LIMBU CHRIS AND ANOTHER v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION AND ANOTHER

HCAL 759/2026

[2026] HKCFI 4135

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 759 OF 2026

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D E C I S I O N

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A. Introduction

1.  The Applicants are Nepalese nationals, born on 30 May 2000 and 5 June 2001 respectively.  They are the natural sons of their mother, Rai Christina (“Mother”), the deponent of the affirmation filed in support of the present application and the sponsor of their applications for dependent visas.

2.  By Form 86 dated 17 April 2026, the Applicants sought leave to apply for judicial review so as to challenge three decisions, being:

(1)  the decision of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 1 June 2020, refusing the Applicants’ applications for dependant visas as dependants of the Mother (“Initial Refusal”);

(2)  the decision of the Director dated 19 January 2023, maintaining the Initial Refusal (“Reconsideration Decision”); and

(3)  the decision of the Chief Executive in Council (“CE-in-C”) made on 2 December 2025 and notified by letter dated 19 January 2026, dismissing the Applicants’ objection under section 53 of the Immigration Ordinance Cap 115 (“Ordinance”) and confirming the Initial Refusal and the Reconsideration Decision (“CE-in-C Decision”).

3.  I gave directions permitting the Director and CE-in-C to file an Initial Response, and for the Applicants to file a Reply, for me then to consider how to manage and determine the proceedings.  The Initial Response was filed on 16 June 2026, signed by Mr Felix Lee, Senior Government Counsel, and Mr Sam Kam, Government Counsel.  The Reply was filed on 13 July 2026, signed by Mr Kamlesh Sadhwani of Counsel, who had also signed the Form 86.

4.  Having considered the materials, I am satisfied that it is appropriate to determine the application on the papers as invited.

5.  This is my Decision.

B.  Dependent Visa Policy

6.  The present proceedings arise out of the operation of the Director’s policy for dependant visa applications, which can be found in the ‘Guidebook for Entry for Residence as Dependants in Hong Kong’(“Guidebook”).  Though there has been a recent 2026 revision of the Guidebook, I do not think there is any material difference for present purposes between the revised version and the prior version from 2018.

7.  In short, the kind of dependant applicant who may apply to join the sponsor for residence in the HKSAR would include, under §4(b) of the Guidebook, the sponsor’s unmarried dependent children under the age of 18.  Further, an applicant for a dependant visa must satisfy all eligibility criteria set out in §5 of the Guidebook, which states that an application for admission of a dependant may be favourably considered if: (a) there is reasonable proof of a genuine relationship between the applicant and the sponsor; (b) there is no known record to the detriment of the applicant; and (c) the sponsor is able to support the dependant’s living at a standard well above the subsistence level and provide him/her with suitable accommodation in the HKSAR.

8.  It is settled – and it is common ground between the parties – that the principles applicable to the Dependant Visa Policy include (insofar as is material for present purposes):

(1)  The purpose of the policy is to allow recognise categories of close family members to come to or remain in Hong Kong when they require the care and financial support of their sponsors in Hong Kong.

(2)  It is a policy founded on humanitarian principles that allows a family member, who is genuinely dependant for his or her maintenance, support and other requirements, emotional and material, on another member of the family to reside in Hong Kong with that member.

(3)  It is not a policy of family union or reunion.

(4)  “Dependency” is an essential element of the policy, and it describes a state of reliance upon somebody.  A dependant is somebody who must rely on another for maintenance, care and support, emotional and material, and is unable otherwise to manage.

(5)  This is sometimes shortened to the concept that the dependant person (the applicant for a visa) is “financially and emotionally dependant” on the other person (the sponsor).

(6)  However, the mutual emotional dependency found in genuine family affection is not of itself, and viewed alone, a form of dependency which falls within the policy.

(7)  There remains as a condition of eligibility being “reasonable proof of a genuine relationship between the applicant and the sponsor”.  Therefore, for example, an applicant can lawfully be refused a dependant visa where the applicant’s primary purpose is not to join the sponsor as a genuine dependant, but instead to come to or remain in Hong Kong as an economic migrant.

(8)  Hence, the requirement for reasonable proof of a genuine relationship is to ascertain whether the applicant is genuinely dependant on the sponsor, and has not applied because of some of terrier primary purpose.

(9)  As regards a child under 18, fitting the criterion under §4(b) of the Guidebook on its own does not discharge the separate and independent requirement of establishing genuine dependency, which must be proven on its own terms.

(10)  Age is not determinative, but may be a relevant consideration in the assessment of genuine dependency.  It is both intuitive, and well recognised by the Courts, that the younger the applicant the more readily genuine dependency will be inferred, whereas the older the applicant the less likely he or she will be found to be a genuine dependant.

(11)  Where a child applicant has finished school, is able-bodied and clearly intends to take up work in Hong Kong, the Director is entitled to find that such an applicant is not in Hong Kong solely as a dependant, but has as one of his primary purposes the desire to take up employment.  The Dependant Visa Policy cannot be used as a means of obtaining what is, in substance, and employment visa.

(12)  Where an applicant has resided separately from the sponsor for many years without reporting any dependency need, the Director is entitled to question why such a need has arisen and to treat its absence as a material consideration, weighing against the applicant.

(13)  Where the dependency need is first asserted when the applicant is approaching the age of 18, the Director is entitled to treat its belated emergence, without compelling explanation, as undermining the dependency claim.

(14)  Assessing dependency is not a ‘tick the box’ exercise, but requires a unitary exercise considering various potential or likely intertwined or interlocking aspects of the relationship, and giving appropriate weight to those aspects on the facts and in the particular context.

(15)  The weight to be given to individual matters or factors is ordinarily to be decided by the decision-maker, and it is not for the Court to interfere, absent establishing some irrationality or Wednesbury unreasonableness – a high hurdle to surmount.

C.  Background

9.  The background factual matters have been set out in the Form 86 and the Initial Response, and can be summarised as follows.

10.  As stated above, the Applicants are Nepalese nationals born on 30 May 2000 and 5 June 2001 respectively.  At the time of the application leading to the Initial Refusal, the Applicants were aged 17 and 16 years old respectively.  The Applicants are natural sons of the Mother, and their natural father (“Mr Limbu”), with whom the Mother says she cohabited, and who died in 2005.

11.  The Mother is a Hong Kong permanent resident (“HKPR”), with right of abode acquired on 23 November 2016.  She first arrived in Hong Kong in 2004 to work as a foreign domestic helper (“FDH”).

12.  In May 2009, she married a HKPR (“1^st Husband”) and was approved for a change of status to reside in Hong Kong as the 1^st Husband’s dependant on 22 September 2009.  On 21 September 2013, the Mother applied for extension of stay as the dependant of the 1^st Husband, but it was found that he had been absent for Hong Kong for a long period.  The 1^st Husband died in Nepal on 21 October 2013.  The extension of stay application was refused in December 2014. Whilst her reconsideration request was being processed, the Mother married another HKPR (“2^nd Husband”), and her extension of stay and change of sponsorship to remain in Hong Kong as the dependant of the 2^nd Husband were approved on 29 February 2016.

13.  As stated above, the Mother subsequently acquired the right of abode in Hong Kong on 23 November 2016.  She renounced her Nepalese citizenship on 16 September 2022, and was naturalised as a Chinese national on 19 October 2022.

14.  On 16 January 2018, the Mother’s marriage with the 2^nd Husband was dissolved.  On 17 December 2018, she married Mr Rai Prakash in Nepal, who was later admitted to Hong Kong for residence as the Mother’s dependant on 9 March 2020.

15.  In these proceedings, the Director emphasises that, until the dependant visa applications set out below, the Mother never reported to the Immigration Department (“ImmD”) that the Applicants were her sons.  In fact, in forms dated 1 October 2013, 5 February 2015 and 20 April 2015, all signed by the Mother, a line was put through the box for identifying ‘children’, twice with the word ‘nil’ also written in.  Nor were the sons mentioned in a record of interview with the Mother on 18 August 2015.

16.  Nevertheless, on 24 July 2017, ImmD received the Applicants’ applications for entry for residence as the Mother’s dependants (“1^st DV Applications”), submitted through solicitors (“JNK”).  Those applications were refused by letter dated 19 December 2017 addressed to JNK.  From the relevant internal minute, it can be seen that the reasons for refusal included that, having considered all the available information and circumstances of the case, (1) the Director was not satisfied that the Applicants were genuine dependants of the Mother, who are physically, emotionally or financially depending on her, (2) there were insufficient reasonable proof of genuine relationship between the Applicants and the Mother; and (3) there existed no compassionate or humanitarian reasons or other special extenuating grounds warranting a departure from prevailing policy.

17.  On 11 May 2018, different solicitors (“M&A”) acting on behalf of the Applicants and the Mother submitted applications for entry for residence in respect of the Applicants as dependants of the Mother (“2^nd DV Applications”).  Further documents in support were provided by M&A in correspondence between August 2018 and August 2019.  By letters dated 1 June 2020, the applicants were informed through M&A that the 2^nd DV Applications were refused - i.e. the Initial Refusal – because, after careful consideration of all the available information circumstances, (1) the Director was not satisfied that there is reasonable proof of a genuine relationship between the Applicants and the Mother, (2) the Director was not satisfied that the Applicants were the Mother’s dependants and coming to Hong Kong to join her as her dependants, and (3) there existed no strong compassionate or tearing reasons or other special extenuating grounds warranting a departure from the prevailing policy.

18.  The relevant internal minute gives more detailed reasons for the Initial Refusal, broadly as follows:

(1)  The Director was not satisfied about the genuineness of the mother/son relationship between the Mother and the Applicants.

(2)  In her previous visa applications and her application for HKPR, when asked to declare her family background/ marriage history, the Mother never reported that she had two sons (i.e. the Applicants) born with Mr Limbu.

(3)  Upon ImmD’s request for an explanation during the 1^st DV Applications, JNK explained on behalf of the Mother that it was an oversight and clerical mistake made by her previous representative, who reported the applicants as brothers instead of her children.  This explanation was considered not convincing.

(4)  The registration dates on the Applicants’ birth certificates and the death certificate of Mr Limbu were 29 and 30 June 2017 respectively, that is about a month immediately preceding the 1^st DV Applications, and 17 years and 16 years after the births of the Applicants respectively, and more than 11 years after the claimed date of death of Mr Limbu. Given the lack of other official documents issued when the Applicants were younger, and the fact that the Applicants had all along remained unreported by the Mother to ImmD until 2017 without reasonable explanation, it was not unreasonable to cast doubt on the Applicants’ identities and their claimed relationship with the Mother.

(5)  The Director was not satisfied that the Applicants were genuine dependants of the Mother physically, emotionally and financially.

(6)  After Mr Limbu passed away in Nepal in 2005, the Mother did not go back to Nepal to reside with the Applicants (then only 5 and 4 years old).  Instead, in 2009, married the 1^st Husband in Hong Kong choosing her place of residence in Hong Kong and leaving the Applicants (then 8 and 5 years old) to live in Nepal.

(7)  There had not been any reporting of dependency issues since then, and it was only eight years later that the Mother made the 1^st DV Applications.  At the time of the making of the 2^nd DV Applications, the Applicants were approaching adult age.  Hence, it appeared more probable that the 2^nd DV Applications were made as a matter of choice of the place of domicile at that age, rather than out of a genuine dependency need.

(8)  The Mother and the Applicants had been living apart since the Mother took up employment in Hong Kong in 2004, and she married twice in Hong Kong, with only six visits to Nepal in more than a decade.

(9)  The communication proof provided indicated that the communications were made after submission of the 2^nd DV Applications.  The remittance slips indicated that they were made since 2016. Reference is made to some photographs showing occasional togetherness, some more recent communications and the Mother’s financial support in recent years. However, overall it was reasonable to consider that there was no material indication to support any genuine need of the Applicants to depend on the Mother physically, emotionally and financially.

19.  On 7 March 2021, the Mother submitted a written request for reconsideration of the Initial Refusal (“RR”), with various documents in support, including more recent remittance slips, insurance documents and financial information about the Mother.  From June to December 2022, letters were also received from Counsel who sought to explain the lengthy delay in making the RR, said to be due to the mishandling by M&A.  Counsel also made written representations to emphasise the “maternal relationship” in support of the RR, offered an explanation for the late registration of the Applicants’ births and their father’s death in Nepal, and provided further supporting documents.

20.  By letter dated 19 January 2023, ImmD informed the Applicants and the Mother (through their Counsel) of the Reconsideration Decision.

21.  On 30 January 2023, the Mother lodged an objection (“Objection”) under section 53 of the Ordinance, against the Initial Refusal and the Reconsideration Decision.  The Mother contended, amongst other things, that the Director had erred in the decision-making and that the decisions made by him should be set aside.  She pleaded that her case should be considered as a fit case of natural justice and based on compassionate grounds.

22.  On 8 February 2024, the Security Bureau forwarded the Director’s response to the Mother and invited comments. Having considered all relevant matters and information available, the Director was of the view that the Objection should be rejected for reasons that were materially the same as those behind the Initial Refusal and the Reconsideration Decision.  On 9 September 2024, the Mother (through Counsel) filed a substantive reply with further medical and background evidence, including DNA test results, information regarding late birth registration in Nepal, and details of the family care and proxy arrangement for the Applicants.  On 26 November 2024, the Director’s further response was forwarded to the Mother’s representatives, who replied on 27 December 2024.

23.  On 2 December 2025, the Objection was considered by CE-in-C.  By letter dated 19 January 2026, the Mother was informed of the CE-in-C Decision.

D.  The Intended Ground of Review

24.  As stated above, by Form 86 dated 17 April 2026 (just shy of the three-month long-stop period after the last of the impugned decisions), the Applicants sought leave to apply for judicial review to challenge all of the Initial Refusal, the Reconsideration Decision and the CE-in-C Decision.

25.  The Applicants rely on one ground only, namely that the Director and, in turn, the CE-in-C acted irrationally and/or Wednesbury unreasonably in concluding that no genuine physical, emotional and financial dependency existed between the Applicants and the Mother.  Accepting that the Director is the primary decision-maker on dependency and that the threshold for intervention is high, the Applicants case is that, applying orthodox principles, the conclusion that there was no genuine dependency was not one reasonably open to the decision-makers on the materials before them.

E.  Analysis of Intended Ground of Review

26.  As identified in the Form 86, the Applicants rely on the following seven matters or limbs as establishing irrationality or Wednesbury unreasonableness:

(1)  There was a failure properly to engage with the significance of the Applicant’s ages at the time of the application, who were still minors when the 2^nd DV Applications were lodged. Treating the Applicants as effectively choosing a domicile as neo-adults gave insufficient weight to the fact that they were children and inherently dependant on adults for maintenance, care and support.

(2)  The reasoning failed properly to account for the absence of any alternative provider, where the Applicants’ natural father had died in 2005 and the 1^st Husband (stepfather) died in 2013, after which no other identified person assumed long-term responsibility for the Applicants’ welfare.  Because the Mother remained the only parent with the ability and willingness to support them, albeit from Hong Kong and through a proxy care arrangement in Nepal, it was not reasonably open to conclude that there was no genuine dependency.

(3)  The reasoning did not conduct the required contextual and unitary assessment.  Authority recognises that a FDH working six days a week is less likely to have time to develop or demonstrate certain conventional markers of family life.  Here, the Mother’s history as a FDH between 2004 and 2009, and the legal and practical constraints associated with that role, were directly relevant to understanding why the applicants remained in Nepal, and why dependency took the form of remittances guidance and proxy care (with direct documentary evidence from earlier years limited).

(4)  There was a failure to grapple rationally with the emotional dimension of dependency, as demonstrated by various correspondence between the Mother and the Applicants.  To characterise the material as showing no genuine need to depend on the Mother physically, emotionally and financially was not reasonably open on the evidence, including letters from the Mother’s sister and the Applicants, the communication records, and the Mother’s responses to the Applicants’ medical crises.

(5)  The reasoning adopted a superficial and overly formalistic approach to documentary matters, including by continuing to rely upon the late registration of the Applicants’ birth certificates and Mr Limbu’s death certificate, notwithstanding the later provision of a DNA report and explanatory material on Nepalese registration practices.  The Mother has also provided an explanation for why the existence of the Applicant as her children was only belatedly disclosed, namely as a result of bad advice from “agents” following her second marriage.

(6)  The factual analysis of the Applicants’ circumstances was superficial, inappropriate and improper in at least the following respects:

(a)  the Mother’s necessity-driven residence in Hong Kong was treated as a matter of personal choice for married life, rather than in its true immigration and economic context;

(b)  the ages of the Applicants at the time of the application were not given the significance which the dependency authorities require;

(c)  the deaths of both paternal figures and the absence of any alternative provider were not given due weight;

(d)  the proxy care arrangement through the Mother’s sister was treated as undermining dependency, rather than as the practical means by which dependency was implemented;

(e)  the Mother’s sustained remittances (of at least HK$180,000, a large sum in Nepal), school involvement, continuing communications and responses to crises were minimised or mischaracterised; and

(f)  contextual explanations relating to Nepal registration practices and migrant family arrangements were treated as inadequate or suspicious rather than explanatory.

(7)  Even assuming the assessment of weight is generally for the Director, the cumulative factual picture before the decision-makers was such that the conclusion of no genuine dependency was one that no reasonable decision-makers could properly reach.

27.  I accept Mr Lee’s submission that, though the Applicants seek to challenge all three decisions, they have not set out individual grounds impugning each decision separately, so that it appears that the ‘nub’ of the challenge is directed at the Reconsideration Decision (though the reasoning for the Initial Refusal may remain relevant, where that was part of the reconsideration).

28.  First, I accept that where (as here) an applicant has lodged a reconsideration request accompanied by substantial further materials, the original decision is subsumed into and superseded by the reconsideration decision.  For that reason, it is also not necessary to address the point that the challenge to the Initial Refusal might otherwise have been well out of time.  Secondly, the CE-in-C Decision is challenged on the basis that it is vitiated by “the same irrationality” as the Director’s decisions, so that the further challenge adds little if anything beyond what is already raised by the challenge to the Reconsideration Refusal.  In any event, where the Director’s Reconsideration Decision was confirmed, and in the absence of any suggestion to the contrary, it may reasonably be assumed that the reasons of the Director submitted in the section 53 procedure were the reasons for the CE-in-C Decision.

29.  Further, the CE-in-C Decision is probably not amenable to judicial review, by reason of section 64(3) of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance Cap 1.  However, I do not think this is the appropriate case in which to seek to resolve that question. That is unnecessary where the real focus of the challenge is to the Reconsideration Decision, and/or the Director’s subsequently expressed views on any new material.

30.  As to the seven matters or limbs of the irrationality or Wednesbury unreasonableness challenge, Mr Lee made the following submissions (in my summary of them):

(1)  The case officer processing the 2^nd DV Applications did engage with the issue of the Applicants’ ages, noting doubts on the authenticity of the birth certificates submitted, and that the ages of 17 and 16 years would mean that the Applicants were reaching adulthood which was a factor weighing against the Applicants’ dependency on the Mother.  This was affirmed upon the reconsideration, which also took into account the DNA report not available to the original case officer.  Doubts were expressed about the DNA report, but even if it demonstrated the biological relationship between the Mother and the Applicants that did not speak to the Applicants’ ages, nor fully resolve the relationship issue.  Hence, the Director’s findings are unimpeachable as a matter of public law.

(2)  The original case officer considered the family background, and the issue of dependency was discussed in detail.  It was noted that the Mother, since 2009, made Hong Kong her choice of residence for a married life, and that the Mother and Applicants had lived apart in two countries with only six meetings or reunions in a decade, that the communication remittance proofs were made after the applications were lodged and since 2016 respectively, and that the submitted photos were of limited weight.  The reconsideration officer considered the additional documents, and the representation that since the death of Mr Limbu the Mother was the only person who supported the Applicants financially, whilst they were taken care of by the Mother’s sister in Nepal.  But the officer concluded that those matters were not sufficient to establish genuine dependency, a conclusion properly open to the officer.

(3)  The Mother’s immigration history and her employment as a FDH was considered and weighed, showing the assessment leading to the Reconsideration Refusal was indeed contextual and unitary.  The Applicants’ real complaint is that the matters were not accorded the weight they consider to be deserved.  Further, an explanation accounting for the absence of evidence is not positive evidence – it might merely seek to excuse an evidential gap, rather than fill it.  The Mother’s FDH status ended in September 2009, but there was an evidential gap as regards the provision of alleged financial support until the remittance slips since 2016, as were provided to ImmD. Further, the alleged FDH constraint was not contemporaneous with the period of claimed dependency.

(4)  The case officers’ assessment of the claimed dependency, including the emotional dimension, was in fact conducted.  The Applicants’ real complaint is therefore as to the weight given by the Director to the evidence in that assessment.  Further, the Mother’s response to the Applicants’ medical crises in 2022 and 2023 occurred years into their adulthood, and was understandably of little weight in supporting a dependant visa application predicated on a parent and child relationship in respect of minor children.

(5)  This limb is also a complaint about the Director’s treatment of evidence.  However, the Director’s concerns about the documentary irregularities were not raised as technical objections.  Rather they were properly considered as part of the overall factual picture bearing on the genuineness of the claimed relationship.  The Director was entitled to approach the documents with some degree of scepticism.

(6)  This matter is in substance a recapitulation of the points already canvassed in the first five matters or limbs, and addressed in response as above.  Taken individually or cumulatively, they do not disclose any irrationality or Wednesbury unreasonableness.

(7)  The same submission is also made in respect of this matter.

31.  I broadly accept Mr Lee’s submissions, and further address the seven matters or limbs as follows:

(1)  First, the authorities properly read establish that age is a relevant consideration in the dependency assessment, with younger applicants in general more readily satisfying it and older applicants less so. The weight to be given to the age of the applicant is a matter for the Director in the particular circumstances of each case.  Here, age was in fact taken into account in the assessment of dependency.  I accept that there is some force in Mr Sadhwani’s submission that continued reservation about the Applicants’ ages was not open to the Director against the documentary evidence of a valid national passport, a citizenship certificate, contextual country materials and registration practice, and contemporaneous school records.  However, it was not reasonably arguably irrational for the Director to give it the weight he did, when there remained some doubt as to the actual dates of birth and, even if those dates were correct that meant that the able-bodied Applicants were approaching adulthood.  Indeed, whilst continued doubt was expressed as to the actual ages of the Applicants, the Director also proceeded to give what was thought to be the appropriate weight in the overall assessment to the ages which the Applicants were said to have attained.

(2)  Secondly, the Dependant Visa Policy is neither a policy of last resort, nor one of family reunion.  An applicant for such a visa must substantiate dependency to the satisfaction of the Director.  Dependency is not shown merely because there might be no one else available to provide support in the country of origin, or because a parent and child would ordinarily share a natural desire to live together.  In this case, it was not reasonably arguably irrational for the Director to reach the conclusion that the Applicants did not genuinely depend on the Mother in the sense that they must rely on her for maintenance, care and support and are otherwise unable to manage.

(3)  Thirdly, whilst the working conditions of a FDH may make it difficult for that person to develop the conventional social markers of intimacy with a sponsor husband, the situation of an FDH and her children arises in a somewhat different context.  Further, in this case, the Mother ceased employment as an FDH in 2009, around nine years before the 2^nd DV Applications.  I accept that from 2009 the Mother became a dependant of the 1^st Husband and was herself subject to immigration conditions which precluded her from sponsoring the Applicants in her own right until she acquired the right of abode in November 2016.  But it nevertheless remained necessary for the genuine dependency to be established, and the weight to be given to the evidential gap in that period (in particular the absence of any formal remittance slips) was a matter for the Director.  It may be argued, as it was by Mr Sadhwani, that the absence of formal remittance slips reflects the informal method employed and not the absence of financial commitment.  But that does not mean it was irrational to reach a different conclusion.

(4)  Fourthly, there is no support for any broad proposition that the presence of some materials pointing to emotional ties is sufficient to establish general dependency.  Those matters should be looked at and weighed in the contextual and unitary exercise of the assessment.  On the materials overall, including those available to and addressed in the section 53 process, it is not reasonably arguable that the Director’s conclusions (adopted by the CE-in-C) were irrational.

(5)  Fifthly, in light of the materials provided to the Director, I do not think it is reasonably arguable to suggest that it was irrational for the Director to make the conclusions he did.  He was entitled to treat the various explanations offered by the Mother with a degree of scepticism.  There is some first blush force in Mr Sadhwani’s submission that the DNA reports were submitted in circumstances that the Director had declined several invitations to identify laboratories which would be acceptable to him, so that any criticism of the reports shows unfairness.  But, it is trite that the burden is on applicants to provide whatever material they think will be sufficient to demonstrate coming within the material policy.  It is not for the Director to seek materials or to give any particular guidance as to those materials, or the form of them.  In any event, the Director did not refuse the visa applications on the issue of relationship only, and it is clear that the question of genuine dependency was also brought into account.

(6)  Lastly, I agree that the last two matters or limbs advanced on behalf of the Applicants are essentially repeating in substance points already dealt with in the previous matters or limbs.  Neither individually nor cumulatively do these add anything to the force of the Applicants’ argument.  Both matters might be seen as compendious ‘merits’ challenges, and they do not reasonably arguably cross the high threshold to irrationality.

32.  It is also important to address the submission made by Mr Sadhwani, that it is not open to the Director to rely on the passage of time caused by his own administrative processes as a reason for diminishing the weight to be given to minority status at the relevant date of the 2^nd DV Applications. As he put it, it was the prolonged administrative process – from application in May 2018 through to the Reconsideration Decision in January 2023 – that caused the Applicants to move from minority into adulthood.

33.  Nevertheless, whilst in broad times that may be correct, I do not think responsibility for the passage of time can be put solely on the Director.  As part of the context for an assessment of dependency, the timing of the applications against the Applicants’ ages is a potentially relevant factor.  The date of the 2^nd DV Applications was just three weeks before the 1^st Applicant’s 18^th birthday, and when the 2^nd Applicant was about to celebrate his 17^th birthday the following month.  Also, after the original applications were made, further documents in support were provided by M&A in correspondence between August 2018 and August 2019.  Presumably, it was thought that those further documents were necessary and appropriate to seek to persuade the Director that the Applicants came within the relevant policy, and that their applications should be viewed favourably.  But, by August 2019, the Applicants were aged 19 and 18 respectively, and there was no suggestion that the Applicants were anything other than able-bodied.  In any event, I do not think the internal minutes identify any reliance by the Director on the passage of time as a basis for diminishing or substantially influencing the weight to be given to the Applicants’ age.

F.  Result

34.  There may be room for thinking that, in light of the totality of materials as was eventually made available and provided to the Director and/or CE-in-C – by which time Applicants were well into their 20s – a decision-maker might reasonably have reached an assessment of dependency different from, or contrary to, that actually reached by the decision-makers in this case.  However, that does not mean that the decisions actually reached were (or reasonably arguably were) irrational.  Therefore, despite the careful, thorough and fair submissions advanced by Mr Sadhwani, I have concluded that the sole intended ground of judicial review does not reach the threshold test for the grant of leave to apply.

35.  In those circumstances, I dismiss the Applicants’ application for leave to apply for judicial review.

36.  As to costs, I am minded in the exercise of my broad discretion to make no order as to costs.  I have already taken into account that applications for leave are ordinarily dealt with ex parte, that I invited an Initial Response, that I was assisted by it and the Reply, and that it might be thought that the arguments advanced on both sides approximated a ‘full’ argument of the sort that would have occurred on a substantive hearing.

37.  However, I shall make that costs order first on a nisi basis, to become absolute if no party makes a variation application within 14 days.  Any such variation application, if made, will be dealt with on paper.