AHTISHAM v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5425 · HCAL 1082/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1082/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5425
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1082 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Ahtisham |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and the name of the
putative interested party be amended to “Director of Immigration”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 4 July 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 26 June 2023 (“the Board’s Decision”). The
Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL001082_
2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s appeal/petition against the
decision of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 9
August 2021 (“the Director’s Decision”) failed on all the applicable
grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Thus, the
Board confirmed the Director’s Decision, which rejected the
applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection.
Amendments
3. The applicant named the Board and the Director as the putative
respondents and the Board as the putative interested party in Form 86.
4. In fact, the Board should only be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and the name
of the putative interested party to “Director of Immigration”.
The applicant’s case
6. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
7. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Pakistan, he would be harmed or killed by the family
members of a female named Mehwish, who was killed by her own family in
2010 due to her relationship with Shaan, the applicant’s cousin. The
applicant claimed that Shaan had fled his home town and disappeared
after Mehwish was killed, and that Mehwish’s family believed that the
applicant was close to Shaan, was involved in Shaan’s escape and
should have known Shaan’s whereabouts.
8. The applicant claimed that one day in 2018 when the applicant was out,
Mehwish’s family went to his house with a man named Adnan, who was
released from prison, and threatened to kill the applicant and claimed
that they suffered disgrace and insult from society.
Oral hearing
9. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and his case was heard on 17 September 2026.
10. When this court asked the applicant for the grounds of his intended
judicial review, he merely said that he had some problems. When this
court asked him what was wrong with the Board’s Decision, he replied
that it was not wrong, but he was confused and could not figure it
out. He reiterated that he had some problems back in Pakistan, but
confirmed that his problems had been assessed by the Board.
11. The applicant then said that there was fighting going on in Pakistan
and he had a video which he wanted to show to this court. However,
the applicant said that he only got the video a few days before the
hearing, hence the video had not been shown to the Board. This court
then explained to him that he could not use new evidence as a ground
for judicial review, and he had nothing further to say.
Grounds for judicial review
12. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
13. The applicant did not advance any ground for his intended judicial
review in Form 86, nor in his supporting affirmation dated 4 July
2023. He only mentioned in the said affirmation that he sought leave
to apply for judicial review against both the Director’s Decision and
the Board’s Decision.
14. As aforesaid, at the oral hearing before this court, the applicant
confirmed that there was nothing wrong with the Board’s Decision. He
only said that he still had problems in his country and he wanted to
submit a video showing the fighting in Pakistan as new evidence to
support his non-refoulement claim.
Discussion
15. First of all, only the Board’s Decision is reviewable by judicial
process and not the Director’s Decision. There are established
statutory procedures of appeal from the Director to the Board and the
applicant had invoked those procedures. The Director’s Decision was
superseded by the Board’s Decision and is no longer susceptible to
judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549). This court will
therefore deal with the Leave Application in respect of the Board’s
Decision only.
16. The applicant’s danger in his country had been duly assessed but
rejected by the Board. If he intends to challenge the Board’s finding
of facts, it is not permissible in an application for judicial review.
17. With regards to the video which the applicant intended to submit to
this court as new evidence in support of his non-refoulement claim,
the Court of Appeal has held in Trinh Thuy Huyen v Torture Claims
Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1090 that the Board had no duty to make
investigation into any matter without the applicant raising it and it
should not be considered by this court at this stage.
18. Thus, what the applicant said at the oral hearing before this court
cannot amount to any valid grounds to challenge the Board’s Decision.
19. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
20. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
21. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 2 May 2023 and the applicant was present. Thus, the
applicant was given the opportunity to present his case to the Board
in person.
22. The Board laid out its findings of the credibility of the applicant’s
claims and evidence in paragraphs 68 to 85 of the Board’s Decision,
and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
23. In gist, the Board gave the benefit of the doubt to the applicant and
accepted that his cousin Shaan and Mehwish were lovers and intended to
marry despite rejection of the marriage proposal by Mehwish’s family,
that Mehwish was killed by her uncle, that Shaan had fled the hometown
and never returned, and that despite the passage of almost 13 years
since the relationship and since the killing of Mehwish, her family
might still feel a need to punish and harm Shaan, and therefore
Mehwish’s family continued to seek him out, but without success. The
Board further accepted that the applicant might be perceived as being
close to Shaan and Mehwish’s family might have suspected that the
applicant would know where Shaan was hiding.
24. However, based on all the evidence before it, the Board did not accept
that (1) Mehwish’s family would have patiently waited some 9 years or
so before commencing what the applicant referred to as “disturbing”
him or his family; (2) Mehwish’s family, or anyone else, held a
genuine intention to put their threats into action; (3) the applicant
fled to Sarka Village fearing serious or fatal harm; (4) Mehwish’s
family learnt of his whereabouts and were going to Sarka Village with
an intention to cause the applicant serious or fatal harm; and (5) the
applicant was actually located and harmed in Jhelum City by Mehwish’s
family at any time.
25. The Board further found that none of the explanations given by the
applicant for his failure to seek police protection was credible.
While the Board accepted that country of origin information (“COI”)
did indicate the problem of corruption and limited resources and other
defects with the police service in Pakistan, the Board found that the
weight of the COI overall indicated that the police force in Pakistan
was willing and able to provide an adequate, albeit imperfect, law
enforcement regime.
26. Apart from the findings as summarised above, the Board also found the
applicant’s failure to make a non-refoulement claim until after his
arrest some 4 months after arriving in Hong Kong undermined the
credibility of his claim that he held or holds a genuine fear of
facing a real risk of serious or fatal harm if he was returned to
Pakistan.
27. Based on all its findings of facts, the Board concluded that the
applicant did not face a real risk of harm from Mehwish’s family in
general, or from Adnan in particular, or anyone else should he return
to Pakistan.
28. Thus, the Board found that the applicant was unable to make out his
claims for non-refoulement on all the applicable grounds under the
USM.
29. Although the Board did not consider state protection and internal
relocation, it was unnecessary to make further findings on the
availability of state protection as the Board found that the applicant
did not face any real risk of harm, and that the police force in
Pakistan was willing and able to provide an adequate, albeit
imperfect, law enforcement regime.
30. As to internal relocation, it is a well-recognised principle that the
decision-maker only needs to consider internal relocation if the
applicant has established that he qualifies as a refugee pursuant to
Article 1A(2) of the Refugee Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor
[1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated 11.7.1997). In other words, internal
relocation only arises if the applicant has established a real risk of
persecution in his home area (see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).
31. As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of
any of the proscribed forms of harm upon his return to Pakistan, it is
not necessary for the Board to consider internal relocation.
32. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with
the applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to make its
own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the
way the Board reached its conclusion.
33. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
34. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
35. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed.
Dated the 23rd day of September 2026
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or the applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors on: |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |23/09/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given | |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Applicant’s ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted |Nil |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |23/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | | |
|within 14 days after | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|the grant of leave and| |Board/Non-refoulement |
|serve it in accordance| |Claims Petition Office |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |Putative respondent’s |
|and | |ref. no.: |
| | |USM 18536 |
|c) supply to every | | |
|other party copies of | |Director of Immigration |
|every affidavit which | |Putative interested |
|the applicant proposes| |party’s ref. no.: |
|to use at the hearing,| |QA T/C 233/21 (formerly |
|including the | |RBCZ 10217/21) |
|affidavit in support | | |
|of the application for| |Department of Justice, |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Senior Assistant Law |
|6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
| | | |
| | | |
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