LAM SUK HAN v. CHAN SO KUEN by her guardian ad litem LAM WAI KIT AND OTHERS

HCA 1655/2014

[2026] HKCFI 1158

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 1655 OF 2014

________________________

________________________

________________________

DECISION

________________________

INTRODUCTION

1.  Before me is Ds’ Summons filed on 3 October 2025 for an application for striking out P’s Writ of Summons and Statement of Claim on the ground that it is an abuse of process of the court under O 18 r 19 of the Rules of the High Court (“RHC”)  (“Summons”).

2.  P filed a summons on 13 January 2026, as amended by summons filed on 15 January 2026 seeking the Court’s leave to adduce additional evidence for the hearing of the striking out application, namely the Affirmation of Leung Kin Sum dated 12 January 2026 which exhibits the police statements taken from D2 and D3 in 2015.  By the Consent Summons dated 15 January 2026, the Parties agreed to the introduction of this evidence and an order in terms of the Consent Summons was made.

3.  In support of its striking out application, Ds filed the 2^nd and 3^rd Affirmations of Lam Wai Kit (D3)  on 3 October 2025 and 23 December 2025 respectively.  P filed the Affirmation of Lam Suk Han (P)  on 27 November 2025.  

BACKGROUND

4.  This dispute concerns the property known as Lot No 460 in Ma Wan and the residential building thereon (“Property”).  It is not in dispute that:

(a)  Mr Lam Hing Tong (“Mr Lam”)  and Mr Tsang Fu Chuen (“Mr Tsang”)  owned Lot No 148 RP as tenants-in-common. After Mr Lam’s death (intestate)  in 1992, letters of administration were granted to D1 in 2007.  Mr Lam was survived by Ds and two daughters.

(b)  In 2011, D1 executed a Deed of Surrender, resulting in an exchange of Lot No 148 RP for Lot Nos 460 and 461.

(c)  On 3 September 2025, an Order by consent was granted appointing D3 as D1’s guardian ad litem.

5.  P’s case is that:

(a)  In 1995, she entered into two agreements of sale and purchase with Ds namely, the Chinese Document on or around 4 March 1995 – which P and D2 signed, and D1 as witness; and the Chinese Confirmation, on or around May 1995 – which D2 signed, and D3 as witness.  The agreements provide that Ds would sell to P Lot No 148 RP in Ma Wan and the buildings thereon for HK$1.7 million (two story ground floor and second floor). 

(b)  According to the Chinese Document, D2 received HK$70,000 from P on 23 February 1995 and D2 subsequently received HK$430,000 on 4 March 1995, with the remaining balance of HK$1,200,000 to be settled on 17 May 1995.

(c)  With reference to the Chinese Confirmation, a further sum of HK$1,200,000 was paid on 19 May 1995.  P paid a total sum of HK$1,700,000 to Ds as consideration.

(d)  On or around 17 December 1997, P and Ds entered into the Chinese Agreement, whereby Ds agreed to sell to P the residential building “Ma Wan Sun Hung Kai Development Project” (“馬灣新鴻基發展計劃樓房”), and P shall pay a sum of HK$1,450,000 (in addition to the HK$1,700,000 already paid)  to Ds as consideration.  On 17 December 1997, P paid HK$987,000 by way of cheque and HK$463,000 in cash.  P as “Party B” and D1, D2, and D3 as “Party A” executed the Chinese Agreement. 

(e)  According to P, the Chinese Agreement has the effect to terminate, supersede and replace the Chinese Document and the Chinese Confirmation.

(f)  P then was informed by Ds that the Redevelopment Programme had been put on hold but had been reassured that when a new lot was assigned in exchange for Lot No 148 RP and the residential building was erected, Ds would proceed with the transfer of the new lot to P pursuant to the Chinese Agreement. 

(g)  On or around September 2011, D3 on behalf of Ds informed P that the Redevelopment Programme had resumed, and that Lot No 148 RP had been surrendered and exchanged for Lot No 460 and Lot No 461.  P was further informed that pursuant to the Chinese Agreement, P would be entitled to the Property.  

(h)  P contends that Ds now hold the Property on trust for her (on express trust, in the alternative a common intention constructive trust, in the alternative a resulting trust).

6.  Ds case is that:

(a)  Ds deny that there was any sale or trust arrangement in respect of the Property.  Instead, these were loan arrangements between P and D2.

(b)  Ds also assert that they had no authority to sell the property as the letters of administration of Mr Lam’s estate were not granted until 2007, and distribution of assets had yet to take place.  Ds also disputed that they had received the sum of HK$1,450,000. 

(c)  Ds also rely on a limitation defence. P’s claim based on trust or contract under the Chinese Agreement is time-barred by the time when the Writ of Summons in this Action was issued on 21 August 2014 with the cause of action extinguished by operation of the Limitation Ordinance (Cap 347)  in particular under ss 4 and 20(2)  thereof. 

PRINCIPLES FOR STRIKING OUT 

7.  The Parties agree that the principles set out in Ma CJ’s judgment in Wing Fai Construction Co Ltd v Yip Kwong Robert (2011)  14 HKCFAR 935 are applicable for striking out for want of prosecution:

(a)  Striking out should only be used in plain and obvious cases and as a last resort: it must be plain and obvious that by reason of his delay, a plaintiff should be deprived of the opportunity to go to trial for the resolution of his dispute with the defendant: at §§65, 73 & 75(1).

(b)  The foundation for the jurisdiction to strike out for inordinate and inexcusable delay must be predicated on an abuse of the process of the court by the plaintiff; mere delay is not sufficient to justify an order to strike out: at §§66, 68, 75(2)  & 75(5).

(c)  Merely for a party to start proceedings and then delay (which will often involve a failure to comply with the applicable rules of court)  will not necessarily amount to an abuse justifying an order to strike out an action. “Warehousing” justifies strike-out only where it clearly shows an abuse of process.  Abuse may be found where warehousing reveals no genuine intention to progress the claim to conclusion, or a wholesale disregard of rules or court orders: at §75(4).

(d)  Prejudice to the defendant is a factor relevant to the overall justice of the case: at §75(7).

(e)  Where all parties to the proceedings have the obligation to prosecute proceedings and assist the court in furthering the underlying objectives, it is relevant to consider the parties’ conduct and any failure on their part for the purpose of considering the question of abuse and the overall justice of the case.  There is no place for defendants to adopt the attitude of “letting sleeping dogs lie”, by sitting idly by and doing nothing, in the hope that sufficient delay would be accumulated so that some sort of prejudice can then be asserted: at §75(8).

(my emphasis). 

8.  As to assessment of prejudice and risk of impossibility of a fair trial, I refer to the following principles in Tsang Foo Keung v Chu Jim Mi Jimmy (unreported judgment of G Lam J, HCA 7140/1995, 12 July 2013)  that have since been adopted and applied by courts in subsequent cases (at §80):

(a)  The burden lies on the defendant to show prejudice or the impossibility of a fair trial.

(b)  That burden is normally discharged by evidence specifying the particular disadvantage suffered or anticipated; in appropriate cases, the judge may draw proper inferences: Shtun v Zalejska[1996] 1 WLR 1270, 1283B, 1285A.

(c)  The prejudicial effect of delay, and its impact on a fair trial, depends largely on the nature of the issues—especially whether the evidence is predominantly documentary or crucially oral: Shtun v Zalejska at 1290A.

(d)  General assertions that witnesses’ memories must have faded will usually not suffice; however, specific evidence of fading memory is not always essential if primary facts allow proper inferences: Rowe v Glenister, The Times, 7 August 1995, cited in Shtun v Zalejska, at 1283E, Yeung Kit Ling v Ma Kwan Ho Lawrence & Anor [2011] 3 HKC 115 at §26, per Stock VP; A & M Manufacturing and Marketing Ltd v Iu Po Shing, CACV 15/2011, 6 September 2011, at §48, per Fok JA.

(e)  The defendant must show that the prejudice or inability to have a fair trial is caused by delay in the action: Trill v Sacher [1993] 1 All ER 961 at 979j-980b, per Neill LJ.

(f)  The court may take into account what the defendant could reasonably be expected to have done which could have avoided or mitigated the prejudice he suffers or anticipates. If, for example, the defendant relies on the dimming of witnesses’ memories through the passing of time, the court will usually want to know what steps the defendant has taken in locating and proofing the potential witnesses: Wing Fai, para 75(8); Hymer v Mass Transit Railway Corporation [2000] 2 HKLRD 589, at p 610.

(my emphasis).

ANALYSIS

Inordinate delay

9.  Mr. Chan’s skeleton sets out a helpful chronology at §10 which I have summarised and added other key events below:

Date	Description
1992	Mr Lam passed away
March to May 1995	Chinese Document which P and D2 signed, and D1 as witness; and the Chinese Confirmation which D2 signed, and D3 as witness
December 1997	P and Ds entered into the Chinese Agreement
21 August 2014	P issued the Writ of Summons with Statement of Claim
19 November 2014	Ds filed their Defence
12 December 2014	P filed her Reply
June and July 2015	P provides police statements
14 July 2015	Police statement of Lam Wai Kit (D3)
24 July 2015	Police statement of Lam Wai Yin (D2)
December 2016 to March 2021	Correspondence between Police to P’s solicitors Messrs. Jal N Kabhari & Co
2016-2018, 2020-2022	Notices of Intention to Proceed were filed by P’s solicitors
August 2021	P terminated the retainer with Messrs Jal N Kabhari & Co for lack of progress and engaged Messrs. Raymond T M Lau & Co  P lodges complaints with Law Society and Bar Association
May 2022	Correspondence between Messrs Raymond T M Lau & Co and Police
26 July 2022	P filed Notice to Act in Person
30 October 2023	Messrs Raymond T M Lau & Co’s letter to Police enclosing affirmations
2023-2024	P filed Notices to Intention to Proceed
21 August 2024	Memorandum of Notification that a party has applied for Legal Aid was issued
28 November 2024	P was granted a Legal Aid Certificate.  Messrs Ho & Associates were assigned as P’s solicitors for these proceedings
30 April 2025	Counsel was assigned by the Director of Legal Aid to represent P
15 July 2025	P filed Notice to Act with a Mediation Certificate and timetabling questionnaire
28 July 2025	P filed Notice of Intention to Proceed
3 September 2025	P filed Case Management Summons
3 September 2025	Order by consent was granted appointing D3 as D1’s guardian ad litem
3 October 2025	Ds issued Summons

10.  Between December 2014 and August 2024, it took P a total of 9 years and 8 months to attempt to resume her civil claim. 

11.  In my view, there was inordinate delay.  However, delay per se is not a sufficient ground for abuse of process.  Delay alone cannot be sufficient to invoke the court’s jurisdiction to strike out a claim, bearing in mind striking out is a remedy of the last resort: Wing Fai Construction §75(4); Kincheng Banking Corporation v Toptime Internation Trading Limited & Others DCCJ 9012/2001, unreported, 5 June 2014 per Kent Yee DCJ at §15.

12.  In order for the “warehousing” of claims to justify striking out, it must be clear that the plaintiff is abusing the process of the court.  Accordingly, where the “warehousing” of claims indicates that there is simply no intention to bring proceedings to a conclusion or there is a “wholesale disregard” of the rules or court orders, abuse can be found to exist: The Agricultural Bank of China v Lau Yuet Wah and Others (HCA 2804/2000, unreported, 15 May 2012), per Recorder Rimsky Yuen SC at §34. 

13.  Here, P explains that the delay in proceeding with this Action was consistent with and driven by erroneous advice from her former legal teams and the Police that the civil action should be put on hold pending the police investigation. 

14.  Despite the inordinate delay, between 2016-2018 and 2020-2022, Notices of Intention to Proceed were filed by P’s solicitors.  P filed a Notice to Act in Person in 2022 and Notices of Intention to Proceed between 2023-2024.

15.  Until late 2023, both P’s former legal teams consistently advised her not to proceed with the civil action pending the criminal investigation. 

16.  P only learned in late 2023 during a consultation with Messrs Raymond T M Lau & Co and counsel, that the civil action could run in parallel with the police investigation, and she then obtained a second opinion through her daughter’s acquaintance and applied for Legal Aid.

17.  P then applied for Legal Aid in January 2024 and was granted a legal aid certificate in November 2024.  In November 2024, Messrs Ho & Associates were assigned to represent P and a Notice to Act, Mediation Certificate and Timetabling Questionnaire were filed in July 2025.  Also in July 2025, P filed a Notice of Intention to Proceed before taking out a Case Management Summons on 3 September 2025.  

18.  Based on the evidence before me, I cannot say that P lacked intention to bring the matter to a conclusion.  On the contrary, her repeated demands for updates from the Police and communications as indicated in the chronology at §9 above demonstrate a clear intention to progress the action.  She also promptly applied for Legal Aid after learning that the civil action could run in parallel with the police investigation.  

19.  While P has warehoused her claim against Ds in order to wait until the criminal investigation would be completed, it was only a temporary one.  This is not a case where P had no intention to bring this action to a conclusion, nor is this a case involving wholesale disregard of rules or court orders.  In the absence of such evidence that P lacked the intention to bring the matter to conclusion, even if her delay was inexcusable, I am of the view there is no abuse of process: The Agricultural Bank of China, per Recorder Rimsky Yuen SC at §35; Kincheng Banking Corporation, per Kent Yee DCJ at §18.

20.  Accordingly, I cannot conclude that there was an abuse of process by P.

Prejudice of Ds

21.  As stated above at §4(c), on 3 September 2025, an Order by consent was issued appointing D3 as D1’s guardian ad litem.  Mr Chan submitted that the loss of D1’s mental capacity prejudiced Ds case in the following way:

(a)  The negotiations in respect of the allegations made by P all took place in the 1990s (according to P in 1997).

(b)  In respect of the alleged representations made by Ds, all D1, D2, and D3 are referred to.

(c)  Therefore, it is necessary from all of Ds’ own perspectives, including that of D1, to provide evidence.

(d)  D1 is quite distinct from D2 and D3 as the latter were in their 20s at the material time. D1 is the matriarch and head of the family to represent Mr Lam’s estate.  She is the Administratrix.  D1 has a distinct lifestyle and identity compared to D2 and D3 and their explanations would be different.

22.  It is necessary to analyse the pleadings to ascertain if Ds have suffered prejudice.  P has alleged in her SOC and Reply that:

(a)  The negotiations with P for the sale and purchase of Mr Lam’s half share of Lot No 148 RP were with D1, D2 and D3 (§13 of SOC);

(b)  D1, D2, and/or D3 represented to P that Mr Lam’s half share of Lot No 148 RP can be surrendered and exchanged for a new lot (later known as Lot No 460)  (§14 of SOC);

(c)  D1, D2, and/or D3 offered to sell to P the ground floor and first floor level of the residential building of Lot No 460 at a price of HK$1,700,000 (§14 of SOC);

(d)  In reliance on D1, D2, and/or D3’s representation, P accepted D1, D2 and/or D3’s offer and sold her apartment in Shatin to raise funds for the purchase (§17 of SOC);

(e)  D1, D2, and D3 agreed to sell to P the third floor level and the rooftop of the residential building of Lot No 460 at the price of HK$1,450,000 (§22 of SOC); 

(f)  It was agreed among D1, D2, D3, and P that the monies already received by D2 and/or D2 for and on behalf of Ds in the sum of HK$1,700,000 be applied towards the sum of HK$3,150,000 as agreed in the Chinese Agreement for the purchase of Mr Lam’s portion of Lot No 148 RP and the building thereon which would be subsequently surrendered and exchanged for another lot and residential building thereon (§25 of SOC); and

(g)  P was led to believe by D1, D2, and D3’s representation that D1, D2, and D3 were entitled to Mr Lam’s half share of Lot No 148 RP and that D1, D2, and D3 had authority or locus to deal with and/dispose of and/or handle issues in relation to Lot No 148 RP.  P relied on D1, D2, and D3’s representation that D1, D2 and D3 were entitled to Mr Lam’s half share of Lot No 148 RP and that D1, D2, and/or D3 had authority or locus to deal with and/or dispose of and/or hand issues in relation to Lot No 148 RP, including but not limited to the surrender and exchange of Lot No 148 RP for a new lot.  Thus P further entered into a sale and purchase agreement with D1, D2 and/or D3, whereby D1, D2, and D3 sold and P purchased the Property upon Lot No 148 RP being surrendered and exchanged for the new lot.  It was also on this basis that P signed and executed the Chinese Document and/or Chinese Confirmation and/or Chinese Agreement with D1, D2, and/or D3 (§4 of Reply). 

23.  According to Ds’ case (as pleaded at §8(2)(a)  of the Defence), in or around February 1995, at the request of D2 in his personal capacity, P (who is a family friend of Mr Lam)  orally agreed to advance a loan of HK$800,000 to D2.  D2 also told P that he expected that he would be able to repay P in two or three years’ time, by which he expected to receive his share of Mr Lam’s estate. 

24.  Pursuant to the oral agreement, P advanced part of the loan in the sum of HK$70,000 to D2 by depositing the same into his bank account with Hang Seng Bank on 23 February 1995.  On a date before 4 March 1995, D2 asked P to increase the loan to him to HK$1,700,000. D2 again told P that he expected that he would be able to repay P in two or three years’ time, by which he expected to receive his share of Mr Lam’s estate (§§8(2)(b)  and (c)  of the Defence). 

25.  It is Ds’ case that on that occasion, P agreed to increase the loan to D2 to HK$1,700,000 on the condition that D2 would have to put up security for repayment of loan and interest, in that D2 had to execute an agreement to be supplied by P whereby he agreed to convey his own interest and/or entitlement in Lot No 148 RP (if any)  which he thought and expected he would receive from distribution of Mr Lam’s estate in the future to P if he was unable to repay the loan to her.  D2 agreed. It was in this context that P produced the Chinese Document for D2 to sign, which he did.  On the same day as D2 signed on the Chinese Document (4 March 1995), D2 received a further advance of the loan from P in the sum of HK$430,000 by way of cashier’s order (§§8(2)(d)  to (f)  of the Defence). 

26.  On or about 19 May 1995, P paid the balance of the loan in the sum of HK$1,200,000 which P had promised to advance to D2.  According to D2, P also produced the Chinese Confirmation and asked D2 to sign, which he did.  Ds admit the three payments made by P to D2 but these were advancement of a loan to D2 personally (§§9(2)  and 10 of the Defence). 

27.  As to the Chinese Agreement, it is Ds’ case that in mid-December 1997, P agreed with D2 that she would advance a further loan to him and would extend the time for D2 to repay all the loan and accrued interest to P, but only on the condition that D1, D2 and D3 signed on the Chinese Agreement produced by P as security for repayment of the further loan to D2 if D2 was unable to repay (§13(3)(c)  of the Defence). D2 recalls that P advanced the further loan by way of cheque issued in favour of D2 which was received and cashed by him in his personal capacity (§13(3)(d)  of the Defence). 

28.  According to Ds, they did not know who drafted the Chinese Agreement and signed it as told by P so as to enable D2 to receive the further loan from her (§13(3)(e)  of the Defence). D1 and D3 had never received any part of the sums advanced by P to D2 and they could not have held onto the same on trust for P (§20(3)  of the Defence). 

29.  I agree with Ms Ng that even on Ds’ case, the key witness as pleaded above by Ds is D2.  Ds’ case is that there were loan arrangements between P and D2.  D2 received all the sums paid by P. 

30.  Regarding P’s case, the allegations set out above are made against all of D1, D2, and D3. Both D2 and D3 can give evidence as to these allegations.  Ds have denied the negotiations regarding the sale and purchase of Mr Lam’s half share of Lot No 148 RP, and the nature and effect of the Chinese Document, Chinese Confirmation and Chinese Agreement given to them by P.  I am of the view that any prejudice by not having D1 give evidence can be overcome by D2 and D3 giving evidence. 

31.  In any event, the principal facts are evidenced by documents.  D2 signed the Chinese Document and Chinese Confirmation, received the payments, and can give evidence of negotiations, execution, and performance. The Chinese Agreement was signed by all Ds.

32.  There are also specific allegations made by P against D2 or D3 that can be addressed solely by them.  On P’s case, D3 on behalf of all Ds informed P that the Redevelopment Programme had resumed and Lot No 148 RP was surrendered and exchanged for Lot No 460 and Lot No 461, and P shall be entitled to Lot No 460 whereas Mr Tsang would be entitled to Lot No 461.  On P’s case, P confirmed with D3 about the Chinese Agreement and that the Property shall be transferred to P without P paying further monies to Ds. 

33.  On P’s case, D3 on behalf of Ds informed P that P needed to pay a premium for the Property.  In or around December 2011, D2 on behalf of Ds invited P and her two brothers to Messrs Liau, Ho & Chan to discuss the premium with Mr Li, a solicitor.  Mr Li provided P with documents in the presence of D2. 

34.  I do not think that Ds have made out a case of prejudice in light of both P’s and Ds’ pleaded cases. 

Conduct of Ds

35.  It is also relevant to look at the conduct of Ds during the period of delay when determining whether prejudice has been suffered.  The Parties share responsibility to advance the proceedings.  Ds are not entitled to adopt the “letting the sleeping dogs lie” approach: Wing Fai Construction Co Ltd., per Ma CJ at §75(8); The Agricultural Bank of China, per Recorder Rimsky Yuen SC at §35; China Railway Investments Group v Eternity Profit Investments Limited & Anor [2018] HKCFI 1928 per Mimmie Chan J at §§38, 40 & 43. 

36.  In China Railway Investments Group, Mimmie Chan J observed that if prejudice is alleged to have been sustained as a result of any alleged delay, the Court would expect to be informed of the steps which had been taken by to locate witnesses, to obtain affidavits or witness statements from the essential witnesses as to the discussions and meetings alleged by the plaintiff to have taken place, and whether these would be adequate to safeguard the interests of the 2^nd defendant, and to remedy any prejudice alleged to have been caused by the delay.  None was forthcoming from the 2^nd defendant in that case (at §40).

37.  In Patrick Hung Hing Yu v Ho Yin Man and Others [2024] HKCFI 3186, Recorder Eugene Fung SC observed that the defendant who failed to preserve a potential witness’s evidence at an early stage is not entitled to complain of prejudice from delay (at §27(3)-(4)). 

38.  Ds’ conduct in letting “sleeping dogs lie” troubles me the most.  No evidence has been adduced by Ds as to the steps taken to remedy any prejudice alleged to have been caused by the delay.  It is no answer that Ds honestly believed that the primary responsibility for prosecuting the claim rests with P (§19(a)  of D3’s 3^rd Affirmation).  It was already clear that D1 was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease for many years and had cognitive impairment prior to the period of delay complained of (D3’s police statement dated 14 July 2025 at §§15 and 28; D2’s police statement dated 24 July 2015 at §17).  Ds took no steps to “equip oneself to fight the dog” in case it wakes up, such as preserve D1’s evidence by taking a witness statement during the period of delay to safeguard the interests of Ds and/or to remedy any potential prejudice suffered or anticipated.  They knew full well that D1 required medical treatment for her condition.  Ds could have mitigated the delay by doing so.  They had a duty to preserve evidence: Tsang Foo Keung at §80(7).  Ds were only compelled to issue the Summons after P had been granted Legal Aid and had taken out a Case Management Summons. 

Whether prejudice was caused by P’s delay

39.  Even if there was prejudice (which I did not find due to the reasons provided above at §§29-38), on balance, I am of the view that Ds have not met their burden of proof of establishing that this was caused by P. 

40.  Mr Wong submitted that the period of deterioration between 2015 and 2025 was the same period of delay.  As can be seen from the medical report prepared by Dr Wong Yee Him on D1 dated 6 August 2025, D1 had totally lost mental capacity and her condition was very severe.  It was not a result of a short period of time that she was so incapacitated.

41.  Mr Wong submitted that the police statements given by D2 and D3 in July 2015 were unhelpful to P’s case as they showed D1’s condition was not serious enough at that time as D1 could serve as the Administratrix of the estate, sign the lease agreements and collect rent (D3’s police statement dated 14 July 2015 at §33; D2’s police statement dated 24 July 2015 at §§20, 51-52).

42.  However, from the police statements given by D2 and D3, it was already clear that D1 was suffering from Alzheimer’s disease for many years and had cognitive impairment prior to the period of delay complained of (see above at §38).  D3 stated that he had hoped the Police would not harass his mother (by obtaining a witness statement)  due to her cognitive impairment (D3’s police statement dated 14 July 2015 at §15).  She was already receiving medical treatment at the time for a “long-term illness” (D2’s police statement dated 24 July 2015 at §17).

43.  In conclusion, for all the reasons provided above, I do not think this case warrants an order for striking-out.

DISPOSITION

44.  I formally make an order that Ds’ Summons be dismissed. 

45.  As to costs, I order that costs of this application be paid by Ds to P to be summarily assessed.  I order that P’s own costs be taxed in accordance with the Legal Aid Regulations.

46.  For the purpose of the summary assessment of costs, I direct that:-

(a)  P do lodge and serve her Statement of Costs on D within 3 days hereof;

(b)  Ds do lodge and serve their List of Objections to P’s Statement of Costs within 4 days thereafter;

(c)  Assessment of costs shall be conducted on paper without a further hearing.

47.  I thank Ms Ng and Mr Chan for their helpful assistance.