Case Details
SULIS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5313 · HCAL 1015/2024
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1015/2024
[2026] HKCFI 5313
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 1015 of 2024
BETWEEN
| |Sulis |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
|(|consideration of the documents only; or |
| |consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Background
1. By a “Notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 28 June 2024, the applicant applied
for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The
intended judicial review was against the decision of the Torture
Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 20 June 2024 (“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the
applicant’s appeal against a decision of the Director of Immigration
(“Director”) dated 2 September 2022 rejecting the applicant’s non-
refoulement claim based on all applicable grounds[1]. The Board’s
Decision is set out in the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2024/HCAL001015_
2024_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. In the Form 86, the applicant named the Board and the Director as the
proposed respondents and additionally named the Board as the
interested party. As the Board should have been the proper putative
respondent and the Director the putative interested party, the Form 86
shall be amended on the court’s own motion.
3. The basis of the applicant’s claim was that, if refouled to Indonesia,
she would be harmed or killed by the loan shark and his underlings for
an outstanding loan. The reasoning and findings were set out in detail
in the Board’s Decision and it is not necessary for me to repeat them.
Unless otherwise specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s
abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
4. The applicant has requested for an oral hearing. On 10 August 2026,
the applicant filed an affirmation to apply for the withdrawal of the
Leave Application as she wanted to go home. In the circumstances,
this court will dispose of the Leave Application on paper.
Discussion
5. The leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence, there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision[2]. It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
6. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[3], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. The applicant’s Form 86 and the supporting affirmation
contained no such grounds.
7. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness, or irrationality.[4] In the present case,
although the Board accepted the applicant’s account regarding the
loan, it nonetheless found that the past ill-treatment from the
moneylender did not reach the requisite level of severity. It was
satisfied that the applicant would not face any risks of harm if
refouled. The Board also found that state protection and internal
relocation would be reasonably available. These are findings of fact,
which the court in a judicial review will not interfere with subject
to there being any public law errors.
8. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the decision of the Board, this court is satisfied that
the Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and
observed a very high standard of fairness. The applicant has not
shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in
the Board’s Decision. The applicant advanced no grounds in support of
the Leave Application. The applicant’s intended challenge to the
Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with any realistic
prospects of success such that would enable this court to grant
leave[5].
Withdrawal application
9. Apart from the application to withdraw the Leave Application referred
to above, there is nothing outstanding in this action. In the
circumstances, I make an order to dismiss the Leave Application, and
hereby order the dismissal of the Leave Application: see Re Manik Md
Mahamudun Nabi [2022] HKCA 471; Ngo Xuan Tuyen v Torture Claims Appeal
Board [2024] HKCA 1140.
Order
10. The Form 86 be amended on the court’s own motion.
11. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
dismissed.
Dated the 18th day of September 2026.
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such | |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 18/9/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Sulis |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions| |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Applicant’s ref. no: |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Nil. |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule | |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); | |18/9/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 20954 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every other| |Director of Immigration |
|party copies of every | |Putative Interested |
|affidavit which the | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|Applicant proposes to | |644/22 (Formerly RBCZ |
|use at the hearing, | |5000517/22) |
|including the affidavit | | |
|in support of | |Department of Justice, |
|the application for | |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong
Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers
to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the
risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under
Art. 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its
1967 Protocol) under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s
Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to
process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description
of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor
[2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] Re Zunariyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23.
[3] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL
21/2015, 22 December 2016 at §142.
[4] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v
Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[5] Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676.