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CACV 465/2026, [2026] HKCA 1352
On Appeal From [2026] HKCFI 2219
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CIVIL APPEAL NO 465 OF 2026
(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL NO 1372 OF 2025)
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BETWEEN
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JUWANTI NUR ANDRIANAH |
Applicant |
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and |
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TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD/NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS
PETITION OFFICE |
Putative Respondent |
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and |
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DIRECTOR OF IMMIGRATION |
Putative Interested Party |
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| Before: |
Hon G Lam JA and D’Almada Remedios J in Court
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| Date of Hearing: |
24 June 2026 |
| Date of Judgment: |
29 July 2026 |
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J U D G M E N T
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Hon G Lam JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):
Introduction
1. This is an appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court
Judge K.W. Lung (“Judge”) on 29 April 2026 refusing to grant an extension of time for the application for
leave to apply for judicial review and dismissing the application for leave to apply for judicial review against
the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/adjudicator of the Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
(“Board”) dated 25 November 2024. In that decision, the Board upheld the decision of the Director of
Immigration (“Director”) dated 21 August 2024 rejecting the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Background
2. The applicant is a national of Indonesia born in 1984 and her
claim was made on the basis that if she returned to Indonesia, her ex-husband would harm or kill her due to
their divorce as initiated by her. Details of the applicant’s background, the basis of her claim and
arguments advanced before the Board as well as the Board’s reasons for rejecting her appeal are all set out in
the Board’s decision: see [4] of the Form CALL-1. The Judge has set out the grounds advanced by the
applicant in support of the application and his reasons for refusal of the application: see [11] – [17] of the
Form CALL-1.
Appeal to this Court
3. On 8 May 2026, the applicant filed her Notice of Appeal
against the Judge’s decision. Her stated grounds of appeal were, essentially, that she feared for her life
and that the Board and the Director completely failed to consider whether her fear was genuine or she would be
free of risk upon refoulement.
4. The applicant has lodged written submissions which can be
summarized as follows: the Board found her fear to be too low but her fear still continues; the Board did not
inquire about her fear, and country of origin information clearly showed there would not be any state protection
for her; a vast land area and large population does not mean it would be safe for the applicant to relocate
within her country; her claim should be established under BOR 3 risk; her fear was not observed properly by the
decision makers; the Judge erred by treating the Board’s findings on credibility as a conclusive determination
rather than part of a holistic risk assessment; the Board acted outside the scope of its powers or applied
incorrect legal tests; there was inadequate opportunity to present evidence; the conclusions were not supported
by the evidence; credible evidence was ignored, testimony was mischaracterised or irrelevant facts were relied
on; there was imposition of an unduly high standard or improper shift of burden to the applicant; updated
country of origin information or reports were not assessed or given proper weight; and the decision conflicts
with human rights.
5. As the applicant did not appear at the scheduled hearing, we
determine the appeal on the basis of the available documents and materials.
Discussion
6. In assessing the merits of the appeal, we shall have regard
to the legal principles which this Court has adopted in dealing with appeals in non-refoulement cases: see
Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at [14]; Re Md Shohel Sheak [2018] HKCA 714 at [13]; and Re Limbu Birkhaman [2019] HKCA 50 at [11]. In particular, the role of the Court in a judicial review
is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The Court will not intervene by way of judicial review
unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board. In
the determination of an appeal against the refusal of leave by the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeal
will only examine the decision of the judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no
viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge’s decision, the appeal should be dismissed. It is not
the role of this Court to examine the decision of the Board afresh as if the appeal were a fresh application for
judicial review.
7. In the present case, the Board found that there was no real
risk of harm upon refoulement as alleged, because it did not accept that there had been continuing threats
against the applicant by her ex-husband; there was no evidence that her ex-husband would endanger her life if
she returned to Indonesia; there was no evidence that state protection would not be afforded to the applicant;
and internal relocation to anywhere in Indonesia, such as Surabaya, would be a viable option and not unduly
harsh for the applicant. These are findings of fact open to the Board based on the evidence it received and for
the reasons it gave. The applicant has failed to show any reasonably arguable public law error in relation to
the Board’s decision. The ground relating to human rights consists of a mere general and bald assertion
without any particulars. As such it does not constitute a viable ground of appeal: see Re Salim
Ahmed [2020] HKCA 244 at [20].
8. Equally, the applicant has not been able to demonstrate any
error in the decision of the Judge or advance any viable ground of appeal against the Judge’s decision. We
are not satisfied that there is any error in the Judge’s decision.
9. The applicant’s appeal is accordingly dismissed.
(Godfrey Lam)
Justice of Appeal |
(S. D’Almada Remedios)
Judge of the Court of First Instance |
The Applicant was not represented and did not appear
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