Case Details
Listing:
MOHD SHAHID v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
MOHD SHAHID v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5254 · HCAL 2802/2025
Court of First Instance
HCAL 2802/2025
[2026] HKCFI 5254
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 2802 of 2025
BETWEEN
| |Mohd Shahid |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
|(|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application to apply for leave for judicial review”
in the prescribed Form 86 filed on 18 December 2025, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave
Application”). The intended judicial review was against the
decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement
Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 11 December 2025 (“Board’s
Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against the Director
of Immigration (“Director”) dated 13 October 2025 rejecting the
applicant's non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds[1].
The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL002802_
2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to India,
he would be harmed or killed by JP, a leader of the Bharatiya
Janata Party, which was opposite to the party the applicant
supported. The Board’s reasoning and findings were set out in
detail in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to
repeat them. Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the
Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s
Decision.
3. As the applicant has not expressly requested for an oral hearing in
the Form 86, the court will therefore determine the Leave Application
without a hearing: see O 53, r 3 (3) of the Rules of the High Court.
Discussion
4. A leave application operates as a “filtering” process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my decision.
It is therefore sufficient to state my observations after considering the
Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials adduced.
5. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[2], and further to make full and
frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an affidavit. In
the applicant’s Form 86, the applicant put forth 8 grounds, namely (i)
Failure to consider material evidence, including COI, and supporting
documents; (ii) Irrationality/Wednesbury unreasonableness, averring that
the findings on credibility were not supported by evidence; (iii)
Misapplication of the legal test for future risk and standard of proof in
that the Board had failed to apply the standard of “ reasonable degree of
likelihood”; (iv) Failure to properly assess political motivation requiring
the applicant to provide evidence of a high political profile; (v) Failure
to conduct a lawful internal relocation assessment without examining the
persecutors’ reach, the reasonableness of relocation, or the applicant’s
circumstances; (vi) Failure to properly assess state protection by having
failed to consider police inaction, political interference, or
ineffectiveness in cases involving politically motivated harm; (vii)
Inadequate reasons in having failed to give adequate and intelligible
reasons addressing the applicant’s explanations, medical evidence,
political context, and relevant COI; and (viii) Procedural unfairness by
relying on matters that were not properly put to the applicant, using
evidence not adequately addressed during the hearing, and drawing adverse
findings without affording the applicant an opportunity to respond. The
supporting affirmation provided no such grounds.
7. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality.[3] In the present case, in
assessing the credibility of the applicant’s evidence, the Board bore
in mind that when assessing credibility, the existence of
inconsistencies in the applicant’s account might not be fatal to his
claim so long as “the centerpiece of the story stands” (Board Decision
at [11]). Applying this principle, the Board did not find credible
and reliable evidence supporting that the applicant supported AAP,
being one of the cruxes of the applicant’s claim. Even if it were
accepted that the applicant was indeed a supporter, the Board found
that the applicant was a mere grass-root level supporter, which the
applicant accepted. The Board also found that there was no credible
and reliable evidence that JP existed or had been there to harm or
threaten the applicant. Even if JP existed, the Board found that the
alleged past threats and fear from JP and BJP were incredible and
unreliable. The future risk of harm was therefore assessed to have
been low as the past ill-treatment, if any, failed to meet the
requisite level of severity. The Board found that state protection
would be available to the applicant (Board’s Decision [87]) and
internal relocation was also viable. These are findings of fact,
which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject
to there being any public law errors.
8. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the
Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and
observed a high standard of fairness in the credibility assessment
(adopting the correct principle); the finding on the available of
reasonable state protection was based on the relevant COI. Despite
the Board’s rejection of the applicant’s main aspect of the claim, the
Board still continued to assess the degree of past harm. In my view,
the Board has considered all the relevant materials and given
sufficient reasons. On the other hand, the eight grounds the
applicant provided were only mere allegations without any particulars.
The applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural
unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The applicant’s
intended challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable
with realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court
to grant leave[4].
Order
9. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review be
dismissed.
|Dated the 29th day of September 2026 | |
| | |
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 29/9/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Mohd Shahid |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |no: |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule |Nil. |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |29/9/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 27366 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |1759/25 (formerly |
|use at the hearing, | |RBCZ/5001655/25) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to
the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of
persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s Unified
Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to process
claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description of the
USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor [2015] 3
HKC 293.
[2] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL 21/2015,
22 December 2016 at [142].
[3] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v
Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[4] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676