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SYED TAHIR ALI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
SYED TAHIR ALI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6149 · HCAL 628/2022
Court of First Instance
HCAL 628/2022
[2026] HKCFI 6149
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 628 of 2022
BETWEEN
| |Syed Tahir Ali |Applicant |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board/ |Putative |
| |Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following;
|( |consideration of documents only; or |
|( |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the Applicant in |
| |open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge (Non-refoulement Claims) Bonnie Cheng:
1. Form 86 be amended, naming the Director of Immigration as putative
interested party.
2. Extension of time for application for leave to apply for judicial
review be refused.
3. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. By Form 86 dated 18 July 2022 (“Form 86”), the Applicant seeks leave
to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”) against the
Decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims
Petition Office (“Board”) dated 7 April 2022 (“Board’s Decision”),
which affirmed the Decision of the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 20 November 2020.
2. The Form 86 failed to name the putative interested party. I therefore
amend the Form 86 on my own motion to name the Director as putative
interested party.
3. An oral hearing, which was requested by the Applicant, took place
before me on 2 March 2026. The Applicant did not however attend the
hearing. The Applicant’s absence would have entitled the Court to
dismiss his application. Nevertheless, to give the Applicant a final
opportunity, his application was adjourned to 3 March 2026. The
Applicant attended the adjourned hearing in person.
Leave Application Out of Time
4. Pursuant to O.53, r.4(1) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), an
application for leave to apply for judicial review shall be made
promptly and in any event within three months from the date when
grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers
that there is good reason for extending the period within which the
application shall be made.
5. Here, the Applicant should have made the Leave Application by 7 July
2022, i.e. within three months from the date when the Board’s Decision
was made. However, the Leave Application was only made on 18 July
2022 and hence out of time for 11 days.
6. S.21K(6) of the High Court Ordinance (Cap 4) provides that:
“Where the Court of First Instance considers that there has been undue
delay in making an application for judicial review, the Court may
refuse to grant –
a) leave for the making of the application; or
b) any relief sought on the application,
if it considers that the granting of the relief sought would be likely
to cause substantial hardship to, or substantially prejudice the
rights of, any person or would be detrimental to good administration.”
7. As the Court of Appeal explained in AW v Director of Immigration &
Anor [2016] 2 HKC 393 at §§23-36, the following (non-exhaustive)
factors are relevant to whether an applicant has a good reason to
extend time: (1) length of the delay; (2) explanation for the delay;
(3) merits of the substantive application; (4) prejudice to the
applicant (if time is not extended) and to the respondent and public
administration (if a challenge is allowed to proceed out of time); and
(5) questions of general public importance. The court is to consider
the matter flexibly, always with regard to the particular
circumstances of each case.
8. At the hearing, the Applicant apologised for the delay and said he had
encountered language barrier and had to ask his friend to help. While
these are not cogent justifications, I accept that a delay of 11 days
is relatively short.
9. In any case, I shall proceed to review the substantive merits of the
Leave Application, being another relevant factor for consideration.
Background
10. The Applicant is from Pakistan. His background and the basis of his
application for non-refoulement were set out in detail in the Board’s
Decision at this hyperlink.[1] I will not repeat them here. Unless
otherwise specified, I adopt the abbreviations in the Board’s
Decision.
Discussion
11. Leave application is meant to be a filtering process and the court is
not expected to give elaborate reasons for its decision: Re Zunariyah
[2018] HKCA 14 at §23. I therefore set out below brief reasons for my
decision, which I have reached upon considering all the materials
before me.
12. The court’s role in judicial review is not to provide a further avenue
of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the
Board. While the court adopts in non-refoulement cases an enhanced
standard in scrutinising the decision of the Board due to the
seriousness of the issue at hand, it should not usurp the role of the
Board. Assessment of evidence and COI materials and risk of harm,
state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily
within the province of the Board (and the Director). The court will
not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law
or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the
Board: Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at §14(1).
There must be a reasonably arguable case, namely one which enjoys a
realistic prospect of success, before leave for judicial review will
be granted: Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676 at
§§14-17.
13. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to state the grounds of
judicial review clearly and succinctly: Ho Loy v Director of
Environmental Protection (HCAL 21/2015, 22 December 2016) at §142. He
or she is also under a duty to make full and frank disclosure of
material facts: Kan Hung Cheung v The Director of Immigration [2008]
HKC 323 at §§14-17.
14. The Applicant’s Form 86 does not contain any ground of judicial
review. In his affirmation, the Applicant stated that the Board’s
decision to determine his appeal without hearing his testimony was
Wednesbury unreasonable and irrational, and the Board had failed to
give any or any sufficient reason for dismissing his appeal without a
hearing. However, I note from the Board’s Decision that an appeal
hearing was held on 4 August 2021, in which the Applicant was assisted
by a Punjabi and English speaking interpreter (§90) and gave oral
testimony to the Board (§§91-93).
15. In any event, I have reviewed the Board’s Decision and I do not detect
any error of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality. The Board
assessed the evidence in detail and gave adequate reasons for its
decision. In particular:
a. The Applicant claimed to face threats of harm from unidentified law
enforcement agencies and/or rival political parties in Pakistan due
to his JKLF membership (§52).
b. The Board, however, found the Applicant’s evidence incredible and
unreliable. Notably, the Applicant did not make a non-refoulement
claim until after his arrest in Hong Kong, which was approximately
one year after his arrival (§131). He also failed to make prompt
and full disclosure of material facts (§§134-140). The Board
further observed material inconsistencies and inherent
implausibility in his account concerning police report, his alleged
first abduction and events after his alleged second abduction
(§§143-151).
16. In the premises, I conclude that the Applicant’s intended challenge
against the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable.
Conclusion
17. I make an order that the Form 86 be amended in the manner set out
above and that the Leave Application be dismissed for being out of
time.
Dated the 10th day of November 2026
| |(Annson Cheung) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant| | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 10/11/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the| |solicitors / such |
|Court the order |Syed Tahir Ali |Putative Interested |
|granting leave and any| |Parties as may be |
|directions given |Applicant’s ref. no:|directed by the Court / |
|within 14 days after | |the Putative Interested |
|the leave was granted | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |10/11/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|originating summons | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|within 14 days after | |Claims Petition Office |
|the grant of leave and| |Putative Respondent’s |
|serve it in accordance| |ref. no.: |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |USM |
|and | |17436/20/11/104/P3398 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative Interested |
|every affidavit which | |Party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes| |QA T/C 397/20 (formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 10343/20) (T2S4) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1]
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2022/HCAL000628_
2022_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf