HOP ON MANAGEMENT COMPANY LTD, as the administrator of the Incorporated Owners of Wang Fuk Court, in the capacity of the chairman of the management committee of the Incorporated Owners of Wang Fuk Court v. ALL OWNERS OF WANG FUK COURT

LDBM 74/2026

[2026] HKLdT 35

IN THE LANDS TRIBUNAL OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

BUILDING MANAGEMENT APPLICATION NO. 74 OF 2026

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J U D G M E N T

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I.  INTRODUCTION

1.  On 13 May 2026, the Applicant, as the administrator of the Incorporated Owners (the “IO”) of Wang Fuk Court (“Wang Fuk Court”), in the capacity of the chairman of the management committee of the IO of Wang Fuk Court, filed Notice of Application (the “Notice of Application”) under the Building Management Ordinance (Cap 344) (the “BMO”) seeking the following orders:-

(1)  An extension of time for the Applicant to give notice of meeting for the purpose of convening a general meeting of the IO of Wang Fuk Court within 14 days of receiving on 29 April 2026 the purported written request (the “Purported Written Request”) of not less than 5% of the owners of Wang Fuk Court under paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 3 to the BMO, from 13 May 2026 to such date as this Tribunal thinks fit (“Relief (1)”);

(2)  An extension of time for the Applicant to hold the general meeting of the IO of Wang Fuk Court within 45 days of receiving on 29 April 2026 the Purported Written Request under paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 3 to the BMO, from 13 June 2026 to such date as this Tribunal thinks fit (“Relief (2)”); and

(3)  Directions as to alternative methods of service of the notice of meeting on the owners of Wang Fuk Court, in circumstances where the methods of service provided in paragraph 2(1A) of Schedule 3 to the BMO are impracticable and/or ineffective following the tragic fire at Wang Fuk Court on 26 November 2025 (“Relief (3)”).

2.  The Notice of Application lists two questions of law for the Tribunal’s determination:-

(1)  Whether the Tribunal should, in the special circumstances of this case, extend time for the Applicant to convene and hold the meeting beyond the statutory timeframe (“Question (1)”); and

(2)  Whether the Tribunal should give directions as to alternative methods of service of the notice of meeting on the owners of Wang Fuk Court, in circumstances where the methods of service provided in paragraph 2(1A) of Schedule 3 to the BMO are impracticable and/or ineffective following the tragic fire (the “Fire”) at Wang Fuk Court on 26 November 2025 (“Question (2)”).

3.  Question (1), in relation to Relief (1) and (2) above, is concerning the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to extend time. Question (2), in relation to Relief (3) above, is concerning the Tribunal’s jurisdiction on ordering alternative modes of giving notice of meeting.

4.  On 15 May 2026, the Applicant filed an Ex Parte Summons (the “Ex Parte Summons”), under rules 7, 8 and 9 of the Lands Tribunal Rules (Cap 17A) (the “LTR”) for leave for substituted service of the Notice of Application and the order made on the Sub-Service Summons on the Respondent, being “All Owners of Wang Fuk Court” (none of whom is named, although obviously, the Applicant must have knowledge of the identities of the 5% owners requesting a meeting).

5.  Having reviewed the papers, the Tribunal has concern over whether it has jurisdiction to grant any of the relief sought in the Notice of Application. Only if it has should it then consider whether the circumstances warrant a substituted service order as sought in the Ex Parte Summons. However, if, in the first place, the Tribunal does not have such jurisdiction and thus the Notice of Application is plainly and obviously bound to fail, it would be academic to grant leave for substitute service notifying “All the Owners of Wang Fuk Court” to come to the Tribunal eventually to be told that the Notice of Application fails for want of jurisdiction. Therefore, on 21 May 2026, the Tribunal issued written directions ordering a substantive hearing of the Ex Parte Summons for the Applicant to address, among others, this jurisdictional issue. In its written directions, the Tribunal also asked the Applicant to make submissions on whether, in the event that the Tribunal would come to a plain and obvious view that the Tribunal does not have such jurisdiction, the Tribunal should, under Order 18 rule 19 of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A) (the “RHC”) adopted via section 10(1) of the Lands Tribunal Ordinance (Cap 17) (the “LTO”), of its own motion, strike out and dismiss the Notice of Application. Subsequently, the Tribunal issued further directions drawing the Applicant’s attention to various authorities which I think are relevant to the jurisdictional issue.

6.  The Applicant is represented by Mr Hectar Pun SC, leading Mr Ross Yuen and Mr Anson YY Wong. I am grateful for their able and thorough assistance in presenting full and thorough arguments in relation to the jurisdictional issue. Having considered their submissions, I now render the present Judgment.

II.  SUBSTITUTED SERVICE UNDER RULE 9 OF THE LANDS TRIBUNAL RULES (CAP 17A)

7.  Under rule 9 of the Lands Tribunal Rules (Cap 17A):-

“If it appears to the Tribunal that, after reasonable efforts, it has not been possible to-

(a) effect service on any person in accordance with rule 7(1)(a) or (b); or

(b) give notice to any person in accordance with rule 8(a) or (b),

the Tribunal may dispense with service upon such person or may, under rule 7(1)(c) or 8(c) (as the case may be), make an order for substituted service upon such other person or in such form (whether by advertisement in a newspaper or otherwise) as the Tribunal thinks fit.”

8.  While there is no express requirement in relation to the merits of the underlying claim, however, in an ex parte application, the Tribunal expects the ex parte applicant at least briefly to explain the nature of the claim. While the Lands Tribunal’s proceedings are to be “conducted with as much informality as is consistent with attaining justice”: see section 10(5) of the LTO, unless the claim is a claim of the run-of-the-mill in the Lands Tribunal, an ex parte applicant, in discharge of its duty to make full and frank disclosure to the Tribunal (which duty court officers would be familiar with), should give a brief explanation of the nature and basis of the claim. Where the basis of the claim is unclear, the Tribunal will not hesitate to proactively case-manage the matter to ensure that the underlying objectives of Order 1A rule 1 of the RHC would be properly achieved, including reasonably expeditious dealing with cases and fair distribution of the judicial resources.

9.  In my view, the Applicant’s claim in the Notice of Application is not a run-of-the-mill claim the Tribunal deals with day in day out.

III.  JURISDICTION ON TIME EXTENSIONS SOUGHT IN THE NOTICE OF APPLICATION

10.  I shall deal with the jurisdiction to extend time first, in relation to Relief (1) and (2) and Question (1).

11.  The Lands Tribunal is “a creature of statute” and so its powers are conferred upon and defined by statutes: see Dow Corning Asia Ltd v The Hong Kong Land Company Limited, LDLA 9/1982, 12 April 1983. The Lands Tribunal of course has jurisdiction to regulate its practice and procedures (and even on this, the Lands Tribunal would need the empowerment by section 10 of the LTO); however, it does not have any inherent jurisdiction going to the substantive rights and obligations of the parties before it. Therefore, to ascertain what substantive orders the Tribunal has jurisdiction to make, I have to construe the relevant statutory provisions.

12.  The legal principles of statutory construction are well established. I only need to refer to HKSAR v Chan Chun Kit (2022) 25 HKCFAR 191 at §§10-11, where the Chief Justice explained:-

“10. The rules of statutory construction are well established. Words are construed in their context and purpose. They are given their natural and ordinary meaning with context and purpose to be considered alongside the expressed wording from the start, and not merely at some later stage when an ambiguity is thought to arise. A purposive and contextual interpretation does not mean that one can disregard the actual words used in a statute. Rather, the court is to ascertain the intention of the legislature as expressed in the language of the statute. As has been repeatedly pointed out, one cannot give a provision a meaning which the language of the statute, understood in the light of its context and purpose, cannot bear.

11. Context here is to be taken in its widest sense and includes other statutory provisions and the general law. The purpose of a statutory provision may be evident from the provision itself, the recommendation of a report such as that published by the Law Reform Commission, the explanatory memorandum to the relevant bill or a statement by the responsible official of the government in relation to that bill in the Legislative Council. It may also be relevant in any given case to look at the history of the provision concerned.”

13.  Section 19 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance (Cap 1) (the “IGCO”) is also relevant. It reads:-

“An Ordinance shall be deemed to be remedial and shall receive such fair, large and liberal construction and interpretation as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the Ordinance according to its true intent, meaning and spirit.”

A.  Building Management Ordinance

14.  The relevant statute here is the BMO. According to its long title, the BMO is:-

“To facilitate the incorporation of owners of flats in buildings or groups of buildings, to provide for the management of buildings or groups of buildings and for matters incidental thereto or connected therewith”.

15.  Section 45 of the BMO defines the jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal. It provides that:-

“(1) The tribunal shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine any proceedings specified in Schedule 10.

(2) …

(3) Subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, nothing in this section or Schedule 10 shall be construed to vest in the tribunal any jurisdiction other than civil jurisdiction or any jurisdiction to make any order which would, if made, have the effect of rendering void, negativing or substantially varying in whole or in part any contractual or proprietary right enjoyed by any owner or occupier or otherwise referred to in the terms and provisions of an instrument which is registered in the Land Registry including a deed of mutual covenant (if any).

(4) …

(5) In this section and Schedule 10, proprietary right includes any such right express or implied whether specified in an easement, licence, permission or otherwise.” (emphasis added)

16.  Schedule 10 to the BMO, insofar as relevant to the present purposes, lists out the following “specified proceedings” for the Tribunal’s determination:-

“1. Proceedings relating to the interpretation and enforcement of the provisions of this Ordinance.

2. Proceedings relating to the interpretation and enforcement of the terms and provisions of a deed of mutual covenant, including such terms or provisions impliedly incorporated into a deed of mutual covenant under Part VIA.

…

5. Proceedings relating to any question of law concerning the powers and duties of-

(a) a corporation;

(b) a management committee, and of the chairman, secretary and treasurer thereof;

(c) a manager;

(d) an owners’ committee within the meaning of that section;

(e) the tenants’ representatives…”

17.  According to the Notice of Application, the Purported Written Request for convening a corporation meeting was made pursuant to paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 3 (“Schedule 3”) to the BMO.

18.  According to section 8(5) of the BMO:-

“Schedule 3 shall have effect with respect to the meetings and procedure of a corporation [registered under the BMO].”

19.  Unlike Schedule 7 to the BMO, the contents of which are “impliedly incorporated” by section 34E of the BMO into the deed of mutual covenant and thus in principle become part of the deed of mutual covenant, Schedule 3 are standalone statutory provisions governing “the meetings and the procedure of” the incorporated owners. In other words, the rights and obligations under Schedule 3 are statutory in nature.

20.  Paragraph 1 and 2 of Schedule 3 provide that:-

“1. (1) The management committee shall convene—

(a) the first annual general meeting of a corporation not later than 15 months after the date of the registration of the corporation;

(b) an annual general meeting not earlier than 12 months, and not later than 15 months, after the date of the first or previous annual general meeting;

(c) a general meeting of the corporation at any time for such purposes as the management committee thinks fit.

(2) The chairman of the management committee shall convene a general meeting of the corporation at the written request of not less than 5% of the owners for the purposes specified by such owners within 14 days of receiving such request, and hold the general meeting within 45 days of receiving such request.

…

2…

(1A). The notice of meeting may be given-

(a) by delivering it personally to the owner or tenants’ representative (if any); or

(b) by sending it by post to the owner or tenants’ representative (if any) at his last known address; or

(c) by leaving it at the flat of the owner or tenants’ representative (if any) or depositing it in the letter box for that flat.”

21.  The remaining paragraphs of Schedule 3 go on to set out various matters concerning notice of meetings, proceedings of meetings and the like. It is worth also setting out paragraph 7 and 8 of Schedule 3:-

“7. Subject to this Ordinance, the procedure at a meeting of the corporation is as is determined by the corporation.

8. In the event of any inconsistency between this Schedule and the terms of a deed of mutual covenant or any other agreement, this Schedule shall prevail.” (emphasis added)

22.  From the above, I draw the following in relation to the BMO:-

(1)  The purpose of the BMO, as set out in its long title, is to “provide for” building management. Nothing is mentioned to confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to vary substantive rights and obligations in relation to building management provided for by the BMO.

(2)  The jurisdiction conferred upon the Tribunal by the BMO is defined by section 45 and Schedule 10.

(3)  By section 45(3), the jurisdiction so conferred does not empower the Tribunal to substantially vary any contractual or proprietary right in an instrument registered in the Land Registry. Although it does not say so, this must be applicable equally, if not a fortiori, to statutory rights enjoyed by the owners.  The starting point must be that for statutory rights enjoyed by the owners, the BMO does not confer any jurisdiction on the Tribunal to make any substantial variation unless clear and unequivocal language is used to confer such power.

(4)  By virtue of section 8(5) and Schedule 3, the right of the 5% owners to request for a corporation meeting is a statutory right. This statutory right, in my view, also has a proprietary nature in that it is part and parcel of the proprietary rights of the owners in the units and the common areas they own. This statutory right is private property in nature.

(5)  The procedure at the meeting of the corporation, if not regulated by the BMO, is a matter for the corporation, an approach made clear by paragraph 7 of Schedule 3. This, in my view, is consistent with the judicial approach that the Tribunal or the Courts should be slow to interfere with internal management of private organisations, because it is the members of the organisations, but not the Courts or the Tribunal, who are in the best position to determine their own private affairs concerning their private rights and obligations: see, for example, Whole Grand Ltd v Bo Fung Building (IO) [2024] 3 HKLRD 725 at §68. This, however, is not to be understood that the Tribunal or the Courts would lay back to leave private matters completely into the private parties. The Tribunal and the Courts have the constitutional duty to determine rights and obligations in accordance with the law when there is dispute. Based on the rights and obligations, it is then for the private parties to determine how to conduct their affairs. Where there is no law regulating the private matter, it is for the private parties to determine how to make arrangements and conduct their affairs, so long as this would not be against the law.

23.  In the present Application, the owners’ right to request for a corporation meeting is a statutory right. This right to request for a corporation meeting is, in my view, a fundament substantive right of an owner so that the owner would be afforded opportunity to come together to be informed, discuss and deliberate, and/or participate in and making decisions concerning the management of the buildings and matters incidental thereto and connected therewith (see the long title of BMO quoted above) in which buildings he or she holds proprietary rights and/or where s/he and her or his family live. The right to request a meeting must entail a right to have the meeting convened and held. The right to convene and hold a meeting is the two sides of the same coin. To hold a meeting, there must be someone to convene the meeting, and therefore, I do not accept any faint suggestion Mr Pun appears to make that the right to convene a meeting is procedural and the right to hold the meeting is substantive. Further, if such right to convene and hold a meeting is to have any real meaning, the meeting must be convened and held within a reasonable time, and by paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 3, the legislature has decided 14 days for convening the meeting and 45 days for holding the meeting to be such reasonable time. In other words, the right to have the meeting convened and held within the 14-day-and-45-day timeframe is part and parcel of the substantive content of this fundamental substantive right to request a meeting. To vary the timeframe would in my view vary the substantive right created by statute. Therefore, unless there is any clear and unequivocal wording to that effect, there should be no means for the Tribunal to vary this substantive right.

24.  A contrast may be drawn between the BMO and the Companies Ordinance (Cap 622) (the “CO”), as, in a sense, an owner’s share in the building is analogous to a shareholder’s share in a company: in a very general sense, in both situations, it is a collective ownership in a private property and thus legislation provides for, among others, how the private owners could make collective decisions on the private property. Section 566 of the CO provides for members of not less than 5% to request for a general meeting. Section 570 confers jurisdiction on the Court to call or even to conduct a general meeting “if for any reason it is impracticable”, effectively including jurisdiction to extend time for holding a meeting if it is “for any reason… impracticable” to hold the meeting within the prescribed time. Similarly, for an annual general meeting mandated under section 610 of the CO, section 610(5) confers jurisdiction on the Court to extend time “[i]f for any reason the Court thinks fit to do so”. Here, insofar as relevant, Schedule 10 to the BMO only confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to interpret and enforce the relevant provisions in the BMO and the relevant deed of mutual covenant, and to determine questions of law concerning the powers and duties of the various persons and entities. Unlike the CO, not a word in the BMO suggests that the timeframe could be varied, let alone that the Tribunal or any other Courts would have any jurisdiction to vary the timeframe.

25.  In the premises, I am of the view that it is plain and obvious the BMO confers no jurisdiction on the Tribunal to extend time as applied for in the Notice of Application.

B.  Lands Tribunal Ordinance

26.  Another Ordinance which I should examine is of course the LTO, which creates the Tribunal itself. Section 8 of the LTO is in relation to the Tribunal’s jurisdiction. It provides, insofar as relevant, that:-

“… (5) The Tribunal shall have such other jurisdiction as may be vested in it under the Ordinance including any Ordinance specified in the Schedule.

(6) …

(9) In the exercise of its jurisdiction, the Tribunal shall have the same jurisdiction to grant remedies and reliefs, equitable or legal, as the Court of First Instance…”

27.  The relevant Ordinance listed in the Schedule to the LTO is the BMO. Therefore, section 8(5) and the Schedule add nothing.

28.  For section 8(9), though “equitable or legal, as the Court of First Instance”, may at the first glance seem to confer wide power on the Tribunal, the power is in relation to remedies and reliefs. This means that the substantive rights and obligations should be determined first. This is a far cry from saying that section 8(9) confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to vary any substantive rights and obligations.

29.  Section 10(2)(d)(i) of the LTO is the provision Mr Pun heavily relies upon. In order properly to interpret it, I set out the following parts of section 10:-

“10. Practice and procedure of Tribunal

(1) The Tribunal may, so far as it thinks fit, follow the practice and procedure of the Court of First Instance in the exercise of its civil jurisdiction, and for this purpose, has the same jurisdiction, powers and duties of the Court of First Instance in respect of such practice and procedure.

(1A) Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), the Tribunal has the same jurisdiction, powers and duties of the Court of First Instance in respect of the punishment of a person guilty of contempt.

(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers vested in it under subsection (1), the Tribunal may—

(d) for good cause, enlarge the time, whether or not that time has already expired, fixed by any Ordinance—

(i) for the giving of any notice (and whether or not the notice relates to any proceedings);

(ii) for the taking of any step in any proceedings;

(iii) for the filing or lodging of any document in any proceedings.

(3) The Chief Justice after consultation with the President may make rules prescribing…” (emphasis added)

30.  Mr Pun submits the premises (1) that the emphasised phrase in section 10(2)(d)(i) (“whether or not the notice relates to any proceedings”) gives the Tribunal the jurisdiction to extend time for giving any notice under any Ordinance over which the Tribunal has jurisdiction; (2) that to convene a meeting under Schedule 3 means to give notice of meeting; and (3) that therefore, the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to extend time for convening the meeting.

31.  For premise (1), the Explanatory Memorandum to the Lands Tribunal (Amendment) Bill 1983 adding section 10(2)(d)(i) (to which subsequent change of statutory wording mentioned below was made) that:-

“Clause 3 [including adding section 10(2)(d)(i)] provides for the Tribunal to follow the practice of the High Court in relation to making of orders as to interim payments and orders in default and provides a power to extend time-limits.” (emphasis added)

32.  What are the “time-limits”? Mr Pun refers me to HH Judge M Wong’s decision in Towerich Limited v Commissioner of Rating and Valuation, LDMP 3/2009, 15 June 2009, upheld by the Court of Appeal in CACV 177/2009, 12 February 2010, where at §10, Rogers VP said that section 10(2)(d)(i) “must relate to something in the nature of a section 37 proposal or something like that”. What was the nature of a section 37 proposal in that case? In that case, the applicant applied under section 10(2)(d)(i) for enlargement of time to serve the Proposal for Alteration of Valuation List and Government Roll under section 37 of the Rating Ordinance (Cap 116) (the “RO”) for the Year of Assessment 2008/2009. As set out by HH Judge M Wong at §12 of his decision in that case, under the RO, after a person makes a proposal under section 37 of the RO, the Commissioner of Rating and Valuation would issue a notice of decision stating its final decision under section 39, and the person aggrieved may then lodge an appeal to the Lands Tribunal under section 42 of the RO. Therefore, “sections 37, 39 and 42 are procedural provisions linked closely with each other. An appeal cannot be lodged under section 42 in respect of a decision under section 39 if the person has not gone through the procedures under section 37” (§12 of the decision). As rightly observed by HH Judge M Wong at §13 of his decision:-

“…The serving of a proposal and the lodging of an appeal are just different steps in the same process. After all, there is only one dispute involved – the valuation of the rateable value of the property in question. When the Lands Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear this dispute, it naturally follows that it has jurisdiction to handle all the procedural matters related thereto, including the time for serving a proposal under section 37… As long as the Lands Tribunal has jurisdiction over a section 42 appeal, then section 10(2)(d)(i) of the LTO can be invoked to enlarge the time for serving a proposal under section 37.”

33.  Therefore, in my view, on this reasoning, the jurisdiction to enlarge time for serving notice is in relation to procedural notice, although such notice is not necessarily related to any proceedings in the Lands Tribunal. Such notice is procedural, rather than substantive or being a substantive part of a substantive right, in the sense that it starts a process to resolve a dispute or determine some substantive rights, which may (not must) eventually lead to proceedings in the Lands Tribunal to determine such dispute or rights, although the notice itself does not necessarily relate to any extant or future proceedings (if any) in the Lands Tribunal.

34.  HH Judge M Wong then went on at §15 of his decision to refer to the amendment made to section 10(2)(d)(i):-

“The statutory wordings changed from “either before or after any proceedings have commenced” to “whether or not the notice relates to any proceedings”. Thus, it is clear that under the old provision, the notice must relate to certain proceedings, but this is no longer a requirement under the new provision. Although the new provision was introduced as a result of some problems in the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance, Cap. 7, it was not stated to be applicable only to the situations under that Ordinance. Thus, the legislative intention must be that the new provision is also applicable to other cases beyond the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance.”

35.  The decision did not mention what “some problems” in the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) Ordinance (the “LTCO”) were. Looking at the legislative history of the change of the statutory wording in section 10(2)(d)(i) of the LTO, one would find that the amendment was part of the amendment under the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) (Amendment) Ordinance 2002 (the “Amendment Ordinance”), which made substantial amendments to Part IV and Part V of the then LTCO. In the Legislative Council Brief for the Landlord and Tenant (Consolidation) Amendment Bill 2001 leading to the Amendment Ordinance, it was stated that:-

“6. Part IV provides the mechanism for a landlord to terminate a tenancy and a tenant to request for a new tenancy through application to the Lands Tribunal if they fail to reach agreement. There are strict time limits on the exchange of statutory documents between the landlord and the tenant. The Lands Tribunal has also indicated that the complicated procedures and strict time limits stipulated under Part IV are preventing it from determining applications for new tenancy solely on their merits…

7. In order to streamline the tenancy renewal procedures so as to better facilitate the landlord and the tenant in reaching agreement and to give the Lands Tribunal the discretion in handling tenancy renewal applications involving notices not served or submitted within statutory time limits, we propose that –

(e) The Lands Tribunal should be empowered to hear cases in which the landlord or the tenant fails to observe statutory time limits in serving or submitting notices with good cause.” (emphasis added)

36.  The amendment to section 10(2)(d)(i) was part and parcel of the Amendment Ordinance to amend Parts IV and V of the LTCO:-

(1)  Part IV of the LTCO concerned new tenancies of domestic premises, containing elaborate provisions in relation to how to determine whether a tenancy was a new tenancy, how a tenancy may be terminated by a notice in the specified form, how a tenant may request for a new tenancy by a notice in the specified form and the like. However, it is fair to say that these notices were all procedural in nature, because by section 115A(10) and section 117 of the then LTCO, an application may be made to the Lands Tribunal for a determination of the matter underlying the notice.

(2)  Part V of the then LTCO concerned “Tenancy (Notice of Termination)”. Section 122 prescribed the minimum length of notice to terminate a tenancy, and section 127A conferred jurisdiction on the Lands Tribunal to determine disputes arising under Part V as to rent or right to possession of the premises. The “notice” under section 127A is again procedural in nature. For section 122, it is fair to say that given that section 122 prescribed the minimum length of notice, there would be no point in talking about enlarging the time for giving notice, and so the amendment to section 10(2)(d)(i) was not intended to cover this section 122 notice of termination.

(3)  From the above, it is clear that irrespective of the change of the statutory wordings to section 10(2)(d)(i), the “notice” intended to be covered is procedural, rather than substantive or being a substantive part of a substantive right. The substitution of “either before or after any proceedings have commenced” with “whether or not the notice relates to any proceedings” seems to address situations where eventually no proceedings are commenced; in such situations, without the change of the statutory wordings, it might be argued that section 10(2)(d)(i) would not apply because there were simply no proceedings at all. However, the substitution does not appear to enlarge the jurisdiction to cover substantive rights.

37.  Back to Towerich Limited v Commissioner of Rating and Valuation. At §17, HH Judge M Wong then cited and followed Chan Sik Cheung & ors v Director of Lands [1995] 3 HKC 199 in support of his view.

38.  Chan Sik Cheung v Director of Lands is a case before the change of the statutory wordings to section 10(2)(d)(i). The fact that HH Judge M Wong saw fit to refer to that case shows that he took the view, and I agree, that the nature of the notice remained the same despite the change of the wordings, although the existence of proceedings would become unnecessary upon the change. In Chan Sik Cheung v Director of Lands, the applicant applied for time extension to serve a notice of claim on the Director of Lands under the Foreshore and Sea-bed (Reclamation) Ordinance (Cap 127) (the “FS(R)O”) in respect of losses allegedly suffered because of the destruction of oyster beds during reclamation. The question before HH Judge Cruden in that case was whether the Tribunal “had jurisdiction to enlarge the time for delivering to the Director, a Section 12(1) claim [under the FS(R)O] in the light of the time limitations imposed by section 13 of the FS(R)O.” (at 202A). The learned Judge aptly pointed out at 202A-B that:-

“In summary, a claim must first be served on the Director and only if agreement is not reached, may either party refer the claim to the Lands Tribunal.”

39.  In other words, like Towerich Limited v Commissioner of Rating and Valuation and like the notices under Parts IV and V of the LTCO, the notice in question in Chan Sik Cheung v Director of Lands was such a notice that may (not must) eventually lead to proceedings in the Lands Tribunal to determine the underlying dispute.

40.  At page 9 of Chan Sik Cheung v Director of Lands, HH Judge Cruden then referred specifically to section 10(2)(d)(i) of the LTO, and held that the Tribunal had jurisdiction to extend time for serving notice on the Director of Lands, saying:-

“However, [section 10(2)(d)(i)] is an exceptional and extremely wide power. First, it extends not merely to the Lands Tribunal Ordinance but to ‘any Ordinance’. Secondly, it extends beyond pleadings and proceedings, to the giving of notices under any Ordinance, even before any proceedings have commenced.”

41.  This dictum, at first glance, seems to suggest that the jurisdiction under section 10(2)(d)(i) is very wide in general. However, properly understood in context, this dictum refers to the wide power over procedural notice only. Therefore, Towerich Limited v Commissioner of Rating and Valuation, on which Mr Pun relies, and Chan Sik Cheung v Director of Lands, on which HH Judge M Wong relied, are cases in relation to procedural notices, which may (not must) eventually lead to proceedings before the Lands Tribunal to determine the underlying dispute. I do not understand these cases to stand for any proposition that the jurisdiction to extend time would cover substantive rights.

42.  In fact, my reading of the above cases is entirely consistent with and supported by a standalone proper interpretation of section 10(2)(d)(i), applying the legal principles in relation to statutory interpretation stated in §12 above. First, section 10(1) is in relation to “practice and procedure”. Second, section 10(2) starts with the preamble “Without prejudice to the generality of the powers vested in it under subsection (1)”, which, in my view, means that section 10(2) would still be in relation to “practice and procedure”. Third, while I have not set out the whole section 10, section 10(1), (1A), (3), (4), (5) and (6) are all related to “practice and procedure”, and thus in proper context, section 10(2) is also related to “practice and procedure”, rather than any surprise that a sub-paragraph of a subsection would oddly relate to and/or cover substantive rights. Fourth, I agree that the Tribunal should construe section 10(2)(d)(i) bearing in mind the purposive and liberal approach mandated by section 19 of the IGCO, but if this section concerns only practice and procedure, however liberal the approach is, this section can only concern practice and procedure. Therefore, I agree with Mr Pun’s premise (1) insofar as it is confined to procedural notice. However, with respect, I disagree with him if his submissions would go so far as to say that section 10(2)(d)(i) would apply also to substantive rights. As such, while I have no qualm with the proposition he submits that the effect of a legislative amendment is not necessarily confined to the mischief to be addressed by the amendment at the time of the enactment of the amendment (citing Veale v Scottish Power UK Plc (2026) SC (UKSC) 77 at §§21-23), I do not think this proposition advances his position any further given that as a matter of statutory interpretation, the “notice” in section 10(2)(d)(i) is confined to procedural notice.

43.  In the present case, the notice of meeting to convene a meeting does not at any rate lead to any proceedings in the Lands Tribunal to determine any dispute. For one thing, there may not be any dispute to be determined at the meeting to be convened and held. For another, there is no mechanism that the Tribunal would determine any dispute in the agenda for the meeting to be convened and held. The notice of meeting, therefore, is not procedural. As I have explained above, the right to convene and hold a meeting is a substantive right, and the timeframe is part of the substantive right.  Assuming that convening a meeting means giving notice, the giving of the notice would not be procedural but part of a substantive right. On the proper interpretation of section 10(2)(d)(i), it does not apply to such notice.

44.  More fundamentally, with respect, I do not agree with Mr Pun’s premise (2) that convening a meeting under paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 3 means giving notice.

45.  Mr Pun refers me to 顏偉國 訴 何蘭, LDBM 173/2000, 5 September 2000. In that case, Deputy Judge Tong gave the following explanation in relation to “convene” at §6:-

“本席認為“召開＂一辭當然不是指正式進行有關的會議，因為附表3第2條第1節規定有關的開會通知，必須有不少於14天的通知期，故“召開＂一辭，只能極其量指發出開會的通告…故本席裁定該節中“召開＂的法定解釋為主席必須在收到有關的要求後，在14天內公佈同表中第2條第2節中所包括的事項即:-

(a) 會議日期、時間及地點；

(b) 將於會議上提出的每項決議及討論的其他事項。” (emphasis added)

46.  Mr Pun takes this in support of his submissions that convening means giving notice. With respect, I disagree:-

(1)  “Convening” means “cause to come together”: see Shackleton on the Law and Practice of Meetings (16^th ed) §5-01. While giving notice of meeting definitely is convening a meeting, it does not follow that convening a meeting can only mean giving notice of the meeting.

(2)  The fact that paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 specifically mentions notice of meeting at least 14 days before the date of the meeting clearly shows that convening a meeting (required to be within 14 days upon the owners’ request under paragraph 1 of Schedule 3) is not necessarily the same as giving notice of meeting.

(3)  Even in 顏偉國 訴 何蘭, the learned Deputy Judge did not use the words “通知” (notice) in relation to “召開”. Instead, he used the words “通告” (announcement) and “公佈” (public announcement), in my view a conscious and deliberate choice to avoid any confusion with “通知” (notice).

(4)  Mr Pun refers me to a paper prepared by the Home Affairs Department for the Legislative Council’s Bills Committee on Building Management (Amendment) Bill 2005 in October 2005. At that time, there was no time limit prescribed for holding a meeting upon owners’ request. Therefore, there had been circumstances where the chairman convened a meeting but did not give any time, or gave some very unrealistic time, for holding the meeting. That amendment bill was intended to address this problem by introducing a time limit for holding the meeting. The issue for that paper was therefore not about what “convene” means. In that paper, 顏偉國 訴 何蘭 was cited for the Home Affairs Department’s view that “convene” “does not mean formally holding the meeting, and only means the issuance of the notice of meeting” (see §§4 and 11 of the paper). The Home Affairs Department then stated at §12 that “When paragraphs 1(2) and 2(1) of Schedule 3 are read together, we consider that one option is to stipulate that the chairman shall issue a notice of meeting within 14 days and that the meeting should be held within 28 days (14 + 14 days) on receipt of the owners’ request” (emphasis added). Mr Pun, relying on these, submits that the legislature clearly took the view that convening means issuance of notice. With respect, issuance of notice is “one option” only. Even the Home Affairs Department accepted that when paragraphs 1(2) and 2(1) of Schedule 3 are read together, issuance of notice within certain timeframes was one option, meaning that there could be other options. Further, despite the Home Affairs Department’s paper, the legislature still saw fit to maintain the different wording of “convening” in paragraph 1 of Schedule 3 and “notice” in paragraph 2 of Schedule 3. In the circumstances, I do not accept that this paper could properly aid the Tribunal’s interpretation to the effect as Mr Pun submits.

(5)  So, convening means convening. It may include giving notice, but it is not equated with giving notice. Another example of convening a meeting I can think of is for the chairman to cause the committee to pass a resolution to hold a meeting at a specified date, time and venue, or for the chairman to direct the secretary to issue notice under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3.

47.  Putting aside that the jurisdiction to extend time under section 10(2)(d)(i) does not apply to substantive rights, I do not think that just because “convening” may include giving notice, section 10(2)(d)(i) then applies to “convening”. It would be awkward if “notice” in section 10(2)(d)(i) could cover any means of convening. It would be equally awkward to suggest that if the chairman chooses to give notice as the means to convene a meeting, then section 10(2)(d)(i) would apply, and it would not apply if the chairman chooses some other means. I see no justification for such differential treatment as a matter of proper statutory interpretation.

48.  To sum up, section 10(2)(d)(i) does not apply to convening a meeting under paragraph 1 of Schedule 3.

49.  Mr Pun’s submissions that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to extend time for holding a meeting are premised upon his submissions that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to extend time for convening a meeting. His submissions are, in essence, that if the Tribunal has jurisdiction to extend time for convening a meeting under section 10(2)(d)(i), it would be absurd if it has no implied or incidental jurisdiction to extend time for holding the meeting, citing R (PACCAR Inc) v Competition Appeal Tribunal [2023] 1 WLR 2594 at §43. Upon my view that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend time for convening a meeting, his such submissions logically fall away. In any event, even if there were jurisdiction to extend time for convening a meeting, I would not see any absurdity in having no jurisdiction to extend time for holding a meeting because:-

(1)  Section 10(2)(d)(i) specifically mentions “notice”, in contrast with “step in any proceedings” in section 10(2)(d)(ii), which means that for any steps other than notice, such steps have to be steps in proceedings;

(2)  Holding a meeting is neither any “notice” in section 10(2)(d)(i) nor any “step in proceedings” in section 10(2)(d)(ii);

(3)  The Applicant’s position would be unduly stretching the scope of the statutory provisions without proper regard to the natural and ordinary meaning in context (including the context of distinction between “notice” and “step in proceedings”), which can in no way point to any such jurisdiction to extend time for holding a meeting, and to me, such stretching would be absurd; and

(4)  To support his submissions that the Tribunal has implied or incidental jurisdiction to extend time for holding a meeting, Mr Pun refers me to PCCW-HKT Telephone Ltd v Telecommunications Authority (2005) 8 HKCFAR 337 and Kwong Sin Yee Florence v Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd [2025] 5 HKC 819.

(a)  In PCCW-HKT Telephone Ltd v Telecommunications Authority, the question was whether under the Telecommunications Ordinance (Cap 106), the Appeal Board had jurisdiction to suspend the Telecommunications Authority’s directions pending appeal. The Court of Final Appeal found that upon proper construction of the Telecommunications Ordinance, there was such jurisdiction as implied ancillary jurisdiction.  In my view, no analogy can be drawn with the present case here. First, that case was about the Telecommunications Ordinance; and second, the power to suspend pending appeal was a power to regulate its procedures in the sense that otherwise, the appeal may be rendered nugatory and even serious consequence may result (see §47).

(b)  In respect of Kwong Sin Yee Florence v Cathay Pacific Airways Ltd, it is a case concerning whether the District Court had jurisdiction to grant Norwich Pharmacal relief. The learned Deputy Judge found that upon proper construction of the District Court Ordinance (Cap 336), the District Court had implied ancillary jurisdiction to grant such relief, arising from the primary jurisdiction of the District Court, notably, section 32 of the District Court Ordinance (see §§101-102), so that a party may properly formulate his or her claim. I do not see how this case helps Mr Pun save and except for the well established proposition that the Court may have implied ancillary or incidental jurisdiction if that is what the statute intends upon proper construction of the statute.

(c)  In the light of the contrast and distinction between section 10(2)(d)(i) (“notice”) and section 10(2)(d)(ii) (“step in proceedings”), I see no room to find any such implied or incidental jurisdiction as Mr Pun submits, since such implied or incidental jurisdiction would do violence to the said statutory distinction by conferring jurisdiction on the Tribunal to enlarge time for a step (holding a meeting) but contrary to section 10(2)(d)(ii), that “step” is not a “step in proceedings”.

50.  In fact, Mr Pun’s submissions cut both ways. Given that unlike giving notice, there is no way to say that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to extend time for holding a meeting, it would be absurd to say that because there is jurisdiction to extend time for giving notice, there must be jurisdiction to extend time for holding the meeting. With respect, such submissions put the cart before the horse. On the contrary, the statutory interpretation that there is no jurisdiction to extend time for giving notice of meeting (assuming convening means giving notice) sits well with the lack of jurisdiction to extend time for holding a meeting. In other words, as a matter of proper statutory interpretation, having regard to the proper context, nothing in the LTO confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to extend time for holding a meeting.

51.  In the light of my view that upon proper interpretation, there is no jurisdiction to extend time for holding the meeting, even if there were jurisdiction to extend time for convening the meeting, Relief (1) would be academic in the sense that the meeting should still be held on 13 June 2026, and practically, what the Applicant would have to do is now to give 14 days’ notice of the meeting under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3, and in such circumstances, to take the giving of notice now as convening the meeting to meet the deadline of 13 June 2026. In this sense, the Tribunal, even if there were jurisdiction, would not entertain Relief (1) at all.

52.  It remains for me to deal with 李志輝 v 蘇麗珍 [2021] HKLdT 37, which Mr Pun cites as an example where the Tribunal extended time for holding an owners’ meeting.

53.  In that case, after some dispute, a consent summons was filed whereby the parties agreed to convene and hold a meeting within a certain period of time, and the proceedings were discontinued. HH Judge M Wong granted the order as consented. Subsequently, the respondent filed a summons for time extension for holding the meeting, and the Tribunal granted the summons (see §§6-7). HH Judge M Wong did not refer to any statutory provision in granting the summons, but in my view, it is clear that the time extension was granted under the consent order – it was simply the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to give time for complying with its order, rather than the statutory provision. In principle, the statutory provision had been breached. Nevertheless, that it was breached would not mean that there was no need to convene and hold the meeting albeit being late and still in breach. The Tribunal ordering the relevant parties to convene and hold the meeting should not be regarded as granting a time extension for complying with the statutory provision or approving the breach, but rather, such ordering should be regarded as enforcing the statutory provisions which have, unfortunately, been breached. It is not merely technical, but of substantive effect. For one, costs implication, although subject to the Tribunal’s discretion considering why there was the breach (for example, practical impossibility, pandemic like in 李志輝 v 蘇麗珍, or deliberate breach). For another, there may actually be no application at all to enforce the rights. For example, the committee and the owners have a proper dialogue to understand each other’s concern and difficulty, and upon such better understanding, agree to a later date for holding the meeting. After all, in the normal course of events (though I understand the present circumstances are unprecedented), the owners and the committee are neighbours and may well like to avoid seeing each other in the Tribunal.

54.  Therefore, 李志輝 v 蘇麗珍 does not assist Mr Pun.

55.  In conclusion, I am of the view that it is plain and obvious the LTO confers no jurisdiction on the Tribunal to extend time as applied for in the Notice of Application, and in any event, even assuming that there were jurisdiction to extend time for convening the meeting, in the light of the fact that the meeting has to be held on 13 June 2026 and the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend time for holding the meeting, the Tribunal would plainly and obviously not entertain Relief (1) for reasons explained in §51 above.

C.  Section 72 of the IGCO

56.  Given the importance of the matter, out of abundant caution and for the sake of completeness, I also look at section 72 of the IGCO, which is in relation to the Court’s power to extend time.

57.  Section 72 of the IGCO provides:-

“Where in any Ordinance a time is prescribed for doing any act or taking any proceeding and power is given to a court, public body, public officer or other authority to extend such time, then the power may be exercised by the court, public body, public officer or other authority although the application for the same is not made until after the expiration of the time prescribed.” (emphasis added)

58.  One of the conditions for this section to apply is that “power is given” to extend time. Since I have found nothing that gives the Tribunal the power to extend time, this section is inapplicable.

D.  Conclusion

59.  I am aware of no other statutory provisions that might give rise to any argument that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to extend time as sought in the Notice of Application.

60.  For the above reasons, I conclude that it is plain and obvious that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend the time specified in paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 3.

IV.  JURISDICTION ON ALTERNATIVE MODES OF GIVING NOTICE OF MEETING

A.  Building Management Ordinance

61.  In relation to jurisdiction to order alternative modes of giving notice of meeting (in relation to Relief (3) and Question (2)), I start with paragraph 2(1A) of Schedule 3. It provides:-

“The notice of meeting may be given-

(a) by delivering it personally to the owner or tenants’ representative (if any); or

(b) by sending it by post to the owner or tenants’ representative (if any) at his last known address; or

(c) by leaving it at the flat of the owner or tenants’ representative (if any) or depositing it in the letter box for that flat.” (emphasis added)

62.  It is worth setting out also paragraph 2(2) immediately following paragraph 2(1A):-

“The secretary shall also, at least 14 days before the date of the meeting of the corporation, display the notice of meeting in a prominent place in the building.” (emphasis added)

63.  The word “may” under paragraph 2(1A) (in contrast with “shall” in paragraph 2(2)) is in my view directory and permissive in the sense that notice may be given in the prescribed manners, but may also be given in other manners. In my view, the purpose of giving notice is to bring the holding of the meeting to the notice of the owners, and therefore, so long as the way to give the notice is effective to achieve this purpose, such notice should be effective.

64.  However, the possibility of giving notice in other manners does not necessarily mean that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to order alternative modes of giving notice as submitted by Mr Pun.

65.  Mr Pun’s submissions in this regard can be summarised as follows:-

(1)  By section 10(1) of the LTO, the Tribunal statutorily inherits the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance’s inherent jurisdiction, referring to First Kind Ltd v Yuet Loong Investment Co Ltd [2018] 2 HKLRD 83 at §40 per HH Judge KW Wong (as he then was);

(2)  In Hong Kong Bar Association v Norman Persaud, HCMP 389/1987, 10 December 1993, the Court of Appeal held at page 10 that “notwithstanding that there is no reference in the [Legal Practitioners Ordinance Cap. 159] to substituted service, this Court has an inherent jurisdiction to make an order for it in a case such as this”; and

(3)  The word “may” in paragraph 2(1A) of Schedule 3 suggests that there can be other modes of giving notice.

66.  For premise (1), I agree that the Tribunal has jurisdiction as the Court of First Instance in relation to practice and procedure of the Tribunal, as stated in section 10(1) of the LTO. First Kind Ltd v Yuet Loong Investment Co Ltd was a case concerning setting aside a notice of discontinuance. This was a procedural matter of the Tribunal. Giving notice of meeting, however, is not. With respect, premise (1) does not help Mr Pun.

67.  Also, I do not accept premise (2). Hong Kong Bar Association v Norman Persaud is a case of disciplinary proceedings against a barrister under the Legal Practitioners Ordinance (Cap 159) (the “LPO”). The then Chief Justice appointed a Committee of Inquiry in relation to certain complaints against that barrister, and subsequently, the Chief Justice caused the matter to be set down for hearing before the Court of Appeal pursuant to the then section 37 of the LPO. By section 37(1), the Registrar shall give notice of the hearing to the barrister. The barrister raised that there was no proper service of the notice on him pursuant to section 37. At the second last paragraph (§23), the Court of Appeal had this to say:-

“Although, for the purpose of fulfilment of the requirement of section 37 it was unnecessary to do so, copies of the requisite documents were left at the applicant's Chambers, and substituted service by way of an advertisement in the South China Morning Post was effected. In the light of our conclusion that service of the documents at the address given by the respondent in his letter of 15 February 1987, was sufficient compliance with the requirements of section 37 of the Ordinance, his submission that there was "no jurisdiction" to order substituted service becomes an irrelevant issue. We have no doubt, however, that, notwithstanding that there is no reference in the Ordinance to substituted service, this Court has an inherent jurisdiction to make an order for it in a case such as this.” (emphasis added)

68.  Mr Pun, of course, relies heavily on the last sentence. However:-

(1)  It is an obiter without any reasoning.

(2)  The notice was in relation to proceedings before the Court of Appeal. While the Court of Appeal’s jurisdiction to discipline a barrister may be said to derive from the LPO, its jurisdiction to regulate its own proceedings (including notice of hearings before it) may well arguably derive from its jurisdiction set out in the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), which permits substituted services in appropriate circumstances. Further, the High Court always has inherent jurisdiction to regulate its own procedure and has supervisory jurisdiction over legal practitioners.

(3)  It was a matter of statutory interpretation of the LPO. I can see no comparison between the LPO and the LTO or the BMO.

(4)  In any event, the notice in question in the present case is a notice of meeting, not a notice of court or tribunal’s proceedings. A notice of meeting is a substantive matter being part and parcel of the substantive right to convene and hold a meeting. In my opinion, drawing any analogy with that case is inappropriate.

69.  I can see no statutory provision that suggests that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to order any alternative modes of giving notice of meeting.

70.  In the premises, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to order any alternative modes of giving notice of meeting under the BMO.

71.  That said, as I mentioned above, the purpose of giving notice is to bring the matter to the notice of the owners. The test is whether it brings notice. The Applicant may take all reasonable means for such notice. In fact, when granting the appointment of the Applicant in LDBM 193/2025 ([2026] HKLdT 4), the Tribunal was satisfied with the professional experience of the Applicant established in 1974 (§§26-27), and at §28 accepted the evidence that in such special circumstances, the Applicant would be able to consult and inform the owners (which must mean that at least on the assessment as at the time of the appointment, the Applicant would be able to contact the owners). In particular, at §28, the Tribunal said:-

“申請人強調，憑藉合安公司涵蓋法律、會計、工程、物業管理等領域的專業知識和支援網絡，有利於處理該屋苑面對的各類繁苛複雜的工作，並可以為所有業主提供重要資訊與專業意見，使他們能就屋苑的相關事宜作出充分諮詢和知情的選擇。”(emphasis added)

72.  In this regard, it appears to me that the modes of service of the Notice of Application proposed in the Ex Parte Summons, namely, (1) advertisement in newspapers, (2) announcement on the Applicant’s website, (3) email and (4) mail to known addresses appear to be modes that would effectively bring such notice of meeting to the owners. But the Tribunal has no jurisdiction under the BMO to grant prospective leave for “substituted service” of the notice of meeting. It is another matter, however, when after the event, there is dispute over whether such notice has served the purpose, and in the Notice of Application is not such dispute.

B.  Lands Tribunal Ordinance

73.  As explained above, the LTO adds nothing in the context of a BMO claim.

74.  Insofar as rule 9 of the Lands Tribunal Rules (Cap 17A), which has been cited in §7 above, this rule only concerns service of the Tribunal’s documents such as notice of application and order. It has no application to giving notice of meeting under the BMO.

C.  Conclusion

75.  I am aware of no other statutory provisions that might give rise to any argument that the Tribunal has jurisdiction to order alternative modes of giving notice of meeting as sought in the Notice of Application.

76.  For the above reasons, I conclude that it is plain and obvious that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to order alternative modes of giving notice of meeting as sought in the Notice of Application.

V.  JURISDICTION ON ENFORCEMENT OF THE BMO

77.  At the outset of the hearing, Mr Pun accepted that the BMO does not confer jurisdiction on the Tribunal to extend time for convening and holding meetings. Nevertheless, during the hearing, in the course of developing his arguments, Mr Pun submitted that paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 to the BMO confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal to decide how the BMO should be enforced and the enforcement may be relaxed for good cause. It is worth quoting paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 again:-

“Proceedings relating to the interpretation and enforcement of the provisions of this Ordinance.” (emphasis)

78.  His submissions appear to be that when bearing in mind the purposive and liberal approach mandated by section 19 of the IGCO, and/or combined with section 10(2)(d)(i) of the LTO, paragraph 1 of Schedule 10 confers wide jurisdiction on the Tribunal to decide how to enforce the provisions of the BMO in special circumstances upon showing of good cause. Mr Pun points out that it would be pointless to ask the owners later to apply to the Tribunal for enforcing the right to convene and hold a meeting, rather than now granting time extension for the Applicant to convene and hold a meeting, and therefore, the Tribunal should have jurisdiction to grant time extension. In my view, insofar as section 10(2)(d)(i) has still to be relied upon, such jurisdiction would still be limited to procedural notice. However, if Mr Pun’s submissions are to mean that the Tribunal has general jurisdiction to determine how to enforce the provisions in the BMO upon showing of good case, with respect, I am unable to accept such submissions. As I pointed out in §53 above, there is a difference between ordering a meeting after breach and allowing a meeting to be held later. For the former, there is still the breach, and the Tribunal is enforcing the relevant statutory right. For the latter, there would be no breach. These will have costs and other implications. Mr Pun’s such submissions would have far-reaching implication not only on Schedule 3, but almost each and every provision under the BMO, whether procedural or substantive. Unless there are clear wordings (such as those in sections 570 and 610(5) of the CO, which are limited in scope in any event) to that effect (which effect would, in my view, be so wide as unduly or almost unduly usurping the legislative constitutional function), the Tribunal does not have such wide jurisdiction. I see no such wordings in the LTO, the BMO or any other statutory provisions Mr Pun is able to point me to.

VI.  INHERENT JURISDICTION

79.  For the sake of completeness, the Tribunal has no inherent jurisdiction to modify the rights to request a meeting and a notice of meeting. As stated categorically by Li CJ (with whom Chan and Riberio PJJ agreed) in Lo Siu Lan & Another v Hong Kong Housing Authority [2005] 2 HKLRD 208 at §7:-

“Where a matter is regulated by statute, the Court has no inherent jurisdiction to modify the statutory rule.”

VII.  DISPOSITION OF THE EX PARTE SUMMONS

80.  Therefore, plainly and obviously, the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the Notice of Application, and even if the Tribunal had jurisdiction to entertain Relief (1), it would be academic to entertain Relief (1) for reasons explained in §51 above. Accordingly, the answers to both Questions (1) and (2) are plainly and obviously in the negative. In the circumstances, I see no point in granting any substituted service order sought in the Ex Parte Summons (without ruling on the practicality or impracticality of service and the appropriateness of the proposed substituted service). I dismiss the Ex Parte Summons with no order as to costs.

VIII.  STRIKING OUT AND DISMISSING THE NOTICE OF APPLICATION

81.  The Tribunal, as I said above, has jurisdiction to regulate its practice and procedure. Where it has come to the Tribunal’s notice that a claim which plainly and obviously the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to, and/or would not, entertain, the Tribunal can and should of its own motion strike out and dismiss it. This is consistent with and pursuant to Order 18 rule 19 of the RHC and the underlying objectives set out in Order 1A of the RHC, as well as with rule 18 of the LTR, which allows the Tribunal to dispose of the proceedings on a question of law where appropriate.

82.  In dealing with the Ex Parte Summons above, I have come to the conclusion that it is plain and obvious that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to extend the time specified in paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 3 and order alternative modes of giving notice of meeting, as sought in the Notice of Application. Mr Pun submits that I should not strike out the Notice of Application of my own motion, because to do so would deprive those owners who support the Notice of Application of the right to be heard. However, it is well established that an agreement between parties does not confer jurisdiction. Given that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain the Notice of Application in the first place and an agreement does not confer jurisdiction, any support (or opposition) may be of little assistance, if any. In any event, the Notice of Application has not been served, and the only party affected by striking out would be the Applicant itself. As I noted at the outset when expressing my gratitude for the assistance rendered by Mr Pun and his learned juniors, the counsel team have presented full and thorough arguments to me. Bearing in mind the underlying objectives set out under Order 1A of the RHC (including expeditious dealing with cases and fair distribution of judicial resources) and upon my view that it is plain and obvious that the Tribunal has no jurisdiction, I strike out and dismiss the Notice of Application, with no order as to costs.

IX.  ORDER

83.  Thus, I make the following order:-

(1)  The Ex Parte Summons be dismissed with no order as to costs.

(2)  The Notice of Application be struck out and dismissed with no order as to costs.

84.  I also order that in the event that the Applicant would apply to the Tribunal for leave to appeal from this Judgment, it should, at the same time of lodging the application for leave to appeal, lodge detailed written submissions with a draft grounds of appeal, and the Tribunal shall dispose of the application for leave on paper as expeditiously as possible, unless directed otherwise.

X.  POSTSCRIPT

85.  It is clear from paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 3 that upon the request of not less than 5% of the owners, when a chairman of the management committee fails to convene a meeting within 14 days of the request, and fails to hold a general meeting within 45 days of such request, the chairman breaches its obligations under paragraph 1(2) of Schedule 3. I note that in the Notice of Application, the Applicant used the word “purported” to describe the 5% owners’ request. During the hearing, Mr Pun confirmed to me that only one owner’s identity has not been verified, while all others (already constituting 5% or more) have been verified subject to a caveat that the Applicant has not been able to verify the signatures given the lack of samplings. In any event, at least for the purpose of the present proceedings, by taking out the Notice of Application, the Applicant must have considered the matter and found itself statutorily obliged by Schedule 3 to convene and hold a meeting as requested, subject to any hope that the Tribunal would have the jurisdiction and exercise it to extend time and order alternative modes of service. If the Applicant regards itself not so obliged, the Notice of Application would be academic, and the general principle is that the Tribunal or the Courts do not entertain academic applications.

86.  Now that I have ruled that the Tribunal has no such jurisdiction, it follows that at least on the face of it, the Applicant should have convened a meeting on or before 13 May 2026, and should hold a meeting on 13 June 2026, though subject to the necessary 14-day notice of meeting to be given under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3. The Tribunal would think that to minimise any or any potential breach of its statutory obligations, the Applicant should convene and hold the meeting as requested as soon as possible in accordance with Schedule 3. There may be practical difficulty in convening a meeting and there may be practical difficulty in holding the meeting. In this regard, I note that on the one hand, some purported owners (with supporting land searches to support their status as owners) have recently filed Notices of Opposition alleging, among others, that the Applicant has the capability to collate the owners’ personal particulars in various matters including handling refunds and outstanding fees, for which the Applicant apparently has managed to reach the relevant owners by mail. Credits should also be given to the Applicant, who, according to its evidence filed with the Tribunal, has managed to collate correspondence addresses, phone numbers and email addresses of 1,601 owners out of 1,984 units in such unprecedented circumstances; credits should also be given to the Home Affairs Department which “provided [the Applicant] with the owners’ contact numbers collected under the ‘one household one social worker’ (一戶一社工) system” with the owners’ consent, according to the Applicant’s evidence. All these apparently suggest that such practical difficulty is not insurmountable. On the other hand, I also note that the Tribunal has received a few letters purportedly issued by owners or authorised persons of owners of several units in Wang Fuk Court, supporting the Notice of Application on the grounds, among others, that after the Fire, many owners have been preoccupied with the daily life basics; that the Applicant should focus its resources on dealing with the aftermaths of the buildings after the Fire; and that it is impossible for the Applicant to effectively notify by the prescribed means all the owners of the meeting after the Fire. Such grounds are of substance and cannot be brushed aside. In a nutshell, on the face of it, both sides have their own practical and legitimate concerns. However, even parties’ agreement, let alone practical difficulties (or even impossibility) and concerns, cannot confer jurisdiction on a Court or the Tribunal. The Tribunal is bound by the law.

87.  The fact that mere practical difficulty would not confer jurisdiction might, unfortunately, leave the Applicant and some owners an impression that the Tribunal is being technical, diffident or even indifferent. However, such impression does not accord with reality. As stated in its statement to the public issued as early as 10 December 2025[1], for the special circumstances arising from the Fire, within its jurisdiction and on its own initiative, the Judiciary has adopted various special measures to handle matters related to the Fire. Among the measures is that a dedicated task group headed by the Chief Judge of High Court and comprising various court leaders has been set up to ensure swift and priority handling of legal proceedings related to the Fire “at all court levels, without unduly compromising the administration of justice”; another measure is waiving probate-related scheduled fees and considering fee concessions for other court services according to the circumstances of individuals. In the light of the immediate needs arising from the tragedy of the Fire and any or any immediate practical difficulty faced by the Applicant and the owners, such special measures may look distant, but this demonstrates that so long as it is within its jurisdiction (emphasis added), the Judiciary has been proactively considering how, and is ready, to cater for the special circumstances related to the Fire without unduly compromising the fair administration of justice to the general public.

88.  Lastly, I thank again Mr Pun, Mr Yuen and Mr Wong for their able and thorough assistance.