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HCAL 405/2024
[2024] HKCFI 1585
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 405 OF 2024
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BETWEEN
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Nguyen Quoc Thien |
Applicant |
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and |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board |
Putative Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan:
1. Extension of time for the application for leave to apply for Judicial Review of the decision of Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 27 September 2023 be refused; and
2. The application for leave to apply for Judicial Review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
1. The Applicant is a 25-year-old national of Vietnam who entered Hong Kong illegally on 24 June 2021 and one month later on 26 July 2021 he surrendered to the Immigration Department and raised a non-refoulement claim for protection on the basis that if he returned to Vietnam he would be harmed or killed by his creditor over his unpaid debts. He was subsequently released on recognizance pending the determination of his claim.
2. The Applicant was born and raised in Bao Loc City, Lam Dong Province, Vietnam. After leaving school he started a wedding planner business in his home district in November 2019 by borrowing a loan from a local money-lender to be repaid within 3 months with interests.
3. However his business did badly due to the Covid-19 pandemic that it suffered huge losses and was soon dissolved, and when the Applicant defaulted with his loan repayment in February 2020, his creditor started to send men to press him for repayment, and for which the Applicant kept pleading for more time to find the money.
4. By February 2021 his creditor lost his patience and came with several men to the Applicant’s home and threatened him, and after 2 subsequent occasions when the Applicant was beaten by his creditor and followers with wooden sticks, and on the last occasion in May 2021 his creditor also took his cell phone and motorcycle, and threatened that next time if he still failed to repay his loan, he would be killed.
5. As a result the Applicant became fearful for his life and fled from his home district, and on 23 June 2021 he departed Vietnam for China, and from there he later sneaked into Hong Kong and subsequently raised his non-refoulement claim for protection, for which he completed a Non-refoulement Claim Form (“NCF”) on 17 December 2021 and attended screening interview before the Immigration Department with legal representation from the Duty Lawyer Service (“DLS”).
6. By a Notice of Decision dated 19 January 2022 the Director of Immigration (“Director”) rejected the Applicant’s claim on all the applicable grounds including risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115 (“Torture Risk”), risk of his absolute or non-derogable rights under the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383 (“HKBOR”) being violated including right to life under Article 2 (“BOR 2 Risk”), risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of HKBOR (“BOR 3 Risk”), and risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (“Persecution Risk”).
7. In his decision the Director took into account of all the relevant circumstances of the Applicant’s claim and assessed the level of risk of harm from his creditor and followers upon his return to Vietnam as low due to the low intensity and frequency of past ill-treatment from them, that there is no evidence of any real intention of them to seriously harm or kill him other than to press him to repay his debts, that in any event it was a private monetary dispute between the Applicant and his creditor without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant if resorted to, and that reliable and objective Country of Origin Information (“COI”) show that reasonable internal relocation alternatives are available in Vietnam with a large population of 98 million people spread across a vast territory of more than 330,000 square kilometers that it would not be unduly harsh for the Applicant as an able-bodied young adult with working experience to move to other areas of the country away from his home district in large cities such as Ho Chi Minh City where it would be difficult if not impossible for his creditor to locate him.
8. On 31 January 2022 the Applicant lodged an appeal to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“Board”) against the Director’s decision, and for which he attended an oral hearing on 31 August 2023 before the Board during which he gave evidence and answered questions raised of his claim by the Adjudicator for the Board. On 27 September 2023 his appeal was dismissed by the Board which also confirmed the Director’s decision.
9. In its decision the Board found material inconsistencies and discrepancies in the Applicant’s evidence that it doubted the credibility of his claim of fear of harm from his creditor and followers that caused him to flee his country to come to Hong Kong for protection, that his credibility was further undermined by his failure to raise his claim upon first arriving in Hong Kong until one month later without good explanation, that even if his asserted account of events occurred in Vietnam were true that it was a private monetary dispute between the Applicant and his creditor without any official involvement that state or police protection would be available to the Applicant upon his return to Vietnam as well as reasonable internal relocation alternatives for him to move safely to other parts of the country away from his home district without any risk of being located that his claim for non-refoulement protection failed on all applicable grounds.
10. On 4 March 2024 the Applicant filed his Form 86 for leave to apply for judicial review of the Board’s decision, and put forward the following grounds for his intended challenge, of which he confirmed at the hearing as follows:
(1) That the Board reached the decision wrongly in assessing his non-refoulement claim as the decision was not fair or reasonable as required by the Wednesbury test in failing to recognize that his life must be protected by the criminal law from the killings that he may face if deported back to his home country;
(2) That the Board failed to appreciate or place proper or sufficient weight or importance to the presence of State Acquiescence in his case which led to an unfair outcome of rejecting his non-refoulement claim;
(3) That the Adjudicator acted unreasonable and was procedurally unfair by placing too much reliance on COI but failed to take into account the Applicant’s personal background and experience in assessing his claim;
(4) That the Board had listed relevant COI which supported the Applicant’s aversions that the police in his country would not be able to protect but failed to consider or give sufficient weight to such evidence and instead ruled otherwise against the Applicant’s case;
(5) That the Board failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by the Wednesbury test in failing to take into account the Applicant’s argument that corruption and incompetency of the administration in the Applicant’s country is still a very serious problem as various human rights organizations had compiled reports that stated testament to the Applicant’s assertions;
(6) That the Adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing whether or not to accept the Applicant’s explanations and unreasonably required him to respond to questions that he was not in a position to offer any response; and
(7) That the Adjudicator made a ruling to dismiss the Applicant’s appeal based on findings which the Adjudicator ought to allow and thus the decision was irrational.
11. By then the Applicant was however out of time with his application, as Order 53 rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A requires that an application for leave to apply for judicial review be made promptly and in any event within three months from the day when grounds for the application first arose unless the Court considers that there is good reason to extend the period within which the application shall be made.
12. As the last day of the three-month period for him to file his form 86 fell on 27 December 2023, the Applicant was therefore more than 2 months late with his application, and in considering whether to extend time, the Court shall have regard to (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reason for the delay; (iii) the merits of the intended application; and (iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public administration: AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393.
13. In the Applicant’s case, a delay of more than 2 months must be considered as substantial and inordinate, for which he explained at the hearing of his application that he was arrested by police sometime in October 2022 for possession of a bullet and was subsequently put in Stanley Prison until early 2024 when by then he was already out of time with his intended application.
14. The record shows that the Board’s decision was sent on the same day of 27 September 2023 to the Applicant at Stanley Prison without being returned through undelivered post, and while it is accepted that there would be the inevitable delay with mails and inconvenience in accessing legal assistance while in prison or detention, I am not satisfied that they would amount to valid justification for such serious delay in the Applicant’s case.
15. As for the merits, if any, of his intended application, those grounds put forward by the Applicant are all just some bare and vague assertions containing a few key words or phrases but without any particulars or specifics or elaborations as to how they apply to his case or how the Board or the Adjudicator had erred in the decision, or in what way was the decision unfair or unreasonable or that the Adjudicator had acted procedurally unfair or irrational, or how did the Adjudicator fail to take into account of relevant COI or being selective or improperly rely on irrelevant COI, or what relevancy were state acquiescence to the Applicant’s case when on the factual basis of even his own case that it was a private monetary dispute between him and his creditor only without any official involvement or political element. As such, and as none of these assertions were properly elaborated or presented with any relevant particulars or specifics by the Applicant, I do not find any of them reasonably arguable for his intended challenge.
16. As has been repeatedly emphasized by the Court of Appeal, judicial review does not operate as a rehearing of a non-refoulement claim when the proper occasion for the Applicant to present and articulate his claim is in the screening process and interview before the Immigration Department and in the process before the Board where the evaluation of the risk of harm is primarily a matter for the Director and the Board as they are entitled to make such evaluation based on the evidence available to them that the court will not usurp their role as primary decision makers in the absence of any legal error or procedural unfairness or irrationality in their decisions being clearly and properly identified by the Applicant, as judicial review is not an avenue for revisiting the assessment by them in the hope that the court may consider the matter afresh: Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328; Re Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018] HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
17. In the Applicant’s case, the fact is that it has been established by both the Director and the Board in their respective decisions that the risk of harm in his claim if real is a localized one and that it is not unreasonable or unsafe for him to relocate to other part of Vietnam, there is simply no justification to afford him with non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong: see TK v Jenkins & Anor [2013] 1 HKC 526.
18. In the premises and having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in either of them, nor any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness in their consideration and assessment of the Applicant’s claim.
19. For these reasons I am not satisfied that there is any prospect of success in the Applicant’s intended application for judicial review, and in the absence of any good reason for his serious delay, I refuse to extend time accordingly dismiss his leave application.
Dated the 13th day of June 2024
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(Chung Lai Fan, Christine)
for Registrar, High Court
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Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must:
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)).
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Sent to the Applicant on 13 June 2024
Nguyen Quoc Thien
Applicant’s ref. no.:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 13 June 2024
Torture Claims Appeal Board
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 19874
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 2393/21 (formerly RBCZ 5000103/21)
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
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