JAIDEEP SINGH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE

HCAL 721/2020

[2025] HKCFI 3597

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 721 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  By a summons issued on 24 July 2025, the Applicant applies for extension of time to appeal the order of this Court dated 9 July 2025 (“the Order”) refusing him leave to apply for judicial review (“JR”). His intended JR was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“TCAB”) dated 30 March 2020 on his non-refoulement claim.

2.  An applicant does not require leave to appeal against a Court of First Instance (“CFI”) judge’s refusal to grant leave to apply for judicial review (Order 59, rule 21(1)(g), Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A). However, an applicant who wishes to appeal against such refusal has to observe the time limit under Order 53, rule 3(4), i.e., within 14 days after the refusal. The 14-day period against the Order expired on 23 July 2025. The Applicant was late for 1 day when the present summons was filed.

3.  A CFI judge has the power to extend the said 14-day appeal period under Order 59, rule 2B(6). The application to extend time must be made promptly. It should be supported by an affirmation deposing any facts relied upon by an applicant and giving a full account of, and explanation for, the whole delay since the expiry of time. In considering whether to extend time for the intended appeal, the Court shall have regard to: (i) the length of the delay; (ii) the reasons for the delay; (iii) the prospect of success in the intended appeal; and (iv) the prejudice to the respondent if extension of time was granted (Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226; and Re Saqlain Muhammad [2018] HKCA 346).

4.  In the Applicant’s supporting affirmation, he claimed that he did not receive the “Judgment Letter” from the High Court even though he had updated his address. Nevertheless, he was able to exhibit to his affirmation dated 24 July 2025 a copy of the Form CALL-1 refusing JR leave, which was issued by this Court on 9 July 2025 ([2025] HKCFI 2909) and reflective of the Order. The Applicant has not explained how he obtained the relevant copy in the affirmation.

5.  In any event, the delay of 1 day cannot be regarded as significant. I am prepared to accept that the Applicant has not acted unreasonably in missing the deadline of 23 July 2025. There will also be no prejudice to any party if extension of time is granted.

6.  I should instead focus on the prospect of success in the intended appeal. It is well established that the Court does not provide a further avenue of appeal on the merits of the underlying non-refoulement claim. In an appeal against refusal of JR leave in a non-refoulement case, the Court of Appeal would only examine the decision of the CFI judge in light of the grounds advanced by the applicant. If no viable ground is put forward to reverse the judge, the appeal should be dismissed (Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

7.  In the Applicant’s summons and supporting affirmation, the Applicant failed to put forth any proposed ground(s) of appeal. In the oral hearing before this Court, I requested the court interpreter to interpret the contents of the Form CALL-1 of this case to the Applicant and further asked if the Applicant has any proposed ground(s) of appeal against the Order. Still, the Applicant has not been able to identify or advance any. The Applicant just repeated he did not receive the Court’s letter, even though I took pain to explain to him my focus was not on reason for delay but prospect of appeal. At one stage, he even said “I don’t have any problem with this decision”. In the absence of any suggested error in my decision to refuse him JR leave, I do not see any prospect of success in his intended appeal at all.

8.  Having considered all the relevant factors to which I should have regard, I decide that the interest of justice does not require me to grant an extension of time in the circumstances of this case. Accordingly, the application for extension of time to appeal is refused and the Applicant’s summons is dismissed.