QASIM MUHAMMAD v. DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION

HCAL 1422/2021

[2021] HKCFI 3305

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No. 1422 of 2021

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Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review

NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)

Following;

	consideration of documents only; or
	consideration of documents and Applicant being present in open court;

Order by Deputy High Court Judge K.W. Lung:

1.    Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused; and

2.    A Restricted Proceedings Order (RPO) be made against the applicant.

Observations for the Applicant:

THE APPLICATION

1.  This is the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 11 August 2021 (the “Director’s Decision”) refusing his subsequent claim of HCAL 239 of 2018 (the “original claim”) under section 37ZO of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap.  115 (the “Ordinance”).

2.  The Court, upon its own motion, has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why the Court should not make a restricted proceedings order (“RPO”) against him since there is evidence to show that if unrestricted, the applicant may take out further proceedings to assert his non-refoulement claim on the same facts of the case, thereby abusing the legal process.

3.  Shortly before the hearing, the Court received a notice from the Legal Aid Department informing it that the applicant had applied for legal aid.  Under section 15 and regulation 7A of the Legal Aid Ordinance, Cap.  91, the matter should be adjourned for 42 days unless the Court orders otherwise.  I decide that the statutory stay should be lifted for the reasons that he only applied for legal aid on 22 October 2021, 3 days before the hearing and that there is no merit in his case.  There is no reason for his delay in making the application.  He seems to be taking advantage of the legal aid application to delay the matter.  Also, I have considered the merits of his application.  I find that there is no merit in his application.  See The China State Bank Ltd v Wong Chun Yun trading as Wing Fung Hong Company HCA 10825/1999, Hon Waung J. in Chambers, 6 April 2000 and White Book Vol 2 of 2021 M1/15/1, Leader Crown Ltd v Herbert Tsai & Partners (unrep.  HCA 3038/2003, [2005] HKEC 869 by J Chu :

“… … In any event, there is no apparent justification for the very late application for legal aid. It is not an unjustified view to regard the application as an attempt to gain an advantage through the statutory stay such that if, contrary to my view, section 15(4) does apply, it will be appropriate to exercise my discretion to lift the statutory stay.”

The procedural history

4.  The applicant is an illegal immigrant from Pakistan. He raised non-refoulement claim with the Immigration Department by written representation dated 14 January 2009 on the grounds of Torture risk under the Ordinance; BOR 3 risk under Article 3 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance, Persecution risk under the Refugee Convention and subsequently BOR 2 risk, Right to Life under Article 2 of the Bill of Rights Ordinance.

5.  His claim was rejected by the Director by a Notice of Decision dated 17 August 2016 and Notice of Further Decision dated 28 July 2017.

6.  He appealed to the Torture Claims Appeal Board (the “Board”).  By its Decision dated 2 February 2018 (the “Board’s Decision”), the Board dismissed his appeal.

7.  He applied for leave for judicial review of the Board’s Decision and the application was dismissed by the Court by its Order dated 26 October 2018 (the “Court’s Order”). 

8.  He appealed against the Court’s Order to the Court of Appeal and his application was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 8 April 2019.

9.  His Notice of Motion for leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision to the Court of Final Appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal on 2 August 2019.

10.  His application for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal against the Court of Appeal’s decision was dismissed by the Court of Final Appeal on 14 December 2020. 

11.  He applied to the Director for making a subsequent claim for non-refoulement protection under the unified screening mechanism by letter dated 30 December 2020.

12.  By the Director’s Decision, the Director refused his application. 

The subsequent claim application

13.  The factual basis of his claim is that if refouled, he will be harmed or killed by Munir or his people because Munir mistakenly held that he was responsible for the death of his son. 

14.  The Director found that his claim was not substantiated.  He assessed that the risk of him being harmed or killed by his enemies if he returned to Pakistan was low; that state protection was available to him and that internal relocation was an option open to him.

15.  The Board affirmed the Director’s Decision.  The Board also found that there was no credible evidence that he faced any serious harm and he was unwilling to return to Pakistan not because of a well-founded fear for any Convention grounds.  It further concluded that he failed to establish any ground for which he could claim protection under the Unified Screening Mechanism.

16.  Under section 37 ZO of the Ordinance, he has to satisfy the immigration officer that there has been a significant change of circumstances since the previous claim was finally determined and such change of circumstances, when taken together with the material previously submitted, would give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

17.  He mainly relies upon the facts he was told by his deceased brother’s wife, Nabila that her car was shot at when she was traveling with her children.  She suspected that those people must be Munir’s people.  Munir had also filed false charge against his brother’s son.  He also said that Munir is still looking for him.  Finally, he said the COVID-19 is prevalent in Pakistan.

18.  The Director does not accept that those are significant change of circumstances as his threats arise from his original claim.  Such information, coupled with the original claim, would not give the subsequent claim a realistic prospect of success.

The application for leave to apply for judicial review

19.  The applicant has filed an affirmation in support of his application.  He did not set out any specific grounds in support of his application.  However, he has submitted a written submission, in which he said that his grandfather and his case partner had been killed; that the Opposite Party had dispossessed his land in Pakistan; that the environment is not safe and that there is a fake charge against him.  If he returned to Pakistan, he would be tortured by police as he had experienced before.  He complained that the Director did not believe him even though he had produced documents to the immigration officer.

20.  The role of this Court is supervisory, meaning that it ensures that the Director complied with the public law requirements in coming to his Decision.  The Court will not usurp his fact finding power.  See TK v Michael C Jenkins Esq and Director of Immigration [2013] 1 HKC 526, CA.  §40 and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 §14 (1).

21.  The Court will bear in mind that the Director’s Decision should be examined with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny.  Before me, the applicant said he did not mean that the Director was wrong in his Decision.

22.  It is quite clear that the applicant is re-litigating his original claim in his subsequent claim application. 

23.  The applicant has no valid reason to challenge the Director’s Decision.  The Director had considered the facts.  The information as to Nabila’s car was shot and false charge filed against his brother’s son are hearsay evidence, which cannot be tested.  The false charge can be sorted out by the Pakistani government.  COVID-19 is a worldwide pandemic, not confined to Pakistan.  The Director is entitled to form his views and conclusions after considering his evidence.

24.  The Court does not find any error of law or procedural unfairness in the Director’s Decision.  The Director’s finding of the facts is not in any respect open to challenge as Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational.

25.  Since there is no realistic prospect of success in his subsequent claim, I dismiss his application for leave to apply for judicial review of the Director’s Decision.

The RPO

26.  The Director’s findings show that the applicant is attempting to re-litigate the facts in support of his original claim for a subsequent claim, which will amount to an abuse of the process.  The Court has the inherent jurisdiction to prevent the applicant from abusing its process by making a RPO and the extended order against him.  See paragraphs 7 & 8 of the judgment of the Court of Final Appeal in Ng Yat Chi v Max Share Limited and China Resources (Holdings) Company Limited (2005) 8 HKCFAR 1. 

27.  RPO is appropriate for the present case.  See The Secretary for Justice v Yuen Oi Yee Lisa, alias Lisa Yuen, Lisa Lee and another [2006] 1 HKLRD 679, Re Wahyuni v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 1991, by Hon.  Chow JA (sitting as an additional judge of the Court of First Instance), 6 July 2021, § 9 and Re Uddin Borhan v Director of Immigration [2021] HKCFI 2129, § 25.

28.  In my view, the fact that the applicant is entitled to apply for subsequent claim under section 37ZO of the Ordinance is irrelevant so far as his intention is clearly an abuse of the process.  The application should be viewed together with the procedural history of the case.

29.  For this reason, the Court has called upon the applicant to appear before it to show cause why RPO should not be made against him.  The applicant has been explained the proposed restricted proceedings order before this hearing.

30.  Upon being requested to show cause why the Court should not make the RPO against him, the applicant said that he would accept the Order.

31.  Having considered the applicant’s explanation, I am satisfied that, if not restrained, it is likely that the applicant would proceed with this application and other proceedings for the sole purpose of remaining in Hong Kong only.  I shall therefore make the RPO in terms below:

(1)   The Applicant be prohibited from commencing any fresh proceedings by whatever originating process, or continuing any existing legal proceedings, relating to any non-refoulement claim of the Applicant in the Court of First Instance, without leave of the Court of First Instance;

(2)   All applications for leave under paragraph (1) shall be made to Deputy Judge K. W. Lung or in his absence, the Judge in charge of the Constitutional and Administrative Law List or such other Judge as may be designated by the Chief Judge of the High Court to hear cases in the Constitutional and Administrative Law List;

(3)   At least 7 days before filing any application for leave under paragraph (1), the Applicant do notify in writing each intended defendant or respondent of his intention to make such application, enclosing a copy of the draft document by which the fresh proceedings are intended to be commenced, and if any response is received by the Applicant from any such intended defendant or respondent, that the Applicant do file a copy of each such response together with the said application for leave;

(4)   Any intended defendant or respondent having notice of such intended proceedings be entitled but under no obligation to place before the court written representations regarding the same;

(5)   All applications made pursuant to this order and all ancillary matters be dealt with by the court on paper and without any oral hearing unless this Court or the designated Judge should otherwise direct;

(6)   If the Applicant should issue fresh proceedings falling or which may fall within the terms of paragraph (1) without first seeking the court’s leave, and if such fact should come to the notice of the Registrar of the High Court or any Master or Judge, such fresh proceedings be referred to this Court or the designated Judge for a decision as to whether they should be permitted to continue or should be dismissed;

(7)   Notice of each decision by this Court or the designated Judge made pursuant to this order be given in writing to the Applicant and to each intended defendant or respondent named in the fresh proceedings;

(8)   Whether or not any fresh proceedings are brought to the notice of this Court or the designated Judge, if a defendant or respondent is served with such proceedings without the relevant documents being accompanied by either an order granting leave to commence such proceedings or a direction that leave to commence such proceedings is not required, such defendant or respondent be entitled to make no response to such service pending notification of the court’s decision in relation to those proceedings; and that time for acknowledging service or for otherwise responding to such proceedings be deemed extended accordingly;

(9)   No more than one leave application under paragraph (1) may be made by the Applicant within any period of 3 months;

(10)   This order shall cease to have effect at the end of 5 years from the date of this order; and

(11))   A copy of this Order shall be sent to the Registrar of the High Court.

DISPOSITION

32.  The applicant’s application is dismissed.

33.  RPO in terms of paragraph 31 be made against the applicant.

Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence

Form CALL-1