H, RS v. X, Y

FCMC 6583/2024

[2026] HKFC 31

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

MATRIMONIAL CAUSES

NO. FCMC 6583 OF 2024

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J U D G M E N T

(Transfer of Proceedings to the Court of First Instance)

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1.  In this Judgment, the Petitioner-Husband shall be referred to as “H”, and the Respondent-Wife as “W”.

2.  By W’s Summons dated 30 April 2025, W sought a transfer of proceedings to the Court of First Instance (“W’s Application”).

3.  A substantive hearing was held on 8 July 2025. Thereafter, Parties agreed, by way of Consent Summons, for the filing of W’s 32^nd Affirmation. By Order dated 18 December 2025, HH Judge S. Lo directed Parties to lodge and exchange further written submissions on matters arising from W’s 32^nd Affirmation. The matter was then fixed for another substantive hearing on 5 February 2026.

4.  At the hearing on 8 July 2025, both Parties were legally represented, with H being represented by Counsel Ms. Bridget Huang, and for W, Counsel Mr. Edward K. H. Ng. At the hearing on 5 February 2026, H was represented by Counsel Mr. Adrian Kwan, and W appeared in person.

5.  Having carefully considered all relevant matters, I dismiss W’s Application. My reasons are as follows.

A.  BACKGROUND

6.  Parties are both in their 60s. This was a long marriage. The Petition was filed on 19 June 2023.

7.  Both Parties work in Finance. W describes herself as a wealth/asset manager and operates several companies for inter alia investment holding. These companies are abbreviated as “BWC Ltd”, “D Ltd”, “B Ltd”, and “GC Ltd”; collectively, the “Companies”.

8.  H previously worked as a commercial banker. He currently holds an SFC Licence and serves as the Chief Operating Officer of an SFC-licensed entity, which he wholly owns.

9.  Following H’s redundancy in 2016, W transferred 50% shareholding in BWC Ltd to H. Since then, H has participated in management of the Companies.

10.  There are 2 adult daughters born within wedlock. Now in their mid- twenties, they do not concern this Application, though their involvement in Parties’ divorce proceedings may become necessary due to a beneficial ownership dispute detailed below.

11.  By Order dated 19 June 2023, H obtained an ex parte injunction to, inter alia, restrict and restrain W from dealing with assets in her own name, as well as certain assets held under the Companies. By the same Order, W was further directed to make disclosure and provide details of transactions and out-flows from accounts held by the Companies.

12.  The injunction application was subsequently resolved through W’s undertaking (the “Undertaking”). There remained, however, a dispute as to whether W is liable to make the disclosure as directed. This was resolved by the Judgment of HH Judge S. Lo dated 13 October 2023, whereupon W was directed to make the disclosure. Subsequently, W also applied to be discharged from the Undertaking. This application has since been dismissed.

13.  By Order dated 22 May 2024, Master J. Lee (as DD Judge J. Lee then was) imposed a deadline of 31 July 2024 for all interlocutory application(s).

14.  By Order dated 24 September 2024, the Court extended, on an unless basis, the deadline for interlocutory application(s) to 31 December 2024.

15.  For about a year between June 2024 and June 2025, W acted in person. Within that year, W made quite a few applications – some of which were dismissed, while others remain pending. Amongst these, W sought, inter alia, to “reprimand” previous legal representatives involved for their conduct in these proceedings. This application was dismissed. Furthermore, in a related application, W sought leave pursuant to rule 121 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap 179A to disclose documents filed in these Proceedings for use in her contemplated High Court action(s). Judgment on this was handed down on 2 July 2025. W’s application was dismissed.

16.  Of note, too, are W’s following applications.

17.  By Summons dated 17 July 2024 (the “Trust Summons”), W sought a declaration that:

“(a) any and all of [W’s] shareholding in [D Ltd] and [B Ltd] are nominee holding on behalf of her late mother [LLY] for the future distribution to the granddaughters…

(b) [W] is holding the [D Ltd and B Ltd] shares on trust.”

18.  By Summons dated 3 December 2024 (the “UT and Investment Losses Summons”), W sought the following relief(s):

“1. Unrestricted access to the securities account of [BWC Ltd] at [IB] be granted to [W].

2. The loss of US$7 million in [the said account] be recognised to have been incurred by [H] as a direct result of his negligence and mismanagement, and the loss to be taken into account during the equitable distribution of marital assets and liabilities…”

19.  By Summons dated 24 December 2024 (the “Loan Summons”), W sought the following relief(s):

“1. I respectfully request that the Court recognise the debt of CAD 5.3 million (principal of CAD 3.5 million plus interest), incurred during our marriage for the renovation of the Canadian Property, as a marital obligation under the Matrimonial Causes Ordinance (Cap. 179).

2. I ask that this debt be added to the equitable split of our assets to ensure a fair resolution for both parties…”

20.  The Loan Summons has since been dismissed with costs to H. The subject Loan however, remains one of the grounds on which W presently seeks a transfer.

21.  By Summons dated 2 June 2025, W as the applicant of the present Application sought to adjourn the current hearing on the basis that she has made plans to travel. By Order dated 13 June 2025, W’s adjournment application was dismissed with costs to H.

B.  APPLICABLE LEGAL PRINCIPLES

22.  Rule 32 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap. 179A provides that:

“(1) The court may order that a cause or application pending in the District Court be transferred to the Court of First Instance, where, having regard to all the circumstances including the difficulty or importance of the cause or application or of any issue arising therein, the court thinks it desirable that the cause or application should be heard and determined in the Court of First Instance”

23.  Rule 80 of the Matrimonial Causes Rules, Cap. 179A provides that:

“(3) The court may order the transfer to the Court of First Instance of any application for ancillary relief pending in the District Court where the transfer appears to the court to be desirable.

(5) In considering whether an application should be transferred to the Court of First Instance the court shall have regard to all relevant considerations, including the nature and value of the property involved, the relief sought and the financial limits for the time being relating to the jurisdiction of the District Court in other matters.”

24.  In H v H FCMC 7173/2000 (unrep., 1 February 2002), HH Judge Saunders (as he then was) granted an application for transfer. This was in the context that the application was unopposed. Further, the Learned Judge took the view that there were questions of law justifying the transfer. On the principles and considerations in approaching a transfer, the Learned Judge stated at p. 9 that:

“In these circumstances there must be cogent reasons why a case should be removed from the ambit of a group of specialist judges. It is right that R 80 requires the court to take into account the financial limits for the time being relating to the jurisdiction of the District Court in other matters, but that is only one consideration. Very large sums of money alone will rarely be sufficient to justify the transfer. There must be some special complexity in the case which will demand that it be given the attention of a Judge of the Court of First Instance”.

25.  In B v B FCMC 3105/1999 (unrep., 11 July 2000), it is stated at p. 4 that:

“I believe that the following matters referred to by HH Judge Hartmann (as he then was) in Jack v Jack and another (DJ No 3782 of 1995) are relevant considerations and should properly be taken into account in deciding whether to order a transfer. They are:

‘where there is a matter of public interest; where there are novel of difficult points of law to be resolved; where delay will work a clear injustice and/or where there is unduly complicated or conflicting evidence the resolution of which is likely to be so protracted that it will unduly prejudice the Family Court lists and this work against the interests of other litigants’.”

26.  In AK v MYNT [2020] HKFC 28, HH Judge K. K. Pang (as he then was) granted an application for transfer. There, Parties were in agreement that the matter was to be transferred due to its complexity and the size of the parties’ assets. The Learned Judge further took the view that there were complex foreign elements in the wife’s application to set aside certain overseas dispositions of potential trust assets.

27.  The above principles are routinely applied: see for example TYT v TLH [2020] HKFC 53; NLT v LYKJ [2020] HKFC 75; MPY v WYC [2023] 5 HKC 304.

28.  Practice Direction 15.14 is also pertinent. It reads:

“2. The Family Court has an unfettered discretion whether, and if so, when to order a transfer of the proceedings to the Court of First Instance. When exercising the discretion, the Family Court is guided by rule 32(1) and rule 80(5) of the MCR. The fundamental principle is whether in light of the overall circumstances including the nature of the issues of fact or law involved, the proceedings or part of them are more desirable to be dealt with in the Court of First Instance…

3. When the proceedings or part of them are ordered to be transferred, it will impact on the future conduct of the case. Thus an application for transfer should be made as soon as practicable after it becomes apparent that a transfer is required. The summons should be supported by affidavit evidence setting out all the grounds for transfer.”

29.  In summary, whether or not a transfer is to be granted is a matter of discretion. There must be cogent reasons. The Court’s discretion is to be exercised with reference to the complexity of issues of both law and fact, bearing in mind the “overall circumstances” of the case. Size of the amount at stake is only one of the considerations and is by no means determinative.

30.  It is with the above principles in mind that I shall approach W’s Application.

C.  DISCUSSION

31.  W’s Application was taken out after the deadline for interlocutory applications. This deadline was on an unless basis. I am not aware that W has sought leave to issue the current Application out of time, nor any relief from sanction.

32.  Be that as it may, I take the view that the interests of the Parties will not be served if the Court is to debar or delay determination of the present Application on such basis. On this premise, I proceed with consideration of W’s Application.

33.  In support of W’s Application, she has filed her 24^th Affirmation (“W 24^th”). There, W refers to quite a long list of factors purportedly in support of the transfer sought. With respect, W 24^th is difficult to follow.

34.  Mr. Ng, in his written submissions, has helpfully distilled W’s grounds. By his submissions, W’s case is that the three main headline disputes of the proceedings, being the Trust Summons, the Loan Summons, and the Investment Loss of the Summons dated 3 December 2024, are matters justifying a transfer, or beyond the jurisdiction of the Family Court. Whilst accepting that not all of the Summonses are still afoot, Mr. Ng submits that the underlying disputes remain the reasons for transfer. I shall deal with these reasons one by one hereinbelow.

35.  That aside, Mr. Ng also points to a potential malicious prosecution claim, as being a novel and difficult point of law to be determined. Finally, Mr. Ng also refers the Court to the substantial value of assets in dispute, as a factor to be taken into account.

36.  As mentioned, subsequent to the hearing on 8 July 2025, W filed her 32^nd Affirmation. This relates to the Trust and/or the Trust Summons, which I will address where appropriate hereinbelow.

C1.  Size of the Disputed Assets

37.  One of W’s main bases for the transfer is the “very large size of the assets in dispute”. In W’s own written submissions filed for previous call-over hearings, she repeatedly uses the description of “super-sized assets of more than HK$300 million…”.

38.  Mr. Ng reasonably does not contend that the size of the assets alone justifies a transfer. Rather, his point is simply that it is one of the basket of factors that the Court shall consider.

39.  I agree. Whilst assets with value of HK$300 million is not uncommon in the Family Court and that this alone shall rarely justify a transfer, I will bear this factor in mind in deciding the outcome of this Application.

C2.  Trust Assets / Trust Summons

40.  Per W’s Trust Summons, W’s case is that she holds legal interest in B Ltd and D Ltd on trust (the “Trust Assets”) for her late- mother. By W’s written submissions dated 1 April 2025, W appears to change her case to say that the Trust Assets are in fact held for the benefit of the daughters.

41.  On W’s case, the Trust Assets has value of about HK$300 million.

42.  On the basis of the above, W says that the potential existence of beneficial interest(s) held by third-parties is “beyond the normal scope” of the jurisdiction of the Family Court.

43.  I disagree. My reasons are as follows.

44.  First, be it held on trust for her late- mother or the daughters, the crux of W’s case is that the Trust Assets do not beneficially belong to her (or Parties) and therefore shall not form part of the Pot, and is not a financial resource to her (or the Parties).

45.  In other words, insofar as ancillary relief is concerned, the issues surrounding the Trust boil down to a simple, run-of-the-mill, dispute on beneficial interest, and therefore whether the Trust is a financial resource to Parties.

46.  Mr. Kwan reasonably agrees.

47.  Disputes of beneficial interests are commonplace in the Family Court. As DD Judge G. Chan (as HH Judge G. Chan then was) stated in FHM v KYM & Ors [2015] HKFLR 241:

“51. The Family Court judges, being judges in this specialised field have been determining in a matter of daily routine, claims on third party beneficial interests and/or whether dispositions of property should be set aside under section 17 of the MPPO.”

48.  Second, the Trust Summons has been progressing under the established TL v ML procedure. There is no conceivable delay. Pleadings and witness statements are all in place. By Order dated 23 April 2025, HH Judge S. Lo directed inter alia that (1) Form Fs are to be served on the daughters, and (2) that the Trust Summons do proceed in the absence of a person representing W’s late- mother’s estate. Currently, the matter is fixed for Case Management Hearing, and I was informed that the Trial has tentatively been fixed for June 2026.

49.  Given the progress, I fail to see anything justifying a transfer on this front. Contrarily, I take note of the fact that if this matter is to be transferred to the Court of First Instance, it is unlikely that trial dates in as early as June 2026 could be obtained.

50.  Third, the contents of W’s 32^nd Affirmation, rather than being reasons justifying a transfer, are in fact grounds on which W says the Trust exists, and/or her arguments. At the hearing on 5 February 2026, W’s emphasis, in oral submissions, was also on the existence of the Trust. With respect, I take the view that this distorts focus. The Court at this instant is to assess if there are complexities (or other reasons) justifying a transfer to the Court of First Instance. It is not for the Court to assess the respective strengths and merits of Parties’ case. W’s arguments on this front should more appropriately be ventilated at the trial proper.

51.  Fourth, W says that H is a mere agent of B Ltd and D Ltd. Accordingly, the injunction obtained herein was “a breach of his fiduciary duties, duties pursuant to the SFC Code of Conduct, and deliberate misrepresentation of his agency status” and thereby adds complexity to the present case, justifying a transfer.

52.  I do not agree. As mentioned hereinabove, the injunction was resolved by way of W’s own Undertaking. Whilst W has applied to be discharged from the Undertaking, such application has already been refused.

53.  In any event, whether H could arguably be said to have breached his fiduciary duties and/or any SFC Code of Conduct, is dependent, again, on the Court’s determination on the Trust Summons. At this stage, I take the view that these speculative assertions do not justify a transfer. Even if established, I do not see how this affects the ancillary relief claim.

54.  Fifth, and turning to Mr. Ng’s submissions, he places certain emphasis on an intended civil claim against H for, inter alia, malicious prosecution with reference to this Trust dispute. Pausing here, I note that no such action has thus far been instigated. Even that aside, such argument is difficult to follow.

55.  In Lee See Woo v Chu Hong Pong [2020] 5 HKLRD 196, DHCJ Jin Pao SC stated at §§20-22 that:

“20. On the basis of the above, I agree that it is reasonably arguable that Hong Kong law recognises that the tort of malicious prosecution should extend to civil proceedings generally. … To avoid any doubt, this decision should not be regarded as a definitive ruling on whether Hong Kong law should be so extended.

21. There is no dispute that the essential elements of the tort of malicious prosecution are stated in Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (23^rd ed) at para. 16-12:

In an action of malicious prosecution the claimant must show first that he was prosecuted by the defendant, that is to say, that the law was set in motion against him on a criminal charge; secondly, that the prosecution was determined in his favour; thirdly, that it was without reasonable and probable cause; fourthly, that it was malicious. The onus of proving every one of these is on the claimant.

22. This statement of law has been approved in Hong Kong…”

56.  A core element, therefore, of malicious prosecution is that there must be a determination in W’s favour. That is to say, unless and until the Court determines the Trust Summons in W’s favour (i.e. that the Trust does exist and its assets are held for the benefit of a third-party), W’s purported claim in malicious prosecution has no leg to stand on.

57.  Moreover, W failed to particularise how a potential malicious prosecution claim would affect Parties’ present ancillary relief claims.

58.  At the very least, this potential claim is wholly speculative and contingent at this stage. Mr. Ng’s submission that a claim of malicious prosecution in civil proceedings being a novel and difficult point in law is still no answer.

59.  For the above reasons, I disagree that the potential claim is a basis for transfer.

60.  Sixth, Mr. Ng submits that W may have other claims against H, such as negligence. I find this wholly abstract and ill-particularised. Again, W has failed to spell out how, even on her own case, such claims will affect ancillary relief.

61.  Seventh, Mr. Ng submits that the Trust Summons may involve other areas of law which the Family Court may not be familiar with. To cite as examples, W says that there are issues of “corporate law” and “international law”. Yet again, W has failed to particularise how these affect ancillary relief. Her approach appears to be one of obfuscation – throwing out tangential concepts just to create complexity.

62.  Eighth, whilst not directly relevant to the determination of the present Application, worthy of note is that the daughters have already filed affirmations confirming that they are not the beneficial owner(s) of the Trust Assets. Understandably, though Form Fs have been served, the daughters do not seek to be joined. Given this, they will be bound by the Court’s eventual determination.

63.  At the hearing on 8 July 2025, Mr. Ng contended that the daughters’ affirmations are inadmissible. The issue of admissibility is a matter more relevantly argued before the trial judge. For the purposes of the current Application, I do not see how the admissibility issue adds to the complexity of this case.

64.  Ninth, Mr. Ng refers to N v W FCMC 5026/2015 (unreported, 8 September 2017) as a case which bears similarities with the present case. There, HH Judge Melloy (as she then was) directed a transfer.

65.  With respect, I do not find N v W to be of assistance to W. There, one of the main reasons for the transfer was a “very substantial point of law” involved, being the defence of illegality. The “novel point of law” raised by W here is malicious prosecution, the speculative nature of which I have already addressed above and will not repeat here.

66.  Lending support from N v W, Mr. Ng further says that, like the present case, there are “criminal overtones”. In my view, the “criminal overtones” here do not justify a transfer. At best, these allegations of a criminal nature rise and fall with the eventual factual findings to be made. In other words, there may or may not be consequent criminal implications.

67.  All in all, I am not satisfied that the Trust Summons justifies a transfer. Claims and/or issues such as these are commonplace in the Family Court. Upon proper consideration, the matter presents no complexity, whether in fact or law.

C3.  Loan / Loan Summons

68.  Under the Loan Summons, W alleges that H owes a debt to W’s late- parents pursuant to a promissory note dated 30 December 2009 in the sum of CAD 5.3 million. W’s evidence is that her sister “may” instigate a claim against H for recovery of the said Loan.

69.  At the hearing on 5 February 2026, H informed the Court that no such claim has been instigated, save and except the issuance of a Statutory Demand back in 2024, which has already been set aside in November 2024.

70.  By Order dated 23 April 2025, HH Judge S. Lo ordered inter alia that:

“1. Without prejudice to [W] raising the issues in [the Loan Summons] as a contingent liability of [H] and [W] at trial, the Loan Summons be dismissed.”

71.  Thus, the Loan Summons has been dismissed. However, it remains open for W to contend for the purposes of the final ancillary relief that the CAD 5.3 million Loan is a liability to be repaid, whether by H alone or H and W together.

72.  For the purposes of a transfer, however, I do not agree that the Loan is justification thereof for the following reasons.

73.  First, at the highest of W’s case, H will have a liability of CAD 5.3 million. Parties’ outstanding and/or contingent liabilities are routinely taken into account in the court’s determination of ancillary relief. This is in fact rooted in section 7 of the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Ordinance, Cap. 192, as one of the matters which the Court should have regard in determining ancillary relief. There is nothing complex about this. The Loan either exists as a liability to be repaid, or it does not.

74.  Second, H does not admit to the authenticity of the promissory note. In response to this, W has sought and obtained handwriting expert evidence.

75.  Even where the authenticity of H’s signature is at issue, this issue presents no factual or legal complexity. With the assistance of expert evidence, this would be a straightforward factual finding at trial. The Family Court and its specialist judges are well-versed in dealing with these issues. This does not justify a transfer.

76.  Third, W argues that “the existence, enforceability and recovery of this international debt fall outside the jurisdiction of this Court”. I take the view that this argument serves only to muddy the waters. In ancillary relief, the Court is determining a fair distribution as between the Parties. Regardless of whether there is a transfer, the ancillary relief court will not adjudicate on W’s sister’s (i.e. a third-party’s) potential claim against H under the Loan and the enforceability of it. W herself does not have such an objective either, alleging only the intention to achieve H’s acknowledgment of the Loan in her 21^st Affirmation. This again reduces the matter as between H and W themselves.

77.  Even if the Court eventually accepts that the Loan does exist and is a liability affecting the Parties, the Court will simply take such Loan into account in ascertaining the Pot and/or in making a division thereof. I thus reject this argument entirely.

78.  All in all, I am not satisfied that the Loan issue justifies a transfer. Claims and/or issues such as these are commonplace in the Family Court. The matter presents no complexity, whether in fact or law.

C4.  Investment Loss of US$7 million

79.  W says that it was due to “H’s mismanagement of [BWC Ltd’s investment account] and his bad investment decisions” that a sum of US$7 million was lost in investments. In Mr. Ng’s submissions, it is argued that “W’s case is that the lost value should be added back as part of the matrimonial assets. Once again, W’s case is that resolving this issue requires an analysis of contract, financial and regulatory laws, all of which are more appropriately dealt with in the High Court”.

80.  I do not agree that the Investment Loss justifies a transfer.

81.  First, W is in effect contending that H has been reckless and wanton in speculating and in making investments with BWC Ltd’s funds. She accordingly asks for the US$7 million to be added back.

82.  Add backs are routinely dealt with in the Family Court. In LCC v LTLA [2022] HKCFI 1922, Hon Au-Yeung J has provided an insightful summary of the applicable principles at §§101 et seq. Suffice it to say, only conduct that is both “obvious and gross” that it would be inequitable to disregard would such conduct be relevant in ancillary relief.

83.  The main question is thus simply whether H acted in a reckless and wanton manner in making those Investments, which resulted in the Investment Loss. It is simply a finding of whether H is guilty of financial misconduct in the legal sense. If W insists on this argument, she is at liberty to do so for the final determination of ancillary relief.

84.  I fail to see anything complex about this. This does not justify a transfer.

85.  Second, as to “contract, financial and regulatory laws” issues, even assuming H has been so in breach, the nub of the issue, in ancillary relief, remains to be whether the Investment Loss is to be added back. Merely conflating this core issue with broad references to “contract, financial and regulatory laws” does not, in itself, introduce complexity. Indeed, W has not particularised how these purported issues are relevant to ancillary relief.

86.  The Investment Loss being the basis whereon W relies for a transfer also fails.

C5.  Valuation of Businesses / Assets

87.  Whilst not contended in Mr. Ng’s submissions, W in her previous submissions has argued that the ancillary relief concerns foreign businesses and/or assets in the Mainland, BVI and Australia. On such basis, she says that “valuation, management, and ownership of these assets involve cross-jurisdictional corporate law, international law, and regulatory issues in different jurisdictions. The High Court has more extensive jurisdiction over such multi-jurisdictional corporate disputes”.

88.  I do not agree that the purported foreign elements justify a transfer.

89.  Valuation of foreign businesses and/or assets is commonplace in the Family Court. In the present proceedings, the Court has already granted leave to the Parties to adduce evidence from single joint expert(s) on the valuation of foreign businesses and/or assets.

90.  Apart from valuation evidence, the Court has further granted leave to the Parties to adduce a PRC legal opinion from another single joint expert. This was intended to identify Parties’ respective liabilities owed to a foreign entity.

91.  At the hearing on 5 February 2026, W indicated that she does not accept the above valuation report(s) and/or legal opinion.

92.  Even if W takes such a stance, it is merely an argument subsumed in the Court’s ascertainment of the size of the Pot. There is nothing complex about this. I do not see how this justifies a transfer.

93.  All in all, I am not satisfied that the purported foreign elements justify a transfer. Claims and/or issues such as these are commonplace in the Family Court. The matter presents no complexity, whether in fact or law.

C6.  Litigation Misconduct

94.  In Mr. Ng’s written submissions, he argues that there is “serious litigation misconduct”. For this, Mr. Ng refers to the wrongful obtainment of the injunction and other purported litigation tactics.

95.  At this stage, there is no existent finding on misconduct and I am in no position to make any such finding. Suffice it to say for the purposes of the present Application, allegations of misconduct, be it litigation or financial, are commonplace in the Family Court and will be dealt with at the final ancillary relief determination. I am not satisfied that such allegations justify a transfer.

D.  CONCLUSION

96.  The grounds for transfer advanced by W, whether singly or cumulatively, do not attain a level of complexity that is uncommon in the Family Court. They are in fact rather run-of-the-mill arguments and/or occurrences which the specialist judges of the Family Court are well-versed in.

97.  Moreover, I am unable to identify any matter of public interest, or any novel points of law that justifies a transfer.

98.  To the contrary, given the progress of these proceedings, i.e. that even trial dates have been tentatively fixed, I take the view that a transfer may work against the underlying objectives as set out in Order 1A of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A.

99.  Having considered all the circumstances of this case and having considered all arguments, I take the view that a transfer to the Court of First Instance is far from justified.

100.  In the circumstances, I dismiss W’s Summons dated 30 April 2025.

E.  COSTS

101.  At the hearing on 8 July 2025, both parties submitted their respective Statement of Costs. Parties also agreed that costs of the Application is to be summarily assessed. Parties further agreed that depending on the determination herein, each party’s costs shall be at a quantum of HK$70,000 with Certificate for Counsel.

102.  At the hearing on 5 February 2026, W however retracts from such position.

103.  Given that H is the successful party, I take the view that H shall be entitled to his costs of the Application. I shall give directions for costs submissions hereinbelow.

F.  DISPOSITION

104.  I therefore make an order that:

(1)  The Respondent’s Summons dated 30 April 2025 be dismissed.

(2)  There be a costs order nisi that costs of the Respondent’s Summons dated 30 April 2025 be paid by the Respondent to the Petitioner, with certificate for counsel, to be summarily assessed.

(3)  The Petitioner shall submit his Statement of Costs within 14 days from the date hereof, and the Respondent shall submit her list of objections (limited to 3 pages at font 14 with double line spacing) within 7 days thereafter.

(4)  Any application for variation of the costs order nisi shall be made by letter together with written submissions (limited to 3 pages at font 14 with double line spacing) within 7 days from the date hereof.

(5)  Unless otherwise directed, any application for variation of costs order nisi and summary assessment of costs shall be determined by paper disposal without an oral hearing.

105.  I thank counsel for their able assistance.

Representation: