SIKDAR SABRINA (a minor) by BEGUM AKASHI, her next friend v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 274/2024

[2026] HKCFI 3634

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 274 OF 2024

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 13 April 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 25 March 2026, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 15 November 2023.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 25 March 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 8 April 2026. Thus, the time for appealing against my order has expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons and her next friend’s supporting affirmation dated 13 April 2026, the applicant’s next friend explained the delay in appealing by saying that she received the order on 10 April 2026 and it was out of time to appeal.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 11 June 2026, the applicant’s next friend further explained that she received the letter enclosing this court’s decision in her letter box only on 10 April 2026, even though she checked the letter box every day.

9.  The applicant’s explanation for her delay in appealing is not satisfactory, as the court’s letter enclosing the decision was sent out on or about 25 March 2026 and it should take just about 2 days for normal post to arrive at the destination. If the applicant’s next friend had checked the letter box every day, there was no reason for her to receive the letter after more than 2 weeks.

10.  Moreover, there is no merit of the intended appeal at all. The applicant’s next friend did not give any ground of appeal in the Summons, nor in her supporting affirmation. What her next friend said in the Summons and her affirmation were just that her problem still existed in her home country, if she returned there, she would be killed by her enemies, her problem was very severe and her enemies were still looking for her.

11.  When I asked the applicant’s next friend for the grounds of the intended appeal at the hearing of the Summons, she merely said that in her country, there were news every day about rape and molestation of young girls, including those below 10 years old, and there were 200 rape cases last month, and she just wanted the applicant to grow up in a safe environment.

12.  What the applicant’s next friend said in the Summons and her affirmation, as well as at the hearing, cannot amount to any valid ground for the applicant’s intended appeal against my decision, nor for the intended judicial review.

13.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

14.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.

15.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable explanation for the applicant’s delay in appealing and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal. Thus, I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

16.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.