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MEHMOOD MUDDASSAR v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
MEHMOOD MUDDASSAR v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6249 · HCAL 2656/2025
Court of First Instance
HCAL 2656/2025 [2026] HKCFI 6249 IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 2656 of 2025 BETWEEN Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3) Following; Order by Deputy High Court Judge To: Extension of time to file the leave application be refused; and Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused. Observations for the Applicant: Introduction This is the Applicant’s application by Form 86 filed on 1 December 2025 for leave to apply for judicial review (the “leave application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 20 February 2025 dismissing his appeal against the decision of the Director of Immigration (the “Director”) in his Notice of Decision (“Notice”) dated 27 November 2024 refusing his application for non-refoulement protection. The Applicant is a Pakistani national, now aged 26. He arrived in Hong Kong on 28 November 2023 and overstayed since 6 December 2023. He was arrested by the police on 15 April 2024 and referred to the Immigration Department. On 24 April 2024, he raised a non-refoulement claim by written signification. His claim was assessed on all four applicable grounds under the Unified Screening Mechanism. His appeal against the Notice was dismissed by the Board’s Decision. He now applies for leave to apply for judicial review of that Decision. The delay in taking out the leave application The leave application was filed nine months and nine days after the date of the Decision sought to be reviewed. Under section 21K(6) of the High Court Ordinance and Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, a leave application shall be made promptly and in any event within three months from the date when grounds for the application first arose unless the court considers there is good reason for extending the period within which the application shall be made. The leave application was made almost six and half months beyond what is usually regarded as having been promptly made. The delay is very substantial. The Applicant has to show good reason for extending the time to file the leave application. In AW and Director of Immigration and William Lam, the Court of Appeal held that the following factors are relevant in determining whether to grant leave to file an application for leave to apply for judicial review out of time: (1) length of the delay; (2) explanation for the delay; (3) merits of the substantive application; (4) prejudice to the applicant if leave is refused vis-à-vis that to the respondent and public administration if leave is granted; and (5) whether the application raises any questions of general public importance, and whether those questions are likely to have to be resolved by the courts in any event. Usually, the first three factors, particularly merits, are most crucial and determinative. If the sum total of these three factors are in favour of granting extension, the court would be more relaxed with the remaining two. Conversely, if it is against the granting of extension, there is no need to consider the remaining two factors. However, where an application is many months out of time, leave may be refused “however strong the complaint might otherwise be”, see Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung, per Litton PJ. Despite clear warning in the Form 86 that an applicant is required to state his grounds for application and reasons for delay, if any, the Applicant provided no explanation for the late application. At the hearing, the Court explored the reason for delay with him. He said that he resided at an address in Cheung Wah Street (the Cheung Wah Street address”) at the time of hearing before the Board and remained in that address until one day when he reported his recognizance at the Castle Peak Bay Immigration Centre (“CIC”). On that occasion, he was told by an immigration officer that his case was “finished” and then he was detained. He was released after about 45 days after he had filed his leave application. Working back from the date he filed the Form 86, he was detained in CIC since about mid-October 2025. According to the Applicant, he resided at the Cheung Wah Street address at the time of the hearing before the Board on 7 February 2025 until he was detained in the CIC in mid-October 2025. The Board’s Decision was dated 20 February 2025. According to enquiries from the Board, the Decision was sent to the Applicant by post to his Cheung Wah Street address on 20 February 2025. The Applicant should have received the Decision by the normal course of mail one or two days after posting. The Applicant’s reported address in the record of the Immigration Department for the period from 27 November 2024 to 31 October 2025 was in Un Chau Street (the “Un Chau Street address”). According to this record, the correctness of which the Court does not have any reason to doubt, the Applicant was actually living in the Un Chau Street address when he attended the hearing of his appeal before the Board and when the Board issued its Decision. In the circumstances the only irresistible inference is that he lived in the Cheung Wah Street address when he filed his notice of appeal, but he never updated his address with the Board when he moved to the Un Chau Street address in November 2024. That explains why he had not received the Decision soon after it was issued. While this Court accepts that he had no knowledge of the Decision until he was informed by an immigration officer in October 2025, his explanation for the delay is not reasonable and the delay is substantial. In Karamjit Singh, the Court of Appeal said: “As we have said before, it is common sense that if a litigant or a claimant does not notify the authority (be it the Immigration Department, the board, or the court) in his change of address, there would be delay in communication. If he does not do so, he should arrange for timely transmission of mail from his old address to his new address. It is the duty of a litigant/claimant to give the authority an address to which correspondence or notice can come to his attention in timely manner. The consequence of any delay occasioned by the ineffectiveness of such an address would fall on the shoulder of the litigant/claimant, see: Islam Raja Rais v Director of Immigration HCMP 881/2017, 26 June 2017; Said Umair v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2018] HKCA 82; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346. That said, however, we note that the delay in this case was very short, being only some 6 days. In such situations, the board should generally have regard to the merits of the case as disclosed by the available material, rather than simply dismissing the application for lateness.” It is the Applicant’s duty to update the Board with his change of address. If he did not, he has to bear the consequence of his neglect. His explanation, though true, is not a reasonable explanation for the delay and the delay is very substantial. Judicial review is a discretionary remedy. By reason of the unreasonable and very substantial delay, extension of time to file the leave application is refused in accordance with the principles in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung. Conclusion For these reasons, extension of time to file the leave application and the leave application are refused. Dated the 12th day of November 2026 ( Seline Sze ) for Registrar, High Court Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence Form CALL-1