DO VAN NGHIA v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5261 · HCAL 1052/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 1052/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5261
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 1052 OF 2023
BETWEEN
| |Do Van Nghia |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”, and “Director of
Immigration” be added as the putative interested party.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 29 June 2023, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 12 August 2022 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL00
1052_2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board found that the applicant’s application for non-refoulement
protection failed on all the applicable grounds under the Unified
Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed the
applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 26 July 2021 (“the Director’s
Decision”) and confirmed the same, which rejected the applicant’s
claim for non-refoulement protection.
Amendments
3. The applicant named the Board / Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
and the Director as the putative respondents and did not name any
putative interested party in Form 86.
4. In fact, only the Board should be named as the putative respondent,
and the Director should be named as the putative interested party.
5. The Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office is just an office providing
administrative and secretariat support to the adjudicators of the
Board and should not be named as a putative respondent at all.
6. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board” and to add
“Director of Immigration” as the putative interested party.
Late application
7. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
8. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 29 June 2023, which was more
than 10 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 12 August 2022).
The applicant was hence late for more than 7 months in making the
Leave Application, and this court has to consider whether there is any
good reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application.
9. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
10. The applicant did not make any application for extension of time and
provided no explanation for the delay when he filed the Leave
Application. At the oral hearing before this court, the applicant
first explained the delay by saying that he did not have the money to
make the Leave Application and he borrowed money in order to do so.
When this court asked why he did not borrow money earlier for the
purpose, the applicant then changed his story and said that he did not
know about the procedures. He only heard from a friend later that he
could make such an application, and therefore he borrowed money to
file the application.
11. A delay of more than 7 months is very substantial, and the
explanations given by the applicant are clearly not satisfactory.
Ignorance of the court procedures is generally not an excuse.
Moreover, if he indeed had a friend who was familiar with the
procedures, he could have asked his friend shortly after he received
the Board’s Decision and obtained money to make the Leave Application
without such a long delay.
12. More importantly, there is no merit of the intended judicial review at
all as discussed below. Thus, this court is not prepared to extend
the time for the applicant to file the Leave Application, even if an
application for extension of time was made. The Leave Application can
be dismissed on the ground of being made out of time alone.
13. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still examine
the merits of the Leave Application.
The applicant’s case
14. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
15. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Vietnam, he would be harmed or killed by his creditor
due to his inability to repay a loan of 500 million Vietnamese Dong.
Oral hearing
16. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application
and his case was heard on 10 September 2026.
17. When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on the grounds of his
intended judicial review, which were stated in a document annexed to
his Form 86 with the title “Grounds on which relief is sought”, he
first replied that he did not know what grounds were mentioned
therein.
18. After the said document was interpreted to the applicant, he confirmed
that he would rely on the contents stated therein, he had nothing to
add and that he had written the grounds himself previously.
Grounds for judicial review
19. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
20. The contents of the said document with the title “Grounds on which
relief is sought” were all very general and were in fact used by many
applicants in similar applications as their grounds for applying leave
to judicially review the Board’s decisions. It is like a template for
such applicants and they just used the grounds stated therein without
any regard to their own situations. Nevertheless, as the applicant is
relying on the said grounds to make the Leave Application, this court
will still deal with the grounds as discussed below.
21. As aforesaid, the applicant did not elaborate on any of the grounds
stated in the said document at the oral hearing and only confirmed
that he would rely on the same for his intended judicial review.
Discussion
22. As mentioned, all the grounds contained in the document with the title
“Grounds on which relief is sought” are very general. Some of the
grounds therein were directed at the Director. As the Director’s
Decision was superseded by the Board’s Decision, it is no longer
susceptible to judicial review (see Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549).
This court will therefore consider only those grounds directed at the
Board in respect of the Board’s Decision.
23. There are a total of 6 paragraphs under the heading “Grounds” in the
applicant’s said document. Paragraphs 2 and 5 of the applicant’s
grounds were directed at the Director. Hence, they could not be used
to challenge the Board’s Decision and can be simply ignored. Thus,
only paragraphs 1, 3, 4 and 6 of the grounds are relevant to the Leave
Application.
24. In paragraph 1 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator of the Board reached the Board’s Decision wrongly and it
was not reasonable and fair as required by the Wednesbury test.
However, the applicant did not state how or why the Board’s Decision
was wrong, unfair and unreasonable. It does not help the applicant to
establish any ground by just mentioning the right to life in paragraph
1 either.
25. In any event, the Board did assess the applicant’s risk of right to
life but concluded that on the totality of evidence, the applicant had
failed to establish a personal and real risk of absolute and non-
derogable rights under BOR 2[1] being violated if he was refouled to
Vietnam (see paragraphs 88 to 90 of the Board’s Decision).
26. In paragraph 3 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator acted unreasonably and was procedurally unfair by placing
too much reliance on country of origin information (“COI”) but failed
to take his personal background and experience into account. However,
the applicant did not state which aspects of his personal background
and experience had not been taken into account by the Board.
27. In paragraph 4 of the grounds, the applicant alleged that the
adjudicator was procedurally improper and unfair when assessing
whether to accept or not to accept explanations provided by him, and
unreasonably required him to respond to questions. This accusation
lacks any particulars in support. The applicant did not state which
explanations he provided were not accepted by the Board and which
questions he was unreasonably required to answer.
28. There was in fact nothing wrong for the Board to question the
applicant extensively to try to understand his claims better and to
assess his credibility and his accounts of the events leading to his
claim for non-refoulement protection. The questions were necessary
for the Board to fulfil its duty of finding of facts in relation to
the applicant’s claim. This court finds no fault or unfairness in the
Board’s questioning of the applicant at all.
29. In paragraph 6 of the grounds, the applicant simply alleged that the
adjudicator ought to allow the appeal/petition and the Board’s
Decision was irrational. There was no particulars or reasons given to
say how or why the Board’s Decision was irrational.
30. The Board had in fact provided a detailed analysis of the applicant’s
claim and the reasons why the Board concluded that the applicant
failed on all applicable grounds under the USM to claim non-
refoulement protection. The Board’s rejection of his non-refoulement
claim was a decision made after due consideration of the law and the
evidence placed before it. If the applicant intends to challenge the
finding of facts by the Board, it is not permissible in an application
for judicial review.
31. The Court of Appeal has repeatedly held that general assertions
without particulars cannot be effective grounds to support a judicial
review (see Re Mizan Sikder [2019] HKCA 20; Re Aziz Nasir [2019] HKCA
578; and Re Kharsu Numan [2019] HKCA 626). Further, as held by the
Court of Appeal in Re Salim Ahmed alias MD Salim [2020] HKCA 244,
“general assertions or propositions of law cannot assist an appellant
when he fails to condescend to the requisite particulars related to
the facts of his case”.
32. Thus, none of the grounds that were contained in the applicant’s said
document could establish any valid ground to challenge the Board’s
Decision when they are so vague and general without any requisite
particulars related to the applicant’s case.
33. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
34. Thus, this court will examine and scrutinize the Board’s Decision for
any errors of law, procedural unfairness and irrationality, despite
the lack of any valid ground being advanced by the applicant for the
intended judicial review.
35. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 21 December 2021 and the applicant was present. Thus,
the applicant was given the opportunity to present his case to the
Board in person.
36. The Board laid out its findings on the credibility of the applicant
and its assessment of the applicant’s case on all the applicable
grounds under the USM in paragraphs 45 to 106 of the Board’s Decision,
and it is not necessary to repeat the same here.
37. In gist, the Board found that the applicant’s story was internally
consistent as to the loan collection incidents from the creditor.
38. However, the Board found that the applicant’s fear only arose from his
inability to repay a loan, which was a private matter. There was only
one physical attack on the applicant. The Board did not accept that
the ill-treatment, whether physical or mental, attained a minimum
level of severity. The creditor was not a state actor, and there was
no element of state acquiescence in the alleged ill-treatment of the
applicant. Avoidance of loan repayment was clearly not one of the
RC[2] reasons.
39. Moreover, the Board found from COI that although there were materials
that indicated corruption and illegal moneylending were common in
Vietnam, the Vietnamese government had taken practical steps to
improve the protection offered to the citizens, the monitoring system
to govern the professional conduct of the police forces, to combat
corruption and illegal moneylending. The Board found that reasonable
state protection was available to the applicant, and there was no
ground based on well-founded fear for refusing it.
40. Thus, the Board concluded that the applicant had failed to establish a
case for non-refoulement protection in Hong Kong on any of the
applicable grounds under the USM.
41. Although the Board did not make findings as to internal relocation, it
is a well-recognised principle that the decision-maker only needs to
consider internal relocation if the applicant has established that he
qualifies as a refugee pursuant to Article 1A(2) of the Refugee
Convention (see Robinson v SSHD & Anor [1997] EWCA Civ 3090, dated
11.7.1997). In other words, internal relocation only arises if the
applicant has established a real risk of persecution in his home area
(see Gardi v SSHD [2002] 1 WLR 2755).
42. As it is the Board’s finding that the applicant had no real risk of
any of the proscribed forms of harm, it is not necessary for the Board
to consider internal relocation.
43. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence, COI and
risk of harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board. The Board was
entitled to make its own decision. This court finds nothing wrong or
unreasonable in the way the Board reached its conclusion.
44. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no errors of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
45. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
46. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed for being
made out of time and also for lack of merits.
Dated the 16th day of September 2026
| | |
| |( Gladys LEE ) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant| | |
|or the applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s |the putative |
|may be directed by the|solicitors on: |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order |16/09/2026 |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any| |interested parties as |
|directions given |Applicant’s ref. no: |may be directed by the |
|within 14 days after |Nil |Court / the putative |
|the leave was granted | |interested parties’ |
|(Order 53, rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |16/09/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and| |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance| |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5;| |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 18476/21/8/64/V2977 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the applicant proposes| |QA T/C 550/21(Formerly |
|to use at the hearing,| |RBCZ 158/20) |
|including the | | |
|affidavit in support | |Department of Justice, |
|of the application for| |Senior Assistant Law |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |Officer |
|6(5)). | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
| | | |
| | | |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] Article 2 of section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap
383.
[2] The non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention
relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol