SK MOINUDDIN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 2367/2020

[2026] HKCFI 3645

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 2367 OF 2020

________________________

________________

_______________

D E C I S I O N

_______________

1.  By a summons filed on 7 May 2026 (“Summons”), the Applicant applied for an extension of time to appeal my order dated 16 April 2026 (“Order”) wherein I had, pursuant to the observations set out in [2026] HKCFI 1959 (“CALL-1”), refused his application for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“TCAB”)/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“NRCPO”) dated 9 November 2020 (“TCAB Decision”).

2.  In dealing with such I have had regard below to the length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the prospects of the intended appeal, and the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time is granted (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346; Nupur Mst [2018] HKCA 524; Nguyen Van Quyen [2025] HKCA 510).

3.  In the Summons, the Applicant apparently claims that he received the CALL-1 and the Order on 4 May 2026, said that he disagrees with them, and that his problem “is still exist” in his home country hence he wants to appeal. The Affirmation effectively says the same thing, except that the problem is said to be a “severe problem” and adds that if he returns to his home country he will be killed by his enemies. Neither the Summons nor the Affirmation contain any grounds of appeal.

4.  The 14-day period for the Applicant to appeal against the Order expired on 30 April 2026 (RHC O 53 r 3(4)), hence the application is 7 days late. While I do not see that I have been given a credible or valid explanation for the delay, given its length I have focused on the merits of the appeal.

5.  It is trite that the court will not grant an extension of time to pursue a hopeless appeal (Tran Van Anh [2025] HKCA 408). I had, in my decision, reviewed the TCAB Decision with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, applying the enhanced Wednesbury standard, and found no reasonably arguable public law grounds to vitiate such. I do not see any proper ground of appeal with any prospect of success, particularly when the Applicant has not identified any ground of appeal or any basis (in the nature of an error of law, any failure to take account of relevant matters already placed before the court, or that I was plainly wrong) on which the Court of Appeal would reverse my decision (Nupur Mst, supra). The assertions by the Applicant in the Summons and Affirmation do not, whether assessed individually or cumulatively, even begin to constitute any or any proper ground of appeal.

6.  It would be futile to extend time to allow the Applicant to mount a hopeless appeal. Were I to do so, that would also needlessly prejudice the respondent.

7.  I hence, and notwithstanding the relatively short delay, refuse the application and dismiss the Summons.