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HCMA 219/2014
香港特別行政區
高等法院原訟法庭
刑事上訴司法管轄權
訟費命令上訴
案件編號：裁判法院上訴案件2014年第219號
(原東區裁判法院刑事案件2013年第4099號)
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主審法官：高等法院原訟法庭法官潘敏琦
聆訊日期：2014年10月28日
頒下判案理由書日期：2014年10月31日
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判案理由書
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1. 上訴人被控一項「猥褻侵犯」罪。經審訊後，判罪名不成立，當庭獲釋。上訴人向裁判官申請訟費被拒。他現就裁判官拒絕頒下訟費令的命令，提出的上訴已被本席駁回，以下是理由。
2. 根據裁判官在裁斷陳述書所裁定的事實：
「21. 本席不相信被告人指他事前有對葉小姐說做按壓會觸摸到她皮膚。……
24. ……所以本席根本不相信被告人有預先問葉小姐的說法。
25. 被告人承認他有在葉小姐兩邊腋下的位置並由該部位打橫向心口來回移動，他亦承認他有接觸葉小姐的皮膚及伸手入葉小姐衣服內之前，他沒有說他的手會接觸到葉小姐身體哪一部位。他否認他的手掌邊曾到過葉小姐兩邊乳房中間的位置。他亦同意這部位是女性敏感部位……
28. 被告人指他倚賴師生信賴的關係，但葉小姐是首次上堂，大家認識不深，被告人又沒有詳細指出，他將會做的動作，而所做的動作事實上不止觸及皮膚，而且接觸的部位，亦是女性敏感的地方。被告人指葉小姐沒有作出反對，但這就會變成是事後之事，那麼被告人豈非將自己放在一個非常危險的處境。
29. ……葉小姐所述被告人觸碰她的身體位置及方式，事實上與其餘各辯方證人所述時他們過往經歷的情況無大分別。各辯方證人除其中有一位是男士外，其餘的都是女士，而女士中有介紹葉小姐的劉女士，而劉女士與葉小姐年齡相若，其餘女士有年長的、亦有中年女士。
30. 簡單而言，被告人的手法及動作，無論男女老幼，同出一轍，事前都沒有詳細解釋。各女辯方證人都指被告人是正直及關心學生，沒有感覺被非禮的感覺，……
31. 至於觸及葉小姐兩邊乳房中間位置，即所謂「雞心」的位置，當時被告人的手指已插入了運動型胸圍内做雙掌合十向上拉頸的動作，被告人所觸及的位置，就其他女辯方證人按壓時的情況亦同樣觸碰，只是各女辯方證人所戴著的是普通胸圍，因此沒有進入胸圍內，所以觸碰沒有出現在胸圍內的情況，但被告人所觸碰到的位置，其實各人都是一樣的。」
3. 上訴人大律師的完備上訴理由，概括來說，他指裁判官錯誤地裁定上訴人的作為“招致嫌疑，把自己放在一個非常危險的處境”，没有考慮上訴人對投訴人所作的按壓動作和身體觸碰、與他過往對各辯方證人的作為是一致的，未有充分考慮上訴人伸手入投訴人胸圍内作按壓動作純是因為運動胸圍之設計與普通胸圍不同，不涉任何歪念，本案亦没有證供顯示上訴人的作為並非一般瑜珈導師替學員紓緩的動作，故不能說他把自己放在一個非常危險的處境。上訴人從被捕後交代事件的說法是他深信投訴人是同意，與其庭上證供一致，裁判官錯誤地沒有行使酌情權去接納成功脫罪的上訴人作出的堂費或訟費申請，錯誤而拒絕頒予訟費，等同否認他的無罪身份。
4. 答辯人不同意上訴人大律師的論點，答辯人認為原審裁判官是以上訴人没有得到投訴人的同意的情況下觸碰她身體敏感的部分，此乃自招嫌疑之行為，拒絕頒下訟費令是正確的。
判決
5. 根據香港法例第 492 章《刑事案件訴訟條例》第 3 條，裁判官在處理任何簡易罪行後，判被告人無罪，則裁判官可命令將訟費判予被告人。
6. 一般而言，裁判官就批准或拒絕頒下訟費令的命令，上訴法庭是不會干預的。而主審裁判官就決定訟費的事宜上是有廣泛的酌情權，他在庭上直接聽取證供，處於最有優勢的位置來決定甚麼因素有助他對訟費作出裁決。除非裁判官明顯地在考慮行使酌情權時越權，否則上訴法庭並無干預的基礎或理由。
7. 終審法院在Tong Cun Lin v HKSAR [2000] 1 HKLRD 113案的判案書第 117 頁，有以下指引：
“When a defendant has been brought to trial upon particular charges and is then found not guilty it is clearly right that he should normally be compensated out of public revenue for the costs incurred in defending those charges. In considering whether, despite this general rule, he should be deprived of all or part of his costs, the judge exercising the discretion must obviously look to his conduct generally, so long as such conduct is relevant to the charges he faced. This cannot be confined to any particular period of time. . . . it follows that, generally speaking, the conduct most relevant to the matters under consideration must be the defendant’s conduct during the investigation and at the trial . . . Wrapped up with this is the strength of the case against the defendant and the circumstances under which he came to be acquitted . . . ”
「當一名被告人因某些罪行被檢控而被判無罪時，一般情況下，他理應由公帑支付他答辯控罪所招致的訟費，以作補償。雖然有上述一般原則，在考慮他應否被剝奪全部或部分訟費時，行使酌情權的法官必需考慮其一般行為，只要該些行為和他被控的罪行有關。該些行為不應局限在某時段……一般而言，有關行為應該是被告人在調查及審訊階段時的行為……另外亦要考慮針對被告人證據的強弱及被告人被裁定無罪的情況……」(非官方翻譯)
8. 一般來說，假若被告人的行為本身招致嫌疑，或被告人令控方相信控方案情較實際情況有力，或被告人之獲釋乃基於技術上的情況，則被告人不應獲得訟費。
9. 夏正民法官在HKSAR v Li Siu Tong & Others, HCMA 547/2000一案中，詳細分析了何謂行為本身招致嫌疑，他認同如果要拒絕頒下訟費令：
“. . . there must be such a proximity between the behaviour that is condemned and the alleged criminal conduct that it can reasonably be said not just that the appellants behaved badly but that their conduct brought suspicion upon themselves in respect of their alleged criminal conduct.”
他又指出：
“. . . What amounts to ‘relevant’ conduct will differ according to the circumstances of each and every case. While the relevant conduct, generally speaking, will be the conduct of the appellants during the police investigation and at trial, that does not, in my opinion, prevent the magistrate from considering the appellants’ actions directly surrounding the alleged criminal conduct.”
10. 終審法院前首席法官李國能在Ting James Henry v HKSAR (No 2) (2007) 10 HKCFAR 730案判案書第 735 頁，亦有解釋何謂和訟費有關的“被告人的行為”：
“ . . . The discretion is not bounded by any such inflexible rule. By his conduct prior to the investigation and trial stages, including conduct which formed part of the setting for the charges laid against him, the defendant may plainly have brought suspicion upon himself. There is no reason to ignore such conduct in the exercise of the court’s discretion on costs following an acquittal on the charges laid, . . . provided that its exercise does not involve the court in adopting a position at variance with the defendant’s acquittal by the tribunal of fact.
In our judgment, we stated that the jury had clearly found, as the Court of Appeal also made clear, that the appellant had been dishonest in a way relevant to the counts charged. The Court of Appeal’s decision to overturn the convictions was not, in any way, inconsistent with the jury having so found. . . . ”
「……酌情權不受該些一成不變的規則限制。被告人在調查過程前及在審訊階段的行為，包括和針對他的控罪有關的行為極可能為被告人招致嫌疑。在裁定被告人無罪後行使酌情權處理訟費問題時，法庭不應無視該些行為……但行使酌情權時，法庭的取態不可以和裁定被告人無罪的事實審裁者有別。
在判案書內，本庭指出陪審團裁定被告人確有在和控罪有關的事情上有不誠實的行為，而上述裁定和上訴法庭立場相同。上訴法庭推翻定罪的決定和陪審團的裁決沒有任何不符之處。」(非官方翻譯)
11. 高等法院原訟法庭法官彭偉昌於香港特別行政區訴范順等人一案(HCMA 188/2009，頒佈日期：2009 年10 月22 日)中在援引終審法院Ting James Henry v HKSAR (No 2)一案後所述：
「……自招嫌疑，並不一定指向被告在調查和審訊階段的行為。相反，作為被起訴的基礎的某些行為，也可被視作自招嫌疑。唯一的限制是不能與無罪判決相違背。」
12. 賴盤德暫委法官(當時官階)在 HKSAR v Lam Chiu Fong and Others, HCMA 1148/2007一案處理訟費上訴時，考慮了Qamar Sheraz v HKSAR, FACC 5/2007(頒佈日期：2008 年1 月31 日)，他說:
“Qamar Sheraz decides that if a judge on appeal is sure a man committed the crime in question, the man’s acquittal at first instance by a magistrate prevents that finding, being used as a basis to deprive him of his costs as, without a conviction, the presumption of innocence is engaged. Conduct indicating guilt there, that amounts to something less than proof of guilt, even though blameworthy, obviously falls to the same argument.
The conduct identified by the magistrate here as attracting suspicion was either the commission of the crime charged or something falling short of it.
It follows that this appeal must be allowed . . . ”
13. 然而，律政司不服上述裁決，提出上訴，被判得直(CACC 71/2008，頒佈日期：2009 年2 月9 日)。上訴法庭在分析了Ting James Henry一案中指出：
“32. . . . The misdirection was not inconsistent with the finding of dishonesty so that the Court of Appeal was not taking a view of the facts ‘palpably different from that taken by the jury’. Nor did the refusal of costs contravene the presumption of innocence. Although Ting had been found not guilty, this did not mean he had not been dishonest as alleged by the prosecution. In the course of that judgment, Li CJ stated:
‘16. It may often be the case that a defendant’s conduct during the investigation and at the trial is such that it brings suspicion on himself, providing a ground for refusing him costs. Such conduct has been described as ‘most relevant’ to the discretionary exercise. However, it is incorrect to suggest (and the authorities give no warrant for suggesting) that a defendant can only be regarded as having brought suspicion on himself by virtue of his conduct during the investigation or at trial and not otherwise. The discretion is not bounded by any such inflexible rule. By his conduct prior to the investigation and trial stages, including conduct which formed part of the setting for the charges laid against him, the defendant may plainly have brought suspicion upon himself. There is no reason to ignore such conduct in the exercise of the court’s discretion on costs following an acquittal on the charges laid, provided always that the discretion is not exercised so as to undermine the presumption of innocence, and in particular, provided that its exercise does not involve the court in adopting a position at variance with the defendant’s acquittal by the tribunal of fact.’ [Emphasis supplied] (per Stuart‑Moore VP and Beeson J)
51. . . . In Ting James Henry at para 16, the Court of Final Appeal pointed out that it was incorrect to suggest that a defendant could only be regarded as having brought suspicion on himself by virtue of his conduct during the investigation or at trial and not otherwise; and that such inculpatory conduct might be conduct that ‘formed part of the setting for the charges laid against him’. There has, I understand, been some difficulty in the application of the last segment of the principle there stated, for the question arises how to marry that principle with the notion that an acquitted person should not, for the purpose of a costs application, be treated as someone who ought to have been convicted. There is no inconsistency. Ting itself is an example of an acquittal that was not inconsistent with a finding of dishonesty on the part of the appellant. The present case provides another example, namely, that of D7 and his confession and avoidance – a confession to culpable conduct closely linked to the charge though, according to counsel, avoiding the commission of the actual offence charged.” (per Stock JA(as he then was))
14. 上訴人大律師所援引的其中兩宗裁判法院上訴案件判獲頒訟費的案件，HKSAR v Perez Sanchez, Martin，HCMA 449/2006和香港特別行政區訴藍琼芳，HCMA 344/2008均是在Lam Chiu Fong案上訴前，即上訴法庭闡釋Ting James Henry案前頒下的。
15. 在本案中，裁判官指出：
「本席考慮到本案的案情，本席特別強調，無論是葉小姐的說法，或是被告人在庭上的說法，他們所指發生的情況，都令被告人自招可疑，被告人實將自己放在一個非常危險的位置，隨時被人即時指責猥褻侵犯，若然他沒有得到學生的信任，他實已不止一次遭人指責。」
16. 裁判官未能排除上訴人是誤以為他的行為是得到投訴人的同意、及意外觸碰敏感部分的可能性。答辯人所援引以下三案例均可顯示，以上述兩理據判定被告罪名不成立，並不自動等同其行為沒有自招嫌疑。
（1）HKSAR v Khan Munsaf, HCMA 143/2006：上訴人被控猥褻侵犯他的外傭。他在涉案當日抓住受害人的胸、嘗試脫去她的褲子、擁抱她和以陽具摩擦她的身體直至射精。裁判官認為上訴人有可能因受害人以往並沒有就他作出的觸碰而投訴，誤以為受害人同意涉案的作為。他裁定上訴人就涉案控罪罪名不成立，但由於上訴人於案發時在受害人面前射精，裁判官認為上訴人的行為招致嫌疑，拒絕其訟費申請(第 6及7 段)。原訟法庭認為裁判官的決定正確無誤(第 21及22 段)。
（2）香港特別行政區訴宋沛傑 [2013] 3 HKLRD 383：上訴人被控強姦前女友，案中其中一爭議點是上訴人是否知道受害人是不同意性交。他在審訊後被定罪，但上訴法庭撤銷定罪裁決，指陪審團沒有就前述的議題得到適當的引導。上訴人申請訟費，但上訴法庭在判詞第 15 段指出上訴人和控罪有關的一般行為及在調查和審訊階段時的行為/取態足以令法庭行使酌情權來剝奪他全部訟費，拒絕其申請。上訴法庭在第 10 段指：「不論被告人過往和“X”的關係如何，他在“X”酩酊大醉下兩次和她性交，其中一次更沒有使用避孕套。被告人的行為是令人厭惡的。被告人在“X”全無知覺下和她兩次性交，亦必會招致別人對他有嫌疑。」
（3）HKSAR v Manolache Adrian Daniel, HCMA 839/2011：上訴人被控在電車上猥褻侵犯女乘客，裁判官指由於他未能排除觸碰可能是意外所致，和受害人未能確定上訴人身體哪部位碰到她的臀部，裁定罪名不成立。裁判官拒絕上訴人的訟費申請，原因是上訴人擠進電車後緊貼在受害人此行為招致嫌疑。原訟法庭認同裁判官的分析和決定。（第 6-8及13 段）
17. 本席不認為裁判官在本案中錯誤行使酌情權，裁判官拒絕頒下訟費令並没有違背無罪假定的原則。下令上訴駁回。
答辯人：由律政司高級檢控官范凱琳大律師代表香港特別行政區。
上訴人：由湛耀強律師行轉聘余超卓大律師代表。
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