ATTORNEY GENERAL v. CHAN YU SANG

----------

-----------------------

J U D G M E N T

-----------------------

Sir Alan Huggins, V.-P.:

1. Once again this Appellant is before the court on an application which is wholly misconceived. In view of her persistence and the possibility that she may seek to pursue the matter elsewhere it is desirable that I should set out the history of it at some length.

2. The application is for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against the dismissal by this court of an appeal against an order of Penlington, J. dismissing an appeal first against an order of Master Betts by which he refused to re-hear a summons previously dismissed by Master Boa and secondly against "all other decisions unfavourable to me created by the Attorney General along the way through the Court in High Court Action No.13726 of 1983". The second part of the application not only is out of time but is not competent. The Appellant has asked us for an adjournment today in order that she may bring fresh evidence and have time "for the preparation of documents for exhibit".

3. We dismissed her appeal on 13th December 1984. She gave notice of the present motion on 27th December. There had been ample time for her to file any papers which were necessary. It appeared from what she told us that the evidence which she wished to call was evidence which might be relevant at the trial but which was certainly not relevant today. We therefore refused an adjournment.

4. The Appellant is the wife of a man who was himself a litigant well known in these courts. The husband was the holder of a British Passport issued by the Director of Immigration. We were told that he wished, or was required, to leave Hong Kong and he asserted that his passport was in the custody of the Appellant, who would not surrender it. Other papers were issued to the husband to enable him to go on his journey, but the Director of Immigration was anxious to recover the man's passport. He instituted, in his own name, the present action against the Appellant for the recovery of the passport. Subsequently an order was obtained amending the Writ by substituting the Attorney General as the Plaintiff to comply with the provisions of the Crown Proceedings Ordinance.

5. The Appellant filed a Defence. She alleged that the passport was the property of her husband and not of the Crown. She said she had not "taken away" her husband's passport and (a fortiori) that she had not 'taken it away unlawfully". It may be implicit that she denies having it. She alleged that the action was unlawful and malicious". She is obviously seized with a burning sense of grievance: she thinks that the Director of Immigration and his officers are corrupt and that every Government official is doing what he can to harass her. The action proceeded with an order for discovery of documents. There was then an application by the Appellant to dismiss the action and, in the alternative, what I think was an application for an order for inspection of documents. That order was dismissed by Master Boa on 31st July. On the same day the Master heard a second summons. That was an application (i) to strike out the Director's summons to amend the Writ (ii) to strike out the whole action (iii) again for inspection and (iv) for leave to file an application for further discovery. That application was also dismissed. It was this summons which the Appellant sought to have re-heard by Master Betts. Not unnaturally the Master dismissed that application: he had no jurisdiction to hear it and, in any event, clearly Master Boa's order on the second summons was correct. The Appellant appealed to the judge in chambers from the order of Master Betts. That appeal was rightly dismissed, but it was against that dismissal that she came to this court.

6. I was at great pains on 13th December to explain to the Appellant why the whole of her attitude was mistaken and applications misconceived. There is at least one issue which sooner or later will have to be tried by the court, Whether or not she has the passport issued to her husband - and, if it is a live issue, Whether or not the passport belongs to the Crown. The Appellant seems to think that somehow or other she can have that first issue decided otherwise than at the trial. She cannot do so. The case will have to go to a trial sooner or later and it is as much in her interest as everybody else's that it be sooner rather than later.

7. There is clearly no issue which ought to be tried by the Privy Council and I would dismiss this application.

Cons, J.A.:

8. I agree.

Fuad, J.A.:

9. I also agree.

29th January 1985