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SHINDORN POOYFAY v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
SHINDORN POOYFAY v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5463 · HCAL 1448/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1448/2024
[2026] HKCFI 5463
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1448 of 2024
BETWEEN
| |Shindorn Pooyfay |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
|(|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
2. No extension of time be granted to the applicant to file the
Leave Application out of time.
3. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial
review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in the
prescribed Form 86 filed on 28 August 2024, the applicant applied for leave
to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended judicial
review was against the decisions of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the
Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 9 December 2022
(“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the decision
of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 17 December 2021
rejecting (“Director’s Decision”) the applicant's non-refoulement claim on
all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the
following hyperlinks: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL001448_
2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
Notwithstanding that the Director’s Decision and the Board’s Decision are
both in Chinese, this court considers it expedient to render its decision
in English as both the Form 86 and the supporting affirmation were prepared
in the English language.
In the Form 86, the applicant named the Board as the proposed interested
party in addition to it having also been named as the proposed respondent.
As the Director should have been the proper putative interested party, the
Form 86 shall be amended accordingly on the court’s own motion.
The applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Thailand, she would be
harmed or killed by (i) the loan shark for an unpaid loan; and (ii) the
creditor of her ex-boyfriend for an unpaid loan of which the applicant was
the guarantor. The reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the
Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless
otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and
descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
The applicant has requested for an oral hearing. On 10 September 2026, the
Removal Assessment and Litigation (Removal and Deportation) Section (2) of
the Immigration Department separately faxed a letter to the court,
informing the court that the applicant would like to withdraw her judicial
review application. Enclosed with the said letter was the applicant’s
signed memo in English dated 8 September 2026. In the memo, the applicant
stated that she would like to withdraw the Leave Application as her issues
has been solved. In the circumstances, this court will dispose of the
Leave Application on paper.
Discussion
A leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there is no
requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.[2]
It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the
Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.
In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds of
judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full and
frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. The
applicant’s Form 86 and the supporting affirmation contained no such
grounds.
As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will not
interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law, procedural
unfairness, or irrationality.[4] In the present case, although the Board
accepted the applicant’s evidence regarding the two outstanding loans, it
nonetheless found that the applicant would not be at risk of harm as the
Board believed that the loan sharks had no intention to cause her harm of
any kind. The Board found that the past ill-treatment failed to meet the
requisite level of severity. It further found that state protection and
internal relocation would be reasonably available. These are findings of
fact, which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with subject
to there being any public law errors.
Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the decision of the Board, this court is satisfied that the
Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and observed a
very high standard of fairness. The applicant advanced no grounds at all
in support of the Leave Application. Hence, the applicant has not shown
any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s
Decision. The applicant’s intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is
not reasonably arguable with any realistic prospects of success such that
would enable this court to grant leave[5].
Another matter I need to consider is the delay. Pursuant to O 53 r 4(1) of
the Rules of the High Court, an application to apply for judicial review
shall be made promptly and in any event within 3 months from the date of
the Board’s Decision. The applicant was late for about 1 and ½ years,
which delay is extremely lengthy. A good explanation shall be required.
The applicant has not provided any explanation at all. In the
circumstances, I’d be disinclined to grant any extension of time.
Withdrawal application
Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application referred to
above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the circumstances,
I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and hereby order the
dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md Mahamudun Nabi [2022]
HKCA 471; Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1140.
Order
The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
No extension of time be granted to the applicant to file the Leave
Application out of time.
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Dated the 6th day of October 2026
| |( Alfred CHAN ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |on 6/10/2026 |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as | |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the |Shindorn Pooyfay |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting| |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions|Applicant’s ref. no: |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Nil. |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was | |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |6/10/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 19575 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |2106 (Formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |11095/21) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to
the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of
persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified
Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process
claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the
USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3
HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23.
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015,
22 December 2016 at §142.
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v
Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.