LSP v. CHT

FCMC 3538/2023

[2026] HKFC 153

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 3538 OF 2023

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JUDGMENT
(Appeal against Master’s Decision)
(Interim Maintenance for Child of the Family)

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Introduction

1.  In the present divorce proceedings, the husband is the petitioner and the wife is the respondent.  For the ease of reference, I shall refer to the petitioner as “H” and the respondent as “W”.

2.  By a judgment dated 12 February 2025 (LSP v CHT [2025] HKFC 54) (“the Master’s Judgment”), Master Lung dismissed the applications taken out by H and W against each other for interim maintenance for the benefit of their child of the family, a daughter, whom I shall refer to as “D” in this judgment.  W did not appeal against the Master’s Judgment but H did.  This judgment deals with H’s appeal.

3.  Before I proceed, I must say this case should be qualified as one of the top 3 worst cases I have ever seen as a judge in the Family Court.

4.  H’s appeal was first heard on 2 May 2025. It came to my notice that parties had never served his/her Form Es on the other side, or for that matter, other documents as well throughout the proceedings for the reason of “reciprocity” or, to be more accurate, out of retaliation. Their stance is, “if you did not serve the document on me, I would not serve mine on you”.  Even if a piece of document was eventually served after the court’s intervention, it was not a complete copy or the same as the one filed to court.  I was therefore compelled to give the following case management directions for H’s appeal:

1.  Parties shall lodge and serve his/her hearing bundle on or before 11 July 2025.  The hearing bundle shall be served by way of registered post.

2.  Parties do file and serve his/her affirmation of service on or before 18 July 2025.  The affirmation of service shall be served by way of registered post.

3.  Parties may lodge and serve a Note on if the hearing bundle from the other side is inadequate on or before 25 July 2025.  Such Note shall not be more than 3 pages (printed one sided on A4 paper, at font 14 and 1 ½ line spacing) and shall be served on the other side by way of registered post.

4.  In the event that parties wish to adduce additional evidence pursuant to Order 58, rule 1 (5), Rules of the High Court (“RHC”), such application shall be taken out on or before 11 July 2025.

5.  H’s appeal was adjourned to 1 August 2025 for case management and with 15 August 2025 fixed for a 2-hour argument.

6.  In the meantime, on 11 July 2025, H took out a summons seeking leave to adduce further evidence for his appeal.  I shall deal with this application in the later part of this Judgment.

7.  On 1 August 2025, W was absent at the hearing as a result of which the hearing had to be adjourned to 8 August 2025.

8.  At the hearing of 8 August 2025, there were complaints by H that after comparing the court’s hearing bundle lodged by W with the hearing bundle he had received from W, the latter was incomplete.  I also noticed some documents included by the parties had been redacted at their liking without leave.  I therefore made an “unless order” against both of them that they had to lodge with the court a complete set of documents without any redaction; otherwise, they would be debarred from adducing his or her evidence at H’s appeal.  

9.  It can readily be seen from the above narration that both parties had engaged in manipulative tactics or underhanded tricks with a view to gain unfair advantages over the other so as to “win” the legal battle.  This is undesirable since much costs and time were spent on the part of the court to rectify the situation.

Background

10.  H is 38 years old and W is 39.  They were married in Hong Kong in March 2020.  A few months later, D was born in June 2022; she is now 4 years old.

11.  Unfortunately, the marriage is a short one.  On 30 March 2023, H petitioned for divorce on the ground of W’s unreasonable behaviour; that was disputed by W.  By then, D was only 9 months old.

12.  Notwithstanding that the petition was taken out more than 3 years ago, decree nisi has not been issued yet.  Further, despite the fact that the parties had clearly separated at some point of time, they had dispute over when that happened. Both were resolute to have the main suit to go to trial on the ground of W’ s unreasonable behaviours. In fact, as can be seen below, both parties were at loggerheads over all issues, be they big or small, relevant or not.  They have zero ability to agree on anything; perhaps the only agreement they have is to disagree.

13.  H was initially legally represented, but very soon, in December 2023, he chose to act in person.  W has been acting in person throughout.

Parties’ Applications for Interim Maintenance

14.  H started this round of litigation battle by taking out an application for interim maintenance in favour of D on 12 April 2024.  A few days later, not surprisingly, this met with W’s own application for interim maintenance on 19 April 2024.  I remarked “not surprisingly” because as observed by Master Lung, parties have been adopting “an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth” approach in handling these proceedings.[1] I am afraid, regrettably, this is their common modus operandi.

The Present Situation of the Parties

15.  Since D’s care and control has been granted to H, she is living with H and H’s mother, with the help of a domestic helper in a leased flat in Fanling.  D is attending kindergarten.

16.  As for W, she is living with her parents at her parents’ property in Kowloon Bay.  By an order dated 25 April 2024, W was given the following defined access:

(i)  Thursday access from 4:30-7:30pm (this access change to Wednesday when Thursday is a public holiday);

(ii)  Staying weekend access from Friday 3pm to Sunday 6pm on the 1^st and 3^rd week of the month;

(iii)  For 4^th and 5^th week (if situation arises) weekend access from Saturday 9am – 6pm.

17.  Recently, by a judgment dated 28 May 2026 (LSP v CHT [2026] HKFC 98), Deputy Judge F Li expanded the defined access in favour of W as follows,

1.  Overnight access to be exercised on a two-week rotation basis, (commencing on Friday 5 June 2026 as week 1, 12 June 2026 as week 2, 19 June 2026 as week 1, and so on), as follows :-

(a)  Week 1: Friday from after 4:30pm (or after school pick-up if the child of the family is attending school) until Sunday 6:00pm;

(b)  Week 2: Friday from after 4:30pm (or after school pick-up if the child of the family is attending school) until Saturday 6:00pm.

Holiday access

2.  For public holidays such as Christmas, Lunar New Year and Easter, each party shall have half of the holiday period for access. If the access period exceeds one day, it shall be overnight access. The specific dates and times shall be agreed between the Petitioner and the Respondent.

18.  Both parties do not have a new relationship.

Parties’ Properties

19.  For the purpose of this appeal, it is necessary to refer to the 2 pieces of landed property owned by the parties.  The first piece of property is a one-bedroom flat (around 381 ft²) in Tai Po (“the Tai Po Flat”) that they purchased in 2019. It was purchased in the joint names of the parties and was their first matrimonial home.  They then purchased a bigger flat in Shatin (“the Shatin Flat”) (around 548 ft²) in the sole name of W in anticipation of D’s arrival.  The Shatin Flat became their second and the last matrimonial home. At about the same time, the registered ownership of the Tai Po Flat was changed from joint names to H’s sole name. Hence, as of now, the Tai Po Flat is in H’s name and the Shatin Flat is in W’s name.  The 2 properties are still subject to mortgage.  H is paying a monthly mortgage repayment of $17,000 odd for the Tai Po Flat and W is paying $24,000 per month for the Shatin Flat.

The Master’s Judgment

20.  The Master found that both, in breach of their duty to court, had failed to give a full and frank disclosure of their respective financial situation; their Form Es lacked information and supporting documents. [2] Specifically, on the part of H, he did not disclose his salary statement nor did he disclose the fact that he had been in receipt of housing allowance. [3] Both exaggerated their expenses. [4]  Indeed, as I shall elaborate below, after having read the documents and heard the parties, I would add that they just picked and chose what information or documents they felt like to be disclosed.  By way of an example, both are working for the Government; I have no doubt that they could easily have their monthly salary statements or proof of monthly income printed out but for reasons only known to them there was none.

Parties’ Stance

21.  H’s case is he is in dire financial situation. He has been running on a deficit every month.  He therefore desperately looks to W for contribution.

22.  H’s stance is unbelievably fluid.  At the hearing of 2 May 2025, he said he needed $26,000 but at the end he sought a monthly sum of $40,000 payable by W.  These have to be contrasted against the figures he previously sought.  In his original application of 12 April 2024, he sought a monthly sum of $9,350 only and this sum would have to be increased to $11,850 as from September 2024.  Shortly thereafter on 29 April 2024, H increased his claim to $55,100, and to $60,100 as from September 2024.  I have no doubt that H just plucked the figures out of the air.

23.  As for W, while she said $40,000 is simply beyond her ability, she offered nothing.

Master’s Appeal

24.  Master’s appeal before a Judge is by way of actual re-hearing, and the Judge treats the matter as though it came before him for the first time: Order 58, rule 1, RHC.  The judge in chambers is in no way fettered by the previous exercise of the master’s discretion. The judge, however, is entitled, if he thinks fit, to adopt the master’s reasoning in his own judgment without setting out the reasoning himself; by so doing the judge does not fail to exercise the discretion confederated on him: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure (2026), at para 58/1/2.

Applicable Legal Principles on Interim Maintenance

25.  H is seeking interim maintenance for D only. The empowering provision is section 5 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap 192 (“MPPO”).  HH Judge Bruno Chan said the following in DX v LN (Maintenance Pending Suit & Costs Provision) (FCMC 7870/2014; 21 September 2015),

27.  … it would also be relevant to note that s 5 of MPPO gives the court much wider powers in dealing with financial provision for children both in terms of both the time for making orders which is before (hence maintenance pending suit) or on granting the decree of divorce, and the range of orders that the court can make including periodical payment, secured periodical payment, as well as a lump sum for the benefit of the children or for the purpose of enabling any liabilities or expenses reasonably incurred by or on behalf of the children before the making of the application, and that the court may exercise such orders from time to time, and to make further orders from time to time.

28. Furthermore, when considering such application albeit interim on behalf of the children, s 7(2) of MPPO requires the court to exercise those powers as to place the children, so far as it is practicable and just to do so, in the financial position in which the children would have been if the marriage had not broken down and each of the parties had properly discharged his or her financial obligations and responsibilities towards them. This would in my view be particularly relevant when the court comes to consider the standard of living which the children used to be able to enjoy and the parties’ proposed financial provisions for them.

(emphasis added)

26.  As to the approach to be adopted, the Court of Appeal in HJFG v KCY [2012] 1 HKLRD 95 summarised the established principles,

37.  The principles that have emerged over time to guide judges in matters of interim maintenance have been fashioned in the main to ensure fairness.  This is well illustrated in the judgment of Nicholas Mostyn QC, sitting then as a deputy High Court judge, in TL v ML and Others (Ancillary Relief: Claim against Assets of Extended Family) [2006] 1 FLR 1263, at 1289, in which, having looked at earlier authorities, he derived the following principles that speak specifically to fairness or are based on the need to ensure it.  For present purposes, it is sufficient to cite the relevant principles without citing the judge’s reference to the source of those principles:

i.  The sole criterion to be applied in determining the application is ‘reasonableness’, which is synonymous with ‘fairness’.

ii.  A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living.  This is not to say that the exercise is merely to replicate that standard.

iii.  In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long-term expenditure, more aptly to be considered on a final hearing.  That budget should be examined critically in every case to exclude forensic exaggeration.

iv.  Where the affidavit or form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay.  The court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources.  In such a situation, the court should err in favour of the payee.

38.  Finally, it is to be noted that in applications for interim maintenance, when the amount to be paid is for a limited period only and not all of the evidence is necessarily before the court, it is not appropriate, nor indeed in most cases possible, for the court to conduct a detailed investigation into the finances of the parties.  While, in order to determine what is or is not reasonable, some analysis is always required, that analysis can be conducted on a ‘broad-brush’ basis.”

(emphasis added)

27.  Further, Rayden and Jackson on Relationship Breakdown, Finances and Children (Lexis Nexis), said the following,

[11.78] There is no hard and fast rule, and no fixed proportion: each case depends on its own facts. The approach to maintenance pending suit should be empirical, and that 'in the ordinary sort of case the district judges who deal with these applications will have to take a broad view of means on the one hand and income on the other and come to a “rough and ready” conclusion', or take a 'broad brush' approach. The overriding consideration is the actual needs of the parties pending suit. Although the provisions of the MCA 1973, s 25 are expressed to arise only when the court is deciding whether to exercise its powers under s 23, 24 or 24A, the court may nonetheless have regard to the criteria listed in s 25 on an application for maintenance pending suit.

[11.79] In practice, as oral evidence is rarely given, it will be unusual for the court on an application for maintenance pending suit to be in a position to make findings of fact on issues in dispute sufficient, for example, to deal with conduct or allegations of non-disclosure. However, if it is demonstrated that the paying party has not performed his duty to make full and frank disclosure of his financial resources, then the court can take a broad and robust view of his means, and it does not have to accept and proceed on the basis of the assertions of the paying party as to his means and an inability to pay. The court can look at the reality of the situation and take into account voluntary funding from third parties (see TL v ML above).

(emphasis added)

H’s Summons to adduce new evidence

28.  As mentioned in [6] above, H had a summons to adduce further evidence in support of his appeal.

29.  The evidence that H sought to rely upon were:

(1)  An unstamped tenancy agreement dated 12 May 2025 that he entered with the landlord in respect of his Fanling home;

(2)  Some notices and documents issued by D’s kindergarten some of which pre-dated the hearing before the Master;

(3)  An employment contract made between H and his foreign domestic helper dated 12 August 2024.

30.  Order 58, rule 1(5) RHC provides that, “No further evidence (other than evidence as to matters which have occurred after the date on which the judgment, order or decision was given or made) may be received on the hearing of an appeal under this rule except on special grounds.”

31.  It is well settled that the phrase “special grounds” requires the conditions laid down in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 to be satisfied: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure (2026), at 58/1/3.  The Ladd v Marshall conditions are:

(a)  that the evidence could not have been obtained with reasonable diligence for use at the hearing below;

(b)  the evidence must be such that, if given, it would probably have an important influence on the result of the case, though it need not be decisive; and

(c)  the evidence must be such as is presumably to be believed.

32.  All the 3 conditions must be met.

33.  I now turn to H’s evidence.

34.  First, in respect of the unstamped tenancy agreement, I accept that apparently it came into existence after the Master’s hearing so it was not caught by the restriction.  However, as W rightly pointed out, it was unstamped.  Section 15 of the Stamp Duty Ordinance (Cap 117) stipulates that no instrument chargeable with stamp duty shall be received in evidence in any proceedings.  There was no explanation from H on why it was unstamped.  For these reasons, H is not allowed to adduce this piece of evidence.

35.  Secondly, in respect of the school notices issued before the Master’s hearing, there was simply no explanation why these documents could not have been produced.  As for the notices and documents post-dated the Master’s hearing, H did not explain their relevance and how these documents would probably have an important influence on the result of his appeal.

36.  Thirdly and finally, the employment contract was in existence well before the Master’s hearing; again, there was no reason why the evidence could not have been obtained.

37.  Hence, H’s application to adduce new evidence has to be rejected. His summons is dismissed.

The Issues

38.  W did not appeal against the Master’s Judgment. As a matter of fact, it transpired at the appeal that W was in agreement with the Master’s findings insofar as they relate to H.  That being the case, the only issues before this court are (1) if interim maintenance should be payable by W; and (2)  if the answer is in the positive, the quantum to be payable.  In determining these issues, I consider the following are relevant:

(1) the living standard of D;

(2) the financial resources and needs of H and D; and

(3) the financial resources and needs of W, including the financial needs of D when W was having access to D.

39.  In assessing the parties’ financial resources and needs, all that is required is a “broad-brush” approach.

The Living Standard of D

40.  When H issued his petition for divorce, D was merely a 9-month-old infant.  The Master found that during the marriage the parties had led a relatively frugal and simple life. [5] This finding was agreed to by W. It happens that I also come to this same finding.  I find that D’s living standard would also be a relatively frugal and simple one.

H’s Financial Resources

41.  H graduated from a local university in 2011. Since June 2021, he has been working with the Government.  H was evasive when being asked about his monthly wages.  He only said it was about $60,000 odd.  As pointed out by Master Lung, H had failed to report he was in receipt of a housing allowance.  It is clear that he had been adopting a “catch me if you can” tactic. At the end, H accepted that his net salary was $66,050 plus housing allowance of about $6,500, a total of $72,550 at his disposable.

42.  H had been renting out the Tai Po Flat for $16,000 per month; that was the situation when the application was heard before Master Lung.  When the case came before me, H claimed that after the tenant had left in early 2025, despite repeated efforts, he was not able to find a new tenant.  When being asked if that was the case, he could have lowered the asking rent, H then explained that the outgoing tenant had caused severe damages to many electrical appliances the replacement of which would cost him around $30,000 each; but unfortunately, he had no money. H, however, did not provide any particulars such as what these appliances were or how many pieces were there. Bearing in mind that that Tai Po Flat is only a 1-bedroom flat with about 381ft² large, I cannot image what appliances were there that expensively required a replacement cost of $30,000 each.  I have no doubt that this is H’s mere say-so.

43.  In the circumstances, I find that H was not truthful; his assertions were utterly unbelievable.  I reject H’s version that he was not able to have the Tai Po Flat rented out.  Even if it was not rented out, probably it had been deliberately left vacant for the purpose of this appeal.  For these reasons, I assess that H has a notional monthly rental income of $16,000 from the Tai Po Flat.  Hence, I assess that H has a monthly sum of about $88,550 ($72,550 + $16,000) at his disposal.

H and D’s Financial Needs

44.  In his 1^st Form E dated 15 May 2023, H reported monthly expenses of $71,517, of which $34,372 were general expenses, $29,645 were personal expenses and $7,500 were D’s expenses.

45.  Then 16 ½ months later in his 2^nd Form E of 17 October 2024, H’s reported total expenses soared to $127,346.50 per month, comprising $48,262 general expenses, $35,093 personal expenses and $43,992 D’s expenses; this means an average increase of about $55,830 per month and a staggering 78% increase.

46.  H claimed that between the dates of his 2 Form Es, during these 16 ½ months, he had liquidated $1,224,263 (or on average $74,198 per month) from his bank accounts and investments to cover the shortfall.  As at the date of his 2^nd Form E, he had a bank balance of $27,737 only.

47.  At the appeal, H claimed his average monthly expenses for the last 12 months were $117,846 and he only had $20,000 left in his bank accounts which was roughly the same amount he had 10 months ago back on 17 October 2024.  In my assessment, one way of looking at this situation is H did not really have to resort to his savings for meeting his daily needs.  If what H said about his monthly expenses were true, H would have suffered a deficit of $29,296 per month ($117,846 - $88,550). This deficit figure would be even larger if the Tai Po Flat had been left vacant. It also has to be borne in mind that this alleged “deficit” did not include some one-off payments that H claimed to have spent on his new accommodation in Fanling after he had moved out from the Shatin Flat and the legal expenses at the initial stage of the litigation. When being so pointed out by the court, H was simply unable to explain how he had made his ends meet.  At the end, he vaguely claimed he had exhausted all savings and had to borrow from his sisters.  He, however, was not able to tell how much, not even a ballpark figure, he owed. He just gave the excuse that he needed to check.  H admitted he had not disclosed these extensive borrowings in his Form Es.

48.  In the circumstances, I have to reject H’s allegations that he borrowed from family members.  There was no plausible explanation as to how he managed to survive if his monthly expenses were really as much as $117,846 per month.  I find that H’s reported expenses are utterly unreliable and have no probative value at all.

49.  I have carefully considered the documentary evidence, taking a broad-brush approach, I am largely in agreement with Master Lung’s assessment that H’s monthly expenses are $74,046.50 (General expenses of $44,761.50 + personal expenses of $22,093 + D’s expenses of $7,192).  I round down the total figure to $74,000; and D’s expenses are round up to $7,200 per month.

50.  On the above analysis, I assess that H has a monthly surplus of about $14,550 ($88,550 - $74,000).

W’s Financial Resources

51.  W graduated from the same university and in the same year as H’s but majored in different disciplines.  As at the date of hearing, she was working on contract term for another government department.  Previously, she worked in an investment bank.

52.  In the same fashion as H, W was opaque in her disclosure. She did not provide her employment contract nor details of her remuneration package. She just stated on her 2^nd Form E of 1 November 2024 that her monthly income was about $60,000 without mentioning any benefits.  I am sure these were deliberate omissions.  At the hearing, W admitted she was earning around $63,000 per month, plus 15% gratuity. She admitted she is qualified as an accountant with a title “CPA” but claimed she was not clear what this exactly stood for and forgot at what year she was so qualified.  As I see it, W was not forthcoming. It must have been on the basis of her academic and professional qualifications that W has been developing her career and in the position that she so employed. It is hard to believe that she had little ideas on these particulars.

53.  I assess that, inclusive of gratuity, W has on average a monthly receipt of around $65,000.

W’s and D’s Financial Needs

54.  In her 1^st Form E of 15 May 2023, W reported her monthly expenses were $89,800, which were made up as follows,

General expenses (inclusive of mortgage payment for the Shatin Flat)	$47,100
Personal expenses (inclusive of living expenses for parents in the sum of $10,000)	$36,200
D’s expenses	$6,500
Total:	$89,800

55.  17 months later, in her 2^nd Form E of 1 November 2024, W’s reported monthly expenses rocketed to $146,700; the breakdown is as follows,

General expenses (inclusive of mortgage payment for the Shatin Flat)	$46,000
Personal expenses (inclusive of living expenses for parents in the sum of $30,000)	$66,700
D’s expenses	$34,000
Total:	$146,700

56.  At the hearing of 12 December 2025, W claimed her total expenses had slightly increased and were as much as $150,700 per month.

57.  Pausing here, it is to be recalled that D was living with H most of her time. There is nothing to convince me that D’s expenses were as high as $34,000.

58.  Same as H, W’s figures do not tally with the bleak financial picture she endeavoured to paint.  If W’s total expenses were actually as much as $146,700 per month, given that her net income was $63,000 only, as far as arithmetic goes, she would have a shortfall of $83,700 per month ($146,700 - $63,000), which means $1,004,400 a year.  Her bank balance, however, did not support this picture.  According to her 2^nd Form E, on 1 November 2024, W had $4,700 in her bank account only, yet about 12 months later on 12 December 2025, she was able to save and had $20,000 odd.  There is no explanation why she managed to do that.

59.  When being enquired by the court how she managed to survive, W’s explanation was she had borrowed from relatives and friends and parents (in her words,「親朋戚友，爸爸媽媽」).  If this were true, then it is baffling to see that, according to her Form E, W has to pay her parents living expenses of $30,000 per month, which takes up nearly half of her salary, but at the same time she had to borrow extensively from them.  Further, these borrowings were not disclosed in any of her Form Es.  W played ignorance by explaining that she thought she was only required to disclose her credit card liability in the relevant part (being Part 2) of the Form E. She was not able to provide any further particulars and just said she needed to check how much she owed.  W is well educated and a professional; her explanation was simply incredulous.  I am sure W was just making up along the way.  I reject W’s case that she has been running on a deficit every month.

60.  For the above reasons, I agree with Master Lung that W grossly exaggerated her expenses.  Same as what I have ruled against H, I find W’s reported expenses are wholly unreliable and have no probative value.  Taking a broad-brush approach, I am largely in agreement with the Master’s assessment.  I assess W’s expenses as follows,

General expenses (inclusive of mortgage payment for the Shatin Flat)	$29,500
Personal expenses (inclusive of living expenses for parents in the sum of $30,000)	$19,200
D’s expenses	$4,100
Total:	$52,800

61.  It follows that W should have a monthly surplus of about $12,200 ($65,000 - $52,800).

Full and Frank Disclosure

62.  At this juncture, it is necessary to remind the parties of their duty to court though I am sure they have been reminded repeatedly of this by other judges and masters throughout these proceedings.

63.  The duty is that when it comes to financial matters parties in matrimonial proceedings owe to court a duty to make full and frank disclosure of his/her financial situation, without which the court simply could not be in a position to discharge its duty in a just and fair manner.

64.  The duty of full and frank disclosure is onerous; it is an absolute and continuing one.  Rayden and Jackson on Relationship Breakdown, Finances and Children states at [13.101].

The importance of the duty of both parties to make disclosure of their assets which is full, frank and clear cannot be overemphasised. Unless a court is provided with correct, complete and up-to-date information on the matters to which, under the MCA 1973, s 25, it is required to have regard, it cannot lawfully or properly exercise its discretion in the manner ordained by that section. The duty on each party is absolute, and it must be discharged regardless of whether the application for a financial remedy is adjudicated upon by the court after full evidence has been heard, or settled after an exchange of financial information between the parties leading to a consent order. The duty is also a continuing one: a party must not mislead the other party and the court into assuming that his financial situation is unchanged if in fact it has changed. Any material changes in the financial situation of either party occurring between the filing of their Form Es and the final dispatch of the claims by the court must be brought to the notice of the other party and the court at the earliest opportunity. A party who seeks to negotiate and secure a settlement without informing the other party about a material change in his or her financial circumstances runs the risk that, if a settlement is reached and a consent order is made, the consent order will be set aside by the failure to provide full, frank and timely disclosure. Shortcomings in disclosure will be visited by orders for costs against the offending party, often on the indemnity basis. Furthermore, deviation from the standard of disclosure required may be visited by the court drawing adverse inferences against the party in default.

65.  Disclosure must be given in a timely and orderly manner and bona fide. The material disclosed must be correct, complete, clear, comprehensible, and up to date. A litigant who gives obscure, piecemeal, or superficial disclosure, or one who adopts a “wait and see” approach in the hopes the “right questions” will not be asked, falls afoul of these principles: see L v L [2006] HKFLR 121 (Lam J, as he then was)  at [197] – [200].

66.  I have found that both parties failed to comply with the duty.  They adopted a “catch me if you can” trick and engaged in selective disclosure and concealment of documents, as well as inflating and, in my view, even to the extent of fabricating, some figures entirely according to their own whims without respect to the court.  The Form Es were given by the parties under oath, any statement falsely made would be visited by criminal penalty.  Parties should realize that these are litigation misconducts and the court reprimands both of them for their misconduct. If this happens again, the court would have no hesitation to take the matter further including referring the matter to the Secretary for Justice.

Should W pay any interim maintenance for the benefit of D; if yes, how much?

67.  To conclude, I have found that:

(1)  H has a monthly surplus of $14,550;

(2)  W has a monthly surplus of $12,200; and

(3)  D’s immediate and reasonable needs are $11,300 per month (H’s $7,200 + W’s $4,100).

68.  I am conscious that H is financially capable of supporting D even without W’s contribution. That is the reason why H’s application was rejected by Master Lung.  However, I think I need to take into consideration the facts that both are in gainful and stable employment and, on the basis of my assessment, both have the financial ability to contribute to the living expenses of D.  I also have to give weight to the fact that both H and W have the responsibility to maintain D even at this interim stage.  Ultimately, it is a question of “reasonableness” and “fairness”: see [26] above.  On that basis, I am compelled to come to a conclusion that even at this interim stage, in all fairness, both parties should contribute equally to the living expenses of D. This is the only point where I am not in agreement with the Master.

69.  I have assessed that D’s immediate and reasonable needs are $11,300 per month, of which H has been paying $7,200 and W has been paying $4,100.  On the basis that each has to pay an equal share, i.e. $5,650, W should pay an equalization money of $1,550 per month (($11,300 ÷ 2) - $4,100)).  I also need to take into account of the fact that W has not been making contributions for months, taking a broad-brush approach, I would add another sum of $500 onto it and round it up to $2,100 per month. This is the interim maintenance that W has to pay.  I have to remind the parties that this is merely an interim sum. Final adjustment will be made at the final ancillary relief trial which effectively means that any shortfalls or over-payments will be remedied.

Order

70.  For the reasons aforesaid, I make the an order that:  W do pay H a sum of $2,100 per month as interim maintenance for D, the first payment to be made on 1 September 2026 and thereafter on the 1^st day of each and every month until further order of the court.  The payments should be made by transfer to H’s bank account with Hang Seng Bank with account number ending “888”.

Costs

71.  H is successful in his appeal. The parties’ original applications were dismissed by Master Lung with no order as to costs.  I consider it is fair that H should be given half of the costs before the Master.  As for the costs of the appeal, costs should follow the event. That means W has to pay half of the costs of the application below and the costs of the appeal, inclusive of all mention/case management hearings for the appeal, and I so order. There be no order as to costs of H’s summons to adduce evidence.

Other Litigation Conducts

72.  I need to say a few words on the parties’ other litigation conducts before I end this judgment.  As mentioned at [3] above, this case is qualified as one of the top 3 worst cases I have ever seen.  Looking at it objectively, this case is not a complicated one.  The marriage is short and the parties, with one child, have modest assets only and both are young and in gainful employment.  However, it is glaringly clear that both parties have been treating each application and, for that matter, each hearing as a “game” in itself.  All they have been doing were trying their best to “knock down” the other side regardless of whether the means adopted were legitimate or not.  They have no regard to proportionality of time and costs involved, and have no insight into how their financial matters and the arrangement for D, who has been witnessing her parents confronting each other most of her life, could be resolved.  On that view, parties should realize that they are victimizing their own beloved daughter.  The duration of these proceeding is even longer than their entire marriage as if the same has gained a life of its own. Even with the judgment by Deputy Judge F Li on the access to D (see [17] above), parties still continue to argue over its implementation, neither is willing to move an inch. For this reason, I am given to understand they will soon appear before the Deputy Judge again.  Parties are urged to give serious and careful thoughts on how they would like to end their feud.  In this connection, I have to remind parties that judicial resources are scare and the courts would give proper regard to proportionality of time and costs involved in the case management of this case.