陳啟生，梁鳳儀經營生記工程公司 訴 YIU CHOR LIN

HCSA 39/2017

[2018] HKCFI 2700

香港特別行政區

高等法院

原訟法庭

小額錢債審裁處上訴案件2017年第39號

(原案件編號：小額錢債審裁處申索2016年第34780號)

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判決書

序言

1.  申索人是室內裝修公司，而被告人聘用申索人裝修其家居的洗手間 (下稱「該裝修」) 。雙方無爭議：

(1) 雙方簽訂兩份裝修合約，即 (a) 日期為2016年3月8日及工程金額為港幣23,000元的編號為C-160308裝修合約 (下稱「合約1」- C1)，和 (b) 日期為2016年3月16日及工程金額為港幣6,250元的編號為C-160316裝修合約 (下稱「合約 2」- C2) (下總稱「該兩份裝修合約」)；

(2) 該兩份裝修合約記載雙方同意的裝修工程事項，而除此之外沒有口頭協議；

(3) 該裝修在2016年3月開始，並在2016年4月20日完工；

(4) 申索人於2016年4月22日向被告人發出日期皆為2016年4月22日的兩份發票，即 (a) 有關合約 1的編號為C‑160308V及應付金額為港幣11,500元[1] 的發票 (下稱「發票 1」- C3) ，和 (b) 有關合約 2 (連同金額為港幣810元的後加項目) 的編號為C-160316V及應付金額為港幣3,935 元[2] 的發票 (下稱「發票 2」 - C4)；及

(5) 被告人於2016年5月13日支付發票1下應付金額港幣11,500元，和發票2下應付金額港幣3,935元的其中港幣3,235元 ，而發票2下的未付金額為港幣700元。

2.  被告人已就該裝修共支付了港幣29,360元，但始終未付申索人發票2下未付餘款的港幣700元。申索人於2016年5月11日及20日去信被告人 (C5 - C6) 追討合約2下該裝修的未付餘款港幣700元。

3.  於2016年9月15日，申索人在小額錢債審裁處 (下稱「該審裁處」) 案件編號SCTC34780/2016 (下稱「該案件」)向被告人提出申索，追討該裝修的未付餘款港幣700元。被告人則稱，該裝修未有根據該兩份修裝合約完成，而合約2下第3項工程 (「廁所天花維修士波令及批灰，完成後整個天花油上乳膠漆」) 有多處缺陷。[3] 被告人於2016年10月22日存檔反申索書 (下稱「該反申索書」) ，向申索人提出反申索追討合約2下第3項工程項目的維修金額港幣4,000元。該反申索書提出的理由如下：

「- 沒有更換新鋼筋，大廈1983年落成，舊喉用了33年，

- 打磨生鏽鋼筋，只做表面，少過一半圓周，

- 舊天花裂縫多，拆除石屎只做水喉位，

- 舊批灰沒有全部拆除，新批灰蓋上舊，

- 完成後沒有油上乳膠漆，

- 裝修今年4月中完成，10月3日發現天花已出現一條28cm裂縫(見圖)。」

4.  該案件於2017年8月9日在暫委審裁官梁家欣 (下稱「梁審裁官」) 席前進行審訊。梁審裁官於2017年8月9日頒下判決 (及述明其簡要理由 (下稱「該簡要理由」) ，判決申索人的申索勝訴，被告人須支付申索人款項港幣700元和訟費港幣175元，而上述判決款項 (包括訟費) 的判決後利息，以判定利率計算，由裁斷日起計至款項付清時止，而被告人的反申索被撤銷，不作訟費命令 (下稱「該判決」) 。

5.  於2017年8月9日，被告人將港幣875元繳存於該審裁處。但其實被告人對該判決不滿，並於同一天 (2017年8月9日) 提出申請，要求覆核該判決。於2017年8月11日，梁審裁官頒下指示，批准被告人要求暫緩發放款項的申請，並指示暫緩發放被告人於2017年8月9日繳存於該審裁處的款項港幣875元予申索人，直至該審裁處進一步命令為止。

6.  被告人亦於2017年8月15日向高等法院原訟法庭申請上訴許可，以提出上訴 (下稱「該許可申請」) 。於2017年8月25日，梁審裁官作出指示，根據第338章《小額錢債審裁處條例》(下稱「該條例」) 第27A (1) 條作出指示，除非被告人同意撤回該許可申請，否則，該審裁處將無司法管轄權聆聽被告人要求覆核該判決的申請，並取消覆核聆訊。

7.  於2017年9月29日，梁審裁官頒下判決理由書 (下稱「該理由書」) 。

8.  該許可申請於2017年10月17日在本席席前進行聆訊。於2017年10月25日，本席頒下書面判決書 (下稱「該判決書」) ，並頒下命令批准被告人就下述法律觀點方面的上訴理由提出上訴 (下稱「該許可命令」) ：

(1) 就被告人聘用申索人做該裝修，梁審裁官不接受「廁所天花出現飾面剝落」構成沒有根據合約1和合約2 (即該兩份裝修合約) 履行該裝修及 / 或構成工程具有缺陷，該裁斷是否因錯誤應用舉證責任的法理原則及 / 或忽略了法定查詢責任所致，而梁審裁官作出該裁斷時是否未有全面述明足夠的判決理由 (下稱「理由 (一) 」) ；

(2) 梁審裁官作出有關申索人沒有「截斷」或切割洗手間門板及 / 或申索人不需要為「截斷」或切割洗手間門板負上責任的裁斷時是否沒有考慮相關因素及 / 或偏離正軌而毫不理性 (下稱「理由 (二) 」) ；

(3) 梁審裁官是否誤解了被告人的反申索的訴因及案情而錯誤認為履行該兩份裝修合約項下的工序便等同所完成工序沒有缺陷 (下稱「理由 (三) 」) ；

(4) 梁審裁官在作出該判決及於2017年8月9日頒下該簡要理由時是否已考慮反申索的各項申索項目而作出所需的相關裁斷 (下稱「理由 (四) 」) ；及

(5) 梁審裁官是否在作出該判決及頒下該簡要理由後才在日期為2017年9月29日的該理由書作出進一步的事實裁斷以支持該判決 (下稱「理由 (五) 」) 。

9.  於2017年11月2日，被告人存檔原訴動議通知書，申請撤銷該判決，並申請作出命令如下：

(1) 「整個工程沒有缺點」；

(2) 「專家意見並不接受」；

(3) 「做完就沒有錯，即時離場沒有缺點」；及

(4) 「判決日只解釋部份理由，不夠全面，判決理由不合理」。

10.  於2018年1月22日，申索人和被告人就上述原訴動議通知書出席本席席前的聆訊。鑒於上述原訴動議通知書所述的上訴理由並非該許可命令所批准的法律觀點方面的上訴理由，本席便在聆訊當天頒下如下的案件管理命令 (下稱「該修訂命令」) ：

(1) 許可申索人修改上述原訴動議通知書，將上述原訴動議通知書所述的四個上訴理由刪去，並加添本席在該許可命令下批准的上訴理由 (見上述第 8 (1) – (5) 段) ；

(2) 申索人須於當日起計7天內向本席書記領取該修訂命令的蓋印本，在隨後7天內將經修訂的原訴動議通知書存檔法庭及送交答辯人；

(3) 經修訂的原訴動議通知書之聆訊押後到2018年3月16日上午10時在本席席前聆訊 (預留兩小時) ；及

(4) 2018年1月22日聆訊之訟費保留待決。

11.  於2018年1月26日，被告人存檔經修訂的原訴動議通知書，述明其上訴理由如上述第8 (1) – (5) 段所述。於2018年3月16日，申索人和被告人皆出席上述經修訂的原訴動議通知書的聆訊，他們雙方親自行事，沒有律師代表。

雙方的案情及爭議點

12.  本席在該判決書第8 – 10段已詳述雙方的案情及爭議點。本席採納相關內容，在此不贅。

梁審裁官裁決

13.  同樣地，本席在該判決書第13 – 16段已詳述梁審裁官的裁決。本席採納相關內容，在此不贅。

法理原則

14.  根據該條例第 28 (1) 條，如任何一方對審裁處的決定感到受屈，而理由只涉及法律問題，或是因為該申索超越審裁處的司法管轄權範圍，該一方可向原訟法庭申請上訴許可，而原訟法庭如認為適當，可予批准。該條例第 29 (2) 條述明，「原訟法庭對於根據第 28 條批予許可的上訴，可– (a) 作出事實推論；及 (b) 就訟費及開支方面而作出其認為適當的命令，但不可(i) 推翻或更改審裁處就事實問題作出的裁決；或 (ii) 收取其他證據」。

15.  其實，香港法例第25章《勞資審裁處條例》 第32 (1) 條及35 (2) 條也有相同的條文，所以有關勞資審裁處上訴適用的法理原則也同時適用於該審裁處的上訴案件。

(1) 事實裁斷

16.  正如本席在該判決書第 19 段所述，被告人如欲推翻該審裁處就事實所作的裁定，這是法律所不容許的，法庭不能純粹因對事實的觀點與原審審裁官不同而推翻對事實的裁定。關於事實的裁定，除非是偏離正軌或毫不理性、或沒有證據支持、或考慮了無關的因素、或沒有考慮有關的因素，方可被推翻。馮皓嵐訴威達製品有限公司一案[4] 採納終審法院於Kwong Mile Services Ltd v Commissioner of Inland Revenue一案[5] 所述的原則，並在第39段述明如下：

「處理上訴的法庭不能純粹因對事實的觀點與原審審裁官不同而推翻對事實的裁定。若處理上訴的法庭另有唯一合理及真實的結論，則它有責任取代原審判決。被上訴的裁斷若是偏離正軌或毫不理性地就事實裁斷或推論、或沒有證據支持、或考慮了無關痛癢的因素、或沒有考慮相關的因素，則可被推翻。如果被上訴的裁斷無法被支持，則處理上訴的法庭會推論該審裁者誤解或忽略相關證據或在法律上錯誤引導自己，而無需辨別一個明確的法律謬誤。」

其實，那位證人的證供及 / 或那些證據較為可信、案情的強弱，很多時是見仁見智。若申索人欲挑戰審裁處就事實方面作出之裁斷，他必須能說服本法庭，該審裁處就在作出事實裁斷的過程內有可能犯上了法律方面之錯誤；否則該審裁處對證據或證人證供之衡量、誰的證供較可信、誰是誠實可靠之證人、誰的案情較合常理等等方面之判斷，均不牽涉法律論點上之錯誤。

(2) 調查責任

17.  該條例第16條述明：「 (1) 審裁處的法律程序聆訊，須不拘形式進行。 (2) 審裁處可傳召任何證人，及要求交出在任何法律程序中有關的文件、紀錄、帳簿或其他物件。 (3) 審裁處如認為任何事宜與申索有關，則不論該事宜曾否由任何一方提出，亦須予以查訊。」。

18.  就著審裁處的法定調查責任，高等法院原訟法庭法官區慶祥在Wai Mei Lai Stella v Viya Pramita一案[6] 述明該審裁處在法例下負上調查責任的相關上訴法理原則如下：

「Further, failure to discharge the statutory duty to investigate is a ground of appeal. However, it is trite that not every failure to investigate a relevant matter will give rise to an appeal. The appellate court has to be satisfied that the subject matter of the complaint must not only be relevant but be of such a nature that the lack of investigation will give rise to injustice, in that, a fair and proper determination of the claim cannot be attained: Chan Suk Bing Angie v Harbour Phoenix [1992] 2 HKC 459 at 462A to 463F; James Manuel Ho v Choy Kwei Ling Vionnon (unrep, HCSA 5/2004, 29 July 2005) at para 14 per Chung J.」

19.  在Chan Suk Bing, Angie v Harbour Phoenix Limited & anor一案，[7] 高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官陳振鴻 (當時官階) 指出：

「…… I accept …… such statutory duty [to investigate] is not an absolute one in the sense that the presiding officers do have a ‘discretion’ in the matter. They are only bound to investigate matters they ‘may consider relevant’. ……

It is obvious that not every failure to investigate a relevant matter will give rise to an appeal for a failure to discharge a statutory duty. The relevant matter forming the subject matter of the complaint must not only be relevant, but be of such a nature that the lack of investigation will give rise to injustice in that a fair and proper determination of the claim cannot be attained. All the circumstances of the case as well as all other findings of fact must be given all due regard before such a complaint can be upheld. Further, not only is the total absence of investigation a ground for complaint, totally inadequate or useless investigation which amount to no investigation at all will also suffice. It is, however, never sufficient for the appellate court to conclude that it would have preferred to approach the matter differently, or that there is a better way to investigate the claim. It is not open to the appellate court to prefer its own views to that of the presiding officers as to the manner of investigation. To suffice, it must be a clear and obvious case that the inadequacy of the investigation will render an ordinary reasonable man on the tram to Shaukiwan to conclude that injustice has resulted in that a fair and proper determination of the claim cannot be attained.

…… The insufficiency of evidence to support a finding, or the inconsistency of a finding with the evidence, are matters that the appellate court can properly take into account to determine whether there has been a failure to conduct any or any adequate investigation of material facts relevant to such a finding. But that is as far as the relevance of these matters go in relation to the failure to discharge the statutory duty. They do not per se prove a failure to discharge the statutory duty. ……」

20.  在James Manuel Ho & anor v Grand Pacific Vacation (Hong Kong) Limited一案,[8] 高等法院原訟法庭法官鍾安德闡述審裁處的調查責任如下：[9]

「14. The extent to which the duty imposed on the Tribunal …… to inquire must depend on the individual circumstances of each case. However, the following legal principles can be gathered from the relevant judgments:-

(a) the duty to inquire is limited to a duty to inquire into any matter ‘which it may consider relevant to a claim’;

(b) the duty is not absolute;

(c) not every failure to inquire a relevant matter gives rise to a valid ground of appeal. The failure must be of such a nature that it gives rise to injustice in that a fair and proper determination cannot be attained;

(d) ‘matter … relevant to a claim’ can cover matters of various degrees of relevance to a claim. The Tribunal has no duty to inquire into all matters of relevance irrespective of whether they have a reasonable basis;

(e) the manner of investigation is a matter of discretion for the Tribunal dependent on the facts of the case before it. The appellate court should not interfere with that discretion merely because it would have exercised it in a different manner. Regard can be taken of matters such as the issues in dispute, the incontrovertible evidence before the Tribunal and materials placed before the Tribunal by the parties prior to the trial before the Tribunal;

(f) on the other hand, the duty to inquire does not mean the Tribunal should take over the role of an advocate for a litigant. The Tribunal must remain neutral and impartial. Thus, litigants must still be allowed to cross-examine witnesses for the other side, and litigants cannot be compelled to testify against their wishes. But the Tribunal has a duty to invite litigants to consider giving evidence when it is apparent he could give evidence on important matters in issue;

(g) the duty to inquire can include the Tribunal inviting the parties to comment on matters, or, if necessary, directing them to produce evidence or documents, relating to matters which the Tribunal discerns to be important.」

21.  審裁官並非申索人或被告人的律師，他/她不可能在審訊前對申索人或被告人的案情有深入理解及知悉存在的證據，案中亦要有恰當的客觀事實或證據才能促使審裁官執行其調查責任，而審裁官有酎情權決定是否及如何進行調查。據此，雖然該審裁處有查訊任何與申索相關事宜的責任，但是該責任並非是絕對性的，該審裁處須因應案件的情況、爭議點、無爭議的事實及與訟雙方在審訊前呈交的資料，而酌情決定查訊的範圍。在保持中立的情況下，該審裁處的查訊責任包括要求與訟雙方提交它認為重要的文件或證據。但是，在一般情況下，只有在欠缺查訊而引致裁定有欠公允的情況下，才可產生上訴的理由。[10] 由於第 25 章《勞資審裁處條例》第 20 (3) 條的條文與該條例第 16 (3) 條的條文十分相似，所以高等法院原訟法庭暫委法官陳振鴻 (當時官階) 在Chan Suk Bing，Angie v Harbour Phoenix Limited & anor一案[11] 所述明勞資審裁處在法例下負上查訊責任的相關法理原則亦有指導性作用：

「Section 20 of the Ordinance provides that hearings at the tribunal shall be conducted on an informal manner. This is mainly due to the prohibition against legal representation in the tribunal. This in turn，brought about s 20(3) which provides that ‘the Presiding Officer shall investigate any matter which he may consider relevant to the claim，whether or not it has been raised by a party’. …… Presiding Officers should not allow themselves to derogate from this statutory duty under any circumstances，if a fair and just disposition of the claim is to be ensured. The requirements of justice in a judicial system such as the tribunal is such that，the Presiding Officers are required to assume an active inquisitorial role in the proceedings ……」

22.  於謝林及其他二十位訴陳德偉，[12] 高等法院原訟法庭法官陳振鴻解釋，審裁官在聆訊中所須承擔的「查訊責任」並非絕對的，無選擇性的。陳法官就第 25 章《勞資審裁處條例》第 20 條下審裁官所須承擔的調查責任提供下述的指引：

「(一) 審裁官所須承擔的調查責任，只限於‘任何與申索有關事宜’。

(二) 此責任並非一絕對責任，審裁官只須就任何對判決或對事實的裁定有重大影響的事宜，作出適當合理的調查。

(三) 即審裁官並無責任對任何與有關事宜，不論其重要性，不論其是否有合理論據或基礎，毫無選擇地盲目地作出不必要的調查。

(四) ‘與申索有關事宜’，有輕重之分，性質之別，絕不可一概而論，持一論而放諸四海。有效事宜，爲對判決或事實的裁定‘有重大影響’者，即其影響力，並非必須對判決或事實的裁定起決定性作用，但須爲重要的影響力，足可引致一個合理的審裁官對其判決或事實的裁定，産生合理疑慮，或認爲有必要再作考慮。但調查責任不能引伸至一些較輕微，或少於上述程度的事宜。

(五) ‘作出適當合理的調查’：同樣地，所須調查程度亦有深淺之別，形式之異。調查必須是適當而合理的調查，不可有任何偏見，不可有任何先入爲主之差。調查形式及程度，須視乎事宜本身的合理需要，不可一概而論。唯一絕對的準則，爲審裁官所持態度，必須中立持平，不可以任何一方代表律師爲己任。他的任務乃找出事實真相，而非以破壞證人的可信性爲目的。他只能在有合理的疑點時，對證人作出查訊性的盤問，深入的追問，以求真相。他絕不應在毫無合理的疑點時，對證人作出無理及無必要的盤問。審裁官能保持角色中立，不偏不倚，絕無庖代餘地，實至爲重要。」

(3) 述明判決理由的責任

23.  審裁官亦有責任在作出判決時述明其判決理由。在Vermeerbergen Peter Alfred v Swisstribe Limited，[13] 本席指出：

「27. There is in general a requirement that a tribunal of fact must give adequate reasons for its decision. In Zhou Cui Hao v Ting Fung Yee, it was held that:[14]

‘Generally speaking, a professional judge is under a duty to analyse in his judgment the material points in the evidence of the case and give reasons as to why he has reached a particular conclusion or decision. This is the only way to make people understand why their evidence is not accepted by the court and why they lose in a case. Only by this can justice be seen to be done. Furthermore, the losing party needs to be clear on whether there is any error in the reasons for the decision given by the court before he can decide whether to appeal or not, and, at a later stage, submit to the Court of Appeal his grounds of appeal in order to seek to set aside the original decision. A professional judge is under a duty to give adequate reasons for any decision which he has made. This is a principle of paramount importance in the common law system. ...... ’

28. In Oriental Daily Publisher Ltd v Commissioner for Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority, Li CJ gave the following guidance on reasons to be given by the tribunal:[15]

‘First, the reasons given should show that the tribunal has addressed the substantial issues before it and show why the tribunal has come to its decision. There may not be any need however to address every single issue. But the reasons should show that the issues that arise for serious consideration have been considered.

Secondly, ...... [in some] instances, the duty to give reasons could be discharged by describing the contents without much more. Apart from cases of this kind, a decision ...... would not normally be adequate [where such] statements would in effect assert conclusions and would not reveal why the tribunal has come to such conclusions.

Thirdly, the reasons may not require great elaboration and they may be brief. It is only when they are defective in substance that they should be considered inadequate. Ultimately, what are adequate reasons in the circumstances of a particular case have to be approached sensibly.’

As explained by the Court of Appeal in Re Profit Success Development Limited,[16]‘[whether] adequate reasons have been given in a particular case is, in other words, a fact sensitive question’.」

(4) 舉證責任

24.  本席於馮進堂對振通物流配送 (香港) 有限公司及另一人[17]一案提及民事訴訟舉證責任的法理原則如下：

「55. 一般而言，民事訴訟的舉證責任 (general persuasive burden of proof in civil cases) 在於『the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue』，而負上舉證責任的一方需在平衡相對可能性的標準下證明他的主張。Phipson on Evidence一書第18版第 162-163 頁第6-7 段指出：

‘...... If, when all the evidence is adduced by all parties, the party who has this burden has not discharged it, the decision must be against him. ...... This rule is adopted principally because it is just that he who invokes the aid of the law should be the first to prove his case; and partly because, in the nature of things, a negative is more difficult to establish than an affirmative. The burden of proof ...... remaining unchanged throughout the trial ...... never shifting. In deciding which party asserts the affirmative, regard must be had to the substance of the issue and not merely to its grammatical form ...... The true meaning of the rule is that where a given allegation ...... forms an essential part of a party’s case, the proof of such allegation rests on him. ...... In all but the simplest cases, the burden of the issues will be divided, each party having one or more cast upon him. ’

56. 在LBTC 1800/2015及LBTC 3400/2015二案，馮和周也有作供及提呈文件證據，審裁官可從相關證據作出事實裁定，而實際來說，舉證責任的法理原則不外是指：

‘…… the claimant (on whom the legal burden lies) has an evidential burden to adduce sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence or otherwise of a fact in question whereupon the spotlight switches to the defendant to discharge his evidential burden of raising a prima facie innocent explanation, and if that is satisfied the claimant has to establish on proper standard of proof the defendant’s prima facie innocent explanation is to be rejected. If the defendant chooses to adduce some countervailing evidence such that the 2 sides’ versions are contradictory and mutually exclusive, the burden of proof is practically an assessment of the parties’ relative credibility and cogency of evidence/inferences. ……’」(重點加強)

討論

25.  申索人及被告人在2018年3月16日的聆訊花了很多時間向本席陳述他們在該案件的案情及於梁審裁官席前審訊時所呈交的證據。但正如上述，經修訂的原訴動議通知書下的上訴理由，只能涉及法律問題，而本席不能就該案件重新審訊或收取新的證據。因此，本席不會在本判決書中詳細討論申索人及被告人在庭上提及有關他們分別的案情的陳述，而著眼探究該理由 (一) 至 (五) 是否有效的上訴理由，足以令本席推翻及 / 或撤銷該判決。

(1) 理由 (一)

26.  梁審裁官在該簡要理由指出申索人負上舉證責任，在相對可能性之下證明其申索事項，而被告人則負上同樣的舉證責任，證明其反申索的事項。梁審裁官所指出舉證責任的法理原則正確，但關鍵事宜是梁審裁官在該案件作出分析 / 裁斷時有否正確應用上述法理原則。

27.  梁審裁官在該簡要理由指稱，未有證據顯示「廁所天花出現飾面剝離」的情況是在申索人完工之後便發生，但梁審裁官沒有指出或作出事實裁斷述明，如果該裝修工程有缺陷，天花出現飾面剝離的情況定然在完工後便會發生，而不會隨後才出現。該簡要理由及 / 或該理由書也沒有說明梁審裁官曾就這方面向雙方證人 (包括專家證人) 作出查詢，以確定天花出現飾面剝離的時間性。如果梁審裁官不接受「廁所天花出現飾面剝離」構成該兩份裝修合約下的工程缺陷的其中原因是因為廁所天花出現飾面剝離不是在完工後便發生，她必須作出相應調查及事實裁斷，解釋為何廁所天花出現飾面剝離的情況必然在完工後便會發生，而不會在完工一段時間後才出現。這方面的調查及裁斷可能涉及事實方面的證據 (例如在證人作供時向證人提出查問) 及 / 或專家方面的證據 (例如在專家證人作供時向他查問他就廁所天花出現剝離情況的專業意見，包括這狀況的成因及出現剝離的時間性等問題) 。梁審裁官未有進行上述關鍵的調查，但即使她進行了上述的調查，她也未有在該簡要理由及該理由書闡述這方面的證據分析。在這情況下，梁審裁官作出裁斷認為未有證據顯示「廁所天花出現飾面剝離」的情況在完工之後便發生便足以證明工程沒有缺陷，該裁斷的證據基礎薄弱。因此，本席認為，梁審裁官在這方面未盡其調查責任及 / 或述明全面的判決理由。

28.  梁審裁官在該理由書指出，專家證人及其報告沒有指出廁所天花飾面剝離的唯一原因是「沒有髹上乳膠漆」，亦沒有排除有其他原因導致「飾面剝離」(尤其是「飾面剝離」的情況是該裝修完工接近 6 個月後才出現) 。但是，專家報告 (D20 及D23-24 ) 述明檢驗人員到現場檢查時，「現場所見，廁所天花沒有髹上乳膠漆。」，[18] 而「檢驗人員利用導電感應法 (針入式) 對飾面剝落位置進行隨機測試，結果顯示該位置沒有出現明顯滲水情況，反映該位置出現飾面剝落情況並非由於滲水所導致。檢驗人員判斷此飾面剝離情況與裝修工程未有妥善完成有關，需作出維修」。正如梁審裁官在該理由書所述，專家證人作供時亦述明如果有髹上乳膠漆，便不會出現「飾面剝離」的情況。

29.  雖然民事訴訟的一般舉證責任 (general persuasive burden of proof in civil cases) 落在「the party who substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue」的身上，但被告人已親自作供，傳召專家證人以及呈交文件證據 (包括專家報告) ，以履行其「evidential burden to adduce sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence or otherwise of a fact in question」，那麼申索人便需履行其「evidential burden of raising a prima facie innocent explanation」。

30.  從上述的證供證據可見，被告人已提出證據指出廁所天花飾面剝離是因為申索人沒有髹上乳膠漆而不是因為滲水所致。梁審裁官在該簡要理由及該理由書中也沒有提及，除了被告人作出上述舉證外，有否任何反駁的證據顯示有其他理由令「飾面剝離」，也沒有述及申索人已履行evidential burden (證據責任) 推翻被告人提呈的上述證供證據。在這情況下，梁審裁官認為被告人在未能排除有其他原因導致「飾面剝離」便等同被告人未有履行舉證責任這說法，是錯誤應用民事訴訟的舉證責任，亦未有全面述明足夠的判決理由。本席認為這是有效的上訴理由。

(2) 理由 (二)

31.  梁審裁官認為，由於該兩份裝修合約不包括安裝洗手間門板，所以申索人便不需要為「截斷」或切割門板負上責任，更而接納申索人指稱他們沒有切割洗手間門板。但是梁審裁官沒有在該簡要理由及該理由書作出事實裁斷，申索人在進行該裝修時有否將洗手間的地台升高。如果有的話，由於該兩份裝修合約沒有要求申索人做新的門板，那麼舊有的門板如何在升高了的洗手間地台上開關運作？如果洗手間地台升高了而不能令舊有的門板開關運作自如，那麼審裁官便需考慮專家所提出，因洗手間地台升高了故洗手間門板需切割成合適高度的說法是否有理。但在未作出相關事實裁斷前，而只說因申索人的工程不包括安裝洗手間門板便了事，本席認為，梁審裁官作出這方面的裁斷時缺乏足夠的調查及 / 或事實裁斷，因此便沒有足夠證據基礎，可相對證明申索人不需為「裁斷」或切割門板負上責任。雖然一般而言，被告人如欲推翻該審裁處就事實所作的裁定並不容易，而且法庭不能純粹因對事實的觀點與原審裁官不同而推翻對事實的裁定，但如果裁斷「偏離正軌或毫不理性、或沒有證據支持、或考慮了無關因素、或沒有考慮有關因素，方可被推翻」 (重點加強) 。[19] 因此，本席認為理由 (二) 是有效的上訴理由，在缺乏足夠的調查下，梁審裁官無法達至一個公平及適當的事實裁斷 (fair and proper determination) 而因此對被告人構成不公。

(3) 理由 (三)

32.  理由 (三) 質疑梁審裁官是否誤解了被告人的反申索訴因及案情而錯誤地認為履行該兩份裝修合約項下的工序便等同所完成工序沒有缺陷。被告人在庭上陳述時簡單及直接地指出「做完」不等同「沒有錯」。明顯地，申索人的申索爭議點是他們是否已完成該兩份裝修合約項下的工程，以便收取工程尾數費用。這與被告人的反申索是兩碼子事，因為被告人指稱甚至申索人已完成相關工程，其成品不妥當及 / 或有缺陷，因此向申索人申索賠償及維修費用。簡單而言，履行合約項下的工序並不等同所做的工程沒有缺陷。

33.  但是從該簡要理由及該理由書可見，梁審裁官看似沒有清楚分辦上述兩項不同的法理概念。該簡要理由在這方面比較明顯。例如，梁審裁官認為，雖然專家證人指出廁所天花出現飾面剝離的缺陷，「但係 [專家證人] 亦都係承認其實申索人已經做過相關嘅工序」(見該判決書第13 (3) 段) 。又例如，梁審裁官指出該兩份裝修合約不包括安裝洗手間門板，所以申索人不需要為「截斷」門板負上責任。因此，梁審裁官在該簡要理由認為，既然申索人已遵照該兩份裝修合約完成相關工序，工程便沒有任何缺陷 (見該判決書第14 – 15段) ，而完全沒有探究該反申索書的其他指控，[20]亦沒有就這方面作出任何相關的事實裁斷。

34.  本席認為，上述分析清楚顯示梁審裁官混淆了申索人的申索與被告人的反申索，和申索人及被告人需要證明申索及反申索訴因下的各項不同因素。該簡易理由及該理由書的分析及裁斷給人的印象是如果申索成功的話 (即申索人已完成工序而有權追討工程費用的尾數) ，反申索便必然敗訴。但其實在法理上這並非必然，因為其他因素 (例如履行該裝修時疏忽及 / 或工藝水平不足) 也可令工程有缺陷，這法理上的誤解也令梁審裁官沒有進行有效的調查，去了解相關事實因素而作出公平及適當的裁決。本席認為這是有效的上訴理由。

(4) 理由 (四)及 (五)

35.  一直以來，被告人指稱該簡要理由「只解釋部份理由，未夠全面，判決理由欠合理」。從該判決書第13 – 16段可見，該簡要理由沒有探究該反申索書首4項的反申索項目，亦沒有在這方面作出事實裁斷。再者，該簡要理由也沒有探究如果該裝修並非根據該兩份裝修合約履行或申索人的工程有缺陷的情況下維修及賠償金額是多少。本席認為，梁審裁官未有在該簡要理由就被告人的所有反申索項目作出事實裁斷的情況下便頒下該判決並撤銷被告人的反申索，這是法律觀點上的錯誤。正如上述第 23 段所述，審裁官有責任在作出判決時述明其判決理由，以便與訟雙方得以明白審裁官為何不接納某些證據及 / 或審裁官為何判決一方敗訴，而只有與訟雙方清楚明白裁決理由公義才得以彰顯。再者，敗訴的一方也需明白審裁官的裁決理由才可以有效及全面地考慮審裁官有否犯上法律觀點的錯誤以決定應否提出上訴許可申請，而如果獲得許可提出上訴，上訴人也需要在原訴動議通知書列舉其上訴理由，謀求推翻審裁官的裁決。

36.  雖然梁審裁官未有在該簡要理由探究該反申索首4項的反申索項目，亦沒有就這方面作出事實裁斷，梁審裁官在該理由書花了很大編幅作出有關方面的補充 (見該判決書第16段) 。但本席認為，這不足以彌補該簡要理由的不足。

37.  該條例第18條述明如下：

「(1) 審裁處須於申索聆訊結束後盡早作出裁定，並就申索作出其認為適當的裁斷或命令。

(2) 審裁處可按其認為適當的情況而以口頭或書面說明作出某項裁斷或命令的理由。

(3) 審裁官以口頭作出裁斷或命令後，須盡早將該項裁斷或命令予以書面記錄，且無論如何須不遲於裁斷或命令的日期後14天內辦妥。」

38.  在Chan Tsz Kwan v Wing Yip E&M Limited一案，[21] 上訴人就勞資審裁處審裁官的裁決 / 命令提出上訴。高等法院原訟法庭法官任懿君指出審裁官於2006年6月22日頒下裁決，並頒下口頭簡要理由，但當僱主提出上訴許可申請時，審裁官便頒下書面裁決理由書。任法官述明如下：

「14. In the case before me the presiding officer did not alter his determination. In fact he had not make any determination at the time of the oral judgment as to the four serious allegations of the employer leading to his dismissal of Mr Chan summarily. He had only dealt with the minor allegation of not attending a meeting on 4 October 2005.……

15. However the written reasons for decision had expanded the oral decision by considering the other three allegations. The question now is whether it is proper.

16. …… a presiding officer could give his reasons for an award or order orally or in writing. It was only the award or order given orally which has to be reduced into writing not later than 14 days thereafter.

17. Due to the high volume of works in the Labour Tribunal, when a presiding officer made an award or order he would invariably deliver his oral determination first. When appeal was lodged by an appellant, the registrar of the High Court will inform the registrar of the Labour Tribunal for a written determination to reach the High Court seven days before the hearing of the application for leave to appeal.

18. In my view it is not incorrect for a presiding officer to add to his oral reasons delivered in his written reasons for judgment which is consistent with his original determination and finding of facts. The case of Chan Muk Wing only decided that contrary findings, although lead to the same conclusion would lead any appellant tribunal to entertain serious misgivings as to whether the presiding officer had properly addressed his mind to the evidence before him or carried out his statutory duty to investigate all relevant matters or in general, come to a determination which satisfied that justice has been done to both parties.

19. If a presiding office would like to change his determination he was given the power to alter or amend his determination by way of a review. Here it is not a question of reviewing his decision/determination since it is simply a reduction of his oral determination into writing.

20. However having failed to address those four points of allegations leading to the company’s summary dismissal of Mr Chan, the presiding officer subsequently only dealt with them very briefly. He did not state his reasons for accepting Mr Chan’s version in opposition to the company’s allegations, or at least not in detail. He had not dealt with the allegation of the company in respect of the Zhongshan Shangri-la Hotel construction works.

22. In my view the allegations of the company have not properly been dealt with both in the oral determination and the written reasons for decision. ……

23. For the aforesaid reasons I would allow the appeal of the appellant company.……」

39.  在劉新嬌對陳淑基一案，[22] 申請人就土地審裁處的裁決 / 命令向上訴法庭提出上訴許可申請。土地審裁處成員於2017年7月6日頒下其裁決及口頭簡要理由，並於2017年10月16日頒下書面裁決理由書。上訴法庭副庭長林文瀚述明如下：

「16. It has to be borne in mind that the reasons for judgment were those set out orally by the member on 6 July 2017. It is not legally permissible, unless the member expressly reserved his reasons at the time he gave judgment and gave written reasons later, for the member to add to, or subtract anything from the oral reasons by means of a subsequent decision, see Happy Dragon Restaurant Ltd v The Director of Lands [2010] 2 HKLRD 727.

17. In the context of an application for leave to appeal, the member (as does this Court in a renewed application for leave) has to consider if the appeal has any reasonable prospect of success (or, if it is an inexcusable late application, real prospect of success). In the making of such assessment, if there are points not addressed in the original judgment but duly canvassed in the course of the application for leave, it could be appropriate for the member to refer to such points (if they are clearly irrefutable and the parties would not be prejudiced by the same being taken only after judgment) as part of the reasons for granting or refusing leave. But this should not be confused with providing additional reasons for the original judgment which is not legally permissible. The soundness of the original judgment has to be determined by the reasons already given at the time when judgment was pronounced.

18. We are aware that the usual practice of the Lands Tribunal in possession cases is that the Tribunal would not give any written judgments. From time to time, we have cases coming before us that the Tribunal only gave written decisions or written reasons for decision in the context of applications for review or applications for leave to appeal. Provided that oral reasons have been given at the time when the original decisions were made, such a course is permissible. The oral reasons would be recorded in the DARTS recording system. If a party requested for a written copy of such reasons, the transcript of that part of the hearing could be prepared and given to the party.

19. When there is an application for leave to appeal, we are of the view that the written transcript of the oral reasons for judgment should be prepared and made available to the parties. As explained in the authorities, one of the purposes requiring reasons to be given is to facilitate the losing party to understand the decision properly and to consider if he has valid grounds of appeal, see Oriental Daily Publisher Ltd v Commissioner for Television and Entertainment Licensing Authority [1998] 2 HKLRD 857 at p.867D; Zhuo Cui Hao v Ting Fung Yee [1999] 3 HKC 634 at p.639; Leung Wing Yi Asther v Kwok Yu Wah (2015) 18 HKCFAR 605 at [59]. A losing party must have access to a copy of the reasons given by a judge and, if those reasons were given orally, written transcript should be provided to facilitate his consideration of exercise of his right of appeal. The transcript would also facilitate this Court in processing any renewed application for leave before us.

20. For these reasons, we should focus on the oral reasons given by the member at the hearing. What he said at [18] in the written Reasons for Decision of 16 October 2017 cannot alter what he had already said on 6 July 2017. 」

40.  該判決書第13 – 14段載述梁審裁官在該簡要理由的裁決及裁決理由，而梁審裁官在該簡要理由指出「如上文所述」 (即該判決書第13 (1) –(3) 段所提及的簡要理由) ，該裝修工程沒有缺陷。但在該理由書，梁審裁官作出補充理由 (見該判決書第15段) ，而該些補充理由正是就該簡要理由沒有探究的事項 (即被告人提出該裝修非根據該兩份修合約履行或申索人的工程有缺陷的情況) 作出補充。梁審裁官更在該理由書就被告人的反申索所訴述的維修或賠償金額作出分析及裁斷 (見該判決書第16段) ，但梁審裁官在該簡要理由完全沒有探究這方面的事宜，而她只簡單指出「……因為工程係冇缺陷，所以申索人亦都係唔需要支付工程缺陷嘅修復金額。所以本席係將會宣判申索人得直，被告人係未能成功佢嘅反申索。……」從上述第38 – 39段所提及的案例可見，梁審裁官不應亦不可在該理由書作出上述的補充。但如果本席不考慮該理由書的補充裁決理由，而只考慮該簡要理由所載述的裁決理由，很明顯地梁審裁官未有在該簡要理由就被告人的所有反申索項目作出事實裁斷便判令申索人勝訴而被告人的反申索敗訴。本席認為這是法律方面的錯誤，這亦令該判決不妥穩，亦對被告人構成不公。

總結

41.  基於上述的分析，本席裁定被告人的上訴得直，並撤銷該判決，本席亦指示申索人在該案件的申索及被告人在該案件的反申索發還其他審裁官 (即非梁審裁官) 重審，並依據該條例第 16 (3) 條履行調查責任，如有需要應傳召證人及 / 或專家證人作供及 / 或接受盤問。

42.  申索人未能成功反駁被告人的上訴，因此他應支付被告人就有關是次上訴的訟費。但是被告人的2017年11月2日原訴動議通知書出現錯誤而引致上訴未能於2018年1月22日進行聆訊。由於2018年3月16日的上訴聆訊之聆訊時間比較2018年1月22日的聆訊之聆訊時間為長，而提出是次上訴涉及申請上訴許可和存檔及送達文件的程序，在申索人及被告人互相應得訟費對沖下，本席認為合宜的訟費命令是申索人支付被告人就是次上訴的一半訟費。因此，本席頒下暫准訟費命令，申索人須支付給被告人是次上訴所涉及的 50% 訟費，如果雙方未能同意訟費的款額，則由訟費評定官評定。至於該案件所涉的訟費，將保留待審裁官重審該案件作出裁決時一併處理及作出裁決。