ANWAR TARIQ v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 1400/2020

[2026] HKCFI 2329

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1400 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  By a summons issued on 9 January 2026 (“Summons”) supported by an affirmation of the same date (“Affirmation”) the Applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal my order dated 24 December 2025 (“Order”) wherein I had refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review of decisions of the Director of Immigration dated 6 October 2014 (“Director’s Decision”) and 18 May 2017 (“Director’s Further Decision”), and of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board(“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) made on 22 June 2020.

2.  In dealing with the application I have had regard below to the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospects of the intended appeal, and the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time is granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346; Nupur Mst [2018] HKCA 524; Nguyen Van Quyen [2025] HKCA 510).

3.  In the Affirmation the Applicant asked the Court to exercise its discretion to allow him to appeal out of time, and said that:

(1) “My enemy has threatened me that he will harm and or kill me once I return back to my country and has threatened my family back in Pakistan as well”;

(2) “This is a new threat to me now; on top of all other problems, I am facing previously in my home country.”; and

(3) “I am unrepresented and have no means to instruct a private lawyer.”

4.  As the 14-day period for the Applicant to appeal against the Order expired on 7 January 2026 (RHC O 53 r 3(4)), there is only a relatively short delay. While I do not see how the claim at Paragraph 3(3) above amounts to a credible or valid explanation for the delay, given the length of the latter I have focused on the merits of the appeal.

5.  In that regard, the prospects of success of the intended appeal are important as the court will not grant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal (Tran Van Anh [2025] HKCA 408).

6.  In the CALL-1 I had outlined the various Grounds (as defined therein) apparently relied on by the Applicant, explained why the Director’s Decision and Director’s Further Decision were not susceptible to judicial review, and reviewed the TCAB Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard, and bearing in mind the need for the high standard of fairness as well as the remainder of the Grounds. Having done so, I saw no reasonably arguable public law grounds to vitiate such, including in the nature of the Grounds.

7.  I do not see that there is any proper ground of appeal with any prospect of success. The Applicant has not identified any basis (in the nature of an error of law, any failure to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court, or that I was plainly wrong) on which the Court of Appeal would reverse my decision (Nupur Mst, supra). As for his bare allegations set out at Paragraphs 3(1) and (2) above, I do not see that such are relevant to the present application. After all, the decision-maker had inter alia (and as I had highlighted at paragraph 15 of the CALL-1) refused to accept that any of the incidents described by the Applicant allegedly leading to his departure from Pakistan had in fact taken place, and I had discerned no reasonably public law grounds to vitiate that conclusion, or indeed the other conclusions in the TCAB Decision. If he wishes to claim that there are changes in the circumstances or new information that are material to his non-refoulement claim, that may be relevant to the procedure in ss 37ZO and 37ZP Immigration Ordinance (CAP 115), but such are not relevant to the present application (Amandeep Kumar v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2019] HKCA 1369 at §13; Poinem v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2020] HKCA 911 at §15).

8.  As the intended appeal has no prospect of success, it would be futile to extend time and would clearly needlessly prejudice the Respondent were I to grant the Applicant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal.

9.  Given the above, I refuse the application and dismiss the Summons.