RATNASARI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 2765/2019

[2026] HKCFI 3270

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2765 OF 2019

_____________

BETWEEN

_____________

_____________

D E C I S I O N

_____________

1.  On 9 September 2025 I refused to grant leave to the Applicant to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) in dismissing her appeal regarding her non-refoulement claim upon finding that none of the grounds put forward by her reasonably arguable for her intended challenge, that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness in the process before the Director of Immigration (“Director”) or the Board or in their decisions, and that there was no reasonable prospect of success in her intended application.

2.  The Applicant now by a summons issued on 10 November 2025 (of which has only recently been brought to the court’s attention) seeks leave to appeal against that decision out of time, as the 14-day period for her to file her appeal under Order 53 rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A ended on 23 September 2025, and hence she was some 18 days late with her intended appeal.

3.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing against a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted: see Re MK HCMP 2609/2016, 10 January 2017; Chu On Fong Winter v The Appeal Panel (Housing) HCMP 982/2017, 20 July 2017; Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346.

4.  In the Applicant’s case, a delay of 18 days must be considered as significant and inordinate, for which she explained in her affirmation that she did not get the decision in the mail until later when she was so informed by her immigration officer, but by then she was already out of time with her intended appeal.

5.  The court record shows that the decision was sent on the same day of 9 September 2025 to her then reported address without being returned through undelivered post, and in the absence of any documentary evidence to corroborate her bare assertions, I am not satisfied that the Applicant has provided a good or valid reason for her significant delay.

6.  More importantly, nor did she put forward any proper or valid draft or proposed grounds of appeal, or any particulars of any error in the decision or why it may be reasonably arguable that the decision was unfair or unreasonable either in her summons or her affirmation. As such, and in the absence of any error in the decision being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, I do not see any prospect of success in her intended appeal either.

7.  In the premises, and for the reasons given, it would be futile to extend time for what appears to be a hopeless appeal. Accordingly, I refuse the Applicant’s application for leave to appeal out of time, and dismiss her summons.