GDML v. EJR

FCMC 11629 / 2017

[2019] HKFC 65

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NUMBER 11629 OF 2017

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RULING
(Application to expunge a Single Joint Expert’s report from the
court file, variation of an interim access order and
maintenance pending suit/interim maintenance and litigation funding)

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Introduction

1.  There are three applications all filed by the Respondent mother that now require adjudication; a summons dated the 25 October 2018 seeking to expunge a Single Joint Expert’s report together with an Addendum, from the court file; a summons dated the 2 November 2018 seeking to vary the order for interim access dated 10 May 2018 and an application for maintenance pending suit/interim maintenance together with an application for litigation funding also dated the 2 November 2018. An urgent application made by the mother to take the children to Australia over the Christmas holiday period was dealt with by way of a Memo dated the 14 December 2018. The mother’s application was refused. 

2.  I intend to deal with these applications in the order that they were argued before me and as set out above. The history of this litigation can be found in brief in the court’s Ruling of the 10 May 2018. Reference should be made to that Ruling as necessary.

Expunging the Single Joint Expert’s report from the court file 

3.  Dr B filed a Single Joint expert’s report entitled a “Parenting Evaluation” on the 1 May 2018 followed by a short Addendum on the 15 May 2018. This was a report that had been agreed to by the parties and consequently it did not form part of a court order. It is clear from the communications between solicitors that it was agreed that Dr B’s brief was to prepare a Clinical Psychological report on the parties themselves. This was sensible given that there were and continue to be concerns about the psychological wellbeing of each of the parties. In his e-mail of the 12 February 2018 Dr B confirmed that the “evaluation will explore the psychological condition of each party as it pertains to their current custody dispute”. In the report he reiterates that the purpose of the report was to “render an expert opinion regarding the psychological wellness and fitness to parent of each of [the parties]”. Therefore, it was understood that Dr B would not make any recommendations with respect to residency (i.e. care and control), nor would he make any assessment with respect to the children themselves. The focus of the report was on the parents only.

4.  Consequently, and as one might expect in such circumstances, it was agreed that Dr B would have sight of a number of court documents. In terms of the process Dr B had indepth interviews with both of the parties and they each underwent psychological testing – namely they each took the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory – 2 (MMPI-2) and the Million Clinical Multiaxial Inventory-4 (MCMI-IV). In addition, he asked each party if they had any collateral information that they would like to rely upon. He then had a final interview with each of them, when he gave each parent an opportunity to comment, inter alia, on some of the more difficult aspects of his proposed report.

The law

5.  The law is not in dispute. Reference may be made to Order 38 rule 4 A as appropriate. It is also accepted that the court has the power to exclude a piece of expert evidence at an interlocutory stage, but clearly that is a power that must to be exercised with some caution. (See Re Estate of Au Kong Tim, [2015] HKEC 2404). Further an expert witness should not become the advocate of one or the other of the parties, nor should he (or she as the case may be) enter into the arena of the court and make findings of fact. (See Singh Arjun v The Secretary for Justice [2014] 2 HKLRD 678).

6.  In an appeal from this court namely LYAG v YSG (YX) (Expert Evidence: Children), believed to be unreported, the Hon Chu JA proffered the following additional guidance:

Judicial management and control over expert evidence

31.   The intended appeal is in essence an appeal against the Judge’s exercise of discretion to manage the expert evidence to be adduced at the hearing on children’s arrangement.  It is important at the outset to reiterate some basic principles in this aspect.

32.   First, expert evidence has always been subject to control by the court as is reflected in section 58(1) of the Evidence Ordinance, Cap. 8, which states that the admissibility of expert evidence is subject to rules of the court, and is further dependent on the evidence being within an area in which expert evidence is permissible, the witness properly qualified to give the expert evidence, and the evidence being relevant to the issues in dispute.  The requirement of “relevance” is approached broadly so that expert evidence to be given by a qualified expert can still be excluded if the court takes the view that calling it will not be helpful to the court in resolving any issue in the case justly: Barings PlcνCoopers & Lybrand(No.2) [2001] Lloyds Rep. Bank 85 at § §23 and 45. Part IV in Order 38 of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A sets out the requirements for adducing expert evidence, which are directed at controlling the volume, quality and impartiality of expert evidence.

33.   Second, modem judicial approach has moved away from leaving all matters to be dealt with by the trial judge at the trial to an emphasis on effective pre-trial case management. In this post Civil Justice Reform era, the court is under a duty to further the underlying objective by actively managing cases.  It is also the duty of all parties to assist the court to achieve the underlying objectives.  Greater judicial management of expert evidence at an early stage of the proceedings is therefore to be expected.  The court is prepared at an interlocutory stage to exercise its discretion to exclude expert evidence if it takes the view it is not useful to the just resolution of the dispute. The obvious advantage of such an approach in reducing proliferation of evidence, costs and the length of the trial needs no elaboration.

34.   Third, in the context of proceedings relating to children’s arrangement, where the paramount consideration is the interest and welfare of the children, a sensitive and proportionate approach to the calling of expert evidence and the identification of the scope and limit of investigations and assessments is called for. There is therefore an even greater need for the court to be proactive and to manage and exercise control over expert evidence to be adduced well before the trial.

35.   Fourth, under Order 38 rule 35A of the Rules of the High Court, an expert witness has an overriding duty to assist the court on matters within his expertise. This duty overrides any obligation to the person from whom the expert witness has received instructions or by whom he is paid. Paragraphs 2 to 4 of the Code of Conduct for Expert Witnesses, Appendix D, Cap. 4A reinforce the point. They provide that an expert witness has an overriding duty to help the Court impartially and independently on matters relevant to his area of expertise, that his paramount duty is to the court and not to the person from whom he has received instructions or by whom he is paid, and that he is not an advocate for a party. An expert is required by Order 38 rule 37C to declare that he has read the Code, agrees to be bound by it and has complied with it, before his report can be admitted as evidence. Expert report that fails to comply with the rules shall not be admitted as evidence.

7.  In addition, Mr Pilbrow, S.C for the mother referred to two cases in his written submission. He referred to DanielsνWalker [2000] 1WLR 1382, Lord Woolf MR said:

The appeal raises a point of some significance as to the approach which judges should adopt when a single expert who has been jointly instructed makes a report and one side or the other is unhappy with that report...  In a substantial case such as this, the correct approach is to regard the instruction of an expert jointly by the parties as the first step in obtaining expert evidence on a particular issue. It is to be hoped that in the majority of cases it will not only be the first step but the last step. If, having obtained a joint expert’s report, a party, for reasons which are not fanciful, wishes to obtain further information before making a decision as to whether or not there is a particular part (or indeed the whole) of the expert’s report which he or she may wish to challenge, then they should, subject to the discretion of the court, be permitted to obtain that evidence.   (emphasis supplied)

8.  Later in CosgroveνPattinson [2001] C.P. Rep. 68, Neuberger J referred to a number of general considerations to be taken in to account when calling for further evidence, saying:

In my judgment although it would be wrong to pretend that this is an exhaustive list, the factors to be taken into account when considering an application to permit a further expert to be called are these. First, the nature of the issue or issues; secondly, the number of issues between the parties; thirdly, the reason the new expert is wanted; fourthly, the amount at stake and, if it is not purely money, the nature of the issues at stake and their importance; fifthly, the effect of permitting one party to call further expert evidence on the conduct of the trial; sixthly, the delay, if any, in making the application, seventhly, any delay that the instructing and calling of the new expert will cause; eighthly, any other special features of the case; and, finally, and in a sense all embracing, the overall justice to the parties in the context of the litigation.

Discussion

9.  In this instance the mother asks that Dr B’s report be removed from the court file in its entirety. In its stead she asks that Dr J (and her team) prepare a further psychological assessment on the parties, together with a parenting evaluation on both of them together with a report on the psychological wellbeing of the children.  

10.  The mother’s main complaint is that Dr B made some findings of fact in his report and that as a result he became an advocate for the father. In addition, she accuses him of bias.

11.  Ms Irving, for the father, says that the mother wishes the report to be removed from the court file simply because she does not like its findings. She points out that the report also makes some unfavourable references to the father and that the more sensible way forward would be for Dr B to be cross examined on his report at trial.

12.  I have now had an opportunity to reread Dr B’s report and his Addendum. It is a detailed report and in the main it simply records what the parties have said. In other words, it reports much of the interviews verbatim. It also comments on the outcome of the two tests.

13.  Working backwards I do not accept that Dr B has shown any evidence of bias. The allegations of bias mainly centre on the two tests and Dr B’s analysis of the outcomes. If the mother wishes to challenge these aspects of the report then it seems to me that she should be able to do so by calling her own expert to challenge Dr B’s report and/or to cross examine Dr B, as her legal team deem appropriate.

14.  Unfortunately, it is not so easy to deal with the allegations of “fact finding”. I accept that towards the end of the report and particularly in the section marked “Final Interviews”, Dr B makes a number of “findings”. With respect, I agree that it is not open for him to make such “findings”. These are listed in Appendix 1 attached to Mr Pilbrow’s submission. In particular Dr B states that a number of factual allegations are “founded”. I accept that these references should be removed and I have therefore taken the liberty of redacting Dr B’s report and his Addendum as attached. I do not though accept that this is a sufficient reason for all of Dr B’s report and his Addendum to be expunged from the court file. In all other respects this seems to be a wholly sensible report that has been undertaken in a standard fashion. I can see no reason for Dr J and her team to repeat this process, which will be both time consuming and expensive.   

15.  As indicated above however, I also accept that it is generally open for either of the parties to challenge Dr B’s report, (now in its redacted form), if they should so choose. The father has already indicated that he would have no difficulty in being involved in the production of a further report. Ultimately however, that is a matter for him.

16.  Finally, I also accept that I am likely to be assisted by a report being prepared on the psychological wellbeing of the children. It seems to me that conversely this should be in the form of a Single Joint Expert report. It goes without saying that the same psychologist or team of psychologists cannot be used to both challenge Dr B’s report on behalf of the mother and to prepare a Single Joint Expert’s Report on the children.

17.  Both the psychologist used to challenge Dr B’s redacted report and Addendum and the SJE for the children shall be shown all of the materials originally shown to Dr B, plus his redacted report and Addendum together with the mother’s updated affidavit. It is a matter for the parties’ solicitors if they feel that any other evidence would be of any assistance to the new experts.

Costs

18.  Given that this is essentially an interlocutory application that concerns the ultimate arrangements for the two children of the family I shall make an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days time, that there shall be no order as to costs of this application.

Variation of access   

19.  In the mother’s summons dated the 2^nd November 2018 she asks for an order in the following terms:

1.    Paragraph 1 of the Order dated 10^th May 2018 (the “Order”), where inter alia, the Respondent was granted interim and supervised access to the Children of the family TNL(“T”), a boy born on XX April 2015, now aged 3½ years, and SDJL (“S”), a girl born XX July 2016, now aged 2¼ years (“the Children”) on every Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday from 2:00 pm to 5:00 pm and each Friday from 2:00 pm until Saturday at 5:00 pm with such access to be supervised by the Petitioner’s domestic helper or by some other third party in addition to the Respondent’s domestic helper by agreement, be varied to the effect that the Respondent do have defined supervised access to the Children as follows:-

i.    With S from Monday after her nap until Friday at 7 p.m. in the presence of a supervisor;

ii.    With T from Monday after school at 3.15 p.m. until Friday at 7 p.m. in the presence of a supervisor.

iii.    During public holidays, reasonable access to the Petitioner; and

iv.    In the event either party is away from Hong Kong without the Children, the other party to be given first chance to spend time with the Children.

2.   Access to be supervised by the Respondent’s domestic helper and by the Petitioner’s domestic helper, Christie, or by some other third party by agreement.

3.   Paragraph 1 of the Order be discharged.

20.  In accordance with the court order dated the 10 May 2018 the mother currently has access as follows:

1.   Paragraph 2 of the Order dated 7th September 2017 shall be varied to the extent that the Respondent shall have interim and supervised access to the Children of the family, namely TNL (a boy born on XX April 2015) and SDJL (a girl born on XXJuly 2016), on every Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday and Thursday from 2:00 pm to 5:00 pm and each Friday from 2:00 pm until Saturday at 5:00 pm. The supervision must be by either the Petitioner’s domestic helper or by some other third party by agreement. For the avoidance of doubt, a third party in addition to the Respondent’s domestic helper must be present for the overnight staying access on Friday evenings.

I am told that this arrangement has been altered slightly by agreement.

The law on children

21.   The law governing applications concerning children in Hong Kong can be found at section 19 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap. 192 where it is stated that the court has the power to make such order as it thinks fit for the education and custody of children under the age of 18 years.

22.   The general principles governing such applications are set out in s.3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance, Cap. 13, which refers to the best interests of the child as being the first and paramount consideration of the court. 

23.   Section 48C Matrimonial Causes Ordinance, Cap. 179 adds that

…… section 3 of the Guardianship of Minors Ordinance (Cap 13) (which provides that the welfare of the minor shall be the first and paramount consideration) shall apply in relation to any order for the custody care or supervision of a child which may be made under this Ordinance or the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance (Cap 192).

Discussion

24.   I am not minded to accede to the mother’s request. As I have stated in my Ruling of the 10 May 2018, this is an unusual case where very significant allegations have been made against the mother with respect to her alleged neglect of the children. The court’s primary role in a situation such as this is to assess the potential risk attached to her care giving going forward. It is suggested by Mr Pilbrow that the risk must be very much reduced given that we are in the middle of litigation and that the mother will not do anything to “risk criticism”. Unfortunately, I am not convinced that this will necessarily ensure the safety of the children, especially given the more recent incident with Ms L. I also remain concerned about the mother’s mental health.

25.   As things stand at present the mother has contact with the children every day, save for Sunday – i.e. she has the care of them every day after school and for one night and for one day of the weekend. All access is currently supervised, but other than that on the face of it this is very much a shared care regime. I do not accept that the mother’s proposal whereby she has the children with her for all of the week and either for half of the weekends or alternate weekends, would be acceptable, even if this case did not present the difficulties that it does. 

26.   The mother says that the father is outsourcing his care of the children to a string of third party helpers and that the children are distressed. Time will tell if that is true or not. As things stand at present I tend to accept that there is a regular routine in place that enables the children to see both of their parents on an almost daily basis. Given the current situation that seems to me to be an optimal interim arrangement. 

27.   Consequently, the order of the 10 May 2018 shall remain in place. The mother’s summons on the children dated the 2 November 2018 shall be dismissed. As this is a children’s application there shall be an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days time that there shall be no order as to costs in so far as this summons is concerned.

Maintenance Pending suit, interim maintenance and litigation funding

28.   In her second summons of the 2 November 2018 the mother makes a general request for maintenance pending suit, interim maintenance and litigation funding. During the hearing I was told that she “only” seeks an additional HK10,000 per month plus she asks that the father pay off her credit card bill of HK$60,000 and that he reimburses her a further HK$100,000. In that context it is worth reiterating that the court cannot make an interim lump sum order.

29.   In so far as litigation funding is concerned, the mother has recently changed solicitors and now has a new legal team. The relevance of this will become clearer later.

The law

Maintenance pending suit/interim maintenance

30.   The ordinance states that the only governing principle is that the court shall make such order, as it considers reasonable in all of the circumstances of the case.  (See s. 3 MPPO Cap 192). Consequently, applications such as these are approached on a broad-brush basis.  A detailed examination of the parties’ means may be examined at a later date at a full ancillary relief hearing if there is no agreement in the meantime.

…what really matters is the immediate and reasonable requirements of the wife balanced against the ability of the husband to pay for them, assessed using a broad-brush approach. (See also paragraphs 16.17 of Rayden, 18^th edition).

31.   Counsel for the father has also referred me inter alia to the Court of Appeal decision in HJFG v KCY (CACV 127/2011, 28 October 2011, where the following principles were reiterated with respect to maintenance pending suit/interim maintenance applications:

a.   The sole criteria to be applied in determining the application is “reasonable” which is synonymous with “fairness”.

b.    A very important factor in determining fairness is the marital standard of living.

c.   In every maintenance pending suit application there should be a specific maintenance pending suit budget which excludes capital or long term expenditure, more aptly to be considered on a final hearing.

d.    Where the affidavit or form E disclosure by the payer is obviously deficient, the Court should not hesitate to make robust assumptions about his ability to pay.  The Court is not confined to the mere say-so of the payer as to the extent of his income or resources.  In such situation, the Court should err in favour of the payee.

32.   In so far as this particular case is concerned the reference to the marital standard of living previously enjoyed by the parties and the ability of the father to pay is particularly pertinent.

Discussion

33.   The father currently pays for the majority of the mother’s regular monthly expenses including rent, management fees and rates, the domestic helper’s salary, an allowance of HK$2,000 for children related activities and a personal allowance or maintenance of HK$40,000 per month. In addition, the mother is entitled to medical benefits by virtue of the father’s employment. The estimate for these expenses varies between the parties, but on average the father says that they amount to just over HK$140,000 per month. In addition, he has been providing the mother with HK$135,000 per month by way of litigation funding and he has also been wholly responsible for the parties’ mediation costs. Further he pays for all of the children’s direct expenses including their education costs. He also has the expenses associated with running his own household to fund and he is said to be financially responsible for his parents.

34.   The father is only able to pay for all of this because he currently earns a substantial amount of money. In round figures he earns approximately HK$650,000 per month gross, which includes a discretionary bonus which is split into 12 monthly instalments. He also receives other bonuses.

35.   The difficulty however is that this monthly spend generally exceeds his income, which means delving into savings.

36.   The mother asks for an additional sum, in part to cover the cost of the parental coordinator as follows:

27. I, therefore, request that G either:

1.   settle the debt on my credit card of HK$60,000 and the outstanding WW bill in the sum of HK$34,325 immediately, and thereafter increase my monthly maintenance to HK$50,000 per month (or HK$85,000 to include HK$35,000 for Ms W’s fees if G is not prepared to pay them in full each month); or, in the alternative

2.   increase my monthly maintenance to HK50,000 or HK$85,000 as detailed above but, for the first 3 months, pay an additional HK$32,000 (or HK$67,000 to include HK$35,000 for Ms W’s fees if G is not prepared to pay them in full each month) in order to ensure that I can settle the outstanding liabilities I have within a reasonable time and enable me to restore my capacity to settle bills promptly.

37.   It seems that the parental coordinator charges HK$3,500 per hour and that the parties are also spending in the region of HK$35,000 per month on this service.   The father has indicated that he is prepared to pay the mother HK$45,000 per month as maintenance on the premise that she contributes towards 20% of the parental coordinator costs, as the father wishes the mother to fully engage with the process.   On the premise

that the parties are spending HK$35,000 per month on the parental coordinator’s fees, 20% of that would amount to HK$7,000 per month.

38.   Consequently, and on a broad brush basis, I will round up the mother’s maintenance pending suit to HK$50,000 per month as requested on the premise that she contributes towards 20% of the parental coordinator’s fees to be capped at HK$35,000 per month. I will hold the father to his agreement to also pay for the parental coordinator’s costs otherwise and to continue to pay for the mother’s other monthly expenses as set out in paragraph 33 above, which shall be included in the preamble of the court order as his undertakings. I would also invite the mother to undertake to pay for her 20% share of the parental co coordinator fees. In the absence of that undertaking I will direct that she pays this sum going forward.

Litigation funding

The law

39.   In so far as the law on the funding of litigation costs is concerned, Currey v Currey [2006] EWCA Civ 1338 continues to be routinely applied in Hong Kong. This states inter alia that:

“the conditions for a ‘costs allowance’ are as follows:

(1) That the applicant spouse has no assets, or none that can reasonably be deployed (at para [19], [20]).

(2) That she can provide no security for borrowing, or none which can reasonably be offered (at paras [19], [20]).

(3) That she cannot reasonably obtain legal services by offering a charge on the outcome of the litigation (at para [20] and see Sears Tooth, per Wilson J).

(4)   That she cannot secure publicly funded legal help ‘at a level of expertise apt to the proceedings’ (at para [20])”

40.   There is also a requirement to undertake an overarching enquiry

At para [20], Wilson J held that the initial, overarching enquiry should be into whether the applicant for a costs allowance could demonstrate that she cannot reasonably procure legal advice and representation by any other means. Therefore, to the extent that an applicant has assets (as in C v C), she has to demonstrate that they cannot reasonably be deployed (whether directly or as the means of raising a loan) in funding legal services …… Other factors may well come into play.  The subject matter of the proceedings would always be relevant, as would the reasonableness of the applicant’s stance in the proceedings.

41.   I have some sympathy with the father when it comes to the issue of litigation funding, given that he has been very reasonable in this respect. He has been responsible for the mother’s litigation costs up to date, even though he has been concerned that her spending on lawyer’s fees is excessive. In total he has contributed over HK$3 million towards her costs. The difficulty is that the mother has now changed law firms, which has led to a duplication of costs as the new team has had to read in and to become acquainted with the case generally. The other difficulty is that her former law firm insisted that all of their fees be paid up to date before they were willing to release the file. Again this is understandable. The net net however, is that the mother’s new legal team are without funds and are likely to remain that way for a considerable period of time. The father conversely says that he is willing to continue to contribute HK$135,000 per month towards the mother’s legal costs and that this is reasonable. He says that he should not be held liable for the costs associated with the mother’s change of lawyers – especially as she has gone from one specialist law firm to another. The mother meanwhile says that she owes just over HK$470,000 as at the end of October 2018 and with this in mind she proposes as follows:

However, If G cannot agree to settle my solicitors’ outstanding fees to the end of October (including Counsel’s fees) then I will require HK$213,000 each month (made up of HK$135,000 per month already payable and a further HK$78,000 in order to settle arrears due for October 2018) for the next 6 months such that I can settle the outstanding solicitors’ and Counsel’s fees within a reasonable time frame and in order for my solicitors to remain on the record.  Depending on when this increased monthly sum begins to be paid, an adjustment will need to be made.

42.   In considering the Currey principle, I confirm that the applicant mother seemingly has no assets save for some limited savings which have been depleted in any event. She is not currently working and it seems unlikely that she would be able to provide any security for borrowings. It is also clear that she would not be able to obtain the services of her lawyers by offering a charge on the outcome of the litigation. She is also not eligible for legal aid given the high level of financial support afforded to her by the father. In such circumstances I accept that on the face of it she satisfies the Currey test. The difficulty however, is that she has changed lawyers. Notwithstanding this I have somewhat reluctantly decided to allow the sum requested for the period from March 2019 – August 2019. Thereafter the sum for litigation funding shall be reduced back to HK$135,000 per month. If there are any further issues with respect to the funding of the proposed trial, then these will need to be raised initially at the PTR hearing and further directions can then be given as necessary. I should also like at this stage to warn the mother that the court will not be so lenient if she chooses to change law firms again. I make this order now as I am very concerned that the matter should proceed to trial as expeditiously as possible.   

43.   I shall reserve the costs of this application.  

Order

44.   Upon the Petitioner’s undertakings as set out in paragraph 33   above and also upon his undertaking to pay for the parental coordinators fees capped at HK$35,000 per month.

IT IS ORDERED and DIRECTED as follows:

1)    Dr B’s report dated the 1 May 2018 and his Addendum dated the 15 May 2018 shall remain on the court file in their redacted form, as attached to this judgment.

2)    Leave be given to the Respondent to file a further expert report in order to challenge Dr B’s report and Addendum. The date for the filing of this report to be discussed at the PTR hearing.  

3)    A Single Joint Expert’s report be called for to prepare a report on the psychological wellbeing of the children. Again the date for the filing of this report to be discussed at the PTR hearing.

4)    There shall be an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days time that there shall be no order as to costs with respect to the Respondent’s summons dated the 25 October 2018 seeking to expunge the Dr B’s report and Addendum from the court file.

5)    The Respondent’s summons dated the 2 November 2018 seeking to vary the interim access order dated the 10 May 2018 shall be dismissed.

6)    There shall be an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days time that there be no order as to costs with respect to that application also.

7)    The Petitioner shall pay the Respondent maintenance pending suit for herself in the sum of HK$50,000 per month such sum to be paid with effect from the 1 March 2019 and thereafter to be paid on the first day of each month until further order. It is further directed that in the absence of an undertaking to this effect that the Respondent shall contribute towards 20% of the parental coordinator’s fees capped at HK$35,000 per month.

8)    In addition, the Petitioner shall pay to the Respondent further maintenance pending suit as litigation funding, in the sum of HK$215,000 per month for a six-month period from the 1 March 2019 and thereafter that sum shall be reduced to HK$135,000 per month pending further order. All such sums shall be paid directly to the solicitors for the Respondent on account of the Respondent’s costs.

9)    There shall be an order nisi to be made absolute in 14 days time that there be no order as to costs with respect to that application also.    

10)    There shall be a further PTR on the 4 June 2019 at 9:30am

11)    Both parties do personally attend that hearing.