BRAVE SKY MORTGAGE LTD v. CHAN YUK PING AGNES

HCMP 928/2024 and HCA 451/2025

(Heard Together)

[2025] HKCFI 2665

HCMP 928/2024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 928 OF 2024

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AND

HCA 451/2025

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO 451 OF 2025

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(Heard Together)

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R E A S O N S

F O R

J U D G M E N T

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1.  The following matters are before the Court:

(1)  A mortgage action (HCMP 928/2024) commenced by Brave Sky Mortgage Limited (“Mortgagee”) by originating summons on 3 June 2024 (“OS”) for, inter alia, monetary judgment and an order for delivery up of vacant possession of the properties known as Flat A, 29/F, Tower, Homantin Hillside, 8 Wai Ying Path Hung Hom, Kowloon, Hong Kong and Carparking spaces No. B1-22, M5 and M6 in the basement thereof (collectively, the “Property”) against Chan Yuk Ping Agnes, (the “Borrower”) upon her default, pursuant to O 88, r 1 (1): (“the HCMP Action”).

(2)  An action commenced by the Borrower (as “Plaintiff[1]”) on 6 March 2025 (HCA 451/2025) based on identical allegations to the Borrower’s defence in the HCMP Action against the original vendor of the Property (D1), the Mortgagee (D2), Yoyo Wai (“Yoyo”) (D3), Stanley Yu Shing-Wai (D4)[2] and Ricacorp Property Ltd (“Ricacorp”) (D5): (the “HCA Action”).

(3)  The Borrower/Plaintiff’s summonses in the HCMP Action and the HCA Action both dated 25 March 2025 for a stay and consolidation (the “Consolidation Summonses”).

(4)  The striking-out summonses dated 26 March 2025 and 3 April 2025 in the HCA Action taken out by (a) D1 and D2, and (b) D3 to D5 respectively.

2.  On 27 May 2025, a week prior to this hearing, the Borrower/Plaintiff filed a Notice to Act in Person.

3.  On 29 May 2025, the Borrower/Plaintiff informed the Court that she had filed for bankruptcy on 26 May 2025, and attached a copy of her Bankruptcy Petition (HCB 4066/2025) fixed for hearing on 15 July 2025. She also informed the Court that she would not be attending this hearing.

Factual background

4.  The Borrower purchased the Property on 2 February 2018 with the assistance of a mortgage made with the Mortgagee (the “Previous Mortgage”). Messrs Katherine Or & Co acted for the Borrower in that transaction.

5.  The Borrower made regular repayments under the Previous Mortgage until February 2021.

6.  The Previous Mortgage was discharged on 22 March 2021 when it was refinanced by the Mortgagee and the Borrower entering into a new facility letter (23 February 2021) and mortgage (22 March 2021) (the “Facility Letter” and “Mortgage”) (collectively, the “Mortgage Loan”).

7.  The Borrower (either by herself or her husband, Joseph Chow[3] (“Mr Chow”), made various repayments of the Mortgage between March 2021 and April 2024 as well as rates, government rent and management fees of the Property (collectively, the “outgoings”). Since her purchase of the Property in 2018, the Borrower has repaid a total sum of over $17 million.

8.  On 8 January 2024, the Borrower and Mr Chow successfully applied for an extension of the repayment period of the Mortgage for an additional 3 months until 2 May 2025. The Borrower signed the extension letter on 29 January 2024.

9.  The Borrower defaulted on 2 May 2024, and following her default, the Mortgagee commenced the HCMP Action on 3 June 2024. The Borrower filed her affirmation in opposition on 19 September 2024 (“Chan 1^st”).

10.  The Plaintiff commenced the HCA Action the day before the call over hearing of the HCMP Action before the Master on 7 March 2025 and approximately a month before the hearing fixed for 10 April 2025 before this Court. The Plaintiff’s allegations in the HCA Action are largely identical to and, in essence, are a ‘mirror image’ of her defence (as Borrower) in the HCMP Action.

11.  By summons dated 31 March 2025, the Borrower applied for leave to file a further affirmation in opposition to the HCMP Action (the “new evidence summons”). The “new evidence” sought to be introduced was a draft affirmation from Mr Chow with exhibits including a medical report by Dr Chong King Yee (“Dr Chong”) dated 21 March 2025 (“the 2^nd report”) to supplement her earlier report dated 2 October 2024 (“the 1^st report”)[4]. At the last hearing on 10 April 2025, I refused leave and dismissed the new evidence summons for the reasons below.

12.  Under the order of Master Ho made on 20 September 2024, inter alia, the Borrower was given leave to file a supplemental affirmation in opposition to supplement her defence on or before 14 October 2024, failing which the Borrower would be debarred from filing any further affirmation in opposition. The rounds of affirmations closed with the Borrower’s 2^nd affirmation filed on 5 November 2024 (“Chan 2^nd”) and the Mortgagee’s reply affirmation filed on 31 December 2024.

13.  The applicable principles in dealing with late applications such as the new evidence summons may be found in the Decision of Coleman J in Chu Hsiao Chu v Ma Jinrui [2020] HKCFI 942:

“18. It is well-established in the ‘post-CJR era’ that the underlying objectives emphasise not only substantive but also procedural fairness. Therefore, late or last-minute applications trigger the Court’s expectation that the applicant will provide a full account of the lateness of the application, and full justification as to why the application should be entertained at all at such a late stage.

19. There is no longer room for the notion that delay, even though inordinate and unexplained, will be forgiven as long as there is no prejudice and costs are paid. Courts should take into account that there may be an irreparable element of unfair prejudice in unnecessarily delaying proceedings. Further, the vacation or adjournment of the hearing occasioned by last-minute applications may mean the loss of the hearing day which could have benefited other litigants, and inefficiencies in the use of Court time, which is a public resource. Hence, late applications can be dismissed on the basis of lateness alone.

20. Further, whilst the ultimate concern of the court is to achieve a just resolution of the case, it does not mean that a party should be permitted to raise any arguable case at any point in the proceedings, simply on payment of costs. If a party has been afforded a reasonable opportunity to advance its case, the just resolution of the case does not require that he should be allowed a further opportunity in spite of his own inordinate and inexcusable delay. Essentially, the applicant making a late application is extremely unlikely to be able to rely upon self-induced prejudice.”

14.  The Borrower had legal representation and acted through counsel. There was no explanation as to why the new matters (including the 2^nd report) could not have been dealt with in Chan 1^st and 2^nd such that the Mortgagee could have responded in its reply affirmation. In fact, the draft affirmation regurgitates the same events already deposed to in Chan 1^st and 2^nd. Mr Chow’s draft affirmation was hearsay in nature. Mr Chow is not qualified to opine on the Borrower’s mental condition. There was no explanation for the delay in seeking leave for a further round of evidence made at this late stage. Hence its dismissal.

This hearing

15.  Mr Adrian But, counsel for the Mortgagee in the HCMP Action and D1 and D2 in the HCA Action submitted that the Court should proceed with the scheduled hearing despite the Borrower’s absence.

16.  Section 14 of the Bankruptcy Ordinance, Cap 6 (“BO”) empowers the Court after the presentation of a bankruptcy petition to stay the action against the property or person of the debtor or allow it to continue on such terms as it may think just.

17.  So far as the HCMP Action is concerned, the Mortgagee is a secured creditor and a bankruptcy order, even if made, would not affect secured creditors and their rights. Section 12 (2) of the BO expressly preserves “the power of any secured creditor to realise or otherwise deal with his security”. In those circumstances, the Court should proceed to hear the HCMP Action.

18.  The Borrower’s affirmations (namely, “Chan 1^st and 2^nd”) set out her defences which in summary are that:

(i)  she suffered from bipolar disorder during the execution of the PSPA and SPA (collectively, the “Agreement”) to purchase the Property[5], the Previous Mortgage, and the Mortgage Loan;

(ii)  the Previous Mortgage is void of the grounds of non est factum:

(iii)  the Mortgage Loan is voidable on the grounds of economic duress;

(iv)  the Agreement is voidable on the grounds of fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentations by the estate agents in respect of which Ricacorp is vicariously liable.

19.  The HCA Action is the mirror image of those defences. On that basis, if the Court were to conclude that there are no triable issues in the HCMP Action, it would follow that the Court should also strike out the HCA Action.

Applicable legal principles

20.  Dynamic Assets Management Limited v Choi Chau Chung [2021] HKCFI 1334 decided that to set aside a contract based on mental incapacity, the counterparty to the contract must either have actual knowledge of the mental incapacity of patient (the person with whom he contracted)[6], unless the mental incapacity of the patient was ‘apparent’[7] or ‘ostensible’[8]: see §§51-69 where the relevant authorities are considered.

21.  In Imperial Loan v Stone, Lord Esher expressed the rule in these terms:

"unless he can prove further that the person with whom he contracted knew him to be so insane as not to be capable of understanding what he was about."

22.  But in Dunhill v Burgin [2014] UKSC 18 at [31], Baroness Hale asked:

“can matters be re-opened long after the event or does the normal rule of English law apply, which is that a contract made by a person who lacks capacity is valid unless the other party to the contract knew or ought to have known that she lacked capacity in which case it is voidable (rule in Imperial Loan)?

23.  It is not entirely clear on what basis Lord Esher’s statement is thought to extend to ‘ought to have known’ situations. As far as it could be construed as an extension, as noted in Chitty at §12-079, there is little direct support in the English authorities for such an extension. As DHCJ Maurellet SC noted in Dynamic Assets (at §60), to import ‘constructive knowledge’ into the mix significantly complicates matters. He further noted (at §68) that if Burgin was not adopting a new test, the ‘ought to have known’ limb could be treated as “a short form for saying a party ought to have known because it was apparent or ostensible”.

24.  It is well-established that one of three restrictions, namely, affirmation of the contract, lapse of time or the acquisition by third party of rights in the subject matter of the contract may bar a claim for rescission. They are discussed in Chitty at §§10-143 to 10-150. For present purposes, the more salient principles are highlighted below:

(i)  Affirmation requires knowledge. A party entitled to rescind or avoid a contract will not be held to have affirmed it unless he knows the facts, and is aware that he has a right to rescind or avoid[9].

(ii)  A party may be held estopped from rescinding or avoiding the contract even where he does not know the facts or his rights in cases where he must have led the other to believe, by unequivocal statements or actions, that he does intend to affirm the contract and the other party must show that he has acted on the statement or conduct to his prejudice[10].

(iii)  Lapse of time after discovery that there has been a misrepresentation may be evidence of affirmation[11].

25.  Where a person enters into a contract under duress, then if after the duress has ceased he takes no steps to set aside the transaction, he may be found to have affirmed it[12].

The HCMP Action

26.  The Mortgagee seeks a monetary judgment in respect of what is due and owing under the Mortgage (including interest) as of the date of the hearing and delivery up of vacant possession of the Property.

27.  That the Borrower has defaulted is common ground. Unless the Borrower has raised triable issues, the Mortgagee would be entitled to the relief that it seeks. I turn to consider whether the Borrower has raised triable issues.

A. Whether the Borrower can set aside the purchase of the Property on 2 February 2018 and so resist enforcement of the Mortgage made on 22 March 2021

28.  The Borrower acquired the Property in 2018 with the assistance of the Previous Mortgage.

29.  The Borrower now contends that the Agreement should be set aside on the basis that the estate agents made fraudulent and/or negligent misrepresentations to her at the time relating to “Rebatement Provisions”.

30.  She also seeks to set aside the Previous Mortgage on non est factum grounds. She claims that Yoyo agreed to help her seek the cancellation of the Agreement in late 2017/early 2018[13] but that she (the Borrower) had to sign some “procedural documents” first. It was on that basis that she came to sign the Previous Facility Letter and the Previous Mortgage, believing them to be “procedural documents”.

31.  Other than her own bare allegations, there is no evidence before the Court to substantiate them. Not only did the Borrower have separate legal representation[14] for the acquisition of the Property, it is also noteworthy that the complaints regarding misrepresentations allegedly made by the estate agents did not surface until Chan 1^st, more than 6 years later.

32.  Moreover, the reliability/credibility of the Borrower’s allegations is dubious.

33.  In Chan 2^nd (at §40), the Borrower exhibited “CYPA 8” comprising, inter alia, a police report card (HH 17040349)[15] relating to an incident[16] on 1 November 2017. The Borrower’s evidence is that shortly after signing the PSPA[17] for the Property, on around 1 November 2017, Yoyo convinced her to purchase a 3^rd property located directly above the Property. When Mr Chow discovered that, he allegedly reported Yoyo to the police for defrauding a person suffering from a mental condition and thwarted that transaction.

34.  However, on 6 May 2025, when the estate agents and a member of Ricacorp’s Legal Department attended the police station at Hung Hom Division and requested the officer to provide any information relating to them under HH 17040349, the officer told them that there is no information recorded. The police have never requested Yoyo to make any statement in relation to that case reference or to provide any information.

35.  In the circumstances, the Borrower’s prospects of setting aside the Agreement, the Previous Facility Letter and the Previous Mortgage are virtually nil.

36.  Further, the Borrower claims that her bipolar disorder affected her mental capacity not only when she signed the Agreement, the Previous Facility Letter and the Previous Mortgage, but also the Facility Letter and the Mortgage. She also seeks to invalidate the Facility Letter and the Mortgage on the basis that she signed them under economic duress[18].

37.  The evidence shows that since its purchase in 2018, the Borrower has been exercising her rights and obligations as owner of the Property by

•  making regular repayments under the Previous Mortgage and meeting all its outgoings

•  offering the Property for letting via Ricacorp at $140,000 per month on or about 16 December 2017 (after the signing of the Agreement and before its completion)

•  instructing Yoyo to place the Property for sale on 14 December 2020 with the minimum asking price of $46 million

•  renting out the Property to a celebrity on 17 December 2020

•  making regular payments under the Mortgage from March 2021

•  inviting Ricacorp to take a virtual reality video of the Property in November 2021 to facilitate its sale

•  permitting prospective buyers to view the Property in 2021 and 2022

•  constantly discussing with Yoyo the Borrower’s strategy to entice and attract buyers to purchase the Property from 2022 to 11 March 2025

•  requesting an extension of the tenor of the Mortgage on 8 January 2024 and was granted an extension of a period of 3 months to 2 May 2024.

38.  Viewed against that backdrop, it is clear that the Borrower’s conduct is only explicable as rational acts of ownership exercised over the Property rather than random acts of a person under disability. Nor are those acts consistent with any intention on her part to rescind any of the documents she now seeks to impugn. The notion that she did not know she had become the owner of the Property simply defies belief.

39.  As earlier noted, the Mortgage formed part of the refinancing arrangement made at the Borrower’s request in March 2021 with the Loan applied to discharge the Previous Mortgage. After the execution of the Mortgage, the Borrower (or Mr Chow) made regular payments under it from March 2021. Then on 8 January 2024, the Borrower and Mr Chow requested an extension of the tenor of the Mortgage The Mortgagee granted the Borrower an extension for a period of 3 months to 2 May 2024.

40.  When the parties entered into the Mortgage,

(i)  The Borrower was (and remains) the registered owner of the Property. There is no evidence to show that the Mortgagee was aware of any alleged misrepresentation/undue influence made or exercised by the agents when the Borrower purchased the Property.

(ii)  In any event, the Mortgagee had no inkling that the Borrower considered the Agreement voidable and intended to set it aside.

(iii)  In clause 3.01 (a) of the Mortgage, the Borrower covenanted herself as “Beneficial Owner” of the Property under the Mortgage and agreed to charge such interest in the Mortgagee’s favour. She further covenanted (in clause 7.01(a)) that she “had good right and title to charge the Property aforesaid free from all incumbrances.” The Borrower cannot now disavow what she had contractually covenanted with the Mortgagee.

41.  The Mortgagee submitted that as it had no notice of the circumstances the Borrower now claims entitle her to set aside the sale in 2018, the Mortgagee was a bona fide mortgagee for value. As such, the Mortgagee submitted that it would take free of any equity the Borrower may have to rescind the sale. I can see the force of that submission.

42.  In short, in my view, the defence of the Borrower that she can resist enforcement of the Mortgage by impugning the earlier transactions is ‘practically moonshine’.

B.  Economic duress

43.  The Previous Mortgage was for a term of 3 years, maturing on 2 February 2021.

44.  It is the Borrower’s case that the Mortgagee’s representatives contacted her in early 2021 about the need for the Facility Letter and Mortgage.

45.  Contemporaneous emails show that on 28 December 2024, the Borrower made an application for a “Mortgage Extension” and requested a meeting to discuss the terms. At the same time, she threatened to make a complaint to the authorities about the Mortgagee’s non-compliance with the Residential Properties (First-hand Sales) Ordinance, Cap 621.

46.  By her email of 27 January 2021, the Borrower accepted the Mortgagee’s terms for refinancing the Previous Mortgage (set out in the Mortgagee’s letter dated 12 January 2021) and thanked the Mortgagee for approving her ‘application for mortgage loan extension’[19].

47.  It is impossible to discern from the events disclosed by those email exchanges that the Borrower was ‘pressured’ into refinancing the Previous Mortgage. Rather, she expressed her thanks not once but twice for the refinancing. The allegation of economic duress remains an unsubstantiated allegation and raises no triable issue.

C.  The Borrower’s mental capacity

48.  Apart from her own evidence in Chan 1^st and 2^nd (which is entirely at odds with her conduct highlighted in §37 above), the Borrower exhibited the 1^st report based on Dr Chong’s review of the Borrower’s medical record in Dr Chong’s clinics, with collateral information from Mr Chow and the Borrower’s children.

49.  Dr Chong saw the Borrower for the first time on 3 January 2018. The Borrower’s family brought her to see Dr Chong because of alleged ‘manic symptoms’ since July 2017.

50.  The report stated that the Borrower’s “symptoms further worsened in October. She was found to have paranoid delusion since October 2017”. As Dr Chong did not meet the Borrower until 3 January 2018, those statements do not evidence any medical diagnosis carried out by a doctor.

51.  In any event, after examining the Intervener, Dr Chong’s diagnosis was bipolar affective disorder that required medication, continuous management and observation. Thereafter, the Borrower regularly attended follow-up sessions between 2018 and 2022, duly complied with psychiatric treatment “so that her mental illness is maintained under control”. Dr Chong then opined that the Borrower’s bipolar disorder

“became more stable in late 2022 to present time. She was last seen on 30 September 2024”.

52.  If the Borrower’s bipolar disorder symptoms were so serious and apparent to anyone dealing with her, it could not have escaped the notice of the solicitors who acted for her in the acquisition of the Property. Obviously, that was not the case as the transaction proceeded.

53.  Nor can one discern from the communication records exchanged between the Borrower and Yoyo from July 2016 to March 2025[20] that the Borrower was suffering from any mental incapacity.

54.  In relation to the Borrower’s requests for time extensions and indulgence for repayment culminating in the Mortgage Loan, the Borrower’s various emails[21] were clear and rational and displayed no signs of compromised cognitive abilities. The email she and Mr Chow sent to the Mortgagee on 8 January 2024 seeking further time to sell the Property was equally coherent and articulate. Someone who is mentally incapacitated could not have authored those communications.

55.  Even assuming that the Borrower was suffering from some mental illness, it was “maintained under control” through medication, monitoring and treatment[22]. Under the principle stated in Imperial Loan v Stone, for the Borrower to set aside the Previous Mortgage or the Mortgage, she has to show that her medical conditions were apparent and obvious to the Mortgagee at the relevant time. There is no evidence that the Mortgagee was aware of the Borrower’s alleged mental incapacity. In the absence of such evidence, there is simply no prospect of the Borrower setting aside the Mortgage.

D.  Affirmation of ownership and bars to rescission

56.  Given the matters highlighted in §37 above, the Borrower has unequivocally affirmed her ownership of the Property and the validity of the Previous Mortgage and the Mortgage. It is now far too late for her to attempt to rewind the clock by seeking rescission that would affect the interests of the Mortgagee who, in that context, is a third party.

Disposition

The HCMP Action

57.  As the Borrower has failed to raise any triable issues, there must be judgment for the Mortgagee.

58.  At the conclusion of the hearing, I made an order in terms of the OS and directed that the Mortgagee submit a draft order for approval.

The HCA Action

D1 and D2’s striking out summons

59.  As the HCA Action is the mirror image of the Borrower’s defence to the HCMP Action, it follows that the Plaintiff has no reasonable cause of action against D1 and D2. The Plaintiff’s claims are scandalous, frivolous and/or vexatious and an abuse of process. I ordered that they be struck out.

The D3 to D5’s striking out summons

60.  Ms Shannon Leung, counsel for D3 to D5 invited attention to the fact that while the Plaintiff has joined D3 to D5 as defendants, she did not seek any relief against them.

61.  Since I have reached the conclusion that the Plaintiff has not raised any triable issues in her attempt to set aside the purchase of the Property in 2018, Previous Facility Letter, the Previous Mortgage and the Mortgage Loan, D3 to D5 must succeed in their striking out summons.

62.  At the conclusion of the hearing, I directed that the Defendants (D1 to D5) submit a draft order for approval.

Costs

63.  The successful parties i.e. the Mortgagee in the HCMP Action and the Defendants in the HCA Action sought an adjournment for further submissions on the outstanding question of costs in view of the Borrower/Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition and the Court’s concern regarding making costs orders while the bankruptcy petition is pending. The costs hearing took place on 27 June 2025.

64.  Ms Leung referred the Court to First Asia Finance Limited v Tsoi Tin Kwan Fanny CACV 149/2015, unrep., 18 September 2017. In that case, after the appellant lodged appeals against the respondent, the appellant was adjudged bankrupt and as the Official Receiver did not adopt the appeals, Lam VP dismissed the appeals for want of prosecution. At issue was whether the respondent should be entitled to costs for dismissal of the appeal including costs incurred before the appellant was adjudged bankrupt.

65.  Lam VP referred to Lo Shing King v Sy Chin Mong Stephen [2015] 2 HKC 30 where Tang PJ held that if a party’s liability for costs was the result of any liability to which he became subject by reason of any obligation incurred before the date of the bankruptcy, the amount of such costs could be proved in bankruptcy. This is because by engaging in litigation, a litigant incurred an obligation to pay costs should the court make an adverse costs order against him: see Lo Shing King at §§6-10 applying In Re Norbel GmbH [2014] AC 209.

66.  In First Asia Finance, when the Court of Appeal dealt with the issue of costs, the appellant had already been adjudged bankrupt. If a costs order were made, the respondents would need to obtain leave under section 12 (1) of the BO for taxation. If leave were granted, the taxed costs would become a provable debt in the bankruptcy. If the Court of Appeal were to decline to make an order for costs, the respondents would have no right to recover their costs at all even assuming that there are assets for distribution to the bankrupt’s creditors.

67.  The Court of Appeal decided, as a matter of principle, that there was no justification for not giving costs to the respondents.

68.  In the present case, the Borrower/Plaintiff’s liability for costs relates to obligations incurred before the date of any bankruptcy order that may be made on her petition. Costs awarded to a party in respect of litigation that predates a bankruptcy petition are debts provable in bankruptcy: section 34 (3) of the BO[23]. Therefore, there is no reason for not awarding costs to the successful parties in respect of the HCMP Action and the HCA Action pending the outcome of the Borrower/Plaintiff’s bankruptcy petition.

69.  The successful parties seek summary assessments of their costs. As the bankruptcy petition is still pending, I see no reason why the costs should not be summarily assessed. That was not an option in First Asia Finance as the appellant had already been adjudged bankrupt by the time the Court of Appeal had to deal with the issue of costs.

70.  The Mortgagee in the HCMP Action and D1/D2 in the HCA Action have submitted their respective Revised Statement of Costs for Summary Assessment and D3 to D5 in the HCA Action have submitted their Statement of Costs for Summary Assessment.

71.  I consider this an appropriate case for costs to be summarily assessed. The Mortgagee in HCMP Action and D1/D2 in the HCA Action are entitled to indemnity costs that are reasonably incurred pursuant to clause 21.01(b) of the Mortgage.

72.  The Plaintiff’s conduct in HCA 451/2025, joining D3 to D5 as parties but seeking no relief against them is an abuse of process. For this reason, I consider it appropriate to also award costs to D3 to D5 on an indemnity basis.

73.  I make the following orders:

HCMP 928/2024

(1)  The Defendant do pay the Plaintiff the costs of and occasioned by the new evidence summons summarily assessed at $60,000 (inclusive of Counsel’s fees are allowed at $20,000) within 14 days of this Order.

(2)  The Defendant do pay the Plaintiff the costs of this action summarily assessed at $419,000 (inclusive of Counsel’s fees allowed at $190,000) within 14 days of this Order.

HCA 451/2025

(1)  The Plaintiff do pay the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants the costs of this action, including the costs of and occasioned by the Plaintiff’s Consolidation Summons and the 1^st and 2^nd Defendants’ Strike Out Summons, summarily assessed at $140,000 (inclusive of Counsel’s fees allowed at $60,000) within 14 days of this Order.

(2)  The Plaintiff do pay the 3^rd, 4^th and 5^th Defendants the costs of this action, including the costs of and occasioned by the Plaintiff’s Consolidation Summons and the 3^rd, 4^th and 5^th Defendants’ Strike Out Summons summarily assessed at $416,000 within 14 days of this Order.