施鈺蝶 對 呂銀愛

DCCJ3969/2010

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟編號2010年第3969號

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判決書

1.  本案原告施鈺碟女士上訴李慶年暫委司法常務官在10月26日據法庭規則第18命令第19段剔除其申索書及申索傳訊令狀，因原告人的狀書：一，並無披露合理訴訟因由；二，屬瑣屑無聊或無理纏擾；三，濫用法院程序。

2.  剔除原告人的狀書及撤銷她的訴訟是李慶年暫委司法常務官根據法院規則而作出。原告人曾經傳入一份誓章，支持她的上訴及提供上訴因由。她指出，她只是對李慶年暫委司法常務官的裁決理由深感失望，感到剔除她的申索不公平，覺得傷心，又覺得因為自己的身分低賤，被法庭拒於門外，沒有公正。她之所以向被告人在高等法院第一次訴訟，是因為她認為丈夫之死是因為被告人的安老院疏於照顧引致。

3.  在2009年她在最高法院原訟庭提出申索，是因為她堅持向安老院追討，而招致被告人作為該安老院的負責人辱罵，口頭誹謗、指摘、咀咒、侮辱。她並指，這些指摘、侮辱、口頭誹謗，不但出於被告人之口，更出於被告人及其親友之口，令她感到侮辱，傷害她的自尊心。

4.  根據原告人的申索陳述書，她陳列了八件事件，被被告人及其親友指摘、辱罵。這八件事件大多數是發生於法庭門外、法庭預審時以及離開法院到金鐘地鐵站途中或在站內。還有一次是在被告人紅磡安老院門外，當時她正依照法庭指示相約被告人審查安老院的文件。

5.  這八件事件發生在：

1.  2009年8月18日早上11時，在最高法院第四十三庭庭外；

2.  2009年10月13日早上11時，高等法院四十三庭外；

3.  2009年11月26日早上11時，在高等法院四十三庭外步行至金鐘地鐵站途中，並在金鐘地鐵站內，兩位警察在場下，被被告人不停辱罵及冷嘲熱諷；

4.  2010年3月31日早上10時50分，在最高法院2樓，雙方在查看存檔文件的時候，遭被告人辱罵；

5.  2010年4月18日，在被告人紅磡差館里安老院門外以及在紅磡觀音廟，被告人曾經向她辱罵；

6.  2010年7月15日早上10時30分，在高等法院原訟庭第36庭庭內以及最高法院通道至金鐘地鐵站途上，原告指被告冷嘲熱諷，向她作出指控，說她「嫁五個老公就死五個」；

7.  2010年9月6日，在區域法院46庭庭內翁聆案官席前，被告指原告害她丈夫中風；

8.  2010年10月27日2:30 p.m.，在區域法院46庭休庭時間，翁聆案官指示他們雙方查閱文件冊時，被告的親友向原告辱罵，侮辱她及她去世的丈夫，原告曾經打九九九傳召警察幫忙，警察到後，沒有控告任何人。

6.  被告人對原告以上八項的指控全部否認，並且，存入抗辯書，把原告的八項指控一一否認。今天的上訴中，原告的傳票申請本席推翻司法常務官的命令，准許她繼續訴訟以及要求常務官批准她修改狀書。可是在她的支持誓章中，她只是列舉一些她在申索陳述書中八項事件的細節，包括2010年3月31日當天所發生的事件經過，即被告人在司法常務官席前，指是原告人令致被告人的丈夫中風的指責。

7.  原告人更在她的誓章中，重複她在申索陳述書中八項事件中其中幾項，例如在金鐘地鐵站內所發生的事，但在誓章中，她沒有把她指控被告人曾經向她口頭誹謗所用的字句，唯一的節錄是被告人曾經使用她認為是口頭誹謗的字句，即申索陳述書中列出的「妳嫁五個老公就死五個」這句說話。這是2010年7月15日在高等法院原訟庭第36庭庭內原告指被告向她指責的說話。原告人更指被告人侮辱她及歧視她，說她是個綜援人士，沒有資格告她。她認為這種指控，表示被告人歧視她。

8.  根據本港法律，全部誹謗或口頭誹謗的申索書，必須把誹謗的內容一字不漏，清楚陳述在申索書中，所用的誹謗字眼需要清楚明確，才能成立。在原告人的申索陳述書中，唯一清楚陳述的誹謗字眼是「妳嫁五個老公就死五個」，但其他七項事件，原告人並沒有清楚註明被告人向她作出口頭誹謗的字句，原告只是指出，被告及她的親友口頭侮辱她、辱罵她，以及在2010年7月15日，被告告訴法官，因原告的訴訟令她的丈夫中風了。

9.  至於歧視的指控，原告的申索訴訟並非基於本港的歧視條例。直至目前，本港的歧視條例並沒有包括歧視他人貧窮或失業或待人接物等，香港的歧視條例只限於性別歧視、家庭岡位歧視、殘疾歧視及種族歧視；因此，原告指控被告歧視她為綜援人仕，不能構成訴訟因由。

10.  根據法律典籍Gatley on Libel and Slander第11版第28.1至28.3以及28.13 段也清楚註明，誹謗及口頭誹謗的申索書必須具備的要點：

“28.1 Generally. Statements of cases in an action for defamation are extremely important. Due in part to the ambiguity of words and their capacity for influence and implication, pleadings, particularly in relation to the issues of meaning and reference to the claimant, can on occasion become tortuous and complex. The increasing tendency has been to require the parties to set out their respective cases with as much clarity and openness as possible. ……”

“28.2 Material facts. The particulars of claim must contain a concise statement of the material facts on which the claimant relies, but not the evidence of which they are to be proved. A claimant should state all the facts necessary for the purpose of formulating a complete cause of action. These facts are the publication by the defendant, the words published, that they were published of the claimant, （when necessary） the facts relied on as causing them to be understood as defamatory or as referring to the claimant and knowledge of these facts by those to whom the words were published, and, where the words are slander not actionable per se, any additional facts making them actionable, such as that they were calculated to disparage the claimant in an office held by him or that they had caused special damage.”

“28.3 Particulars. The degree of particularity required will of course depend upon the facts of each case. However, as a general rule, as much certainty and particularity must be insisted on as is reasonable having regard to the circumstances and to the nature of the acts alleged. ……”

“28.13 Setting out words complained of：slander. In the case of claims for slander, there is now an express procedural requirement that the precise words used be set out in the particulars of claim, so far as possible and if not already contained in the claim form. This reflects the pre-existing law to the effect that the actual words spoken had to be set out verbatim ‘in order that the defendant may know the certainty of the charge, and may be able to shape his defence’. It is not sufficient to allege that the slanderer used such-and-such words, or words to an alleged effect. ……”

11.  作者意思是，口頭誹謗的申索書必須清楚明確地展示該口頭誹謗所用的字眼，令到被告人能得知悉，究竟原告人所指的口頭誹謗是哪些句語，尤其是在一些口頭誹謗需要證實有真確特別損失的案件，原告人必須把其損失及因口頭誹謗她蒙受的影響一一道出。

12.  這些原則在香港的案例已常有根據，例如怡居地產有限公司訴蘇麗華一案（HCA 1024/2008年），是經暫委高等法院法官歐陽桂如審訊的案件。暫委法官余若海在紀小川訴梁詠琪（HCA 2210/2005）指出，在誹謗訴訟中，這些所有具關鍵性的事實必須齊備，才能構成訴因，狀書應逐字寫出所謂誹謗的句語，使被告人確知指控，從而預備答辯。

13.  法律典籍Gatley on Libel and Slander第4章140至141頁第4.1及4.2段清楚列出以下： “Generally speaking, slander is not so actionable and a person defamed can only succeed on proof of ‘special damage’ arising as the direct and natural and reasonable result of the publication of the words.  This is so no matter how malicious the publication, how disgraceful the imputation and however likely it is to cause damage to the claimant.  However, in four classes of case slander is actionable per se and the claimant’s cause of action is complete upon proof of publication of the defamatory words.”

“4.2 The four categories of slander actionable per se. （1）Where the words impute a crime for which the claimant can be made to suffer physically or by way of punishment. （2）Where the words impute to the claimant are contagious or infectious disease. （3）Where the words are calculated to disparage the claimant in any office, profession, calling, trade or business held or carried on by him at the time of publication. （4）By the Slander of Woman Act 1891, where the words impute adultery or unchastity to a woman or girl. In all the above cases, the words are actionable per se. The claimant need not prove that he has suffered any resulting damage, for such damage is presumed. ‘Every libel is of itself a wrong in regard to which the law implies general damage... Akin to actions of libel are those actions which are brought for oral slander, where such slander consists of words actionable in themselves, and the mere use of which constitutes the infringement of the plaintiff’s right. The very speaking of such words, apart from all damage, constitutes a wrong and gives rise to a cause of action. The law in such a case presumes, and in theory allows proof of, general damage.”

14.  意思是，口頭誹謗不用詳細敘述特別損失的例外案子，只有以下四種：一，用於口頭誹謗的字句，指控對方違反法例，可被警方控訴；二，所用的字句指申索人或原告人染上可傳染的疾病；三，所用的字句可令當事人或申索人在工作上、他的專業上、他的生意上有所損失；四，根據英國1891年口頭誹謗婦女條例，所用的字句指該婦女不忠或犯了通姦罪。

15.  據原告人在本案的申索陳述書，她提出被告人向她作出的口頭誹謗，並不屬於以上四種例外的口頭誹謗案件。根據Gatley on Slander and Libel第5章5.1至5.3段第155至157頁指出， “Special damage necessary to maintain action.  Where spoken words or other matter amounting to slander do not fail under one of the four heads set out in the preceding chapter, the claimant can only maintain an action if he has suffered ‘special damage’ which is the natural and probable result of the publications. This is so however disgraceful the imputation may be, however certain it is that it will injure the reputation of the claimant and however malicious be the motive of the defendant.”

“5.2 What constitutes special damage. Special damage for this purpose is some ‘actual temporal loss’ - the loss of some ‘material’ or ‘temporal advantage’, which is ‘pecuniary’ or ‘capable of being estimated in money’. Or , to put it another way, in case of slander not actionable per se, the law does not presume that damage will be suffered from the publication and the distress felt by the claimant at the injury to his reputation is not sufficient to found his cause of action. So, e.g. the requirement of special damage is satisfied where there is the loss or refusal of an office or employment, or the dismissal from a situation, or the loss of a client, or of a dealing. If a person is prevented by slanderous words from receiving some gift or income which he would otherwise have received, there is special damage sufficient to support the action. The loss of gratuitous entertainment or the hospitality or friends is special damage, but the mere loss of the ‘society’ or social ostracism or disgrace is not enough even though its effect on the claimant may be very painful.”

“5.3 Accrual of special damage. A special damage must have accrued before action brought. Not only is a mere apprehension of temporal loss insufficient, so also is the possibility, or even likelihood, of temporal loss accruing in the future. ‘I know’, said De Grey C.J. in Onslow v Horne： ‘of no case where ever an action for words was grounded upon eventual damages which may possibly happen to a man in the future.’”

16.  以上典籍指出，原告人必須證明因口頭誹謗引致特別損失要求賠償，例如她因為被告的口頭誹謗而失去職業，或失去客戶，或失去生意。失去朋友並不能構成特別損失，但失去朋友提供的一份應得的禮物或失去特別招呼或娛樂，則可被視為特別損失。但將來可能失去的好處並不能成為訴訟因由。

17.  據原告的陳述書，她並沒有陳述任何特別損失的細節，又沒有陳述因為被告人的咒罵、冷嘲熱諷，包括「嫁五個老公死五個」而蒙受損失。或指出被告人的丈夫中風是原告人引致的損失。原告人只指出，被告人曾經向她辱罵、嘲諷、咀咒、侮辱她，但沒有陳述因這些口頭誹謗或侮罵，令她有甚麼特別的損失。因此，根據法庭的規則，就算原告人可證明這些口頭誹謗成立，原告人也未能合乎法庭規則，令其訴訟可繼續。

18.  在李慶年暫委司法常務官席前，原告人經已表示，她的申索陳述書並沒有任何需要修改，她沒有任何細節可加入。在原告人支持上訴的誓章中，她並沒有透露任何新的細節，或提及她有任何特別損失，申請特別賠償，她亦沒有把一份修改申索書藍本附件，提供給法庭。更沒有在支持誓章，或在今天的聆訊中提供損失細節，要求特別賠償。

19.  據以上理由，本席認為，原告人的申索陳述書並不能滿足民事訴訟規則的要求，她的狀書並無披露合理訴訟因由，屬瑣屑無聊及無理纏擾，濫用法庭程序。

20.  本席認為，李慶年暫委司法常務官在10月26日剔除她的申索陳述書及撤銷她的狀書，是一個適當的決定。因此，本席維持暫委司法常務官的裁決。

21.  基於雙方也是自辯人士，本席不準備作出任何訟費的命令。

22.  既然原告施女士並沒有到庭接受本席的口述裁決，她只把信件傳真到法庭說她需接兒子放學，趕不及下午出庭，加上頭暈不適，頭痛聲沙，要求缺席。上述裁決是在她缺席下頒下的。