CHEUK KIT KEI 對 MOHAMMAD, IJAZ

DCCJ 5919/2018

[2023] HKDC 1371

香港特別行政區

區域法院

民事訴訟2018年第5919號

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判案書

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1.  在本案中原告人卓傑基興訟要求取回他出租予被告人Mohammad, Ijaz的物業的空置管有權（vacant possession），及自2018年7月起直至收回相關物業時的租值補償金（mesne profits）。被告人則反指稱原告人不是涉案物業的業主或合法佔用人，根本無權將涉案物業出租，涉案的租賃合約實屬違法，所以原告人沒有權要求被告人歸還空置管有權或向被告人收取租值補償金。同時，被告人亦提出反申索要求原告人返還以往所有曾向原告人繳付的租金，合共港幣622,300元。簡單而言，本案屬於一宗租賃糾紛。

2.  於2022年1月13日，區域法院聆案官麥國昌頒令審訊將於2023年7月18至20日進行，預計審訊需時三天。但於2023年7月14日，本庭收到被告人律師的書面通知，表示被告人不能如期出席審訊，原因是被告人身在外地而未能安排返回香港出席審訊。代表被告人的劉翠玲大律師在她的開案陳詞時表示，縱使被告人不能出席審訊，被告人依然希望繼續依賴被告人的證人陳述書的內容去審理此案。本席當時已經清晰地向劉大律師指出，若然被告人不出席參與庭審，沒有在宣誓下確認被告人的證人陳述書的內容及接受原告人的盤問，本席是不會考慮其證人陳述書的內容。劉大律師向本席表示她已經將該法律後果清楚地告知被告人。劉大律師亦沒有申請將審訊押後。

3.  無論被告人有否就他所知的事實出庭作供，就本席需要處理雙方爭議的議題上，本席認為沒有太大的事實爭議。本案所涉及的主要為法律爭議。

事實背景

4.  本案所涉及的兩個租賃物業位於新界元朗丈量約份第124約的土地上（「該土地」）。該土地屬於政府土地。香港政府於1970年7月1日批出《租用官地牌照》給原告人的姨婆朱義作居住及農業用途（「該牌照」）。該牌照上注明的牌照期限為六個月直至1970年12月31日為止。雖然在本案中沒有直接的證據顯示朱義有否獲得政府延續該牌照，但是沒有太大爭議的是朱義一直佔用該土地直至她離世。於1988年8月2日，朱義曾去信元朗地政處，說明因為健康問題希望將該牌照轉到她姨甥卓廉金（即原告人的父親）的名下。朱義亦於1990年離世。

5.  在一封卓廉金給元朗地政處日期為1997年3月25日的書信中，他敘述了當時該牌照的情況如下：—

“以前已向政府辦理改轉我名字（一切屋地牌照改為我名）＿的手續。地政署叫我去宣誓。在1989年二月十三日星期六我已在政務處宣誓了。已取得宣誓的宣誓紙。翌日是星期日政府無辦公。但在1989年二月十五日星期一，不知何故，我找尋不到我的宣誓紙，所以無法到地政處。但我曾要求再宣誓，他們不讓我再宣誓(長官說我已宣誓過一次不能再宣誓)。因宣誓紙不見拖延至今萬分抱歉。今日我找尋回我的宣誓紙，現特呈上給地政處長官，希望地政處長官你們將我姨母朱義的D.D.124官地上之木屋建築等物業牌照改轉為我的名字。同時我(早已住在)的朱義園口的木屋等殘舊不堪，很難，需要重修。亦希望長官你們在改牌照我名後，同意准去重修（修整木屋雞豬屋等）。萬分感激你們早日辦理我轉名手續，轉牌照名及重修。萬分多謝你們幫忙辦理。感激至之，再者。”

6.  雖然在本案證據中沒有顯示政府如何回覆卓廉金的查詢，卓廉金卻一直佔用該土地直至他於2012年去世。在原告人的父親卓廉金過身後，原告人一直繼續佔用該土地。本席接納原告人的說法，指他一直有繼續繳交佔用該土地的相關費用。在原告人佔用該土地及其後他出租涉案物業予被告人的相關時間，沒有爭議的是政府從來沒有發出任何通告要求收回該土地。

該151A物業租約

7.  於2013年6月1日，原告人將興建在該土地上的一個物業 (即新界元朗洪水橋新生村北段151A物業（「該151A物業」）出租予被告人。雙方亦同時簽署書面租約（「該151A物業租約」），列明租賃期為5年至2018年5月1日為止，租金為每月港幣6,500元及被告人須繳付一個月租金之按金。該151A物業租約的第二條亦列明租用期兩年後將加租10%。

8.  從2013年6月至2015年9月，被告人有按時繳交每月港幣6,500元的租金給原告人。由2015年10月起被告人開始繳交每月港幣7,150元的租金。即使該151A物業租約內註明的租賃期於2018年5月1日便告完結，但被告人亦一直有交付租金直到2018年7月31日。最後一次交付租金的日期為2018年7月26日。在2018年7月26日之後，被告人就沒有就該151A物業繳交過任何租金，但卻一直佔用該151A物業至今。

該851A物業租約

9.  於2015年4月10日，原告人再將興建在該土地上的另一個物業 (即新界元朗洪水橋新生村北段851A物業（「該851A物業」）出租予被告人。雙方亦有簽訂書面租約（「該851A物業租約」），列明租賃期為2年至2017年4月10日為止，租金為每月港幣4,000元及被告人須繳付兩個月租金之按金。從2015年4月至2017年9月，被告人有按時繳交港幣每月4,000元的租金給原告人。於2017年7月13日雙方同意由2017年8月起租金增加至每月港幣4,600元。在該851A物業租約列明的租賃期過後，被告人一直有繳付相關租金至2018年8月9日。最後一次交付租金的日期為2018年7月9日。在2018年7月9日之後，被告人就沒有就該851A物業繳交過任何租金，但一直佔用該851A物業至今。

10.  在被告人的抗辯及反申索書（Defence and Counterclaim）的第13段，被告人對於他為何拒絕交付租金有以下的表述：—

“… In or about July 2018, the Defendant was informed that the 151A Premises, including 851A Premises, is a government land and the Plaintiff has been wrongfully collecting rent from the Defendant since then. Feeling suspicious, the Defendant has stopped paying any rent to the Plaintiff afterwards.”

11.  鑒於被告人沒有參與庭審，在本案中並沒有任何證據支持被告人在抗辯及反申索書的說法。本席只能確定被告人於2018年7月之後便拒絕交付租金給原告人。

12.  不過，原告人在庭審時亦表示，自他父親去世後他並沒有將該牌照轉到他的名下。雖然原告人並不是該牌照下的合法佔用人，但他仍然有向政府繳納相關的費用。政府亦從來沒有向他或被告人發出通知要求收回該土地。

本案爭議的範圍

13.  原告人在本案訴訟展開時是由勞潔儀律師行代表，但在庭審時則沒有律師代表。原告人解釋這是因為他沒有能力支付律師費。在勞潔儀律師行代表他撰寫的申索書（Statement of Claim）中所要求的濟助只涉及該151A物業的空置管有權及租值補償金。原告人在庭審時的案情卻要求法庭就該151A物業及該851A物業兩個物業頒令歸還空置管有權及租值補償金。

14.  本席留意到在原告人2021年7月23日的證人陳述書內有提及為何申索書上只要求對151A物業的濟助。他的解釋如下：—

「因151A屋及851A屋座落於一幅土地上，本人一直以來都將之視作為一個物業。因此，在要求前代表律師行草擬本按入稟文件時，只提供851A屋的租約給律師行。本人確認，被告人佔用本人兩座臨時建築物包括151A屋及851A屋。」

15.  本席留意到：—

(1) 在被告人的抗辯及反申索書中的反申索涉及該151A物業及該851A物業。雙方在提交證據的時候亦有就兩個物業的證據及背景作出披露及呈交法庭。

(2) 本案的爭議只涉及法律爭議，相關的法律原則同樣適用於該151A物業及該851A物業。

(3) 如本席最終判定原告人就該151A物業勝訴及被告人就該151A物業和該851A物業的反申索敗訴，原告人需要往後另外就該851A物業另再提出同樣的申索便能取得相關勝訴判決。因此，這樣不是最有經濟效益或最有效率處理雙方所有爭議的方法。同樣地，如本席判定原告人敗訴而被告人勝訴的話，在沒有處理原告人就該851A物業的申索，亦未必能避免原告人就該851A物業再次興訟。

16.  基於以上的原因，本席在庭審期間詢問劉大律師會否同意本席在本案中就原告人在該151A物業及該851A物業的申索一併作出最終裁決，劉大律師很合理地表示同意。

租約不容反悔原則（Tenancy by estoppel）

17.  原告人在庭審時承認，雖然他有向政府繳納該土地相關的費用，他卻沒有將該牌照轉到他的名下。原告人的案情亦沒有指出他是政府默許的合法佔用人。原告人甚至現在意識到他可能沒有權將該土地及涉案的物業轉租給被告人，但這並不等於原告人與被告人簽訂的租約屬於無效租約。法律上，根據租約不容反悔原則的法律原則（tenancy by estoppel），即使業主不享有某土地/物業的業權，若業主將土地/物業出租予租客，並讓租客取得該土地/物業的管有權，而租客該管有權沒有被任何第三方挑戰的情況下，租客將不可以第三方持有土地/物業更好的業權為理由去挑戰租賃的有效性，或挑戰業主的業權。

18.  在Bruton v London & Quadrant Housing Trust [2000] 1 AC 406一案中，Lord Hoffmann解釋租約不容反悔的法律原則如下：—

“I think that Millett L.J. may have been misled by the ancient phrase ‘tenancy by estoppel’ into thinking that it described an agreement which would not otherwise be a lease or tenancy but which was treated as being one by virtue of an estoppel. In fact, as the authorities show, it is not the estoppel which creates the tenancy, but the tenancy which creates the estoppel. The estoppel arises when one or other of the parties wants to deny one of the ordinary incidents or obligations of the tenancy on the ground that the landlord had no legal estate. The basis of the estoppel is that having entered into an agreement which constitutes a lease or tenancy, he cannot repudiate that incident or obligation …

‘it is the creation of the tenancy, or the estoppel, which arises from the creation of the relation of landlord and tenant by agreement between the parties, that makes the actual legal estate unnecessary to support the distress …’”

19.  在Tang Man Kit v Hip Hing Timber Company Limited（未被輯錄，CACV 137/2002，2005年5月13日）一案中，上訴庭在該判詞的第52及53段亦有對租約不容反悔的法律原則作出闡釋：—

“52. As pointed out by the editors of Hill and Redman’s Law of Landlord and Tenant (17^th Ed) Para 88, [tenancy by estoppel] has two aspects –

(1) A tenant is prevented or estopped from denying the right of his landlord to grant the lease and, conversely, a landlord is prevented or estopped from denying the title of his tenant under the lease.

(2) A person who has no legal estate in the land may nevertheless purport to grant a lease of that land; in that event, there is created between him and his purported tenant a tenancy by estoppel which binds them and their respective successors in title just as if the landlord had a sufficient interest to grant the lease.

53. The position is best stated by Lord Denning MR in Industrial Properties (Barton Hill) Ltd and Others v Associated Electrical Industries Ltd [1977] 1 QB 580:

‘If a landlord lets a tenant into possession under a lease, then, so long as the tenant remains in possession undisturbed by any adverse claim – then the tenant cannot dispute the landlord’s title. Suppose the tenant (not having been disturbed) goes out of possession and the landlord sues the tenant on the covenant for rent or for breach of covenant to repair or to yield up in repair. The tenant cannot say to the landlord: ‘You are not the true owner of the property.” Likewise, if the landlord, on the tenant’s holding over, sues him for possession or for use and occupation or mesne profit, the tenant cannot defend himself by saying: “The property does not belong to you, but to another.’”

20.  在Chan Hau Ling v 劉西（未被輯錄，HCA 1286/2012，2015年4月22日）的判例中，Peter Ng J 清楚地解釋如下：—

“59. In Government of the State of Penang v Beng Hong Oon [1972] AC 425, at 433 E-F, the Privy Council advised that:

‘There is no doubt that under English law as it stood in 1872 and stands today there was and is no difference as regards the matter in hand between a tenant and a licensee. Each is estopped from denying the title of the person from whom he accepted the tenancy or licence so long as he remains in possession under it."

60. Once it is established that there was a landlord and tenant alternatively licensor and licensee relationship between the Plaintiff and the 1^st Defendant, the estoppel kicks in and the 1^st Defendant cannot resist the Plaintiff's claim to recover possession of the Property.”

21.  被告人並不挑戰上述租約不容反悔的法律原則以及其是香港法律的一部分。劉大律師的陳詞是該法律原則不適用於本案。她所依賴的理由如下：—

(1) 該151A物業租約及該851A物業租約實屬不合法租約，違反香港法例第28章《土地（雜項條文）條例》第4條及第6條；

(2) 被告人一直不知道原告人並非真正業主，直到2018年7月他才被告知這個事實，因此這裏並無反言/反悔存在；及

(3) 原告人以非法佔用者身份收租本身已屬違法，在衡平法的眼中原告人不是沒有犯錯（without clean hands），因此，根據衡平法的良知，租約不容反悔原則並不適用。

不合法租約

22.  《土地 (雜項條文) 條例》第4條及第6條列明：—

「4. 佔用未批租土地

除非根據許可證、撥地契據或撥地備忘錄，否則不得佔用未批租土地。

6. 不合法佔用未批租土地

(1) 除第(2A)款另有規定外，如有並非根據許可證、撥地契據或撥地備忘錄而佔用未批租土地的情況出現，則當局可安排張貼通知，飭令在通知內指明的日期前停止佔用該土地，通知可張貼在下列一處或多處地方 ——

(a) 該土地上或附近；或

(b) 該土地上的任何財產或構築物上。

…

(4) 任何人並非根據許可證、撥地契據或撥地備忘錄而佔用未批租土地，且在無合理辯解下，沒有遵從第(1)款所指的通知所飭令而停止佔用該土地，即屬犯罪。」

23.  劉大律師指原告人非法佔用該土地實屬違反《土地（雜項條文）條例》第4條及第6條。劉大律師依賴Pang Kwok Leung v Hung Pui Kan（未被輯錄，LDPE 406/2001，2002年5月2日）一案中，土地審裁處的說法：—

“7. Sections 4 and 6 of the Land (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance (Cap 28) respectively prohibit the occupation of unleased government land and the erection of structures on it. Similar provisions in the former ordinances concerning occupation of government land which were repealed were held to be for the benefit of public at large in Fung Siu Kam v Lo Shun Cheung [1984] HKC 107. I cannot see any reasons why that case should not be followed and accordingly I hold that sections 4 and 6 of the Land (Miscellaneous Provisions) Ordinance are for the benefit of the public at large. As a consequence the tenancy agreement which offends against these sections is not enforceable. In that case the Court of Appeal held that the licensee of Crown Land was unable to sue his tenant for rent…

“8. As to the claim for possession, in order to confer jurisdiction on this Tribunal the applicants must frame their cause of action upon an alleged forfeiture and therefore must rely on the illegal tenancy agreement. For the same reasons as their claim for arrears of rent, they must fail (see the view expressed in Fung Siu Kam v Lo Shun Cheung at p.112)…”

24.  明顯地，上述案件所引用的法律原則源自上訴庭在Fung Siu Kam v Lo Shun Cheung [1984] HKC 107的判決。Huggins VP的分析於第111頁可以見到：—

“It is not every contract prohibited by statute which is wholly unenforceable … As in the interpretation of all statutes one must ask what was the intention of the legislature in so far as that is ascertainable from the language it has used. We should not interpret a statute so as to deprive a subject of rights which he would have at common law unless it is clear that the legislature intended to take away those rights. The question here is whether the probation against occupation of Crown land was intended for the benefit of the public at large or merely for the benefit of the Crown as a land owner. It seems to me that the former must be the correct view. The nature of a licence itself prevents the licensee from allowing another into exclusive occupation, so that the Crown as land owner would already have the right to terminate the plaintiff’s licence and thus to defeat any tenancy by estoppel created in favour of the defendants. The statutory prohibition must, I think, have been intended to prevent any contract purporting to confer exclusive occupation of the land or any part thereof…

… the plaintiff is barred from obtaining for himself any benefit under such contract [prohibited by section 4 of the Crown Land Ordinance] and the court should decline to enter judgment in his favour for rent or mesne profits…”

25.  在Yip Alice v Wong Shun (No 2) [2003] 2 HKC 528一案中，上訴庭對Fung Siu Kam一案中的法律原則作出了詳盡的分析。上訴庭的三位法官（Rogers VP，Le Pichon JA及Yuen JA）基本上一致認為Fung Siu Kam中的分析不全面。Le Pichon JA 在判詞中指出：—

“15. A contract may be rendered unenforceable by statute where the statute on its true construction deprives one or both of the parties of their civil remedies under the contract in addition to, or instead of, imposing a penalty upon them. That is a question of construction. See Chitty on Contracts (28^th Ed) at 17-140… In Fung Siu Kam, Huggins VP considered that the question was whether the prohibition against occupation of Crown (now Government) land was intended for the benefit of the public at large or merely for the benefit of the Crown/Government. He seemed to suggest that they led to different consequences. The difference is not readily apparent since the public at large has no right to enter Crown/Government land, and the public can only indirectly benefit through the Crown/Government as landlord. Neither could it be said that the public interest has been harmed by the running of the restaurant, which would lead a court to deprive the plaintiff of the benefit of the contract. In this respect it may be noted that the Government has taken no steps against the restaurant, despite the fact that a number of departments knew of its existence. Moreover, it is difficult to see what benefits the public can derive from depriving the parties of their civil remedies. In the instant case, the person who stands to reap a windfall would be the defendant: he would be in the happy position of being able to retain all profits of the business and not having to pay the agreed monthly fixed fee to the plaintiffs for the privilege of running the restaurant.

16. Be that as it may, on the facts of the present case, the issue is whether as a matter of statutory construction, the effect of s 4 is to deprive parties of their civil remedies where the contract or its performance necessarily implicates an infringement of the section. One has to turn to the Ordinance itself to ascertain the legislative intent. Section 4 of the Ordinance comes under the heading ‘Occupation of unleased land’ but it appears to be silent as to the effect of its contravention, whilst s 6 comes under the heading ‘Unlawful occupation of unleased land’. Plainly the two sections must be read together when ascertaining the legislative intent. When read together, the statutory scheme which emerges is that whilst there is a general ‘injunction’ or ‘prohibition’ against the occupation of unleased land without a licence etc, such occupation does not become unlawful under the Ordinance (as distinct from the common law) unless and until a notice issued under s 6(1) is not complied with. In other words, the Ordinance imposes no penalty on a person who contravenes s 4 but who ceases to occupy the land within the period specified in a notice issued under s 6(1). The occupation of unleased land is only rendered ‘unlawful’ by such a person failing to cease occupation within the period of the notice. Section 6 was not mentioned at all by Huggins VP in Fung Siu Kam. Furthermore, it should not be overlooked that the issuance of a s 6 notice is discretionary rather than mandatory. In these circumstances, having regard to the statutory scheme, it could hardly have been intended that where a contract or its performance involves a contravention of s 4, the parties should be deprived of their civil remedies.

17. Moreover, there are considerable difficulties with the defendant’s interpretation of s 4 to the effect that any ‘occupation’ of unleased land would be unlawful and illegal, and rendering any agreement to do so unenforceable. Not only would such an interpretation sit uncomfortably with s 6, if correct, it is not apparent how it would ever be possible for a person to acquire title by adverse possession against the Government under s 7(1) of the Limitation Ordinance (Cap 347). That section bars recovery of possession by the Government after the expiration of 60 years from the date on which the right of action accrued. By definition, a person who seeks to rely on s 7(1) of Cap 347 must necessarily have contravened s 4 of the Ordinance. To adopt the defendant’s interpretation would effectively ‘repeal’ s 7(1) by a side wind, a result that plainly could not have been intended and should be avoided in the absence of any express provision. If s 7(1) is not to be rendered otiose, it must follow that the legislature could not have intended that a contract or the performance of which implicates a contravention of s 4 of the Ordinance be made void.

…

In ascertaining the legislative intent behind s 4, one has to read that together with all relevant provisions of the Ordinance, in particular, s 6 and bearing in mind the difference between that regime and the old regime, ie s 10 of the Summary Offences Ordinance. Adopting that approach, the occupation of unleased land of itself is plainly not ‘unlawful’ for the purposes of the Ordinance although a civil action for trespass may be maintainable against the person occupying the land at the suit of the Crown/Government as a result. As a matter of construction, I see nothing in the Ordinance that requires depriving parties of their civil remedies in relation to the making or performance of a contract such as the management agreement, albeit that it can only be performed by occupying unleased land.”

26.  Yuen JA 亦指出：—

“22. As for the defence based on the Ordinance, whilst this case is distinguishable on the facts from Fung Siu Kam in that no tenancy was created here, I share concerns about the decision in that case.

23. There is no criminality in a person occupying unleased land unless and until a notice has been issued under s 6(1) requiring the occupation to cease and a person ‘without reasonable excuse does not cease to occupy the [land] as required by a notice’ (s 6(4)).

24. No notice has been issued in respect of the land in this case. Therefore even if the management agreements were to be treated as contracts letting the defendant into occupation of the land, there were no criminal objects disentitling the plaintiffs to contractual relief under common law (Chitty on Contracts (28th Ed) Vol 1 Ch 17, para 17-014).

25. Therefore the defendant’s case had to be (as pleaded by amendment in para 6A) that the management agreements were illegal and unenforceable by statute, by reason of s 4.

26. However, just because a contract or its performance is implicated with breach of a statute, that does not entail that the contract should be avoided. Section 4 (and the rest of Pt II) is silent as to the civil rights of parties who have dealings with each other regarding occupation of unleased land. ‘Where the [Ordinance] does not expressly deprive the plaintiff of his civil remedies under the contract, the appropriate question to ask is whether, having regard to the Ordinance and the evils against which it was intended to guard and the circumstances in which the contract was made and to be performed, it would in fact be against public policy to enforce it’ (Chitty on Contracts, para 17-144).

27. In seeking to answer this question, the focus must be, not on what acts are prohibited by the legislation, but on whether the legislation is intended to prohibit the contracts in question (Chitty on Contracts, para 17-140).

28. It seems to me, reading Pt II as a whole, that it was intended to provide the Government as land-owner with ‘extra-civil law’ remedies to enable it to manage its unleased land more effectively. Thus,

(1) s 4 disallows the occupation of unleased land;

(2) s 6(2) provides the relevant authority (the Director of Lands, the Director of Food and Environmental Hygiene or the Housing Authority) with speedy ‘self-help’ remedies to re-take possession of unleased land, and s 6(4) visits with criminal sanctions the occupation of unleased land, in both cases after the issue of a warning notice under s 6(1);

(3) s 6(2A) provides the relevant authority with self-help remedies regarding structures on unleased land which are in the course of erection or which are not being habitually and bona fide used, and s 6(4A) visits with criminal sanctions the erection of structures, in both cases without the issue of a warning notice.

Thus even if s 4 itself may be said to be ‘silent’ as to the effect of its contravention, the way Pt II is set out shows that the effect of its contravention is express — in the specific provisions of s 6.

29. If the mischief of Pt II is effective land management for the Government as land-owner, I do not see why s 4 should impact (independently, without more) upon the civil rights and remedies of private parties whose dealings involve the occupation of the land, and I can see nothing in Pt II that points clearly (expressly or impliedly) to such an intention of the legislature…”

27.  雖然在 Yip Alice一案上訴庭頒發判決書的時候，終審庭還未在 Solicitor (24/07) v Law Society of Hong Kong (2008) 11 HKCFAR 117一案中澄清上訴庭可通過「顯然錯誤」（plainly wrong）驗證標準偏離早前判決，本席認為Yip Alice一案中的判詞可見，上訴庭明顯認為 Fung Siu Kam中的相關法律原則是顯然錯誤的。

28.  在Chan Siu Cheung Henry v Cheung Wing Keung Peter [2022] HKDC 325, Chief District Judge Justin Ko在判詞第55段亦指出其後所有案例都是跟隨 Yip Alice一案。

29.  就著Yip Alice這個案例，劉大律師在書面結案陳詞時有以下的回應：—

「就本案例，S.6土地雜項條例 (Cap 28) 的解讀，並無 [賦予] 非法佔用者任何民事補償權利，如本案中的出租權，S.6說的是不合法佔用政府土地，何來剝奪非法佔用者的民事權利？S.6 的立法原意並沒有 [賦予] 非法佔用者的民事權利，尤其是屋牌是政府簽發給農民自住和畜牧，沒有 [賦予] 佔用者出租牟利的民事權利，因此，這裏立法原意的解讀是不正確的；也不可能是未貼通告非法佔用者仍未算非法佔用者，通知只是一個程序去標籤非法佔用者，因此，被告人錯誤認為原告人是業主而與他簽的兩份不合法租約，應予以撤 [銷] 無效，原告人應退還被告人已付的租金。」

30.  本席不接納劉大律師的相關陳詞。首先，《土地（雜項條文）條例》有否賦予非法佔用者任何民事權利並非相關考慮。明顯地，原告人在本案中的民事權利源自於普通法，原告人有權在民事訴訟中依賴租約不容反悔的法律原則。關鍵的考慮是《土地（雜項條文）條例》的解讀是否剝奪原告人在這方面的民事權利。在Yip Alice一案中上訴庭認為該條例的解讀不應存在這個後果。

31.  再者，劉大律師的陳詞無異於要求本席接納上訴庭於Yip Alice的判例是錯誤的。這一點完全忽略了香港整體司法制度下的遵循上級法庭判例規則（stare decisis）。本席認為上訴庭在Yip Alice案的法律原則對本庭是有約束力的。本席甚至認為，就如Yip Alice一案，本席需要考慮的是《土地（雜項條文）條例》整體的解讀，而不是像Fung Siu Kam一案中只考慮第4條的影響。因此，Yip Alice判例的法理完全適用及對本席有約束力。

32.  在本案中，本席特別認同Le Pichon JA在Yip Alice的說法，如果涉案的租約被視為完全無效，被告人就能免費佔用該151A物業及該851A物業長達10年的時間而不用付出任何代價，甚至可以一直繼續無償佔用。

33.  基於上述的原因，本席認為即使原告人是非法佔用該土地，亦不影響原告人依賴租約不用反悔原則。

被告人不知原告人並非真正業主

34.  在本案中並沒有任何證據支持被告人的說法，指他在簽訂相關租約的時候不知道原告人並非真正業主。但是就算被告人在相關的時候並不知道原告人並非真正業主，亦無礙原告人依賴租約不容反悔原則。這個原則並不取決於租客知否真正的業主是誰。如果業主根據租約讓租戶佔用有關物業，只要租戶仍佔用有關物業而不受任何第三方的不利索賠的干擾，租戶就不能對業主的業權提出異議。

35.  因此，本席認為即使被告人不知原告人並非真正業主，在法律上亦不構成有效的抗辯理由。重要的是被告人的佔用一直沒有受任何第三方 (包括政府) 的不利索賠的干擾。

原告人不是沒有犯錯（without clean hands）

36.  被告人指原告人以非法佔用者身份收租本身已屬違法行為，在衡平法眼中不是沒有犯錯， 故此不應得到衡平法的幫助，所以原告人不能夠依賴租約不容反悔的法律原則。本席亦不接納被告人的這一個說法。在Yip Alice一案中上訴庭已表明非法佔用政府土地本身並不構成任何刑事罪行，亦不會因此被剝奪任何相關的民事權利。在原告人與被告人之間，原告人一直容許被告人根據相關租約佔用相關物業，本席認為在他們之間原告人並沒有作出任何應被衡平法視為不當的行為。

37.  在Li Wing-sun v Wu Man [1978] HKLR 575一案中，案中上訴人是政府土地上的持牌佔用人，但無權將土地轉租給第三方。在沒有權轉租的情況下，上訴人卻將土地轉租於答辯人。縱使如此，上訴庭則認為，就上訴人及答辯人之間而言，上訴人的非法行為不應被衡平法視為不當。Leonard J在上訴庭的判詞第578頁中提到：—

“… Before I discuss this I should like to comment briefly on the relevance of the maxim ‘he who comes into equity must come with clean hands’. The learned trial judge apparently invoked this maxim in order to prevent the plaintiff relying on an equitable estoppel – on which, on the pleadings, the plaintiff did not have to rely. It is clear that any inequity committed by the plaintiff was not committed by him in his dealings with the defendant but in his dealings with the Crown. It had no ‘immediate and necessary relation to the equity sued for’ (see Snell 26^th Edition page 36 and the cases there quoted). The maxim had no relevance.”

空置管有權及租值補償金

38.  基於上述所有原因，本席裁定被告人須將該151A物業及該851A物業的空置管有權交還原告人，及支付予原告人租值補償金。

39.  關於租值補償金的計算，本席接納以雙方當時同意的每月租金作為市值租金。正如Denning J（當時官階）在 Clifton v Huntley [1948] 2 All ER 283一案中指出：—

“Mesne profits should be assessed according to the most recently agreed rent unless there was evidence that the real value was other than that agreed rent.”

40.  就該151A物業而言，從2018年8月1日至2023年8月31日，共61個月的租值補償金為港幣436,150元（港幣7,150元 x 61月）。被告人亦須要由2023年9月1日起以每月港幣7,150元就該151A物業繳付租值補償金直至將空置管有權交還原告人為止。

41.  至於該851A物業，從2018年8月10日至2023年9月9日，共61個月的租值補償金為港幣280,600元（港幣4,600元 x 61 月）。被告人亦須要由2023年9月10日起以每月港幣4,600元就該851A物業繳付租值補償金直至將空置管有權交還原告人為止。

被告人的反申索

42.  基於上述所有原因，本席撤銷被告人的反申索。

命令

43.  本席現作出以下命令：—

(1) 被告人須於本判決發出後28天內交出新界元朗丈量約份第124約的土地上的 (i) 新界元朗洪水橋新生村北段151A物業，及 (ii) 新界元朗洪水橋新生村北段851A物業的空置管有權給予原告人；

(2) 被告人須就該151A物業支付予原告人租值補償金： —

(a) 由2018年8月1日至2023年8月31日，共61個月金額為港幣436,150元；

(b) 由2023年9月1日起以每月港幣7,150元直至將空置管有權交還原告人為止；及

(c) 以上租值補償金須另加利息由2018年8月1日起，以香港上海滙豐銀行最優惠利率加1%計算，至本判案書日期為止，及從本判案書日期起至交付所有判定欠款，以判定利率計算；

(3) 被告人須就該851A物業支付予原告人租值補償金： —

(a) 由2018年8月10日至2023年9月9日，共61個月金額為港幣280,600元；

(b) 由2023年9月10日起以每月港幣4,600元直至將空置管有權交還原告人為止；及

(c) 以上租值補償金須另加利息由2018年8月10日起，以香港上海滙豐銀行最優惠利率加1%計算，至本判案書日期為止，及從本判案書日期起至交付所有判定欠款，以判定利率計算。

44.  本席以暫准命令形式頒令被告人須支付原告人本案的訟費。訴訟各方若不能就訟費的款額達成協議，則交由聆案官評定。