NGUYEN THI THU HONG AND OTHERS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 2114/2020

[2026] HKCFI 3314

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2114 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 16 April 2026 (“the Summons”), the 1^st applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 1 April 2026, which dismissed the 1^st and 2^nd applicants’ application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 16 June 2020 and the 3^rd applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 28 September 2022.

2.  At the oral hearing of the Summons on 28 May 2026, the 1^st applicant confirmed that the application for extension of time was made on behalf of all three applicants, ie including the 2^nd and 3^rd applicants as well.

3.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

4.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

5.  As my order was made on 1 April 2026, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 15 April 2026. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicants require leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

6.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

7.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

8.  In the Summons and her supporting affirmation dated 16 April 2026, the 1^st applicant did not give any reason for her delay in lodging the appeal, nor any ground for the intended appeal. The 1^st applicant only mentioned in the Summons that my decision was not reasonable, but she did not give any particulars as to why my decision was not reasonable.

9.  At the hearing of the Summons on 28 May 2026, the 1^st applicant first said that she did not think that she was late in lodging the appeal. When I referred the 1^st applicant to her supporting affirmation where she stated that she was late to appeal and she was requesting extension of time, the 1^st applicant then said that she could not recall the details as it happened long time ago. She only knew that she received a letter which requested her to go to Admiralty and she asked a friend to type the appeal application for her which was then submitted by her. The 1^st applicant further said that she did not receive the letter in time and her friend told her that she lost the application and it was late.

10.  The 1^st applicant filed the Summons on 16 April 2026, which was just one day after the deadline for lodging the intended appeal. Thus, I am not going to take issue on this short delay. However, the applicants did not provide any valid ground for the intended appeal. When I asked the 1^st applicant for the grounds of appeal at the hearing, she simply replied that they were still having the outstanding loan in Vietnam, which they could not repay, and the gangsters were still hunting them. She asked for permission to stay here for a further period of time and for her children to attend school here until they have grown up.

11.  For this application to be successful, the applicants must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

12.  The applicants failed to demonstrate any of the above. The allegation that my decision was not reasonable is just a general assertion without any particulars which cannot be a valid ground of appeal. What the 1^st applicant said at the hearing are clearly not grounds of appeal at all. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

13.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicants to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

14.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.