HKSAR v. LIU TJONG SLAM AND ANOTHER

CAC C 87/2012

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 87 OF 2012

(ON APPEAL FROM DCCC NO. 452 OF 2011)

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BETWEEN

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REASONS FOR JUDGMENT

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Hon Yeung VP (giving the Reasons for Judgment of the Court):

Introduction

1.  Liu Tjong-slam (D1) and Liu Slung (D2) are brothers and they resided together with their father Liu Chin-yick (the father) and their mother (the mother) at a flat in Man Yuen Building in Yau Ma Tei (the residence).

2.  D1 was charged with dealing with property known or believed to represent proceeds of an indictable offence (money laundering) (the 1^st charge) and conspiring with D2 to “launder money” (the 2^nd charge).  D2 was charged with the 2^nd charge of conspiring with D1 to “launder money”.

3.  D1 and D2 pleaded not guilty to the charges and appeared before Judge S D’Almada Remedios (the judge) for trial.  On 21 February 2012, D1 and D2 were convicted as charged and on 27 February 2012, they were sentenced to 63 months and 10 months’ imprisonment respectively.

4.  Represented by Mr Graham Harris SC and Mr Benson Tsoi on the instructions of Messrs Haldanes, D1 and D2 had sought leave to appeal against both conviction and sentence.  D2 subsequently abandoned his application for leave to appeal against sentence and it was dismissed.

5.  We were only concerned with the application of D1 and D2 for leave to appeal against conviction, and D1’s application for leave to appeal against sentence.

6.  At the end of the hearing, we dismissed both applications.  We indicated that we would hand down our reasons in due course and this we now do.

The Background Facts

7.  The father was engaged in drug manufacturing and trafficking activities.  He had pleaded guilty to four counts of trafficking in dangerous drugs on 27 May 2011.

8.  During an operation by the Customs and Excise Department, large quantities of “ice” worth tens of millions of dollars were found in various premises to which the father had means of access.

9.  On 14 July 2010, in a Kwai Chung industrial building unit (the 1^st unit), Customs Officers found 69 kilograms of “ice” with a street value of over $50 million and drug manufacturing equipment, paraphernalia and chemicals.  In another Kwai Chung industrial building unit (the 2^nd unit), Customs Officers found 3.14 kilograms of “ice” with a retail value of $2.2 million and drug manufacturing chemicals.  The 1^st and 2^nd units were drug manufacturing centres.

10.  The father also took the Customs Officers to a room at the Panda Hotel in Tsuen Wan (the hotel room) where there were three suitcases containing 65.269 kilograms of “ice” with a retail value of over $47 million.  A safe in the hotel room was opened with the code number provided by the father and a small quantity of diazepam, cash of $200,000 and US$3,000, two watches, a diamond and an electronic scale were found inside.  

11.  When the hotel room was being searched by Customs Officers, D2 who had the key card arrived and was arrested.  D2 denied knowledge of the suitcases and their contents, but admitted renting the hotel room in June and July 2010 using a supplementary credit card given to him by D1, and staying there 3 to 5 nights per week.  D2 said he resided at the residence with D1, the father and the mother.

12.  The residence was searched in the presence of the mother.  Customs Officers found 2.325 kilograms of “ice” with a retail value of about $1.6 million in two handbags on a sofa and from a drawer of a tea table in the sitting room.  The drugs were not concealed or hidden.

13.  When the residence was being searched, D1 arrived and he was also arrested.  He said he lived at the residence but denied knowledge of the drugs.  The Customs Officers seized a large number of exhibits from the residence, including:

1.     Two passbooks in D1’s name for account number 043-481-1-023878-6 (A/C 1) with the Nanyang Commercial Bank Ltd (“NCB”);

2.     Two passbooks in D1’s name for account number 242-0-039311 (A/C 3) with the Hang Seng Bank (“HSB”);

3.     One passbook in D2’s name for account number 043-482-1-033164-8 (A/C 4) with “NCB”;

4.     One passbook in D2’s name for account number 242-1-039823 (A/C 5) with “HSB”;

5.     Credit card slips signed by the father for the rental of the hotel room for January, February and March of 2010; and

6.     Credit card slips signed by D2 for the rental of the hotel room for the months of April to July 2010.

Activities of A/C 1

14.  A/C 1 was opened in D1’s name with “NCB” on 13 March 2002 and D1 was the sole authorized signatory.  Between 1 June 2009 and 12 July 2010, total deposits into A/C 1 amounted to about $8 million of which about $1.76 million was cash and about $6.25 million were transfer deposits.  Over $1.6 million of the cash deposits were made after 6 November 2009 and 18 deposits were in amounts between $50,000 and $100,000.

15.  Between 19 June 2010 and 12 July 2010, D1, on five occasions, deposited the total sum of $410,000 into A/C 1.  The three deposits on 19 June 2010 and the one deposit on 30 June 2010 were each in the sum of $100,000.  The last deposit on 12 July 2010 was in the amount of $10,000.

16.  The transfer deposits of $6.25 million came from three registered remittance agents/money changers, namely Ease Will Company (Ease Will), Fu Chun Global and Ka Yu Company.

17.  Between 1 June 2009 and 27 May 2010, Ease Will made 11 remittances totalling $2.86 million into A/C 1 on the instruction of a Taiwanese remittance company in Kaoshing.  On 5 February and 12 May 2010, Ease Will made two remittances of $50,000 and $20,000 into A/C 1 on the instructions of a remittance company in Taipei.  One remittance was by a cheque for $546,000 and the other remittances came from Ease Will’s account with Bank of China.

18.  Between 4 June 2009 and 8 February 2010, Fu Chun Global transferred 14 sums from its accounts to A/C 1 totalling about $1.36 million on the instruction of Hung Chun-chun in the Philippines.

19.  On 15 January 2010, Mr Lau of Ka Yu Company transferred $70,000 into A/C 1 on the instruction of Mr Chao Chen-kuang of Keelung City, Taiwan.

20.  The balance of the transfer deposits into A/C 1 between 1 June 2009 and 12 July 2010 totalling about $1.88 million came from the accounts of Wong Kam-hei, Mok Lai-chi, Fortis Insurance Company, D1 and D2.

21.  Between 1 June 2009 and 12 July 2010, there were withdrawals by cash of about $5 million and by transfers of about $2.86 million.  D1, on 13 occasions, withdrew cash totalling $4.26 million in amounts between $100,000 and $1 million.  The transfers of about $1.13 million went to D1’s current account 043-479-0-010934-0 (A/C 2) with “NCB”.

22.  On the other hand, the total deposits to A/C 1 between 2007 and 2009 were less than $1.8 million.

Activities of A/C 2

23.  Account number 043-479-0-010934-0 (A/C 2) was opened in D1’s name on 13 March 2002 and he was the sole signatory.  Between 1 June 2009 and 12 July 2010, there were transfer deposits of $1.37 million into A/C 2, two transfers of $239,000 came from A/C 4 and about $1.13 million came from A/C 1.

24.  Between 1 June 2009 and 12 July 2010, about $1.37 million was withdrawn from A/C 2 with $505,000 in cash by D1 on 7 July 2010.  About $850,000 was withdrawn by cheques signed by D1 and $20,000 was withdrawn by ATM transfer on 11 February 2010.  

25.  D1 issued two cheques, one for $140,000 payable to Tong Yung and one, dated 26 June 2010, for $400,000 payable to Messrs Hastings & Co, solicitors as deposit for the purchase of a flat by SS International Development Ltd (“SS”) and the other cheques were payments to American Express International Inc for credit card purchases and the Government of HKSAR.

26.  The total deposits to A/C 2 between 2007 and 2009 were just over $200,000.

Activities of A/C 3

27.  A/C 3 was opened in D1’s name on 24 December 1999 and he was the sole signatory.  Between 1 June 2009 and 12 July 2010, total deposits to A/C 3 amounted to $673,340 with $344,500 in cash and $328,840 by transfer.  There were 12 cash deposits of $280,500 from 4 November 2009 onwards.  There were one deposit for $100,000 on 13 April 2010 and one transfer deposit of $229,840 on 4 June 2009.  During the same period, the total withdrawals from A/C 3 amounted to $633,972 with $211,700 in cash and $422,272 by transfer.

28.  The total deposits into A/C 3 between 2007 and 2009 were $690,000.

Activities of A/C 4

29.  A/C 4 was opened in D2’s name on 17 January 2005 and he was the sole signatory.  He described himself as a student in the account opening document.

30.  Between 1 June 2009 and 12 July 2010, total deposits to A/C 4 amounted to $853,439 of which $707,970 was in cash and $145,569 by transfer.  There were eight cash deposits totalling $655,970 since 5 December 2009 of which five were each in the sum of $100,000.

31.  D1 had made three cash deposits to A/C 4, two on 19 June 2010 of $100,000 each and one on 30 June 2010 of $60,000.  On 17 November 2009, there was one transfer deposit to A/C 4 from A/C 1 of $30,000.

32.  The total withdrawals between 1 June 2009 and 12 July 2010 from A/C 4 amounted to $698,044 with $81,500 withdrawn in cash.  There was one cash withdrawal of $50,000 on 26 June 2010.  The other withdrawals totalling $616,544 were transfer withdrawals with $339,000 transferred to A/C 1 and A/C 2 on four occasions.

33.  The total deposits to A/C 4 between 2007 and 2009 were less than $500,000.

34.  Inland Revenue records showed that D1 was an education coordinator/ambassador at the Ocean Park Corporation between 2005 and 2008, and a CEO assistant with Ocean Link International Ltd (Ocean Link) in 2008 and 2009.  D1’s reported total earning between 2005 and 2010 was about $259,000.

35.  Employees return filed by Fortis Insurance (Asia) Company Ltd (Fortis) indicated that D2 was employed by Fortis as a business development executive between 15 January 2008 and 31 March 2010 and his total earning during such period was about $174,000.

36.  Immigration records showed that D1, D2 and the father, between July 2009 and July 2010, went to the Mainland on 22 occasions, 8 occasions and 55 occasions respectively.

37.  D1, in the name of “SS”, signed a sale and purchase agreement to purchase a residential property for $6.28 million.  The address of “SS” was incorrectly stated.  A cheque dated 26 June 2010 drawn on A/C 2 for $400,000 was paid as deposit.  There were the payments of further deposit of $278,000 and stamp duty of $254,250 by Tina Ting Kee-pei.  However, the transaction was not completed and the total payments of $932,250 were forfeited in August 2010.

38.  On 6 July 2010, D1 transferred $500,000 from A/C 1 to A/C 2 and withdrew that sum the following day.  It appeared that $500,000 in cash was paid to the vendor to understate the price of the property in order to reduce stamp duty.

39.  The 1^st unit was rented in the father’s name at the monthly rent of $8,500 since 1 June 2009.  The rent was paid from funds in A/C 3.  The residence was rented in the mother’s name at the monthly rent of $6,000 between March 2002 and July 2010.  From 2005 to July 2010, the rent was settled by D1 by transfers from A/C 3 to the bank account of the registered owner of the residence.

The Prosecution Allegations

40.  The prosecution alleged that D1 had dealt with funds in A/Cs 1, 2 and 3 totalling over $10 million between 1 June 2009 and 14 July 2010, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that such funds in whole or in part, directly or indirectly represented proceeds of an indictable offence (the 1^st charge). 

41.  The prosecution also alleged that D1 and D2 had, between 1 June 2009 and 14 July 2010, conspired to deal with funds in A/C 4 totalling just over $850,000, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that such funds in whole or in part, directly or indirectly represented the proceeds of an indictable offence (the 2^nd charge).

The Defence Case and the Evidence

42.  D1 and D2 hardly challenged the prosecution evidence and most of the prosecution evidence was admitted under s 65C of the Criminal Procedure Ordinance.

43.  D1 and D2 admitted that they had dealt with the funds in their respective accounts, but claimed that the father was the source of the funds and they did not know the details.  It was their case that the father had used their bank accounts for inward and outward remittances as well as for making cash withdrawals and transfers in connection with his legitimate businesses.

44.  According to D1 and D2, the father had told them that the money in their accounts was for family expenses as he was often away from Hong Kong for business.  They claimed not to have any knowledge of the father’s businesses and they never asked him about them, but believed that the father was a legitimate businessman in Mainland properties.

45.  D1 and D2 denied any involvement in the father’s drug dealings and said they had no knowledge of the drugs seized by Customs Officers from the 1^st unit, the hotel room or in the residence.

46.  It was D1 and D2’s case that the father had been using their bank accounts for many years and they had no reason not to trust him or to suspect that the funds in their accounts came from an illegal source.  They said they were filial sons and were loyal to and compliant with the father’s instructions.

D1’s Evidence

47.  In his evidence, D1 told the court that he had obtained a BA degree from Upper Iowa University in June 2007, having spent 2 years there, and then finished his degree in Hong Kong.  He said he worked full-time at the Ocean Park before working for Ocean Link until the end of 2009 when he ceased employment.

48.  D1 said he believed, based on the conversations he overheard between his parents that the father was in property business in China.  He said the father was often away from Hong Kong on business and he never asked him about his businesses.

49.  D1 suggested that the father was the source of the funds in A/C 1 and that since the account was opened in 2002 when D1 was 22, the father would ask him to check to see if funds had arrived and he would then inform the father of the actual amounts deposited into the account.

50.  D1 also said he opened A/C 1 on the father’s instruction so that there would be money for household expenses when the father was not at home.  D1 said he paid all family bills with funds in A/C 1, but the father was in over-all control.  He said he trusted the father completely and had no idea that the money from the father would come from an illegitimate source.

51.  D1 was adamant that he was unaware of the father’s drug dealings until he was arrested in July 2010.  He said he was subsequently told that the father had been kidnapped in February 2002, but knew nothing about the father depositing money into his accounts so that should the father be kidnapped again, money from his accounts could be used to pay a ransom.

52.  D1 insisted that all deposits and/or withdrawals were done at the father’s requests.  D1 gave explanation for the various deposits and/or withdrawals in large sums.

53.  D1 also said that the cash deposits to A/C 4 were made by him and the money came from the father.  D1 also admitted to have asked D2 to transfer funds from A/C 4 to accounts in his own name.  D1 said on the father’s instructions, he transferred funds into an account, but had no idea that they were rental payments for the 1^st unit.

54.  D1 was adamant that he had never been to the hotel room although he had settled rental payments for it.  He said D2 told him the hotel room was rented for his study with the permission of the father.

55.  D1 denied knowledge of the drugs found at the residence or the fact that the father also had an account with “NCB”.

D2’s Evidence

56.  D2 said after his graduating from American Universities, he returned to Hong Kong in 2006 and started working for Fortis in 2008 for about 2 ½ years until his arrest in July 2010.

57.  D2 said he knew nothing about the father’s occupation as he was often away and did not talk to him about it.  But he said he overheard that he was involved in property business.  D2 said he opened a saving account with “HSB” in 2000 when he was 15 years old and on 30 September 2004, there was a deposit of $1,229,990 into the account from his father.  Three days later, on the father’s instruction, he withdrew $1,050,000 from the account and handed the money back to the father or mother who were both with him at the time of the withdrawal.

58.  D2 confirmed that A/C 4 was opened by him on 17 January 2005 at the father’s request so that money could be given to him for daily household expenses and for the mother’s use.

59.  D2 also said he had not asked the father why A/C 4 had to be used and he had never discussed with D1 on the subject either.  He said A/C 4 was under the father’s control.  D2 admitted that he used the hotel room a few nights per week to study and he also used the gym facilities of the hotel.  D2 said he was unaware of the drugs found in the hotel room and in the residence.  He insisted that he had no reason to suspect that the father was involved in any criminal activity and he always believed him to be a legitimate businessman.

The Father’s Evidence

60.  The father claimed to be earning a living by honest means since marrying the mother in 1978 until April 2010 when he was involved in drug manufacturing in the 1^st unit.  The father claimed to have no financial gain from his drug dealings and that the funds in the various accounts of D1 and D2 were all from legitimate businesses.

61.  The father said his businesses were mostly conducted in the Mainland and Taiwan and that after setting up the Liberian Consulate in Taiwan in 1990, he was rewarded with the status of Honorary Consul of Liberia with a diplomatic passport, albeit only for a short time between 1990 and 1992.

62.  The father detailed his businesses and suggested that the money deposited into the accounts of D1 and D2 all came from his legitimate businesses.  He said he had a bank account himself, but did not use it because he had been kidnapped in 2002 in Guangzhou.  He said after the kidnap, he realized that his personal safety was at risk and he closed all his bank accounts and made new arrangements.  He said in order to better protect his family, he asked D1 and D2 to open bank accounts for family funds so that both family expenses and business expenses could be met. 

63.  It was the father’s suggestion that as he was often in the Mainland and if his money were under his name, then should he be kidnapped again, his family would not be able to pay a ransom to save his life. By keeping his money in his sons’ accounts, the family would also have money for family expense even if he was kidnapped.

64.  The father further said he did not tell his family about the kidnapping incident until after his arrest in July 2010.  The father accepted that there were only a few transactions in his account with “NCB” after it was opened in 2003 and that between 2008 and 2010, there were only 7 transactions with a balance not exceeding $13,500.

65.  The father said he opened the account because his colleagues and friends all said that as a businessman, he should have a bank account, but he also said he never used the account himself, but instead lent it to a friend from Taiwan to conduct his banking activities.

66.  The father suggested that he had invested $4 million in a stainless steel business of a Mr Tu in Taiwan and the $4 million was paid through a “money house” after it was brought to Hong Kong from the Mainland in batches of cash.  He said there was no document showing his remittance of $4 million to Taiwan either.

67.  The father further suggested that he regarded the $4 million as a loan to Mr Tu and Mr Tu would pay commission to him and the $1,229,990 paid to D2’s saving account with “HSB” on 30 September 2004 should be commission from Mr Tu.  As far as the other deposits into D1 and D2’s accounts were concerned, they were repayments of loans he had made to others and that Mr Tu alone had repaid him $3 million.  The father said there was no record of the loans or the repayments and he just made a “verbal record”.

68.  It was also the father’s evidence that he had invested $5 million into a shoe business and regarded the money as a loan to a Mr Chu who would repay him by depositing sums of money into D1’s accounts.  He said Mr Chu had repaid him about $3.5 million with a balance of $1.5 million.  Again the father said there was no record of the loan or the repayments.

69.  The father accounted for various sums withdrawn from the relevant accounts, saying that he took the money in cash to the Mainland to lend to others.  He said he was able to carry large sums of money in cash without making any declaration as he knew many Mainland Customs Officers at the border crossing, having “bribed” and/or entertained them to obtain their co-operation.

70.  The father also explained how he got himself involved in the drug business.  He said initially he thought he was venturing into a business with a Mr Law and a Mr Yang in the production of scents, but after he signed the lease for the 1^st unit, he came to know the business involved drug manufacturing.  He said he tried to opt out but was threatened by Mr Law that he and his family would be killed.  He said he agreed to join Mr Law in his drug business to protect himself and his family.

71.  The father further said that the three suitcases of drug found in the hotel room were given to him two to three weeks earlier by Mr Law for safe-keeping and that Mr Law also had key to the hotel room.  He said at all times the three suitcases of drug were covered with various items so that they could be concealed from D2 and the hotel staff.

72.  The father also said that he had put drugs at the residence as it was more convenient for Mr Law to access them.  He suggested that he was not concerned if his family members would discover the drugs as they all had the habit of leaving his property alone.

The Judge’s Findings

73.  The judge rejected the father’s evidence, saying that it was unreliable and incredible.  The judge explained in details why she thought so.  The judge emphasized that the father did not try to distance D1 and D2 from the drugs, in the 1^st unit, the hotel room or the residence.

74.  The judge pointed out that the father allowed large quantities of drugs to be stored in the hotel room knowing that D2 would be there to study and he also allowed large quantities of drug to be stored in the residence.  The judge also pointed out that the father never told D2 not to go to the hotel room.  The judge took the view that both D1 and D2 were aware of the presence and the nature of the drug.

75.  The judge emphasized that there was no document at all to support the father’s business, the loans and/or the repayments, and that there was no explanation as to why some of the deposits came from sources in the Philippines, a Mr Malik and a Mr Lin.

76.  The judge, having carefully analysed the father’s evidence in relation to the movements of money in D1’s and D2’s accounts and the manner in which he answered questions put to him, concluded that such evidence was not truthful.

77.  The judge rejected the father’s explanations that he would use his sons’ accounts for business purposes or that he was concerned because of a kidnapping incident.  The judge pointed out that most of the funds withdrawn were not used for family expenses at all.

78.  The judge concluded that the father was using his sons’ account for money laundering purpose in order to avoid suspicion.

79.  The judge also rejected D1’s evidence, having again analysed it carefully.  The judge rejected D1’s suggestion that he could not manage the funds in his accounts because of the ways deposits and withdrawals were made.  The judge pointed out that most of the funds, according to him, were used by the father alone and that there were deposits and withdrawals of funds into and from his and D2’s account.

80.  The judge rejected D1’s evidence that he withdrew cash and gave it to the father and that part of the money that had not been used up would be re-deposited into his accounts again.  The judge pointed out that on an occasion, when D1 claimed to have given money to the father who then returned part of it, the father was not even in Hong Kong.  There were also the occasions when D1 withdrew large sums of cash when the father was not in Hong Kong.

81.  The judge emphasized that D1 did not keep any records or ask the father for any documents on the cash or transfer deposits of over $8.6 million.  The judge pointed out that on 19 June 2010, D1 had made three deposits of $100,000 each at different branches of a bank.  The judge emphasized that although D1 said he wanted to avoid bank charges, he did not even know what the charges were.

82.  The judge mentioned the fact that cash of $500,000 was given to the vendor to avoid stamp duty and that “SS” used an incorrect address.

83.  The judge emphasized that D1 was dealing with funds in his accounts on his own without the father’s involvement.  The judge found D1 to be untruthful and unreliable.

84.  The judge also rejected D2’s evidence, pointing out the unusual transactions in A/C 4.  The judge took the view that there was no innocent explanation for the father to use D2’s account at all and that D2’s explanation that he did not care and was not bothered about the father using his account was not convincing.  The judge further took the view that if D2 really did not care, he was turning a blind eye to suspicious and uncommon transactions.

85.  The judge pointed out that in one year, $853,000 was deposited into A/C 4 by cash or transfers.  There were transfers of funds from A/C 4 to D1’s accounts and there were deposits of large sums including one cash deposit from overseas. 

86.  The judge said it was inconceivable for D2 not to talk to D1 when there were many transactions involving large sums between his account and those of D1.  The judge also rejected D2’s evidence.

87.  The judge took the view that D1 and D2 could not have believed that the funds in their accounts came from legitimate business as no legitimate businessman would use accounts of his sons to deposit and withdraw large sums of money, very often in cash.  The judge pointed out that D1 and D2 were well educated and they knew that the funds passing through their accounts exceeded the household expenses and therefore it was not possible for them not to query why the father had to use their accounts.

88.  The judge also took the view that it was wholly unrealistic for the father to rely on D1 and D2 for funds required for his businesses.  The judge opined that a joint account would have served what the father claimed to be the reason for using the accounts of D1 and D2.

89.  The judge pointed out that D1 paid for the rent of the 1^st unit, went to the Panda Hotel to visit a good friend of the father in a room close to the hotel room rented by the father and D2, and dealt with large sums of money of over $10 million.  The judge emphasized that the flow of money in the accounts of D1 and D2 as well as the ways they had handled them were highly suspicious.

90.  The judge also pointed out that large quantities of “ice” were found both in the hotel room and the residence and the fact that D2 was supposed to be studying at the hotel room 3 to 4 nights in a week.

91.  The judge emphasized that D1 and D2’s accounts were used as a temporary repository for funds with the deposits of large sums of money which were all withdrawn within a very short time.

92.  The judge concluded that D1 and D2, as custodians of the fund, knew that they were tainted or were crime proceeds and/or that these funds were connected with drug dealings.

93.  The judge also concluded that should she be wrong and that there was insufficient evidence to show that D1 and D2 knew the source of the funds, they had at least turned a blind eye and that they had reasonable grounds to believe that the funds in their accounts represented the proceeds of an indictable offence.

94.  As there was no dispute that D1 had handled money in his accounts and that the only reasonable inference was that D1 and D2 must have agreed to deal with the funds in A/C 4, the judge concluded that the two charges against D1 and D2 had been established and he therefore convicted them accordingly.

95.  On the question of sentence, the judge took the view that D1 and D2 knew of the father’s drug dealings and the presence of drugs at the hotel room and at the residence, although she was not satisfied that they knew of the actual quantity of drugs involved.  The judge was satisfied that D1 and D2 knew that the funds in their accounts were crime proceeds.

96.  The judge found that D1 was a key player in the money laundering activities with knowledge that the money was proceeds of drug dealings after he started paying rent for the 1^st unit from September 2009.

97.  The judge accepted that D1 might find it difficult to turn down the father’s request to use his accounts, but by the charge period he was willingly and voluntarily assisting the father.

98.  The judge considered starting points of 5 years and 2 years’ imprisonment suitable for the 1^st and 2^nd charges against D1 respectively and that the global starting point should be 66 months’ imprisonment.

99.  The judge discounted the sentence on the 1^st charge by 3 months on account of the fact that D1 had admitted the majority of the prosecution case.

100.  The judge therefore sentenced D1 to 57 months’ imprisonment on the 1^st charge and 2 years’ imprisonment on the 2^nd charge with 6 months to run consecutively to the sentence on the 1^st charge.  The total sentence against D1 is 63 months’ imprisonment.

Grounds of Appeal Against Conviction

101.  Mr Harris SC suggested that as the judge was unable to conclude that D1 and D2 knew the exact quantity of drugs kept in the hotel room and the residence, the judge was wrong to find that they knew the total sums of money in their respective accounts were proceeds of drug dealings.

102.  Mr Harris emphasized that it was the father’s evidence that no money had yet been generated or received by him from the drug dealings, and in any event, the father’s unilateral conduct and credibility could not be used to boost the prosecution case against D1 and D2.

103.  Mr Harris suggested that the evidence identified by the judge was insufficient to lead to the irresistible inference that D1 and D2 knew that the funds in their accounts were proceeds of drug dealings.

104.  Mr Harris pointed out that D1 and D2 were never seen in the vicinity where drugs were manufactured; that D1 was never present in the hotel room or had access to it or the suitcases containing the drug; and that there was no evidence to show that D1 or D2 had contact with the drugs or the suitcases.  Mr Harris emphasized that the drug charges against D1 and D2 were not proceeded with after the Department of Justice had duly considered the evidence.

105.  Mr Harris also emphasized that D1’s evidence that he did not sign the tenancy agreement for the 1^st unit; that he did not know that he was paying rent for the 1^st unit; and that he had never entered the hotel room was not specifically challenged.

106.  Mr Harris further suggested that D1’s visit of the father’s good friend in a room close to the hotel room and that he had settled credit card bills in relation to the hotel room are innocuous and did not advance the prosecution case.

107.  Mr Harris’s submission was that the presence of drugs at the residence cannot, per se, give rise to the conclusion that D1 and D2 knew of those drugs or that the monies in their bank accounts were proceeds of crime.

108.  Mr Harris suggested that the use of an incorrect address for “SS” and the underhanded payment of $500,000 to the landlady to avoid stamp duty were not relevant matters.

109.  Mr Harris even challenged the judge’s rejection of the father’s evidence that he agreed to deal with dangerous drug because of the threat to his family and himself.  Mr Harris argued that even if the father’s evidence was “unreliable and incredulous”, the judge still had to consider if D1 and D2 had the requisite knowledge or reasonable grounds to believe.

110.  Mr Harris suggested that the judge had not properly considered the inherent probabilities that:

(1)     If any of the other family members knew about the drugs at the residence, why did none of them move out of the premises? Is this not equally (if not more) consistent with the inference that they did not actually know about the drugs?

(2)     If D2 knew that drugs were being stored at the hotel room, why would he continue to go back there to study for his PhD?

(3)     Why would the father (for no apparent reason) tell his family that he was involved in drugs and that drugs were being stored at home or the hotel room, bearing in mind none of the family members were to play any role in the drug activities?

111.  Mr Harris emphasized that the father had testified as a prosecution witness against another defendant for manufacturing and trafficking drugs in a High Court trial and in his statement and evidence, he stated; (a) that it was his first attempt to deal in any way with dangerous drugs (whether manufacturing or trafficking); (b) that he was paid nothing for his role even though he had been promised at least $1 million if the production and distribution of the drugs were successful; and (c) that his family knew nothing of his involvement in the drug dealings.

112.  Raised in his written submissions, but not seriously argued, Mr Harris appeared to be suggesting that the prosecution was not entitled to take a stance different from what the father said under oath, and to that extent, the doctrine of issue estoppel applied.

113.  On the question of reasonable grounds to believe, Mr Harris emphasized that there was evidence of D1 using his accounts for making various legitimate family expenses.  Mr Harris submitted that the failure to make enquiry did not mean that the recipient of money must have reasonable grounds to believe that the payments received were proceeds of a crime.  He reminded the court that on the objective text, the standard to apply was the belief of a reasonable man and that “Such a person is not a lawyer” and was “neither complacent nor unduly sensitive or suspicious”.

114.  Mr Harris further submitted that the judge was wrong to have rejected the evidence of D1 and D2 that they did not have reasonable grounds to believe that the monies in their accounts were proceeds of an indictable offence.

115.  Mr Harris argued that the judge was wrong to reject D1’s evidence that he made five deposits of $100,000 each at different branches of a bank to avoid an administrative fee.  He said it is a matter of common knowledge that many banks in Hong Kong do impose a “bulk cash deposit” service charge and that such a practice was endorsed by the prosecution expert. Mr Harris said defence counsel was prevented at trial from exploring the issue of whether D1 knew what the administrative charge was, and in any event, the fact that D1 did not know how much administrative fee was payable does not mean that such a fee was not payable.

116.  Mr Harris also complained that the judge had wrongly rejected D1’s evidence that on some occasions, some of the cash withdrawn by D1 and given to the father would be returned by the father to him and then he would re-deposit such sums into his accounts again.  He said it was wrong for the judge to reject his explanation just because D1 had made a minor mistake in the chart he prepared in connection with his evidence.

117.  Mr Harris referred the court to a translation mistake which he claimed had led to the judge rejecting D1’s evidence.  He suggested that D1 said he kept the money at home until his father returned, but rejected the suggestion that he “hid” the money at home.  He said D1 misunderstood the word used by the interpreter; namely “sau maih”  to mean “hide away”, and that was why he denied it although it was his evidence that he kept the money at home.

118.  On the judge’s finding that D1’s evidence that he did not know the father had a bank account in Hong Kong was absurd, Mr Harris argued that such a finding was not justified because D1 only said the father had never mentioned to him that he had an account and that he only realized that he had made a transfer to the father’s account after reading many pages of the prosecution documents.  Mr Harris submitted that D1 did not give any thought to the question and D1 only said as the father did not do business in Hong Kong, he did not know if the father had an account in Hong Kong.

119.  Last but not the least, Mr Harris argued that the judge was wrong to conclude that there was a conspiracy between D1 and D2 to deal with proceeds of an indictable offence.  Mr Harris referred to a number of authorities to support his contention.

Grounds of Appeal Against Sentence

120.  Mr Harris suggested that the judge had wrongly concluded that D1 was aware that the monies in question came from the father’s drug dealings and if she was wrong, the sentence should be reduced as D1 would have been sentenced on a more severe basis.  Mr Harris further argued that the judge was wrong to impose a partly consecutive sentence on the 2^nd charge when the two charges were part and parcel of a single scheme to deal with proceeds of a crime.

Discussion

121.  We were surprised that Mr Harris would raise the question of issue estoppel, albeit only in his written submissions.

122.  When the prosecution put forward the father as a witness to testify against the defendant in another case (the other case) for manufacturing and trafficking drugs, it was the prosecution position that the father was involved himself in the manufacturing and trafficking of drugs.  The father was not charged with “money laundering”.

123.  The father’s contention that it was his first attempt to deal with drugs, that he had not been paid anything for his drug dealings or that his family knew nothing of his involvement in drug dealings were not central to the prosecution case in the other case at all and those issues need not be adjudicated upon.  The defendant in the other case was acquitted, an indication that the jury did not accept the father’s evidence.

124.  It was never the prosecution case that the father had derived no benefit from the drug dealings or that the father’s family knew nothing about his drug dealings. 

125.  The prosecution may not be entitled to suggest against a defendant of something which is inconsistent with a previous verdict of acquittal.  It may be argued that if certain findings on relevant issues had been made by a judge or a competent tribunal, the prosecution would not be entitled to reopen the issues and to present a case contrary to those findings.  The prosecution is not entitled to attack the credit of its witness, but can point to inconsistencies between the evidence of the witness and other evidence or to point to matters upon which the evidence of the witness might be unreliable.

126.  The suggestion that the prosecution was bound by the father’s assertion that it was his first attempt and that he had not been paid anything for his role and therefore the monies in question could not have been generated from those drug dealings and that the prosecution was debarred from making such a suggestion were, in our view, completely unfounded.

127.  The judge had carefully analysed the evidence of the father, D1 and D2 before rejecting them in their entirety.  The judge gave many reasons and examples to support her conclusion.

128.  Mr Harris picked and chose some of the judge’s reasons and suggested that parts of the judge’s conclusion were not justified. Mr Harris wished to put a different gloss to the evidence in order to undermine the prosecution case against D1 and D2.

129.  This is not how the issues should be resolved.  The Court of Appeal is not going to conduct a microscopic examination of the judge’s reasons for verdict and then to decide if each and every of those reasons is faultless.  The Court of Appeal is not re-trying the case, or re-considering the credibility of the witnesses; or re-drawing inferences from the evidence.  Those were matters for the judge.

130.  The judge had the opportunity to observe the witnesses giving evidence and the judge had taken into consideration the entirety of their evidence together with the prosecution evidence against them. The judge rejected their evidence and unless it can be pointed out that the judge’s conclusion is not justified, the Court of Appeal would not interfere with the conclusion. 

131.  A District Court Judge is not obliged to deal with every point raised by the parties in the reasons for verdict and needs only to refer to those parts of the evidence which bear upon the issues that have to be decided.  As observed by Black-Kerr J in R v R E Low [1961] HKLR 13 at p 82:

“But it must be remembered that the District Judge is himself the jury. He has heard the whole of the evidence and he is not duty bound to set down precisely what he accepts, what he rejects and what weight he attaches to every piece of evidence, or the arguments of counsel on the evidence, or the whole of the workings of his mind in arriving at his conclusion.

…I think an appellate court should act with the greatest caution before interfering with the District Judge’s findings if, having regard to the whole of the evidence, such findings appear reasonable.”

132.  D1 said he withdrew the money to give to the father.  When it was pointed out to him that on some of the occasions when he withdrew money, the father was not even in Hong Kong, he tried to explain by saying that he would keep the money at home.  Whether he just kept the money at home or whether he hid the money at home (a matter of translation mistake as suggested by Mr Harris), the question was why did he withdraw large sums of money to give to the father in the first place when the father was not even in Hong Kong.

133.  Mr Harris emphasized that it was common knowledge for some banks to charge a service fee for “bulk cash deposit” and that explained why D1 would make a few deposits of $100,000 in a day.  Mr Harris emphasized the fact that D1 did not know how much the administrative fee was did not mean that such a fee was not payable.  Then the question was why he deposited money into different branches in one day.

134.  The judge did not reject D1’s explanation because he had made a minor mistake in the chart that he had prepared.  The judge rejected his explanation on the totality of the evidence because his evidence was inherently improbable.

135.  D2 said he went to the hotel room 3 to 5 days in a week to study for his PhD and for the gym facilities.  The hotel room cost over $10,000 a month, not an insignificant sum, considering the fact that D2 did not even make $10,000 a month working for Fortis at the material times.  Why was he prepared to pay so much for a room for so long just to study and to use the gym facilities there?  If he had to rent a room in a hotel to study, why did he choose the Panda Hotel which was miles from the residence? The whole thing was just inherently improbable.

136.  Whilst D1 had made a number of payments for family expenses, he was unable to account for many payments of very significant sums other than saying that the money came from the father’s business and that he withdrew money on the instruction of his father.  There was not a single piece of document to support the defence’s contention.

137.  The father, on his evidence, was an experienced businessman.  How and why would he be threatened to deal with dangerous drugs?  If he was concerned about his own safety and that of his family, should he not simply report to the police instead of agreeing to deal with drugs worth tens of millions of dollars?  The judge was right in describing the father’s evidence as incredible.

138.  As the judge had observed, the total cash and transfer deposits in relevant accounts of D1 and D2 mushroomed many times during the offence period when compared with previous years.  D1 was dealing with the funds in his accounts on his own and without the father’s involvement by receiving cash directly from others.  D1 and D2 turned a blind eye to those suspicious and uncommon transactions.  The explanations given in their evidence were inherently improbable.

139.  We did not find it necessary to repeat the way in which the judge dealt the evidence of the father, D1 and D2.  On the basis of all the surrounding circumstances and using common sense, the judge was, in our view, entitled to reject the evidence of the father, D1 and D2.

140.  The undisputed evidence showed that the 1^st unit was used as a major drug manufacturing centre and the hotel room was used to store a very large quantity of the finished product.  The values of “ice” found in the 1^st unit and the hotel room were respectively $50 million and over $47 million.  The 2^nd unit was a smaller drug manufacturing centre where “ice” with a value of $2.2 million and other drug manufacturing chemicals were found.

141.  Another quantity of finished product (in 13 packets) with a value of $1.6 million was found in two handbags on a sofa and from a drawer of a tea table in the sitting room of the residence where the father, the mother, D1 and D2 resided.  The drugs were not hidden or concealed.

142.  The father was the tenant of the 1^st unit and was in control of both the 1^st and the 2^nd unit.  He also had key card to the hotel room.

143.  The 1^st unit was rented for two years between 1 June 2009 and 31 May 2011 at the monthly rent of $8,500.  D1 paid for the rent of September and November 2009 by transferring funds from A/C 3 to the landlord’s bank account.  From January 2010, D1 settled seven monthly rental payments by transferring funds from A/C 3.

144.  Since 1 January 2010, the father rented the hotel room at over $10,000 a month and he settled the first three monthly rental payments by credit card.  D2 settled the next four monthly rental payments up to the end of July 2010 with credit card and D1 settled the credit bills by issuing cheques from A/C 2.

145.  D1 and D2 were the only directors of “SS” and “SS” signed an agreement to purchase a flat for $6.28 million and they made a total payment of almost $1 million.  D1 worked for the Ocean Park between 2005 and 2008 earning very little income and between 2008 and 2009, he worked for Ocean Link earning $172,000.  D1 ceased his employment in 2009.  D2’s total earning between 2007 and 2010 was less than $200,000.

146.  D2 had access to the hotel room and he went there three to five times in a week.  D1 had been to another room close to the hotel room to meet a good friend of the father although he claimed not have been to the hotel room itself.

147.  The father was heavily involved in drug dealings on a very large scale.  The father clearly had made no attempt to distance D1 and D2 from his drug dealings.  He allowed D1 to pay for the rent of the 1^st unit and rented the hotel room for D2 to use and in the meantime allowed a very large quantity of “ice” to be stored in the hotel room for weeks. The suitcases containing 65.269 kilograms of “ice” in the hotel room were not even covered with towels.  The father put another large quantity of “ice” at the residence without making any serious effort to hide them.

148.  There was no need to distance D1 and D2 from his drug dealings obviously because D1 and D2 were aware of them and that was the only reasonable inference to be drawn.  It was not just a question of inaction on the part of the father to distance D1 and D2 from his drug dealings.  The judge accepted that the father was openly dealing with drugs at both the hotel room and the residence.  The fact that D1 and D2 had such proximity with the father’s drug dealings indicated that they must be aware of them.

149.  Mr Harris argued that since the judge was unable to conclude that D1 and D2 knew the quantities of drugs involved, she could not have found that they knew the total sums of money in their accounts were proceeds of drug dealings.  We did not agree.

150.  The father’s drug dealings were of a major scale which justified the renting of the 1^st unit and the hotel room at considerable expenses and both D1 and D2 were aware of it.

151.  The 1^st unit and the hotel room were rent in mid 2009 and early 2010 respectively and between June 2009 and July 2010, there were the most unusual transactions in the bank accounts of D1 and D2 involving very large sums of money.  The money was withdrawn within a very short period after deposit and very often in cash.  There were no similar transactions in those accounts prior to June 2009.

152.  Transfer deposits in large sums were only made via many foreign and local remittance agents to A/C 1 soon after 1 June 2009.  The sources of the payments could not be traced.

153.  There was not a scintilla of evidence to show that the father was in any legitimate business that could possibly generate the funds paid into the relevant accounts or in any other business at all.  On the findings of the judge, both D1 and D2 were aware of the father’s drug dealings, although such knowledge would not be sufficient to impute criminal liability for such drug dealings on their part.

154.  In our view, the prosecution evidence, in the absence of any acceptable evidence to the contrary, was sufficient to lead to the only reasonable inference that D1 and D2 knew that the funds in their respective accounts were all proceeds of drug dealings.  The overwhelming evidence supported the judge’s findings of facts that D1 and D2 both knew that all the monies in their respective accounts came from the father’s drug dealings. 

155.  The fact that the prosecution pitched the case on the basis that the deposits into the bank accounts were more likely than not to be the proceeds of the father’s drug-trafficking was no bar to the finding made by the judge that both D1 and D2 actually knew it to be so.  Counsel for the prosecution doubtless took the stance he did in the knowledge that he was not required to prove for sure that it was so, as the Court of Final Appeal in HKSAR v Wong Ping Shui & Anor (2001) 4 HKCFAR 29 had decided that the status of the property dealt with was only an element of the mens rea and not the actus reus.  No separate finding was, therefore, necessary that all or part of the deposits into the accounts were the proceeds of drug trafficking, although it would follow that the finding that both D1 and D2 knew it to be so inevitably implied it to be the case.

156.  In any event, there was no need for the judge to be satisfied that D1 and D2 knew that all the funds in their respective accounts were proceeds of drug dealings as long as they knew parts of them, directly or indirectly represented proceeds of the father’s drug dealings.  On the evidence, the inference that D1 and D2 knew that the monies in their respective accounts were proceeds of the father’s drug dealings was inescapable.

157.  Strictly speaking, this could have disposed of the major grounds of appeal against conviction.  But it would be unsatisfactory not to address the further issue on “the reasonable grounds to believe” limb of section 25(1) of the Organized and Serious Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 455.

158.  In a “money laundering” case, there was no obligation on the part of the prosecution to prove the underlying offences that generated the “money”.  “…it is wholly implausible that the Legislature could have intended proof of money laundering offences to require proof of the underlying criminal offences that generated the money being sanitised….” (Per Ribeiro PJ in Wong Ping Shui & Anor (supra) at 32B-C)

159.  In Westminster City Council v Croyalgrange Ltd 83 Cr App R 155, Lord Bridge opined at p 164; “that it is always open to the tribunal of fact, when knowledge on the part of a defendant is required to be proved, to base a finding of knowledge on evidence that the defendant had deliberately shut his eyes to the obvious or refrained from inquiry because he suspected the truth but did not want to have his suspicion confirmed.”

160.  Similar observation was made in R v Sheif & Ors (unreported: Judgment dated 21 November 2008) that; “a jury was entitled to conclude, if satisfied that the defendant deliberately closed his eyes to the obvious because he did not wish to be told the truth, that that fact was capable of being evidence in support of a conclusion that the defendant did indeed either know or believe the matter in question.”

161.  Despite the overwhelming suspicious circumstances, D1 and D2 claimed not to have asked the father any question about the possible source of the funds paid into their accounts.  If what they said were correct, they were deliberately shutting their eyes to the obvious and had refrained from inquiry.

162.  On the alternative basis for convicting D1 and D2, we accepted the submission of Mr Wesley WC Wong, for the respondent that the judge had applied the correct legal test on “the reasonable grounds to believe” limb and found against both D1 and D2.

163.  Both D1 and D2 admitted that they had dealt with the monies in their respective account(s) and the other issue was whether they had reasonable grounds to believe that the monies were proceeds of an indictable offence.

164.  We had dealt with Mr Harris’ complaints that the judge had wrongly rejected the evidence of D1 and D2.  We did not wish to repeat ourselves except to say that on the overwhelming evidence the judge was entitled to do so.  The attacks on the judge’s findings of facts were simply unarguable.

165.  As the judge had rightly pointed out, the accounts in question were used as a temporary repository for funds.  The funds of significant amounts were paid into the accounts in cash or by transfers and the transferors of the funds into A/C 1 were not traceable.  The funds were withdrawn, mostly in cash, within a very short time.  The sources of the funds were again untraceable.

166.  There was not a scintilla of evidence to justify any of the payments and not a single piece of document had been produced to show the possible sources of the funds.

167.  There was no acceptable evidence to show that the father had any legitimate business to generate any profit comparable to the deposits into the accounts in question.  The monies paid into their respective accounts could not have come from the earnings of D1 or D2.

168.  The judge was right to conclude that a common sense, right-thinking member of the community would consider the evidence sufficient to lead a person to believe that the monies in the accounts of D1 and D2, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, represented proceeds of an indictable offence and that D1 and D2 had reasonable grounds to believe so.

169.  In concluding that D1 and D2 had conspired to deal with the monies in A/C 4, the judge did not say much.  But there was hardly any need to do so, having earlier analysed the evidence and made findings thereon.  The judge pointed out that D1 made both cash and transfer deposits into D2’s account and D2 knew of the cash deposits and permitted D1 to do so.  D2 then withdrew cash from his account and transferred sums to A/C 1 and A/C 2.

170.  On such evidence, the judge was entitled to conclude that D1 and D2 had agreed to deal with the monies in A/C 4, knowing or having reasonable grounds to believe that the monies in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, represented proceeds of an indictable offence.  Not only did they have the intention to do so, they had in fact both dealt with the monies by depositing and/or transferring the monies into or out of A/C 4.  The requirements to prove a conspiracy charge required by R v Saik [2007] 1 AC 18 and R v Anderson [1986] 1 AC 27, as emphasized by Mr Harris had been established.

Conclusion On Conviction

171.  We did not find the conviction against D1 and D2 in any way unsafe or unsatisfactory.  In our view, they were rightly and properly convicted.  The application for leave to appeal against conviction was therefore dismissed.

Sentence

172.  Mr Harris’s ground of appeal against sentence, as he had conceded, was premised on the suggestion that the judge should not have sentenced D1 on the basis of the “knowing limb”.  Our rejection of his argument and our findings that D1 knew that the funds in the accounts originated from the father’s drug dealings would have been sufficient to dispose of the appeal against sentence.

173.  We wish to emphasize that “money laundering” is a very serious offence and a deterrent sentence is called for.  (See HKSAR v Xu Xia Li & Anor [2004] 4 HKC 16 and HKSAR v Boma [2012] 2 HKLRD 33)

174.  As this court has observed in HKSAR v Chen Zhen Chu [2007] 5 HKC 505 at p 513D-E para 48:

“…the gravamen of a money-laundering offence is the amount of money handled, not the amount of profit to the defendants or the loss to the victims.”

175.  In SJ v Jerome Yudal Arnold Herzberg[2010] 1 HKLRD 502 and in Boma (supra), the following factors are considered relevant to sentence in “money laundering” cases:

1.   The amount of money laundered, which was considered to be the major consideration.

2.   The nature of the offence that generated the “laundered money”.

3.   The extent to which the offence assisted the underlying crime or hindered its detection.

4.   The degree of sophistication of the offence.

5.   The defendant’s participation, both in the underlying offence and in the “money laundering” activities.

6.   The length of time that the offence lasted.

7.   The benefit that the defendant had derived from the offence.

8.   Whether there was an international element in the commission of the offence.

176.  The fact that the underlying offence was not known or that the defendant was not involved in the underlying offence were not mitigating factors.  On the other hand, if the underlying offences were serious and the defendant was aware that the money laundered originated from those offences, they were serious aggravating factors.

177.  In Wong Ping Shui & Anor (supra), the defendants laundered proceeds of smuggling activities in Russia, and the money involved, being just money for the trial runs, were US$50,000 and US$20,000 respectively.  A sentence of five years’ imprisonment was considered not excessive.

178.  In HKSAR v Shing Siu Ming & Ors [1999] 2 HKC 818, a case involving drug trafficking to Australia, 7 years’ imprisonment was imposed on two defendants for laundering $3 million and AU$1.5 million, being proceeds of drug trafficking.

179.  In Chen Zhen Chu (supra), the Court had emphasized:

“54. In the context of money laundering, if the defendant knew that the money was derived from very serious crime, it would be an aggravating factor (see Xu Xia Li) and, if we may add, sometimes a very important aggravating factor.

…

64. We wish to add, however, that the seriousness and prevalence of money laundering offences are such that it may be necessary for the courts to take a more robust view about them. In appropriate cases where the aggravating factors are such as those identified above and the sums involved are large, more robust sentences may well be called for than in some of the cases cited to us where relatively modest terms of imprisonment appear to have been imposed.

65. In money laundering cases where the underlying offences are drug trafficking, human smuggling and other serious trans-national crime, sentences of 10 years’ imprisonment or above may well be justified if a defendant knowingly engages in them.”

180.  D1, over a period of just over one year, laundered over $10 million and conspired with D2 to launder about $1 million.  There had been many deposits and withdrawals (both in cash and by transfers).  Some of the payments originated from aboard and to that extent, there as an international element.

181.  What was more significant is of course the fact that D1 laundered the monies knowing that they were proceeds of drug dealings. Looking at the case from that perspective, the total sentence of 63 months’ imprisonment imposed on D1, far from being manifestly excessive, was a lenient sentence.

182.  But for the fact that D1 was helping his father to deal with proceeds of his drug dealings and must have been under his influence, which is a mitigating factor in “money laundering” cases, we would have considered increasing his sentence.

Conclusion on Sentence

183.  The 63 months’ imprisonment on D1 was not manifestly excessive and his application for leave to appeal against sentence was also dismissed.