutory regimes.
I do not know (and I cannot tell from the context) which of the two
possibilities the Chief Secretary had in mind. I can only give effect to a statement of legislative
intention if I can identify what that intention was. It may well be that it was intended to grant the rights
protected by Art. 21 of the BOR to those with certain electoral rights, but
since the particular electoral rights to which the Chief Secretary’s comments
related are unclear, I do not see how I can attach any weight to his
pronouncement.
66. Moreover,
the reference by the Chief Secretary to the desirability of mirroring the
provisions of the Basic Law should not be overlooked. The six classes of persons identified by Art. 24 of the
Basic Law as the permanent residents of the SAR are defined by reference to
Chinese citizenship, Chinese nationality, residence in Hong Kong and right of
abode in Hong Kong. The right to
vote in Hong Kong is not one of the criteria adopted. If the intention was to equate the persons to whom the
rights under Art. 21 of the BOR should be granted with the persons who will be
the permanent residents of the SAR under the Basic Law, that intention could
not have been achieved by granting the rights under Art. 21 to persons with
certain electoral rights in Hong Kong.
It is true that Art. 26 of the Basic Law gives the permanent residents
of the SAR the right to vote and stand for election. But that does not mean that those who have those rights will
be the permanent residents of the SAR:
it simply means that those rights will be granted to those persons who
will be the permanent residents of the SAR.
67. Having
determined that no weight can properly be attached to that part of the Chief
Secretary’s statement in which he referred to “the right to vote and stand for
election”, there is, in my view, no basis for preferring the test advanced by
the Applicants to that adopted by the SCS. Indeed, the test adopted by the SCS is, for the reasons I
have given, much the more preferable of the two. Apart from anything else, the words “permanent resident” in
their natural and ordinary meaning relate to where a person lives, and a right
of abode sits much more comfortably with that notion than the right to vote or
stand for election.
68. The
common law meaning. For a
person to be permanent resident of Hong Kong within the ordinary common law
meaning, the person must be a resident of Hong Kong, and that residence must
have the quality of permanence about it, i.e. he must intend to continue to
reside in Hong Kong until his death.[61] The adoption of this test would result
in a desirable, though incidental, convergence with one of the six classes of
persons identified in Art. 24 of the Basic Law who will be the permanent
residents of the SAR, namely non-Chinese nationals who have ordinarily resided
in Hong Kong for a continuous period of at least seven years and have taken
Hong Kong as their place of residence.[62]
69. The
adoption of the common law meaning of “permanent resident” was not advanced by
either the Applicants or the Respondents as their primary contention. I do not see any formidable obstacles
to its adoption, but the arguments against its adoption in preference to the
right of abode test are nonetheless significant :
(i) Although
it converges with Art. 24(4) of the Basic Law, it does not converge with any of
the other five classes of persons in Art. 24 who will be the permanent
residents of the SAR.
(ii) Unlike
the right of abode test, the common law test is inconsistent with the use of
the phrase “right of abode” elsewhere in the BOR.
(iii) The
common law test will be difficult to operate in practice. A judgment would have to be made in
every case of what the person’s future intention was. A self-serving declaration by the person concerned that he
intends to reside in Hong Kong would not carry much weight when it is in his
interests to make a statement to that effect. It is true that judgments have to be made under the right of
abode test, e.g. whether a person of Chinese race has been ordinarily resident
in Hong Kong for a continuous period of seven years, or whether a BDT citizen
has a connection with Hong Kong and intends to make Hong Kong his home. But such judgments are more easily made
when it is a person’s past which has to be investigated as opposed to
his intentions for the future , and there is a very real difference
between a mere intention to make Hong Kong one’s home for the time being, and
an intention to live permanently in Hong Kong for the rest of one’s life.
For these reasons, I reject the common law test as the correct test for
defining who is a permanent resident for the purpose of the BOR.
70. The
Basic Law definition. I have
already referred to the six classes of persons identified in Art. 24 of the
Basic Law as the permanent residents of the SAR. Both the Applicants and the Respondents disavowed adopting
that definition as the meaning of the words “permanent resident” in Art. 21 of
the BOR. I agree with them that it
would not be appropriate to do so.
Although it is desirable for the laws of Hong Kong to converge with the
laws of the SAR when the transfer of sovereignty occurs, that does not mean
that convergence should take place now.
In particular, three of the six categories relate to Chinese citizens or
persons of Chinese nationality.[63] That may be entirely appropriate
when the PRC becomes the sovereign power, but not prior to the transfer of
sovereignty.
71. Conclusion. For these reasons, I have come to the
clear conclusion that the definition of the words “permanent resident” in Art.
21 of the BOR adopted by the SCS was correct. His decision to adopt that definition was not lawful, and
the AECS’s challenge to that decision fails.
72. The
irony in the Applicants’ case.
I cannot leave the discussion on this topic without commenting on an
irony at the heart of the Applicants’ case. On their construction of the words “permanent resident”, an
overseas officer has to have been ordinarily resident in Hong Kong for at least
seven years (and possibly ten).
However, on the Respondents’ construction, he only has to have lived in
Hong Kong for five years, because that is the qualifying period of residence
for naturalisation as a BDT citizen. An overseas officer on agreement terms, therefore, can
qualify for transfer to local conditions of service in a shorter time on the
Respondents’ contention than on that of the Applicants. I recognise that there
may be disadvantages in having to apply for BDT citizenship: the application costs $3,200.00, and
the officer may have to give up the nationality of his country of origin. But none of the Applicants, nor the
AECS on behalf of its members, sought to rely on the costs of the
application. Moreover, there is no
admissible evidence before me that the nationality laws of the country of
origin of any overseas officer on agreement terms prohibit dual nationality,
and therefore require the officer to give up his existing nationality before he
applies for naturalisation as a BDT citizen. All there is are expressions of belief that that is so for
Sri Lanka and India.[64] But even if dual nationality is
prohibited for citizens of such countries, for all I know acquisition of BDT
citizenship may not equate with citizenship of a foreign country as Hong Kong
is a British Dependent Territory, which is not equivalent to a sovereign
state. Without expert evidence
from lawyers with expertise in the nationality laws of Sri Lanka and India, I
cannot possibly make the leap of faith which the Applicants are asking me to
make.
73. Is
the issue academic? At first
blush, the decision to equate the words “permanent resident” with the right of
abode in Hong Kong cannot affect the outcome of these proceedings. That is because only six overseas
officers on agreement terms of those who applied to transfer to local
conditions of service between 1st August 1993 and 30th
June 1995 had their applicants refused because they were not BDT citizens. I am assuming (I hope fairly) that BDT
citizenships was their only route to acquiring the right of abode in Hong Kong. Five of those officers had not lived in
Hong Kong for five years, and the one who had (a) did not apply to become a BDT
citizen, and (b) had been told by his department that his application for
transfer to local conditions of service would not be supported on other grounds.[65]
None of them would therefore have been able to transfer to local conditions of
service if any of the other three possible definitions of the words “permanent
resident” had been adopted.
74. However,
there may have been other overseas officers on agreement terms (a) who were
members of the AECS, (b) whose only route to the acquisition of a right of
abode in Hong Kong was the acquisition of BDT citizenship, (c) whose
applications for transfer to local conditions of service would have been
successful if they had acquired the right of abode in Hong Kong, (d) who had
lived in Hong Kong for a sufficient length of time to be treated as permanent
residents on any of the other definitions of “permanent resident”, but (e) who
chose, for one reason or another, not to apply for BDT citizenship. Such officers would have been directly
affected by the decision under challenge.
In these circumstances, although the AECS has not identified such an
officer, I cannot say that the AECS did not have the standing to challenge this
decision.
(2) NON-TRANSFERRING OFFICERS
75. Under
the original transfer scheme, overseas officers on agreement terms who did not
apply for transfer to local conditions of service would remain on overseas
conditions of service. The
limitations on the renewal of their agreements would continue. In the light of CSR 281(1)(d), their
agreements would only be renewed if there was not a qualified and suitable
local replacement for them.[66] On pages 11-12 of the judgment which I
delivered on 18th January 1995, I explained why I thought that all
the applicants had the standing to challenge this decision.
76. In
the course of agreement, Mr Dykes limited that challenge only to those
non-transferring officers who were permanent residents of Hong Kong within the
meaning of Art. 21 of the BOR.
That meant that the four individual Applicants no longer have the
standing to challenge that decision. Although Mr Bach did not transfer, he was
not a permanent resident of Hong Kong because he did not have a right of abode
in Hong Kong. And if Mr Tromp, Mr
Wilson and Mr Toes had not decided to transfer, they too would not have become
permanent residents of Hong Kong because they would not have decided to acquire
the right of abode in Hong Kong.
However, it is possible that there was an overseas officer on agreement
terms (a) who was a member of the AECS, (b) who had acquired (or could acquire)
the right of abode in Hong Kong, and (c) who elected not to transfer to terms
modelled on local conditions of service.
In those circumstances, although the AECS has not identified such an
officer, I cannot say that the AECS does not have the standing to challenge
this decision.
77. At
one time, I thought that the basis of the challenge was that the right of
unrestricted access of such officers to continued employment in the Civil
Service on general terms of equality was being infringed by the continued
application of CSR 281(1)(d) to them because of the preferential treatment
which CSR 281(1)(d) accorded to local officers. The Respondents thought that that was the basis of the
challenge as well, because the oral and written submissions of Mr Adrian
Huggins Q.C. for the Respondents, and the additional evidence filed by the
Respondents in the course of the hearing[67] ,
addressed that argument.
78. However,
it became apparent in Mr Dykes’ reply that the challenge would only be
maintained if the definition of “permanent resident” adopted by the SCS was
incorrect. Mr Dykes expressedly
confirmed that to me, and his written submissions in reply[68]
were plainly prepared on that basis.
In the light of my finding that the definition of “permanent resident”
adopted by the SCS was correct, it follows the AECS’s challenge to this
decision fails.
(3) DEADLINES FOR APPLICATIONS
79. The
decisions challenged. On 23rd
August 1993, the SCS announced[69]
that overseas officers on agreement terms whose agreements were due to expire
on or before 31st December 1994 and who wished to apply for transfer
to local conditions of service had to do so before 30th October
1993. Subsequently, on 21st
September 1993, the SCS announced[70]
various transitional arrangements relating to the deadlines within which
officers whose agreements were due to expire soon had to comply. A deadline of 30th September
1993 was imposed for (a) officers whose applications for the renewal of their
agreements were being processed, and (b) officers who had already been notified
that their agreements would not be renewed by reason of the application of CSR
281(1)(d).
80. The
basis of the challenge. The
imposition of the dealines is said to be unlawful for two reasons. First, the shortness of the
deadlines is said to be irrational in the Wednesbury sense (i.e. “so
outrageous in its defiance of logic …that no sensible person who had applied
his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it”[71] )
because overseas officers on agreement terms needed much more time than the
deadlines permitted to digest arrangements which have been described as “new
and complicated”[72] , especially
as the option to apply for transfer was an option which was only available
once.[73] Accordingly, if an officer missed the
deadline, he remained liable to the non-renewal of his agreement under CSR
281(1)(d). Secondly, the fact
of the deadlines is aid to be an infringement of Art. 21(c) of the BOR, because
any deadline would have the effect of removing the option to transfer from
those overseas officers who, prior to the relevant deadline, had not lived in
Hong Kong long enough to be able to apply for naturalisation as a BDT citizen so
as to acquire a right of abode in Hong Kong.
81. The
standing of the four individual Applicants. The four individual Applicants were not given leave to
challenge the 30th October 1993 deadline. However, they were all given leave to challenge the 30th
September 1993 deadline. That was
because the Respondents had not challenged the grant of leave to them to
challenge that deadline. I think
that this must have been a mistake, because all the individual Applicants
applied for transfer within the deadline, and none of them have complained that
they had insufficient time to make an informed decision. In my view, they do not have the
standing to complain about this deadline.
82. The
standing of the AECS. The AECS
was given leave to challenge both the deadlines. A powerful argument has been mounted for saying that the
AECS does not have the standing to challenge them. As a matter of fact, no officer who applied for transfer had
his application refused on the basis that it was out of time.[74] However, it is possible that there was
an overseas officer on agreement terms (a) who was a member of the AECS, (b)
who wished to apply for a transfer, but (c) who failed to do so by the date on
which the relevant deadline expired, and (d) who assumed that the deadline was
immutable and that there was no point in submitting his application
thereafter. Moreover, it is
possible that, if there had been no deadline at all, there were officers (a)
who were members of the AECS (b) who had not lived in Hong Kong long enough to
be able to apply for naturalisation as a BDT citizen, but (c) who would have
applied for such naturalisation when they became eligible to do so, and (d) who
would then have applied for transfer.
In those circumstances, although the AECS has not identified such an
offer, I cannot say that the AECS does not have the standing to challenge the
deadlines.
83. The
legality of the deadlines.
In my judgment, the complaints made against the deadlines are completely
unfounded. Let it be assumed in
favour of the AECS that the imposition of deadlines was in law capable
of amounting to a restriction on the right of officers to transfer. However, a restriction on the right to
transfer of officers who had not yet acquired a right of abode in Hong Kong
could not have been an infringement of Art. 21(c) of the BOR, because those
officers would not have acquired any rights under Art. 21(c) until they had
acquired the right of abode in Hong Kong.
84. Nor
could the length of the deadlines be said to be unreasonably short. I say that for four reasons:
85. (i) Heads of Department needed to
know which overseas officers would be liable to localisation under CSR
281(1)(d) when their agreements expired and which would not be. Only then would they be able to make
informed decisions on manpower and staff planning.[75]
86. (ii) Applications for transfer to
local conditions of service had to be dealt with as soon as possible so that the
officers themselves would know sooner rather than later whether they would
be liable to localisation under CSR 281(1)(d) when their agreements expired.[76]
87. (iii) There was a need to allay the fears
of local officers that the original transfer scheme would lead to a halt on the
localisation policy. The sooner
they could be told how many overseas officers on agreement terms had applied
for transfer, the sooner their concerns would be reduced.[77]
88. (iv) There was nothing to prevent an
overseas officer who had applied for transfer withdrawing his application if he
wanted to.
For these reasons, the deadlines were not unlawful, and the AECS’s
challenge to the decision implementing them fails.
(4) CARRYING FORWARD UNTAKEN
LEAVE
89. The
decisions challenged. On 13th
September 1993, the SCS announced[78]
that transferring officers would be required to take (a) any accrued casual leave before the end of their agreement
on overseas terms, (b) any accrued vacation leave before the
commencement of their agreement on local terms. All the Applicants with the exception of Mr Bach were given
leave to challenge these decisions.
They clearly have the standing to do so.
90. The
basis of the challenge. These
decisions are said to be an infringement of Art. 21(c) of the BOR because they
impose unreasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right of overseas
officers to transfer to local conditions of service, in that they require such
officers to give up accrued contractual rights which they had earned by virtue
of their previous service. These
restrictions are said to be attributable to the national or social origins of
overseas officers, because it was their national or social origins which, by
virtue of CSR 115(1), caused them to be classified as overseas officers in the
first place. That is the basis on
which it is alleged, in relation to all those decisions which are said to
infringe Art. 21(c) of the BOR, that the inequality of treatment between
overseas and local officers is attributable to any of the distinctions
prohibited by Art. 1(1).
91. The
CSRs. However, the CSRs do not
bear out the argument that transferring officers had to give up accrued rights
as a pre-condition of transfer.
The CSRs already provided that both casual and vacation leave which had
not been taken before the end of the agreement on overseas terms would lapse.[79] It is true that undertaken casual
leave could be carried forward to an officer’s next agreement if the officer
had not been able to take all his casual leave due to operational needs.[80] Moreover, untaken vacation leave
could be carried forward to an officer’s next agreement or to when he finally
left the Civil Service if the officer had not been able to take all his
vacation leave due to operation needs.[81] But those exceptions continued to apply
to transferring officers.[82] There was, therefore, no question of
transferring officers being required to give up accrued rights : they were merely being required to
exercise their accrued rights in a way in which they were already required to
exercise them.
92. The
comparison with local officers :
casual leave. The
Applicants point out that in reaching his decision the SCS took account of the
fact that transferring officers “would no longer be eligible for casual leave,
as local officers do not earn casual leave in any event.”[83] That is true for local officers on
Directorate Salary Scale D3 and below . Accordingly, the restrictions imposed on transferring
officers on Directorate Salary Scale D3 and below did not prevent them from
enjoying access to local conditions of service on general terms of equality
with local officers. As for local
officers on Directorate Salary Scale D4 and above , they do enjoy
the equivalent of casual leave. It
is known as “local flexible annual leave”.[84] However, this point does not get the
Applicants anywhere. The
restrictions imposed on transferring officers did not require them to give up rights
equivalent to those which local officers on agreement terms on Directorate
Salary Scale D4 and above enjoyed, because untaken local flexible annual leave
for such officers also lapses at the end of their agreements, except where
otherwise approved on operational grounds.[85]
93. The
comparison with local officers : vacation leave. The term as to vacation leave which local officers on
agreement terms on Directorate Salary Scale D4 and above enjoy do not
differ in any material way from the terms as to vacation leave which overseas
officers on agreement terms at similar grades enjoy.[86] On the other hand, unlike overseas
officers on agreement terms on Directorate Salary Scale D3 and below ,
local officers on agreement terms at such grades are permitted to carry forward
untaken vacation leave to their next agreement.[87]
94. However,
I have already said that Art. 21(c) of the BOR requires the right of access to
the Civil Service to be accorded only on general terms of equality. In my view, the disparity in treatment
between transferring officers and local officers already on agreement terms on
Directorate Salary Scale D3 and below in relation to the inability of the
former to carry forward untaken vacation leave to the first agreement on local
conditions of service is minimal – especially when one remembers that
transferring officers are not being required to give up their accrued vacation
leave, but merely to take it earlier than local officers would be obliged to.
95. That
is the answer to another complaint made by the Applicants about untaken
vacation leave. Overseas officers
on agreement terms on Directorate Salary Scale D3 and below, unlike their local
counterparts, are subject to the forfeiture rule, i.e. the rule that vacation
leave is forfeited if it is taken locally in Hong Kong or Macau.[88]
The effect of this is said to be that if a transferring officer is
exceptionally permitted, for operational or compassionate grounds to carry
forward his untaken vacation leave to his new agreement on local conditions of
service, he will, unlike local officers on agreement terms, have to take that
leave out of Hong Kong – and at his own expense because he will not be entitled
to the passage allowance[89]
to which he would have been entitled had he remained on overseas conditions. I do not construe the forfeiture rule
as continuing to apply to transferring officers in these circumstances, but
even if it does, it does not infringe the principle of general equality
of treatment protected by Art. 21(c) of the BOR.
96. For
these reasons, the decisions relating to casual and vacation leave were not
unlawful, and the challenge to them fails.
(5) OUTWARD PASSAGE BACK TO
HONG KONG.
97. The
decision challenged. On 13th
September 1993, the SCS announced[90]
that transferring officers would not be entitled to an outward passage back to
Hong Kong to enable them to take up their duties under their new agreements on
local conditions. All the
Applicants were given leave to challenge this decision, though I do not now
think that Mr Bach has the standing to challenge it. He did not transfer to local conditions of service, and I do
not suppose for one moment that this decision was one of the reasons why he
chose not to do so. The
Respondents correctly accept that all the other Applicants have the standing to
challenge this decision.
98. The
basis of the challenge. CSR
1320(2) entitles an overseas officer on agreement terms “returning to duty” on
the expiry of his leave to an outward passage back to Hong Kong. The decision challenged is therefore
said to be an infringement of Art. 21(c) of the BOR because it imposed an
unreasonable restriction on the exercise of such an officer to transfer to
local conditions of service. He
had to give up the contractual right to an outward passage back to Hong Kong to
which CSR 1320(2) entitled him.
That was because, until he returned to Hong Kong on the expiry of his
leave to take up his duties under his new agreement, he remained an overseas
officer entitled to the benefit of CSR 1320(2).
99. “Returning
to Duty”. The Respondents
argue that CSR 1320(2) does not apply to transferring officers, because they
are not returning to duty, but starting new duties under a new agreement. I disagree. In my view, transferring officers are returning to
duty, albeit to duty on different conditions of service.
100. Discrimination. Even so, I do not see how the decision
challenged can be an infringement of Art. 21(c) of the BOR. Even if the decision is an unreasonable
restriction on access to local conditions of service, it is not as if local
officers on agreement terms are treated any differently. Local officers on agreement terms who
are not on the Directorate Salary Scale do not have the right to an outward
passage back to Hong Kong. Thus,
the loss of that right for transferring officers who are not on the Directorate
Salary Scale equalises their position with their local
counterparts. No question,
therefore, arises of them being denied a benefit which local counterparts
enjoy.
101. It
is true that local officers on agreement terms who are on the
Directorate Salary Scale and who return to Hong Kong to resume their duties
under renewed agreements after spending their leave overseas are entitled to a
return passage, i.e. a passage which includes an outward passage back to Hong
Kong.[91] However, the passage to which this
regulation relates to is a passage allowed to the officers in order for them to
take their leave during the currency of their agreements. It is not granted to enable them to take
up their duties at the beginning of their renewed agreements. Incidentally, none of the four
individual Applicants can compare themselves with such officers because none of
them were on the Directorate Salary Scale.
102. For
their reasons, the decision complained of was lawful, and the challenge to it
fails.
(6) SCHOOL PASSAGE AND OVERSEAS EDUCATION ALLOWANCE
103. The
decision challenged. Overseas
officers are eligible to claim school passage and overseas education allowances
for their dependant children attending full-time education in the officers’
country of origin .[92] However, on 13th September
1993, the SCS announced[93]
that transferring officers would only continue to receive those benefits for
their dependant children attending full-time education in the UK. That was because that is all that local
officers are able to claim.[94]
104. Standing. All the Applicants were given leave to
challenge this decision, but I do not think that any of the four individual
Applicants have the standing to challenge it. There is no evidence that any of them have any dependant
children, or will have any dependant children in the foreseeable future, let
alone any dependant children who are being, or who they wish to have, educated
otherwise than in the U.K.
105. The
basis of the challenge. The
decision is challenged on two grounds :
106. (i) It is said to be an
infringement of Art. 21(c) of the BOR because it did not give equality of
treatment to all local officers (who include, for this purpose, overseas
officers who transfer to local condition of service) : the decision conferred a greater
benefit on those local officers whose national or social origins are in the
U.K. (and who therefore wish to educate their children in the U.K.) than on
those local officers whose origins are in other countries. I see no answer to this point. It is true that the right of local
officers to have the Government contribute to the expense of educating their
children in the U.K. is enjoyed by all of them, whatever their national or
social origins. However, the
decision indirectly discriminates against local officers whose national or
social origins are not in the U.K., because proportionately fewer of them would
derive any benefit from that right.
I do not discern any overwhelming policy consideration which would
justify this significant departure from the right of access to terms and
conditions of service on general terms of quality.
107. (ii) The decision is said to be
irrational because if it is thought appropriate to subside the education
overseas of children of local officers, it should make no difference where that
education takes place. If the
historical justification for subsidising education in the U.K. alone has been
to encourage local officers to strengthen the colonial ties between the U.K.
and Hong Kong by exposing their children to life in the U.K., that can hardly
be appropriate in the twilight of British sovereignty over Hong Kong. I see no answer to this point either.
108. The
true target of the complaint.
At first blush, the decision being challenged is not the true target of
the complaint. The true target of
the complaint is the relevant CSRs themselves. That is because, under the original transfer scheme,
transferring officers were to be subject to the local conditions of service set
out in the CSRs, and it is the local conditions of service in the CSRs which
limit the benefits to education in the U.K. The CSRs would automatically have applied to transferring
officers even if the SCS had not made his announcement of 13th
September 1993.
109. On
reflection, I do not think that
that argument is correct. When the
original transfer scheme was modified, transferring officers became subject to
terms modelled on local conditions of service. There was, therefore, no automatic application to them of
the local conditions of service in the CSRs. The terms on which they were to serve were bespoke terms,
tailor-made to their circumstances.
The true target of the complaint was , therefore, the decision
challenged, because it was that decision which had the effect of applying the
relevant CSRs to transferring officers.
For these reasons, the decision complained of was unlawful, and the
challenge to it succeeds.
(7) TRANSFER TO THE PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT
110. The
decision challenged. It will
be recalled that overseas officers who joined the Civil Service after 28th
March 1985 have not been allowed to join the permanent establishment. They could only serve on agreement
terms. Those overseas officers on
agreement terms who were already in the Civil Service on 28th March
1985 were permitted in limited circumstances to transfer to the permanent
establishment, but since 30th June 1992 they have not been permitted
to do even then. When the decision
was made to permit overseas officers on agreement terms to transfer to local
conditions of service, the SCS announced on 30th July 1993 that such
transfers would “initially” be on agreement terms.[95] There is no challenge to that decision.
111. However,
on 13th September 1993, the SCS announced[96]
that since the original transfer scheme was an interim arrangement only (pending
the introduction of a uniform set of conditions of service for all officers),
the CSR permitting local officers on agreement terms to apply for
transfer to the permanent establishment would not apply to overseas
officers on agreement terms who transfer to local conditions of service. That decision is challenged by
the Applicants. At the leave
hearing, the Respondents did not dispute that all the Applicants have the
standing to challenge this decision.
In my view, that was the correct stance to adopt.
112. When
the modified transfer scheme was announced on 28th July 1994, the
SCS stated that “as previously announced”[97]
transferring officers would not be allowed to transfer to the permanent
establishment for the duration of their agreements modelled on local conditions
of service. That decision is also
challenged by the Applicants.
However, I have no doubt that the two decisions challenged are in fact
the same decision. The latter is
merely confirmation of the former.
The situation is no different from any of the other features of the
original transfer scheme which are challenged, namely those which survived the
legislative freeze on their introduction and which feature in the modified
transfer scheme. I therefore
propose only to address the challenge to the former decision announced on 13th
September 1993.
113. Even
then, the Respondents argued that the decision announced on 13th
September 1993 was no more than (i) confirmation of the long-standing
prohibition on overseas officers on agreement terms transferring to the
permanent establishment, or (ii) at the very least, confirmation of the
decision announced on 30th July 1993 that transfer to local
conditions of service would initially be on agreement terms. I disagree :
114. (i) The long-standing prohibition
on overseas officers on agreement terms transferring to the permanent
establishment related to the time when overseas officers could not transfer to
local conditions of service. At
that time, it was not contemplated that a fundamental change of policy would
result in certain overseas officers subsequently being treated on broadly the
same footing as local officers. A
decision had to be made as to whether they should be permitted to
transfer to the permanent establishment in the light of their new status as
officers who enjoyed local conditions of service.
115. (ii) There is a significant difference
between the decisions announced on 30th July 1993 and 13th
September 1993. The decision
announced on 30th July 1993 related to the terms to which overseas
officers on agreement terms could transfer , i.e. local agreement
terms. The decision announced on
30th September 1993 related to whether, once an overseas officer had
transferred to local agreement terms, he could thereafter
transfer from local agreement
terms to local permanent and pensionable terms.
116. Irrationality. The decision announced on 13th
September 1993 is said to be irrational because there is no rational
justification for not according to transferring officers the same rights of
transfer to the permanent establishment enjoyed by their local
counterparts. I unhesitatingly
reject this argument. The
Government’s current proposal is that under the uniform set of conditions
serving officers on agreement terms wishing to transfer to the permanent establishment
will have to be “locals”, and will normally have to meet basic Chinese language
proficiency requirements. However,
those requirements would not apply to officers already on the permanent
establishment. They would continue
to serve on their existing terms of service.[98] Accordingly, the effect of permitting
transferring officers now to transfer to the permanent establishment
will, under the current proposals, enable them to bypass the proposed
requirements for transfer to the permanent establishment and to continue on the
permanent establishment even after the uniform set of conditions has been
introduced. That could entitle
them to remain on the permanent establishment even after 30th June
1997, because the Basic Law provides that all civil servants serving the Hong
Kong Government before the establishment of the SAR “may all…retain their …
conditions of service no less favourable than before.”[99]
117. In
these circumstances, I entirely understand by the Government regarded it as
undesirable to permit transferring officers to transfer to the permanent
establishment for the time being, i.e. during their first agreement on local
conditions of service. To permit
transfer to the permanent establishment of former overseas officers would have
amounted to a significant change of policy affecting the establishment of the
Civil Service after the transfer of sovereignty. It was open to the SCS to conclude (a) that the Chinese
government, as the future sovereign power, should be consulted before such a
commitment is made, and (b) that transferring officers should not be allowed to
bypass the proposed requirements in the uniform set of conditions for transfer
to the permanent establishment, pending talks with the Chinese side on the JLG
about who should be regarded as a “local” in the uniform set of conditions and
a final decision as to what those requirements should be.
118. Discrimination. The decision announced on 13th
September 1993 is also challenged on the basis that it is an infringement of
Art. 21(c) of the BOR : it denied
to overseas officers on agreement terms who transferred to local
conditions of service the right to transfer to the permanent establishment,
whereas local officers on agreement terms had the right to transfer to
the permanent establishment. The
access of transferring officers to the permanent establishment on general terms
of equality with local officers on agreement terms was therefore
restricted. That restriction was
attributable to their national or social origins, because it was their national
or social origins which, as a result of CSR 115(1), caused them to be
classified as overseas officers in the first place.
119. I
agree with the Applicants that the decision challenged constitutes a departure
from Art. 21(c). The question is
whether the Respondents have discharged the heavy burden on them to justify
it. In my view, they have
not. I understand entirely the
objectives which the Government sought to achieve. Those objectives were to avoid undermining the proposal in
the uniform set of conditions that the only officers on agreement terms who
will be permitted to transfer to the permanent establishment will be “locals”
who meet basic Chinese language proficiency requirements, and the prevent the
permanent establishment from including a class of officers who the Chinese
authorities ought to be consulted about first. Sensible and fair-minded people who are not civil servants
would recognise the need to achieve those objectives. But those objectives could have been achieved without departing
from Art. 21(c). Local
officers on agreement terms could, for the time being, have been refused the
right to transfer to the permanent establishment. I appreciate that that would have had the effect of
temporarily denying them a right which they have always enjoyed, but that would
not have infringed Art. 21(c) because, for the time being, there would have
been parity of treatment between them and overseas officers on agreement terms
who transferred to local conditions of service.
120. For
these reasons the decision announced on 13th September 1993 relating
to the prohibition on transferring officers transferring to the permanent
establishment was unlawful, and the challenge to it succeeds.
(8) PROFICIENCY IN CHINESE
121. The
decision challenged. When the
SCS announced the original transfer scheme on 30th July 1993, he
stated that one of the criteria which would be taken into account in
determining whether an overseas officer on agreement terms would be permitted
to transfer to local conditions of service was “service need”.[100] However, in a memorandum issued on 21st
September 1993, he explained that it was necessary to take into account the
operational requirements of all the posts in the rank to which the
officer belonged to see whether he was capable of effectively performing all
the required duties in any of those posts which were or could reasonally be
made available. In particular, if
all officers in the same rank were required to communicate directly with people
in Chinese, the officer’s ability to perform effectively and efficiently
without an interpreter would be a relevant consideration.[101] The decision challenged is therefore
the decision to take into account the ability of the officer seeking a transfer
to communicate in Chinese if there are any posts in his rank which might
become available and in which communication in Chinese is required.
122. Standing. I gave all the Applicants leave to
challenge this decision. However,
the leave I gave the four individual Applicants was conditional upon their filing
evidence that they were unable to communicate directly with people in
Chinese. Mr Bach did not file any
additional evidence at all. Since
he did not comply with that condition, the leave which I granted to him has
lapsed. The other three individual
Applicants all filed additional evidence.
I have read that evidence.
None of them stated they were unable to communicate directly with people
in Chinese. Accordingly, they did
not comply with the conditions which I imposed, and the leave which I granted them
has also lapsed. I am not troubled
by that at all. All three of them
were in fact offered terms modelled on local conditions of service, and none of
them were therefore ultimately affected by the gloss placed by the SCS on the
phrase “service need”.
123. As
for the standing of the AECS, seven overseas officers whose applications for
transfer had been processed by 1st September 1995 have had their
applications for transfer refused on the ground that their proficiency in
Chinese was insufficient.[102] I do not know, of course, whether any
of those officers were members of the AECS, or had a right of abode in Hong
Kong, or could qualify for a right of abode in Hong Kong. However, since it is possible that one
or more of these seven officers were members of the AECS and had (or could
acquire) a right of abode in Hong Kong, I cannot say that the AECS does not
have the standing to challenge this decision.
124. Irrationality. The decision challenged is said to be
irrational because its application could result in the Civil Service losing the
specialist skills of an overseas officer – even though there may be no other
officers with those skills – simply because the overseas officer is not
sufficiently proficient in Chinese to carry out the duties of some other posts
in his rank. That is said to be particularly irrational if proficiency in
Chinese is not necessary for the specialist tasks which the officer
performs. However, Mr Jackson has
deposed that in some ranks account was taken of “existing, operationally
required provisions for specialisation”, contrasting such ranks with those
ranks in which applicants for transfer “should be able to do a wide range of
duties”.[103] I take this to mean that if an
applicant for transfer occupies a post calling for specialist skills which
other officers do not have, his lack of proficiency in Chinese, and his
inability for that reason to carry out the duties of some of the other posts in
his rank, would not be treated as a factor which could disqualify him for
transfer under the rubric “service need”.
On that basis, the sitting in the complaint has effectively been
removed. The fact that the
exception for specialist skills was not referred to in the SCS’s announcement
of this decision does not matter : no criticism can legitimately be made of the
decision in view of what is now known about the way it has been applied.
125. I
should add that even if an exception for specialist skills had not been made, I
would not have characterised the decision challenged as irrational. It was, I think, open to his colleagues
from time to time in other posts in the same rank. Unless the officer is sufficiently proficient in Chinese to
carry out the duties of those other posts in the same rank for which a proficiency
in Chinese is required, he will not be able to deputise for his colleagues in
those posts. The result would be
that the task of standing in would fall on those other officers in the same
rank who were sufficiently proficient in Chinese. In my view, the SCS was entitled to conclude that that would
be unfair to such officers.
126. However,
the SCS does not have to go that far to justify the stance taken in respect of
the seven officers whose applications for transfer were refused on the ground
that their proficiency in Chinese was insufficient. Each of them needed to be proficient in Chinese in order to
carry out their own duties effectively without an interpreter.[104]
127. Mr
Dykes made the point that the requirement to be proficient in Chinese in the
assessment of “service need” should only have been imposed if no other option
was open to the SCS. That was
especially so when such a requirement (a) was being imposed for the first time
on serving officers, and (b) had not been imposed in the past when “service
need” was considered for the purpose of the application of CSR 281(1)(a). Mr Dykes reminded me that it was
proposed to make resources available to provide intensive refresher courses in
Cantonese for administrative officers.[105] If for them, why not for the few
officers (seven in all so far) whose lack of proficiency in Chinese prevented
their transfer to local conditions of service? I see the force in that point, but the allocation of
resources is a matter of political judgment, and I cannot say that in not
allocating resources to the provision of courses in Cantonese for officers who
wish to transfer to local conditions of service the SCS has acted irrationally.
128. Finally,
Mr Dykes reminded me that the Official Languages Ordinance (Cap. 5) declares
both the English and Chinese languages to be the official languages of Hong
Kong for the purpose of communication between civil servants and members of the
public. Moreover, the Basic Law
provides that English may be used as an official language by the executive
authorities, legislature and judiciary of the SAR.[106] The argument is that if an officer is
proficient in one of the official languages (and I assume that the majority of
overseas officers on agreement terms are proficient in English), he should not
be penalised for not being proficient in the other official language. That argument misses the point. Proficiency in English, though an
official language, is no substitute for proficiency in Chinese if proficiency
in Chinese is required to enable an officer to carry out his duties or to stand
in for his colleagues.
129. Discrimination. The decision challenged is said to be
an infringement of Art. 21(c) of the BOR on the basis that it restricts the
access of overseas officers to transfer to local conditions of service. They have to be proved to be proficient
in Chinese, whereas local officers on agreement terms are assumed to be
proficient in Chinese. Their
access to local conditions of service is therefore not enjoyed on general terms
of equality with their local counterparts. This restriction is said to be attributable to a number of
the distinctions prohibited by Art. 1(1), namely (a) their national or social
origins, because it was their national or social origins which, as a result of CSR 115(1), caused them to
be classified as overseas officers in the first place, and (b) their language,
because Chinese is likely not to be their mother tongue.
130. This
argument pre-supposes that there are a not insignificant number of local
officers on agreement terms who are not proficient in Chinese, and are not
required to be proficient in Chinese.
Only then could there be a lack of equality on this footing between
transferring and local officers.
That assumption is not correct:
Mr Jackson has deposed that “virtually all of them” are already
proficient in Chinese.[107] I should frankly have been surprised by
anything else. The fact that there may be the odd local officer on agreement
terms who is not proficient in Chinese is irrelevant. It would be a perversion of the phrase “general terms of
equality” if the existence of one or two non-Chinese speaking local officers on
agreement terms were to eliminate the need for all overseas officers on
agreement terms to be proficient in Chinese if the efficient operation of the
Civil Service required it.
131. However,
there is another basis on which it is said that the decision infringes Art.
21(c) of the BOR. The fact that
proficiency in Chinese can in some circumstances be taken into account in the
assessment of “service need” indirectly discriminates, so it is said, against
overseas officers who apply to transfer to local conditions of service, because
proficiency in Chinese is an attribute which, by reason of their national or
social origins, proportionately fewer of them than local officers on agreement
terms have. In that respect, the
access of overseas officers on agreement terms to local conditions of service
is said to be more restricted than that which local officers on agreement terms
enjoy. However, if this is a
departure from Art. 21(c), it is, in my view, a justifiable one. The efficient operation of the Civil
Service requires officers to be able to stand in for colleagues at the same
rank. Sensible and fair-minded
people who are not civil servants would recognise that. How could that be achieved (in the case
of officers who do not have specialist skills) without taking their proficiency
in Chinese into account when assessing “service need”? The difference in treatment between
overseas and local officers on agreement terms, if that is what it was, is in
this respect entirely rational, and rationally connected to the need which
justifies it. Nor do I think that
it is disportionate to the need which justifies it. After all, it is not as if proficiency in Chinese is made a
pre-condition of transfer: it is
merely a factor to be taken into account in appropriate cases. I take the point that if a departure
from Art. 21(c) in the form of a language requirement is to be justified, a
language requirement must be shown to be rationally connected to the
performance of the job in hand.
That requirement is satisfied in view of the need for officers in the
same rank to deputise for their colleagues when necessary.
132. For
all these reasons, the decision of the SCS relating to proficiency in Chinese
was not unlawful, and the challenge to it fails.
(9) OFFICERS WHOSE AGREEMENTS HAD EXPIRED BY 30TH
JULY 1993.
133. The
decision challenged. Overseas
officers on agreement terms whose agreements are not renewed may have
accumulated undertaken leave by the date on which their agreements expire. They continue to be paid up to the date
when their accumulated leave is exhausted. On 21st September 1993, the SCS announced[108]
that overseas officers whose agreements had expired by 30th July
1993 without being renewed would not be eligible to apply for transfer to local
conditions of service, even if they continued to be paid after 30th
July 1993.
134. Standing. None of the four individual Applicants
were given leave to challenge this decision. The AECS was given leave on condition that evidence was
filled “to the effect that there is a former member of the AECS who was denied
the right to apply to transfer to local conditions of service on the ground
that his contract of employment had expired prior to 30th July 1993,
but who continued to receive leave payments, and who wishes the AECS to
challenge [the] decision on his behalf.”
That condition was satisfied.
The AECS filed evidence identifying Mr. Paul Wellings as such as an
officer.
135. The
Respondents contend that the plight of Mr Wellings does not give the AECS
standing on two grounds:
136. (i) Since there is no evidence that Mr.
Wellings was a permanent resident of Hong Kong, it cannot be said that he
acquired the right protected by Art. 21(c) of the BOR. I have two comments to make on this argument. First, the argument (if correct) would
only defeat a challenge to the decision based on Art. 21(c) of the BOR. It would not defeat a challenge to the
decision on grounds of irrationality.
Secondly, the argument is incorrect. The question is not whether Mr Wellings was a permanent
resident of Hong Kong, but whether he was eligible to acquire BDT citizenship
to enable him to become a permanent resident of Hong Kong. It looks as if he was eligible to acquire
BDT citizenship, because the material before me suggests that he lived in Hong
Kong for 11 years prior to his departure from Hong Kong on 20th
August 1993.[109]
137. (ii) Mr Wellings left the payroll of the
Hong Kong Government on 5th January 1994 when his leave payments
came to an end. He was thereafter
no longer a member of the AECS, because membership of the AECS is only open to
overseas officers “who are for the time being employed by the Hong Kong
Government.”[110] Since he was not a member of the AECS
on 27th October 1994 when the proceedings were commenced, the AECS
has no standing to represent his interests. This argument is misconceived. It ignores the fact that one of the objects of the AECS is
to “promote and protect the interests … of its former members”. (My emphasis.)[111]
Accordingly, the AECS has the
standing to challenge this decision.
138. When
service in the Civil Service ends.
Whatever the basis on which the decision is challenged, the argument
that it is unlawful pre-supposes that officers like Mr. Wellings continued in
the service of the Civil Service even after their last agreement expired. After all, persons who were no longer
in the service of the Civil Service could hardly have been afforded the right
to transfer to local conditions of service. “Transfer” connotes the idea
of an officer still serving in the Civil Service. I do not think that officers whose agreements expire on a
particular date can properly be regarded as continuing to serve in the Civil
Service after that date simply because they continue to receive leave payments. In the absence of a regulation in the
CSRs dealing with the point, the true analysis, in my view, is that their
service ends on the date when their agreements expire, but that post-service
payments are continued to be made to them to reflect accumulated leave which
they had not taken by that date.
Accordingly, the decision complained of was not unlawful, and the
challenge to it fails.
THE MODIFIED TRANSFER SCHEME
139. I
have already dealt with those decisions in the original transfer scheme which
survived the legislative freeze and were incorporated into the modified
transfer scheme. However, a number
of the features of the modified transfer scheme which were adopted for the
first time are also challenged, and I propose to deal with each of them in turn. All but one of them are contained in
the announcement made by the SCS on 28th July 1994.[112]
(1) THE SELECTION EXERCISE
140. The
decision challenged. The
modified transfer scheme did not affect in any way the circumstances in
which an overseas officer on agreement terms would be entitled to transfer from
overseas conditions of service, except that he would not be transferring to
local conditions of service, but to terms modelled on local conditions
of service. The most significant
change effected by the modified transfer scheme related to the rank
which the transferring officer would hold once his transfer had taken
place. The modifications which
were introduced in that respect related only to transferring officers in
promotion ranks, and were as follows:
141. (i) A determination would be made
as to whether there was a qualified and suitable local replacement for the
officer. If there was not, the
transferring officer would continue to serve at his existing rank.
142. (ii) If it was determined that
there was a qualified and suitable local replacement for the officer, a
selection exercise would take place.
A list of officers in the rank immediately below that of the
transferring officer who were suitable for promotion to the rank held by the
transferring officer would be prepared.
The list would be drawn up entirely on merit, and could include overseas
officers, though it would not include the transferring officer himself. If the best candidate on the list was
an overseas officer, he would not be promoted, and the transferring
officer would transfer at his existing rank. If the best candidate on the list was a local
officer, the local officer would be promoted to the rank held by the
transferring officer, and the transferring officer would transfer at the rank
immediately below the rank which he had previously held.[113]
143. Two
features of this selection exercise are challenged. The first is the decision to use the old CSR 281(1)(d) test
to determine whether there should be a selection exercise at all. The second is the decision to demote
transferring officers by one rank, and to promote a local officer by one rank,
if the selection exercise reveals that the most suitable officer for promotion
is a local officer. These two
features of the selection exercise have been treated as two separate
decisions. I do not think that is
right. The effect of what was
proposed was that a transferring officer would transfer to the next rank down
if the best officer at the next rank down – of those in the rank who were
qualified and suitable to replace the transferring officer – was a local
officer. To break that
decision down into its various component parts, and then to describe the
various component parts as separate decisions, is, in my judgment, completely
artificial.
144. The
matter can be tested by looking at the two separate decisions from the view of
standing. It can, I think, quite
logically be said that an officer who is demoted on transfer has been adversely
affected only by the second decision.
If the adverse effect of the selection exercise is the possibility that
he might be demoted on transfer, that eventuality would only arise if, in the
selection exercise to which the second decision only relates, a local
officer is adjudged to be the best candidate on the list. It is true that the need to hold the
selection exercise (to which the second decision relates) arose as a result of
the determination that there was a qualified and suitable local officer
available to replace the transferring officer (to which the first decision
relates). But the first decision
had no other part to play in the final determination of whether the
transferring officer should be demoted.
Whether an officer was to be demoted – and therefore whether he was
adversely affected by any of the decisions made by the SCS on this topic –
depended in the final analysis only on the result of the selection
exercise to which the second decision related. Thus, if I were
to treat the two challenged features of the selection exercise as two
separate decisions, I would have had to conclude that none of the Applicants
had the standing to challenge the first.
Accordingly, I propose to treat as the decision challenged the decision
that a transferring officer would transfer at the next rank down if the best
officer at the next rank down – of those in the rank who were qualified and
suitable to replace the transferring officer – was a local officer.
145. Standing. Only two of the individual Applicants
have the standing to challenge this decision (as well as the AECS). Mr Toes was obviously affected by it,
because he was demoted by one rank, and Mr Bach may have been affected by it
because the possibility of demotion may well have been a factor in his decision
to refuse the offer to transfer to terms modelled on local conditions of
service. Neither Mr Tromp nor Mr
Wilson, however, have the standing to challenge the decision: neither of them were demoted on their
transfer.
146. The
basis of the challenge. The
principal sting in the criticism of the decision challenged is that the
transferring officer is demoted by one rank, and a local officer is promoted by
one rank, even though the comparative merits of the two officers are not
considered. Once the local
officer comes top of the list, he is promoted, and the transferring officer is
demoted, simply because he is a local officer and the transferring officer is
not. The effect of that is that
although the discriminatory effect of CSR 281(1)(d) has been removed, it has
now re-appeared under a different guise.
Whereas CSR 281(1)(d) prevented an overseas officer’s agreement being renewed
if there was a qualified and suitable local replacement, now a transferring
officer’s retention of his rank will be lost if there is a qualified and
suitable local replacement ( provided that the local replacement is, apart from
the transferring officer himself, the best person for the job).
147. There
is another sting in the criticism of the decision challenged. It relates to an overseas officer on
the list. Even if, in the
selection exercise, he is found to be, apart from the transferring officer
himself, the best person for the job, he is, unlike a local officer, not
promoted. There is therefore
inequality of treatment between the local officers on the list and overseas
officers on the list, simply because some are local officers and others are
not. This does not sit easily with
the regulation that the selection of officers for promotion is considered on
equal terms for all officers irrespective of their terms of service.[114]
148. There
is, in my view, no answer to these criticisms. There can be no doubt that the decision challenged
constituted a prima facie infringement of Art. 21(c). Access to terms modelled on local
conditions of service at their existing rank for officers on agreement terms
who had previously been on overseas conditions of service was being
restricted: in certain
circumstances, the transfer would only be permitted if they dropped a
rank. That restriction was based
on their national or social origins, because it was their national social
origins which, as a result of CSR 115(1), had caused them to be classified as
overseas officers in the first place.
It amounted to inequality of treatment with local officers, in the
determination of the rank which transferring officers would enjoy, because
preferential treatment was accorded to local officers. I did not understand Mr Huggins to
argue against any of that.
149. Justification. Can this departure from the right
protected by Art. 21(c) be justified?
The objective of the Government which is said to justify it is the
maintenance of good industrial relations between the Government and local
officers. That required the
elimination of the resentment, which local officers felt, following the announcement
of the original transfer scheme, about overseas officers avoiding the
localisation policy which had become entrenched over many years by the simply
expedient of being permitted to transfer to local conditions of service. The strength of feeling had been such
that an unparalleled event in Hong Kong’s history had occurred: in defiance of the Government’s
prerogative to determine employment policies in the Civil Service, the
Legislative Council had been persuaded to intervene on behalf of local officers
in order to thwart proposals which it believed (a) would seriously undermine
the career prospects of local officers, and (b) would jeopardise a
long-standing localisation policy intended to enable Hong Kong to be
administered by Hong Kong people. In
these circumstances, I have no doubt that sensible and fair-minded people who
are not civil servants would recognise the Government’s genuine need to modify
the original transfer scheme, so as to go some way towards placating local
officers, even though that involved (a) compromising over rights which should
never have been compromised, and
(b) revising features of the original transfer scheme which the Government had
proposed in order to remain within the law. The more difficult questions are whether the undoubted
difference in treatment between overseas and local officers embodied in the
modified transfer scheme was (a) rational and (b) proportionate to the need
which justified it.
150. In
my view, the difference in treatment was proportionate to the need which
justified it:
(i) the difference in treatment would last
only for a short time, since the modified transfer scheme was merely an interim
measure pending the adoption of the uniform set of conditions.
(ii) It only applied to transferring
officers whose current agreements expired before 1st September 1995. It was proposed that the posts of
overseas officers whose current agreements expired after 1st
September 1995 would be subject to the opening-up scheme.[115]
(iii) Subject to one exception, the transferring officer would not lose
out financially if he was demoted on transfer, nor would he lose any of the
contractual benefits to which he would have been entitled if he had transferred
without being demoted. That was
because the transferring officer would receive “personal salary and conditions
of service as if he were employed at his original rank on local conditions.”[116] The exception was that he would not be
entitled to salary increments during the period he serves at the lower rank.
(iv) The difference in treatment was something which the AECS felt its
members could live with in order to secure agreement with the SNEOA, and the
SNEOA was not committed to pressing for an even greater difference in
treatment.[117]
151. The
rationality of the difference in treatment can, I think, only be justified by
reference to the need which is said to justify it. The particular form which the difference in treatment took
cannot be rationalised outside that context. But, not without considerable hesitation, I have reached the
view that, within the context of the need for the Government to maintain good
industrial relations with local officers, the form which the difference in
treatment took was rational. The
Government’s objective could not have been achieved otherwise. It must be unique for a difference in
treatment on grounds of national or social origins, which is not capable of
being justified on its merits, to be nevertheless capable of being justified on
the basis that it is a rational response to pressure from a particularly
vociferous and powerful pressure group.
But the dilemma which the Government faced after the legislative freeze
on the original transfer scheme was simply not capable of being resolved
without either an infringement of Art. 21(c) or a significant deterioration in
the morale of local officers as a result of the shameless breach of trust which
they believed the original transfer scheme amounted to. The Government had to decide between
the lesser of these two evils.
That was a matter for mature political judgment. I do not say that the Courts are not
equipped to review such judgments, but I cannot characterise as irrational the
Government’s decision as to which of the two evils should be avoided.
152. For
these reasons, the decision relating to the selection exercise was not
unlawful, and the challenge to it fails.
(2) PROMOTION BEFORE TRANSFER
153. On
14th October 1994, the SCS announced that overseas officers on
agreement terms who applied to transfer to terms modelled on local conditions
of service would not be eligible for promotion prior to their transfer if their
current agreements had less than 12 months to run.[118] This decision is challenged on
the basis of its lack of rationality.
All the Applicants were given leave to challenge it. They all have the standing to do so,
because all four individual Applicants applied for transfer when their current
agreements were due to expire within the next 12 months.
154. In
reaching this decision, the SCS was purporting to apply the logic behind CSR
109(1)(a). At that time, CSR
109(1)(a) provided:
“Officers who have less than
twelve months’ service to give before going on pre-retirement leave or terminal
leave … are not normally considered for promotion.”
This applied to all officers
irrespective of their conditions of service. The logic is obvious:
officers should not be promoted if they are only going to spend a short
time at the new rank. Mr Dykes
criticises that logic on the footing that if it was applied strictly, an
officer could never be promoted if there was a prospect of his being further
promoted in the next 12 months.
However, the fact that the logic can lead to an absurd result in a
particular case is no ground for not applying the logic to other cases if it is
appropriate to do so.
155. It
was, in my view, entirely appropriate to apply the logic behind CSR 109(1)(a)
to transferring officers. If a
transferring officer was promoted before his transfer took effect, he might
have served for a few months at the higher rank. However, on transfer, he might have been replaced by a local
officer. He would then have had to
serve at the next lower rank, i.e. his original rank before promotion. Nevertheless, he would have continued
to receive a personal salary and benefits corresponding to the higher rank. That goes behind the logic behind CSR
109(1)(a).
156. There
is one other ground on which the SCS’s decision can be supported. The consequence of the scenario which I
have just described is that the promotion could be seen by local officers as a
device to give a transferring officer extra salary and benefits. I accept, of course, that it is for the
SCS, and not local officers, to run the Civil Service, but the maintenance of
good industrial relations with local officers warrants taking into account what
they might have seen as the cynical manipulation of the modified transfer
scheme.
157. For
these reasons, the decision complained of was not unlawful, and the challenge
to it fails.
(3)
PROMOTION AFTER TRANSFER
158. The
decision challenged. When the
SCS announced the modified transfer scheme on 28th July 1994, he
stated that transferring officers would not be eligible for promotion during
the term of their new agreements, unless he decided that an exception should be
made in the interests of the Civil Service. This prohibition on promotion applied to all transferring
officers, whether they transferred at their existing rank or at the rank below.[119] All the Applicants were given leave to
challenge this decision. In my
view, they will have the standing to do so – even Mr Bach, because it is
possible that this was a factor in his decision to refuse the offer of a new
agreement modelled on local conditions of service.
159. Discrimination. In my view, this decision constituted a
prima facie infringement of Art. 21(c). The right of access to the Civil Service includes, as I have
already said, access to opportunities for promotion. A transferring officer had no chance of being promoted
during his new agreement (unless the SCS decided otherwise). That restriction on his right of access
to promotion was based on his national or social origins, because it was his
national or social origins which, as a result of CSR 115(1), caused him to be
classified as an overseas officer in the first place. It amounted to inequality of treatment with a local officer
on agreement terms, because no restrictions were placed on the promotion
prospects of such an officer.
160. Justification. Can this departure from the rights
protected by Art. 21(c) be justified?
In the course of the hearing, I suggested to Mr Dykes that the
justification might have been to avoid the circumvention of the selection
exercise. If a transferring
officer transferred at the next rank below, he could have avoided the effect of
that demotion by an immediate application for promotion. In due course, Mr Huggins adopted that
argument. On reflection, though,
the argument is flawed. It could
only justify the non-eligibility for promotion of a transferring officer who
transferred at the rank below. It
could not justify the non-eligibility for promotion of a transferring officer
who transferred at his existing rank.
161. To
be fair, the evidence filed by the Respondents does not rely on this
justification for the decision.
The SCS’ justification for the decision was, as Mr Dykes correctly
submitted, part and parcel of the attempt on the part of the Government to
balance the interests of local officers and the need to remain within the
law. One of the demands made by
the SNEOA in the course of the negotiations was a restriction on the promotion
of transferring officers during the currency of the agreements modelled on
local conditions of service.[120] Accordingly, the need for this
departure from the right protected by Art. 21(c) was the same as the need for
the selection exercise itself: the
desirability of maintaining good industrial relations with local officers and
of eliminating the resentment they felt over the original transfer scheme. That required accepting their demands
for a restriction on the promotion opportunities for transferring officers.
162. For
the reasons I have already given, sensible and fair-minded people who are not
civil servants would recognise that need.
I also think that the difference in treatment between transferring
officers and local officers on agreement terms was proportionate to the need
which justified it. Even
though it was not something which the AECS was ever prepared to agree to, it
was a short-term measure. And
although the form which the differences in treatment took cannot be
rationalised when looked at on its own merits, it was rational in the
context of the Government’s need to maintain good industrial relations with
local officers. Accordingly, the
decision complained of was not unlawful, and the challenge to it fails.
(4) REDUCTION IN THE
LENGTH OF THE NEW AGREEMENTS
163. When
the SCS announced the modified transfer scheme on 20th July 1994, he
stated that transferring officers would be offered agreements modelled on local
conditions of service for 2½ years.
There is no challenge to that decision. That is not surprising. As I have already said, the normal length of the agreements
of officers on agreement terms is 2½ or 3 years.[121] However, the SCS also stated any
extensions granted to a transferring officer’s previous agreement for the
completion of naturalisation procedures and/or as a result of the legislative
freeze on the original transfer scheme would be deducted from the length of the
new agreement.[122] All the Applicants were given leave to
challenge this decision. Again,
they all have the standing to do so – even Mr Bach, because it is possible that
this was also a factor in his decision to refuse the offer of a new agreement
modelled on local conditions of service.
164. The
attack on this decision is based only on its supposed irrationality. In my view, the decision was one which
the SCS could reasonably reach.
The transferring officer had already enjoyed the benefit of a new
agreement by virtue of the extension to his previous one. Without the proposed reduction in the
length of his new agreement, the transferring officer would have received the
windfall of the period of the extension.
The complaints which the Applicants make – namely, that the transferring
officers were not responsible for the extensions and that the reduction in the
length of their new agreements did nothing to advance localisation – do not
address this justification for the decision at all. On the contrary:
during the period of the extensions, transferring officers continued to
enjoy the fringe benefits which local officers did not enjoy. Accordingly, the decision complained of
was not unlawful, and the challenge to it fails.
(5) THE LIMIT ON THE LENGTH OF THE NEW AGREEMENTS
165. The
decision challenged. When the
SCS announced the modified transfer scheme on 28th July 1994, he
stated that the agreements granted to transferring officers would not last
beyond 30th June 1997.[123] All the Applicants were given leave to
challenge this decision. However,
I do not think that any of the four individual Applicants have the standing to
challenge it. The commencement
dates of the new agreements modelled on local conditions of service which they
were offered were all more than 2½ years before 30th June 1997. Accordingly, they could not have been
affected by this decision.
However, the AECS does have the standing to challenge it. Although no particular officer has been
identified, it is more than likely that there is at least one transferring
officer (a) who was a member of the AECS and (b) whose new agreement modelled
on local conditions of service commenced less than 2½ years before 30th
June 1997 and was therefore capped pursuant to the decision challenged.
166. Discrimination. In my view, this decision constituted a
prima facie infringement of Art. 21(c). The right of access to the Civil Service includes, as I have
said, access to the terms and conditions of service enjoyed by local
officers. If transferring officers
are denied agreements modelled on local conditions of service of a similar
length to the agreements of local officers on agreement terms, their access to
the terms and conditions of service enjoyed by local officers is
restricted. That restriction on
their access to the terms and conditions of service enjoyed by local officers
is attributable to the national or social origins of transferring officers,
because it was their national or social origins which, as a result of CSR
115(1), caused them to be classified as overseas officers in the first place.
167. Justification. Can this departure from the right
protected by Art. 21(c) be justified?
The justification for imposing the limits on the length of transferring
officers’ agreements modelled on local conditions of service was that “the
Chinese authorities might have reasonable concerns about any changes which
might have a bearing on the SAR Government’s future employment policy.”[124] It was not thought that local officers
on agreement terms or overseas officers on agreement terms who did not transfer
to terms modelled on local conditions of service posed this problem.[125]
168. What
I think the SCS had in mind was this.
The modified transfer scheme amounted to a significant change of
policy. For the first time,
overseas officers could transfer to terms modelled on local conditions of
service. The modified transfer
scheme would only have an impact on the Civil Service after 30th
June 1997 if the new agreements of transferring officers straddled the transfer
of sovereignty. It was natural for
the Government to wish to avoid being accused by the Chinese authorities of
making major policy changes so close to the transfer of sovereignty, when those
changes would have an impact on the establishment of the Civil Service after 30th
June 1997. In my view, sensible
and fair-minded people who are not civil servants would recognise the need for
the inequality of treatment complained of.
169. The
rationality of the inequality of treatment is attacked by the Applicants on
three grounds:
170. (i) It is said to be inconsistent with the
provisions of the Basic Law,[126]
which on one view guarantee the continued service after 30th June
1997 of all those civil servants who were in post prior to 30th June
1997, including British and foreign nationals. They “may … retain their seniority with pay, allowances,
benefits and conditions of service no less favourable than before.” These guarantees have recently been repeated
by the Chinese authorities.[127] If the Chinese authorities are content
for all overseas officers to remain in post after 30th June 1997,
what was there for the Chinese authorities to be concerned about in respect of
those overseas officers who are now employed on terms modelled on local
conditions of service? I reject
that criticism. The fact is that
there is no inconsistency between such guarantees as are given in the Basic Law
and any concern which the Chinese authorities may have about the modified
transfer scheme if it has an impact beyond 30th June 1997. That is because the guarantees in the
Basic Law relate only to persons who are in post on 30th June
1997. The modified transfer scheme
would have an impact on who those persons might be.
171. (ii) The inequality of treatment is said to
be inconsistent with the right which existed prior to 30th June 1992
for some overseas officers to transfer to the permanent establishment. If the Hong Kong Government is
concerned about the attitude of the Chinese authorities over overseas officers
who transfer to terms modelled on local conditions of service because their
appointment could straddle the transfer of sovereignty, why was the Government
not concerned about the rights which some overseas officers used to enjoy to
transfer to the permanent establishment, because their service too could
straddle the transfer of sovereignty?
I reject this criticism as well.
Ever since 28th March 1985, the Government has set its face
against overseas officers being on the permanent establishment. The right which existed prior to 30th
June 1992 related only to those overseas officers who had joined the Civil
Service on agreement terms prior to 28th March 1985. Clearly, the Government was phasing out
the right of transfer to the permanent establishment. It was retained for the time being only as a concession to
those officers who were in post at the time the decision not to appoint
overseas officers to the permanent establishment was made.
172. (iv) The inequality of treatment is said to
be inconsistent with the opening-up scheme. Agreements which are offered as a result of the selection
exercise to which the opening-up scheme relates are not subject to a provision
that they will not last beyond 30th June 1997. Assuming, without deciding, that the
logic of this argument is correct, I do not think that it gets the Applicants
anywhere. The process of reasoning
which justifies preventing the new agreements of transferring officers from
straddling the transfer of sovereignty is not devalued by the fact that the
same process of reasoning could have been applied to another scheme but was
not.
173. However,
the objective which the SCS wanted to achieve could have been achieved without
departing from Art. 21(c). Local
officers on agreement could, for the time being, have had the length of any new
agreement which they were given capped in the same way as transferring
officers. I recognise that that
would have had the effect of temporarily depriving those officers whose new
agreements commenced less than 2½ years before 30th June 1997 of
agreements of the length which had been the norm in the past, but that did not
justify taking a course of action which infringed the rights given to
transferring officers by Art. 21(c).
For this reason, therefore, the decision complained of was unlawful, and
the challenge to it succeeds.
THE OPENING-UP SCHEME
174. The
decision to introduce the opening-up scheme was announced by the SCS on 19th
December 1994.[128] This scheme was to apply to all
officers on agreement terms (whether overseas or local) in promotion ranks
whose agreements expired on or after 1st September 1995. The only exception was those overseas
officers on agreement terms who were either ineligible for transfer to terms
modelled on local conditions of service or who chose not to apply for
transfer. Under the scheme, as I
have already stated, the incumbent officer and the officer one rank below would
compete for the post, and the most meritorious officer would be appointed. If the incumbent officer was not
appointed, his agreement would not be renewed on its expiry, and he would leave
the Civil Service.
175. Mr
Jackson has explained the thinking behind this scheme. It is “to improve the mechanism for
renewal of agreements”. Under the
scheme, the renewal of agreements “is based on a set of objective criteria
applicable to all officers who enter the competition”. The scheme “ensures a greater emphasis
on objectively tested merit. The
aim is to select the best person for the job.”[129]
176. The
Applicants argue that this justification for the introduction of the scheme is
a pretext. The true reason for the
introduction of the scheme was to make those overseas officers on agreement
terms who transfer to terms modelled on local conditions of service more vulnerable
to replacement by local officers.
The device used to achieve that end was a subtle but effective one. The long-standing prohibition on
overseas officers on agreement terms applying to transfer to the permanent
establishment was to apply to those overseas officers on agreement terms who
had transferred to terms modelled on local conditions of service.[130] Local officers on agreement terms could
avoid the opening-up of their posts to competition simply by applying to join
the permanent establishment, whereas that escape route was not available to
overseas officers on agreement terms who had transferred to terms modelled on
local conditions of service.
177. Putting
it in another way, prior to the introduction of the modified transfer scheme,
overseas officers on agreement terms were vulnerable to the non-renewal of
their agreements, by virtue of CSR 281(1)(d), if there was a qualified and
suitable local replacement available.
As a result of the opening-up scheme, overseas officers on agreement
terms who had transferred to terms modelled on local conditions of service (and
were therefore no longer vulnerable to the application of CSR 281(1)(d) were
vulnerable to the non-renewal of their agreements if there was a better
qualified and more suitable officer available. Local officers on agreement terms were not vulnerable in
that way because they could escape the effect of the opening-up scheme by
applying to join the permanent establishment. The Applicants contend that this was the real reason
for the introduction of the opening-up scheme.
178. That
the opening-up scheme had this effect is not in doubt. However, whether it was introduced so
as to have this effect is another matter altogether. I cannot infer that it was introduced to have this effect
simply because it did have this effect.
What the Applicants are doing is questioning whether the stated
motive for the introduction of the opening-up scheme was the true
motive. That is not an issue which
I can determine on the affirmations and affidavits which have been filed. What the SCS’s true motive in
introducing the opening-up scheme was is an issue of fact. That issue of fact could only have been
resolved by cross-examination of Mr Jackson. No application to cross-examine him was made. In these circumstances, I have no
alternative but to treat the stated reason for the introduction of the
opening-up scheme as the true reason for its introduction.
179. It
is against that background that I turn to the three features of the opening-up
scheme which are challenged.
Before I do so, however, there is one point I should deal with. In support of the Applicants’
contention as to what the true motive for the introduction of the opening-up
scheme was, Mr Dykes relied on the fact that the prohibition on overseas
officers who had transferred to terms modelled on local conditions of service
transferring to the permanent establishment was not referred to in the document
issued in September 1994 outlining the proposals for the opening-up scheme.[131] These proceedings were commenced on 27th
October 1994, and it could be inferred that it was as a result of that that it
was decided that the prohibition should continue to apply to transferring
officers. However, the September
1994 document identifies when local officers on agreement terms who wish to
transfer to the permanent establishment should do so.[132] So too did the paper for a meeting of
the Legco Panel on the topic.[133] The fact that the September 1994
document and the paper for the Legco Panel referred only to the right of local
officers on agreement terms to apply to the permanent establishment shows that
even at that stage it was proposed that overseas officers who transferred to
terms modelled on local conditions of service should not have that right.
(1)
TRANSFER TO THE PERMANENT ESTABLISHMENT
180. In
view of what I have already said, it is not surprising that the Applicants now
challenge the decision, re-affirmed in the context of the opening-up scheme,
not to permit overseas officers who transferred to terms modelled on local
conditions of service to transfer to the permanent establishment. All the Applicants were granted leave
to challenge this decision. With
the exception of Mr Bach, they clearly all have the standing to do so.
181. The
SCS’s justification for continuing, in the context of the opening-up scheme,
the prohibition on transferring officers applying to transfer to the permanent
establishment is exactly the same as his justification for doing so in the
original and modified transfer schemes.
For the reasons I have already given, the Respondents have not
discharged the burden of justifying this departure from the right protected by
Art. 21(c) of the BOR. All the
more so, where the difference in treatment between local officers on agreement
terms and overseas officers on agreement terms who transfer to terms modelled
on local conditions of service has a much more far-reaching impact now that it
enables only local officers to avoid the opening-up scheme. Accordingly, the decision complained of
was unlawful, and the challenge to it succeeds.
(2) PROFICIENCY IN
CHINESE
182. In
announcing the criteria which would be used in assessing the relevant merits of
the various candidates for the incumbent’s post, the SCS stated:
“…it will be necessary to take
into account the operational requirements of all positions in the rank
concerned to see whether an officer is capable of performing efficiently and
effectively the required duties of the rank. For instance, if a substantial
portion of officers in the rank are required to communicate directly with
people in Chinese, a candidate’s ability to perform effectively and efficiently
without an interpreter would be a consideration.”[134]
All the Applicants were given leave to challenge this decision. In my view, they all have the standing
to do so, with the exception of Mr Tromp.
He has been informed that, as a result of a selection exercise under the
opening-up scheme, his agreement would not be renewed. However, I was told from the Bar Table
that proficiency in Chinese was not a requirement in any of the posts in his
rank in his department, and the non-renewal of his agreement had nothing to do
with any lack of proficiency in Chinese on his part.
183. The
issues which the challenge to this decision raises are not dissimilar to the
issues raised in connection with the earlier decision relating to proficiency
in Chinese. I adopt what I have
already said on the topic, though I should add two points :
184. (i) The exception for specialist skills
which Mr Jackson deposed to in connection with the earlier decision was not
repeated when Mr Jackson explained the thinking behind the current decision.[135] However, I think I can fairly assume
that the thinking behind each of the decisions was the same.
185. (ii) The earlier decision focused attention
on what should happen if all the officers in the same rank were required
to communicate directly with people in Chinese. The current decision focuses on what should happen if a
substantial proportion of officers in the same rank were required to
communicate directly with people in Chinese. In my view, that is a distinction without a difference. The need for an officer to stand in for
another is less important if not all officers in the rank have to communicate
with people in Chinese, but the need for an officer to be able to do that still
exists.
186. For
these reasons and for the reasons set out earlier, the decision complained of
was not unlawful, and the challenge to it fails.
(3) LANGUAGE TRAINING .
187. The
decision challenged. In the
memorandum announcing the details of the opening-up scheme, the SCS stated :
“in
view of the growing need to speak colloquial Chinese in many departments,
overseas officers who transfer to locally modelled conditions will be required,
subject to the availability of resources to undergo Chinese language training.”[136]
188. Standing. All the Applicants were given leave to
challenge this decision, although the leave which the four individual
Applicants were given was conditional upon their filing evidence that they
needed to under go Chinese language training. I fear that the drafting of this condition was
deficient. The evidence which I
think they should have been required to file was whether they spoke colloquial
Chinese. It was only if they did
not that they would have been affected by this decision. As it was, all but Mr Bach complied
with the condition imposed, because all of them filed evidence to the effect
that they had not yet been required to undergo Chinese language training. Since Mr Bach did not comply with the
condition imposed, the conditional leave granted to him has lapsed. However, in view of the deficiency in
the drafting of the condition, I propose to treat the other three individual
Applicants as having the standing to challenge the decision, and it follows
that if they have the standing to challenge it, so too does the AECS.
189. The
context of the decision challenged.
Although this decision was announced in the memorandum setting out the
details of the opening-up scheme, it has nothing to do with the opening-up
scheme itself. The renewal of a
transferring officer’s agreement is not dependent on his undergoing Chinese
language training. I propose to
deal with the decision as a free-standing one, unconnected with the various
schemes introduced by the SCS. I
confess to being surprised by the challenge to this decision. After all, if the AECS wants its
members to be treated as local officers, it is a little rich for the AECS to be
complaining about those of its members who do not speak colloquial Chinese
having to undergo Chinese language training. However, I must consider the challenge to the decision on
its merits, and that I now do.
190. The
basis of the challenge. The
decision is challenged on the basis that it constitutes an infringement of Art.
21(c) in that it is not a requirement which is imposed on local officers on
agreement terms. That presupposes that there are a not insignificant number of
local officers on agreement terms who do not speak colloquial Chinese. I have rejected this argument in
another context. The more
compelling ground on which the decision is challenged is its
irrationality. There is no need,
it is said, for transferring officers to be able to speak colloquial Chinese if
it has no rational connection with their duties. In my view, there is no answer to this criticism. It is said that proficiency in
colloquial Chinese “is a means to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of
those officers who were formerly appointed on overseas terms by enabling them
to become more proficient in the language spoken by the general public.”[137] But how is that effectiveness and
efficiency improved if they do not need to speak colloquial Chinese to
discharge their own duties and those duties of other officers in the same rank
who they might be required to stand in for? Indeed, the approach of the SCS is inconsistent with the
criteria for determining (a) “service need” in assessing whether an overseas
officer is eligible to transfer to terms modelled on local conditions of
service, and (b) who is the most meritorious in the selection exercise under
the opening-up scheme. Those
criteria relate to the officer’s efficiency and effectiveness in performing his
duties and those duties of officers who he might be called upon to stand in
for.
191. It
may be that the SCS intended to limit the requirement to undergo Chinese
language training to officers who have to speak colloquial Chinese to perform
those duties. But he did not say
that in his announcement, nor is there any evidence that, despite the terms in
which the requirement was expressed, the requirement was nevertheless intended
to be limited in that way. For
these reasons, therefore, the decision complained of was unlawful, and the
challenge to it succeeds.
THE PRINCIPAL OFFICIAL POSTS
192. The
decisions challenged. The Basic
Law identifies a number of senior posts which can only be held by Chinese
citizens who are permanent residents of the SAR with no right of abode in any
foreign country, and who have ordinarily resided in Hong Kong for a continuous
period of at least 15 years.[138] The Government believes that these
posts should be filled, well before 1997, by officers who are, at least
potentially, able to continue in these posts after 30th June
1997. Most of these posts are in
the Administrative Service or have traditionally been filled by members of the
Administrative Service. Thus, it
was decided that steps should be taken in the Administrative Service to ensure
that there was a sufficient pool of officers who were potentially eligible for
these posts. Accordingly, in June
1994, the SCS announced that there would have to be a limit on the number of
overseas officers in the ranks in the Administrative Service immediately below
that of Secretary. That ceiling
was fixed at two AOSGA posts and four AOSGB1 posts.[139]
194. A
similar scheme was established in the Attorney-General’s Chambers. The post of Attorney-General will be a
Principal Official post in the SAR Government. So too will any of the five Law Officers if any of them acts
as his deputy. In the light of
that, it was recommended that special measures be taken to build up a pool of
local officers who would be potentially eligible for these posts.[140] Those measures included the grooming of
up to six local officers at the rank of Deputy Principal Crown Counsel for the
posts of Principal Crown Counsel.
The effect of the adoption of these measures would be the acceleration
of the promotion of those local officers.
These recommendations were adopted, and the scheme, which came to be
known as the Succession Posts Scheme, was announced by the Attorney-General in
the 1994 Policy Address.
194. Standing. The four individual Applicants were not
given leave to challenge these decisions.
None of them were employed in the Administrative Service or the
Attorney-General’s Chambers. The
AECS was given leave to challenge these decisions on the basis that it
represented a class of officers, at least one of whom was likely to be affected
by these decisions.
195. The
fact that the AECS has not been able to identify a particular officer affected
by some of the other decisions challenged in these proceedings has not
prevented me from finding that the AECS has the standing to challenge those
decisions. I have found in
relation to them that it was nevertheless possible that there was in the Civil
Service a member of the AECS affected by them, and who wished the AECS to
challenge the decisions on his behalf.
However, unlike all the other decisions challenged in these proceedings,
the decisions relating to the Administrative Service and the Attorney’s
General’s Chambers are decisions which relate to particular Government
departments. The limited number of
officers affected by these decisions can be identified. In the Administrative Service, they are
those officers who would otherwise have been eligible for promotion to AOSGA
and AOSGB1 posts but who are not potentially eligible to be a Principal
Official. In the
Attorney-General’s Chambers, they are the officers at the rank of Deputy
Principal Crown Counsel who are likewise not potentially eligible to be a
Principal Official. Because such
officers can be identified with ease, I have reached the conclusion that the
AECS only has the standing to challenge these decisions if they identify such
an officer who is a member of the AECS and who wishes the AECS to challenge
these decisions on his behalf.
196. As
for officers in the Administrative Service, the AECS relied in the course of
the hearing, on Mr. Jackson himself and Mr. Robert Footman, who were both
superseded for promotion to AOSGA and AOSGB1 posts.[141] However, Mr. Huggins told me from
the Bar Table that neither of them are members of the AECS, and neither of them
is willing for the AECS to challenge the decisions relating to the
Administrative Service on their behalf.
Plainly, no reliance can be placed on them to establish standing. The only other officer who the AECS
relies upon is an unidentified officer who is stated in Answers to
Interrogatories to be a member of the AECS and who wishes the AECS to challenge
the decision relating to the Administrative Service on his behalf. What the
Answers to Interrogatories say about him is as follows :
“Mr.
X, an Administrative Officer, employed on Permanent & Pensionable
conditions of service, more than 15 years in Hong Kong, not a BDTC (HK), is or
is likely to be affected directly or indirectly by [the decision relating to
the Administrative Service]. Mr. X
is unwilling, unless it is determined to be necessary in law to do so, to
reveal his name in these proceedings.”[142]
Mr. Dykes told me that Mr. X was not prepared under any
circumstances to be identified.
197. It
may be that the information given about Mr. X is inadmissible as hearsay[143] ,
but I am prepared to assume, for present purposes, that it is admissible. I am also prepared to assume that Mr. X
is not potentially eligible to be a Principal official. What I cannot assume is that he would
have been eligible for promotion to AOSGA and AOSGB1 posts. There may be all sorts of reasons why
he would not have been eligible:
examples might be his age (the policy has been that overseas officers in
the Administrative Service have generally been required to retire at the age of
57) and his health. I respect, of
course, Mr. X’s desire for privacy, but if he is not, albeit for understandable
reasons, prepared to come out into the open, the Respondents are in an
impossible position. They cannot
point to any matters which might show that he was not eligible for
promotion. For this reason, the
AECS cannot rely on Mr. X to establish its standing to challenge the decision
relating to the Administrative Service.
Since none of the Applicants, therefore, have the standing to challenge
this decision, the challenge to it fails.
198. As
for the Attorney’s General’s Chambers, the AECS relies on Mr. Alan Roger. I know from an affirmation made by him
in these proceedings that he is the Immediate Past President of the AECS. The Answers to Interrogatories tell me
that he wishes the AECS to challenge the Succession Posts Scheme on his behalf. What the Answers to Interrogatories say
about him is as follows :
“Alan
Ralph Roger, Deputy Principal Crown Counsel in the Legal Department, 8 years in
Hong Kong, on agreement conditions of service, not a British Dependant
Territories Citizenship (Hong Kong), is, was or likely to be affected directly
by [inter alia , the Succession Posts Scheme].”[144]
Again, it may be that the information about Mr Roger is inadmissible
as hearsay, but I can, I think, assume that it is correct. The Respondents have not asserted that
it is not. Having lived in Hong
Kong for only eight years, Mr Roger is not potentially eligible to be a
Principal Official. As a Deputy
Principal Crown Counsel, his chances of promotion to Principal Crown Counsel
are affected by the Succession Posts Scheme. The Respondents do not suggest otherwise. They simply take the same point about
him as they took about Mr. Wellings, namely that Mr. Roger is not a permanent
resident of Hong Kong. That point
does not get the Respondents anywhere for the reasons I have already
given. Accordingly, the AECS can
rely on Mr. Roger to establish its standing to challenge the Succession Posts
Scheme.
199. Irrationality. The decision to implement the
Succession Posts Scheme is said to be irrational on two grounds :
(i) the
Basic Law does not contemplate the creation of a pool of officers from which
the Principal Officials will be selected.
Indeed, it contemplates continued employment for all officers in post on
30th June 1997, including British and foreign nationals. It is therefore said to be irrational to
groom officers for the Principal Officials posts at all. I reject this criticism. The fact that the Basic Law does not
contemplate the creation of a pool does not make the creation of a pool
irrational. Sensible manpower
planning requires the creation of a pool of talent from which senior officers
will be drawn in the future. And
although the Basic Law contemplates continued employment for all officers in
post on 30th June 1997, it excludes a class of officers from the
Principal Official posts.
(ii) Even if it is rational to
groom officers to be Principal Officials, it is said to be irrational to
include in the pool officers whose eligibility is only potential. Should not the pool be limited only to
those officers who are in fact eligible to the Principal Officials? After all, officers who are only
potentially eligible may never be eligible in fact. I reject this criticism as well. Only Chinese citizens are eligible to be Principal
Officials. It may be that few, if
any, of the officers currently in line for the Principal Official posts are at
the moment Chinese citizens. To
include in the pool, therefore, only persons who are Chinese citizens now
could mean that there would be no officers in the pool at all. It is therefore necessary to include in
the pool officers whose eligibility to be Principal Officials is only
potential. That means including in
the pool officers who have the potentiality to become Chinese citizens by 1997,
even though to do so might involve them having to divest themselves of their
current nationality.
200. Discrimination.
The Succession Posts Scheme is said to be an infringement of Art. 21(c) of the
BOR. That is because the scheme only applies to local officers. The
opportunity for accelerated promotion to the post of Principal Crown Counsel is
denied to overseas officers. That is attributable to their national or
social origins, because it was their national or social origins which, by virtue
of CSR 115(1), caused them to be classified as overseas officers in the first
place. If local officers who are only potentially able to qualify to be
Principal Officials are included in the scheme, so too should those overseas
officers who are potentially able to do so.
201. In
evaluating this argument, it is necessary to draw a distinction between
officers whose potentiality to be eligible for the Principal official posts is
only theoretical, and those whose potentiality to be eligible for them is very
real. If only local officers have
a real potentiality to be eligible for the Principal official Posts, the
inequality of treatment is justifiable.
Sensible and fair-minded people who do not serve in the
Attorney-General’s Chambers would recognise the need to afford only officers
who have a real potentiality to become Principal Officials accelerated
promotion to the post of Principal Crown Counsel. Limiting accelerated promotion to the post of Principal
Crown Counsel to such officers is both rational and proportionate to that need. It may be that there is a tension
between the eligibility requirements for the Principal Official posts in the
Basic Law and Art. 21(c) of the BOR, but that does not make the need to groom
officers who have a real potentiality to become Principal Officials any the
less real.
202. On
this analysis, all that remains is to determine whether it is factually correct
that only local officers have a real potentiality to become Chinese
citizens, and therefore eligible to be Principal Officials. On that issue, I have the expert
evidence of Professor Anthony Dicks Q.C., an acknowledged expert on Chinese
law. His evidence is not
challenged, and there is no reason why I should not accept it. The thrust of his evidence is that an
application for naturalisation as a Chinese citizen must be approved by the
Ministry of Public Security. The
power of the Ministry to approve such applications is entirely discretionary,
but at the very least it must be satisfied that the applicant for
naturalisation is a “close relative” of one or more Chinese persons or has a
“fixed residence” in China, or that there are other “proper” or “legitimate”
reasons for the application.
“Legitimate” reasons are “almost certainly” limited to “devotion to the
cause of [China’s] revolution or construction”, and being adopted by a Chinese
citizen. Professor Dicks accepts
that “it is not impossible for foreign nationals whose ethnic origin is not
that of any of the numerous ethnic groups who together comprise the population
of China to acquire Chinese nationality by naturalisation”[145] ,
but the thrust of his evidence is that they are unlikely to be able to do
so. Since the effect of CSR 115(1)
is that local officers are overwhelmingly likely to be ethnic Chinese, and that
overseas officers are not, it is the case that local officers have a
real potentiality to become Chinese citizens, and overseas officers do not.
203. For
these reasons, the Succession Posts Scheme is lawful, and the challenge to its
legality fails.
THE UNIFORM TERMS SCHEME
204. The
Government’s modified proposals for a uniform set of conditions of service for
all civil servants were published on 24th June 1994.[146] Two of the proposals are challenged in
these proceedings:
(i) the proposal that references to local
officers in the uniform set of conditions should for the time being refer to
those officers who are “Hong Kong permanent residents” within the meaning of
the Immigration Ordinance;[147]
(ii) the proposal that for appointment to
the permanent establishment, an officer should have passed a Chinese subject in
the Certificate of Education examination or have passed a basic Chinese
language proficiency test.[148]
205. However,
an important question arises as to whether these proposals amount to decisions
of the kind which are amenable to judicial review. The fact that they were only proposals is borne out by the
document itself, which concluded :
“We are consulting the major staff councils again and will seek
further advice from the civil service advisory bodies. Thereafter the Administration will
discuss the proposals with the Chinese authorities with a view to reaching an
early agreement.”
Mr. Huggins told me that it is the Government’s present intention to
implement these proposals unless very compelling reasons are advanced for
changing that intention.
206. There
are two powerful reasons which justify the conventional view that mere
proposals should not be susceptible to judicial review – even if the proposals
are likely to be put into effect.
First, there is always the possibility that they might not be put into
effect. In that event, the
proceedings would have served no useful purpose. Secondly, no one has the standing to challenge mere
proposals. Until the proposals are
put into effect, no one is affected by them.
207. Mr.
Dykes argues that the conventional view is now an outmoded one in view of the
decision of the House of Lords in R. v. Secretary of State for Employment
ex p. Equal Opportunities Commission [1994] 2 WLR 409. In that case, the Secretary of State
had been requested by the Commission to indicate whether he was willing to
introduce legislation to remove discrimination which the Commission argued was
inherent in existing legislation.
The Secretary of State replied that the Government believed that the
existing legislation was not discriminatory. The House of Lords held that (i) there had been no decision,
but (ii) the Courts had the jurisdiction to declare whether the existing
legislation was discriminatory, and (iii) proceedings by way of judicial review
was the appropriate procedure for the determination of that issue.
208. The
basis upon which the House of Lords held that there had been no decision was
that the Secretary of State’s reply did no more than express the view that the
existing legislation was not discriminatory.[149] I confess to being surprised by that
reasoning. The reply had gone on
to state that the Government had no plans to change the aspects of the existing
legislation which were alleged to be discriminatory. I would have thought that it was strongly arguable that that
statement amounted to a decision not to introduce amending legislation for the
time being. Be that as it may, it
is not for me to question the view of the House of Lords, and I proceed on the
assumption that a decision is not a necessary prerequisite for an application
for judicial review.
209. However,
I do not think that this case assists the Applicants. Whatever else can be said the Government had adopted a
particular stance on whether the existing legislation was discriminatory. There was nothing provisional about
that stance. The only way the
Government’s view was going to be altered was if the Courts declared that its
view of the law was wrong.
Contrast that with the present case. The Government’s modified proposals for a uniform set of
conditions of service were still provisional. A further consultation exercise was still to take
place. In my view, even if there
does not have to be a decision to warrant the invocation of proceedings by way
of judicial review, there must
have been a concluded stance on whatever it is sought to challenge. It is for that reason that I conclude
that the Government’s modified proposals for a uniform set of conditions of
service are not amenable to judicial review.
210. Despite
that, both Mr. Dykes and Mr. Huggins asked me to express a view on the legality
of the two challenged features of the proposals, upon the assumption that they
will in due course be carried into effect. I do not think that it would be appropriate to do so. I acknowledge that the mere fact that
an issue is hypothetical does not mean that the Courts do not have the jurisdiction
to determine it: the fact that an
issue is hypothetical goes only to whether in its discretion the Court should
grant declaratory relief.[150] The only declaration I could grant
would be that, in the (albeit likely) event of the proposals being carried
into effect , they would be either lawful or unlawful as the case may
be. However, that would be so
close to the Court giving an advisory opinion that I would not be prepared to
grant such relief. If I cannot
make such a declaration, it follows that it would be wrong for me to express a
view on the topics which the parties want me to.
THE OFFERS TO THE FOUR INDIVIDUAL APPLICANTS
211. The
terms on which the four individual Applicants were offered new agreements on
terms modelled on local conditions of service are challenged by the individual
Applicants in these proceedings.
They are challenged on the basis that they incorporated the decisions
complained of. I need only deal
with those decisions which I have found to be unlawful, and which any of the four
individual Applicants have the standing to challenge. On the assumption that the terms of the offers
incorporated the decision to require the Applicants to undergo training in
Chinese, the offers which Mr. Tromp, Mr. Wilson and Mr. Toes received were
unlawful to that extent. On
the assumption that the terms of the offers to the four Applicants incorporated
the decision not to permit them to transfer to the permanent establishment, the
offers they received were unlawful to that extent as well.
CONCLUSION
212. Relief. I have in the course of this judgment
identified those decisions which were lawful, and those which were not. Mr. Dykes and Mr. Huggins agreed early in the hearing that the
only relief I should give at this stage is declaratory relief, and that if
further relief is sought in the light of my judgment the parties should have
liberty to restore the Motion for that purpose. I make a consent order to that effect. I leave it to the parties to draft such
declaratory relief as my judgment renders appropriate, and I give them liberty
to restore the Motion in the event of a suitable draft not being agreed.
213. Costs. I have found that five of the decisions
challenged were unlawful. All the
other decisions I have found to be either lawful or not amenable to
challenge. However, two of the
decisions which I have found to be unlawful, viz. the prohibition on
transferring officers transferring to the permanent establishment, are
particularly significant ones. The
spoils of battle have been sufficiently shared, I think, to say that neither of
the principal protagonists in the litigation (the AECS and the SCS) have been
victorious. In these
circumstances, the right course is for all the parties to bear their own legal
costs. The order nisi as to costs which
I make, therefore, is that there be no order as to costs. That will also apply to the costs
reserved on 25th November 1994.
214. Miscellaneous
matters. There are four other
things I want to say in conclusion:
(i) Mr. Huggins criticised the
Applicants for retreating in the course of the proceedings from some of the
more serious allegations they had originally made. I acquit the Applicants of that criticism. It is natural in the course of a case
of this complexity for the arguments to be refined when the hearing takes
place. It may be that some of the
allegations were originally expressed in language which have since been
modified, but it cannot be denied that the strength of feeling generated by the
Government’s attempts to re-organise the Civil Service has been intense. If emotions were running a little high,
I think that those who used strong language because they perceived their
interests to be threatened can be forgiven for doing so.
(ii) I have attempted to address
in this judgment all the principal arguments which have been canvassed before
me. However, it has not been
possible to address every argument.
Otherwise, this already lengthy judgment would have been even
longer. Those arguments which I
have not touched upon in this judgment are ones which I have either not
accepted or not regarded as decisive of the issues before me. In particular, I have not addressed in
detail the statistics which the interrogatories I ordered on 4th
August 1995 have revealed. I have
only referred to those which I have regarded as having a real impact on the
legality of the decisions challenged.
(iii) I wish to make two recommendations
for the future handling of a case which has so many different issues. First, with the advantage of hindsight,
I would have preferred to hear both sides’ arguments on each issue before
proceeding to the next issue.
Secondly, again with the advantage of hindsight, I would have preferred
all the exhibits to the affidavits and affirmations to have been in separate
bundles in chronological order.
That would have enabled me to see more clearly the history of the localisation policy, and of the various schemes which were introduced. Consideration should be given in the
future to the adoption of those courses in an appropriate case.
(iv) Finally, I wish to pay tribute to
the industry and research which has gone into the preparation of this case, and
the comprehensive nature of the arguments of counsel. I could not have produced this judgment without the enormous
assistance I have had. I do not
wish to single anyone out in particular, but I think that the burden which Mr.
Dykes was shouldering on his own was an unusually onerous one. Although some of the Applicants and
officers of the AECS were available to help him on questions of fact, he did
not appear to me to have had the legal back-up which Mr. Huggins an Mr. Fok
had. Having said that, though, I
wish to express my personal thanks to everyone responsible for making my task
less difficult than it would otherwise have been.
(Brian Keith)
Judge of the High Court
Representation:
Mr. Philip Dykes, inst’d by Messrs. Boase &
Cohen, for the Applicants
Mr. Adrian Huggins Q.C. Leading Mr. Joseph Fok,
inst’d by Messrs. Wilkinson & Grist, for the Respondents
[1]
“Organisation of the Colonial Service”, Colonial Office (Col. 197), 1946,
para.3.
[2] Ibid., para.
3.
[3] Ibid., para.
21(vii).
[4] Ibid., para.
13.
[5] “Service
with Overseas Governments”, Cmnd. 1193, para. 32.
[6] Report of
the Hong Kong Salaries Commission, 1947, para. 30.
[7] Secretarial
Standing Circular No. “L” 10, 5th September 1961, para. 1.
[8] Ibid.,
paras. 4-6.
[9] “General Guidelines”, issued by the
Principal Assistant Secretary for the Civil Service (Appointments), 23rd
March 1979, para. 4.
[10] Joint
Declaration, Annex I, Part IV, final para.
[11] CSR,
Introduction, para. 4.
[12] CSR 115(2).
[13] CSR 100
(15).
[14] CSR
100(14).
[15] CSR 100
(5).
[16] CSR
100(12)(d).
[17] CSR 112(4).
[18] CSR 121(2).
[19] CSR 121(3).
[20] CSR
121(2)(c).
[21] CSR 121(1).
[22] CSR 109(1)(a).
[23] CSR,
Introduction, para. 4.
[24] 1968
Agreement between the Hong Kong Government and the Main Staff Associations,
clause 15(1).
[25] Notes of
Meeting, the SCS and representatives of the AECS, 19th March 1993.
[26] Circular
Memorandum No. 79/93, 25th October 1993.
[27] Circular Memorandum No. 36/94, 24th
June 1994.
[28] Affidavit
(2) of Christopher Jackson, para. 59.
[29] Letter, the
Governor to the Convenor of the LegCo Panel on Public Service, 3rd
September 1993.
[30] Minutes,
177th meeting of the SCSC, 13th August 1993, para. 4767.
[31] Memorandum
SPH 1/1/C(C)(93)III.
[32] Minutes,
177th meeting of the SCSC, 13th August 1993, para. 4770.
[33] Affidavit (2) of Christopher Jackson, para. 98.
[34]
Memorandum SPH 1/1/C(C)(93)V, 23rd August 1993; Circular Memorandum No. 64/93, 13th
September 1993; Circular Memorandum
(78) in SPH 1/1/C(C)(93)VI, 21st September 1993.
[35] Hong Kong Legislative Council, Reports
of Debates, 15th December 1993, pp. 195-199.
[36] Paper for LegCo Panel on Public
Service, 8th June 1994.
[37] Affidavit (2) of Christopher Jackson, para. 188
[38] Circular Memorandum No. 47/94.
[39] Affidavit (2) of Christopher Jackson, paras. 185-188.
[40] Memorandum SPH 1/1/C(C)(94)XV.
[41] Circular Memorandum No. 47/94, 28th
July 1994, para.6.
[42] “Proposals for Opening Up Agreement
Officers’ Positions for Competition”, 28th September 1994.
[43] CSB Circular No. 24/94; Circular Memorandum No. 79/94.
[44] Arts. 61 and 101.
[45] Letter, the SCS to members of the
Administrative Service, 15th June 1994.
[46] The 1994 Policy Address.
[47] Wade and
Forsyth, Administrative Law, 7th ed., pp. 710-711.
[48] Memorandum SPH 1/1/1C(C)(93)III.
[49] Section 2A of the Immigration
Ordinance.
[50] Section 18 of, and paras. 5-8 of Sch. 1
to, the British Nationality Act 1981.
[51] Affidavit (2) of Christopher Jackson, paras. 85-87.
[52] Section 2(1) of the Civil Aviation
Ordinance (Cap. 448).
[53] Art. 24(6) of the Basic Law.
[54] Compare R. v. Sin Yau Ming [1992] 1 HKCLR 127 with Waung J’s powerful judgment in Kwan Kong Co.
Ltd. V Town Planning Board (HCMP 1679/94).
[55] See section 59A of the Immigration
Ordinance.
[56] See Art. 1 of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination.
[57] Hong Kong Legislative Council, Reports
of Debates, 25th July 1990, pp. 210-211.
[58] Sections 6(1) and 18(1) of the
Electoral Provisions Ordinance (Cap. 367).
[59] Section 7-11 of the Electoral
Provisions Ordinance.
[60] Sections 18 and 19 of the Electoral
Provisions Ordinance.
[61] Re Gape [1952] 1 Ch. 743
at p. 749, in which the Court of Appeal had to construe the phrase “take up
permanent residence in England” in a will.
[62] Art. 24(4) of the Basic Law.
[63] Arts. 24(1)-(3) of the Basic Law.
[64] That is said to be the effect of
section 20 of the Citizenship Act (Cap. 349) of Sri Lanka and section 9 of the
Citizenship Act 1955 of India.
[65] Affidavit (4) of the Christopher
Jackson, para. 4; affidavit (7) of
the Christopher Jackson, para. 9.
[66] Memorandum SPH 1/1/C(C)(93)III.
[67] Affidavit (8) of Christopher Jackson.
[68] Paras. 15 and 19.1.
[69] Memorandum SPH 1/1/C(C)(93)V.
[70] Circular Memorandum (78) in SPH
1/1/C(C)(93)VI.
[71] Lord Diplock in Council of Civil
Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services [1985] AC 374 at
p.410G.
[72] Affidavit
(2) of the Christopher Jackson, para. 22(3).
[73] Annex B to
Memorandum SPH 1/1/C(C)(93)III, para. 1.
[74] Affidavit (7) of Christopher Jackson, para. 9.
[75] Affidavit (2) of Christopher Jackson, para. 96.
[76] Ibid.
[77] Ibid.,
para. 97.
[78] Circular
Memorandum No. 64/93, para. 3(a)
[79] CSRs 1212(3) (casual leave) and 1222(5)
(vacation leave).
[80] CSR 1212(3).
[81] CSRs 1225(4) and 1235.
[82]
Affidavit (2) of Christopher Jackson, para. 106 (casual leave); Circular Memorandum No. 64/93, para.
3(a)(iii)(vacation leave).
[83] Agreement (2) of Christopher Jackson, para. 105(a).
[84] CSR 1181(2).
[85] CSR 1183(2)(d).
[86] CSR 1183(1).
[87] CSR
1153(2).
[88] CSR 1237.
[89] Under CSR 1320.
[90] Circular
Memorandum No. 64/93, para. 3(b).
[91] CSR 1376(4).
[92] CSRs 766(1)(school passages) and
1335(d)(i) (overseas education allowances).
[93] Circular Memorandum No. 64/93, paras.
3(c) and 3(d).
[94] CSRs 767 (school passages) and
1335(d)(ii) (overseas education allowances).
[95] Memorandum SPH 1/1/C(C)(93)III, para. 4
[96] Circular Memorandum No. 64/93, para.
3(g).
[97] circular Memorandum No. 47/94, Annex A, para. 32
[98] Circular Memorandum No. 79/93, 25th
October 1993, para. 5.
[99] Art. 100.
[100] Memorandum SPH 1/1/C(C)(93)III, para.
3(a).
[101] Circular Memorandum (78) in SPH
1/1/C(C)(93)VI, para. 2.
[102] Affidavit (7) of Christopher Jackson, para. 9.
[103] Affidavit (2) of Christopher Jackson, para.
116.
[104] Affidavit (4) of Christopher Jackson, para. 6.
[105] The 1994 Policy Address.
[106] Art. 9.
[107] Affidavit (2) of Christopher Jackson, para. 243.
[108] Circular Memorandum (78) in SPH
1/1/C/(C)(93)VI, para. 10.
[109] Answers to Interrogatories, 3rd
May 1995, para. 1(d). These
interrogatories were contained in an affidavit made by Mr. Royston Griffey, the
President of the AECS. The
evidence relating to the length of Mr. Wellings’ stay in Hong Kong is
technically inadmissible as hearsay, because I do not suppose that Mr. Griffey
was speaking from his personal knowledge.
I have taken it into account de bene esse.
[110]
Constitution and Rules of the AECS, Art. 5(1).
[111] Ibid. Art. 3(1)(a).
[112] Circular Memorandum No. 47/94.
[113] Circular Memorandum No. 47/94, Annex A, paras. 23, 14, 18-19.
[114] CSR 109(1)(a).
[115] Circular Memorandum No. 47/94, para. 2
[116] Ibid, para. 3.
[117] Letter, the SNEOA to the SCS, 6th
June 1994.
[118] Memorandum SPH 1/1/C(C)(94)XV.
[119] Circular Memorandum No. 47/94, Annex A, para. 30.
[120] Letter, the SNEOA to the SCS, 12th
April 1994.
[121] CSR 100(12)(d).
[122] Circular Memorandum No. 47/94, para.
4.
[123] Circular Memorandum No. 47/94, para. 4.
[124] Affidavit (2) of Christopher Jackson, para. 194.
[125]
Affidavit (4) of Christopher Jackson, para. 14.
[126] Art. 100 and 101.
[127] View of the Political Sub-Group of the
Preliminary Working Committee, undated; newsletter of the AECS reporting the
views of Lu Ping, 25th May 1995.
[128] CSB Circular No. 24/94; Circular Memorandum No. 79/94.
[129] Affidavit (2) of Christopher Jackson, paras. 236, 238.
[130] CSB Circular No. 24/94, Annex A, Part
II, para. 5.
[131] “Proposals for Opening Up Agreement
Officers’ Positions for Competition”, 28th September 1994.
[132] Ibid., para. 8.
[133] Paper for Legco Panel on Public
Service, 17th October 1994, para. 12.
[134]
CSB Circular No. 24/94, para. 14.
[135] Compare paras. 116 and 242 of affidavit
(2) of Christopher Jackson.
[136] CSB Circular No. 24/94, para. 15.
[137] Affidavit (2) of Christopher Jackson, para. 243.
[138] Arts. 61 and 101.
[139]
Letter, the SCS to members of the Administrative Service, 15th June
1994, Annexure, para. 9.
[140] Third Report of the Working Group on
the Localisation of the Attorney-General’s Chambers, 30th September
1993.
[141] Affidavit (2) of Christopher Jackson, para. 153.
[142] Answers to Interrogatories, 3rd
May 1995, para. (1)(e).
[143] See footnote 109.
[144] Answers to Interrogatories, 3rd
May 1995, para. 1(b).
[145] Affidavit of Anthony Dicks, para. 23.
[146] Circular Memorandum No. 36/94.
[147] Ibid., para. 8.
[148] Ibid., para. 10(a).
[149] Per Lord Keith of Kinkel at p. 418C-D.
[150] See Zamir and Woolf, “The Declaratory
Judgment”, 2nd ed., paras. 4.032-4.042.