GURUNG KIRPA v. SPARKLE ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES LTD

DCPI 1728/2023

[2025] HKDC 883

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

PERSONAL INJURIES ACTION NO 1728 OF 2023

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BETWEEN

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JUDGMENT

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1.  This is the trial of a personal injury action in the Running List arising out of a work accident the Plaintiff (“P”) had when he was employed by the Defendant (“D”).

2.  Both liability and quantum are contested.

3.  P himself and the Vice Operation Manager (副營運經理) of D, Mr Wong Ka Lun (“Wong”), respectively gave evidence. Both of them I find are honest and reliable witnesses and I accept both of their evidence, which in fact does not materially conflict. Mr Hussain Abid (“Abid”), a colleague of P, was originally intended to give evidence for P. After D agreed to be adduced certain photos taken by Abid of the scene very shortly after the accident, P decided not to call him.

The accident

4.  P is Nepali. He has resided in Hong Kong since 2010. He was 40 years old at the time and was employed by D as a street cleaning worker. His working hours were 6:30 am to 5:30 pm.

5.  D was a cleaning services provider at the material time having contracted with Food and Environmental Hygiene Department (“FEHD”) to provide services to clean the public areas in 4 areas in Hong Kong. These areas were not delineated according to the administrative districts but were conveniently referred to as “油尖旺 (南)”, “油尖旺 (北)”, “將軍澳” and “西貢”. The accident occurred while P was instructed to work in “油尖旺 (南)” area and some evidence was elicited at trial on the boundary of this area, for the present purpose it is not necessary to say more about it.

6.  Around 7:20 am on 6 June 2020 when P was performing cleaning work on the rear lane of No.115 Chatham Road South, Tsim Sha Tsui (“the Rear Lane”), as instructed by the foreman, one Mr 陳耀林 (“Foreman Chan”) according to Wong but P only knew him as “boss”, his head was struck by a hard falling object. He was then wearing a cloth cap bearing the name of D which was provided and required to be worn by D. He felt dizzy and was bleeding. He did not see the object when it struck him, but immediately after the accident he noticed a piece of glass on the floor near where he stood which was not there moments ago as he had just cleaned the vicinity. He then asked for help and moments later was sent to Queen Elizabeth Hospital (“QEH”) by ambulance.

7.  On learning about the accident at the scene, Abid went to the Rear Lane and took several photos[1]. One of them[2] depicted a piece of window pane glass, said by P to be about 15 x 15 inches in measurements, cracked and crooked, but still in one piece. On my part, I would estimate it to be about 10 x 8 inches. Anyway, it was the kind that was about ¼ inch in thickness and had metal mesh wires embedded in the middle to hold the glass together to prevent it from shattering. P identified the glass depicted in that photo as the piece of glass he saw nearby after he was struck (“the Fallen Glass”).

8.  D in cross-examining P suggested that he in fact slipped and fell based on certain information on the Ambulance Journey Record. But that suggestion was, I think rightly, no longer pursued in the closing submissions. I find that the accident happened as above narrated.

9.  After treatment, P was discharged from QEH the same day. The next day, he went back to the Rear Lane and took a number of photos of the surroundings[3]. Most of them were included in the trial bundles, but one. And this photo was only sought to be included in the trial bundles at P’s opening[4]. It was a close-up photo depicting the outer wall of a building named Kency Tower[5] viewed from the Rear Lane. P identified in evidence that the location was where he stood when he had the accident. The photo showed that a number of glass panes were broken in the windows on the 2^nd floor and seriously cracked in the windows on the 3^rd floors of that building (or 3^rd and 4^th floor, as it was not entirely clear from the photo), and the glass panes of these windows were of the same type as the Fallen Glass. There can also be observed in the middle of that photo that a piece of the same type of glass was lying rather precariously on the horizontal iron bars located outside the wall between the 2^nd and 3^rd floors.

10.  Mr Wong, counsel for P, in the middle of trial sought to introduce a factual case that the Fallen Glass fell from or came from the said windows of Kency Tower, as shown or suggested by what was depicted in that photo. I accepted the objection raised by Mr Ho, counsel for D, and ruled that P could not now do so as such allegation was never stated in P’s witness statement or introduced anywhere, and it would be too late and prejudicial to D for P to introduce that now by the reliance on that photograph.

The Rear Lane

11.  I would next briefly describe the Rear Lane from what I can observe from all the photos depicting it. It is material as P pleaded that “there were a lot of unauthorized building structures and/or authorized building structures and/or items protruding from and/or attached on the buildings around the Rear Lane” and “the buildings around the Rear Lane were and are old buildings which [sic] external walls were and are in a dilapidated condition”[6]. This is denied in the Defence[7] and Mr Ho challenged that there was no evidence showing any structure along or on both sides of the Rear Lane was unauthorized.

12.  Despite positively denying in the Defence P’s case regarding the surroundings of the Rear Lane, D only proffered but one photo of the Rear Lane and no other evidence thereon. The photo was a small one printed as part of [8] of Wong’s witness statement[8]. It depicted a narrower section of the Rear Lane of about 5 to 6 feet in width with no objects attached to the walls on both sides and the floor was clean. It was a photo Wong took days after the accident and it was not his evidence that the photo depicted the scene of the accident; and I find that it did not.

13.  The photos taken by Abid[9] and P[10], according to P’s evidence which I accept, depicted the section of the Rear Lane where the accident occurred. The Rear Lane there was wider, about 8 to 10 feet in width. On the right side was the perimeter wall of Kency Tower, of about 7 to 10 feet tall, on and along its top was erected an iron bar fence of about another 10 feet tall. The iron fence had 2 layers of protruding hook shape iron bars, protruding out about a foot towards the Rear Lane, one at mid-height of the fence and another at the top of the fence, presumably to prevent climbing on it from the Rear Lane. There was also a large PVC pipe (of 6 to 8 inches in diameter) running along the full length and on the top of the iron fence. There were various pipes and bars of various diameters and length, some made of plastic and some metal, hanging or placed on the iron fence or running from the fence onto the back wall of Kency Tower irregularly, and some of them did not look well and securely affixed. There were various kinds of rubbish seen caught on the top of wall and by the iron fence. I have also described in [9] above the broken window panes and the hanging glass depicted in the close-up picture. On the wall on the other side of the Rear Lane were a number of air-conditioning units placed on top of metal shelves attached to the wall, placed at about 8 to 10 feet above the ground (as measured from the bottom of those shelves) and protruding out about 2 to 3 feet. Most metal shelves or fences depicted in these photos appeared old and rusted. I make my findings on the surroundings of the relevant section of the Rear Lane as above-described.

Liability

14.  As usual, P pleaded that D breached its employer’s duty of care in numerous ways prolixly. At trial, Mr Wong focused on D’s breach two-fold. Firstly, there was D’s failure to assess the risk of injury to P from falling objects when he was working on the rear lanes; and that if proper assessment was done, D ought to have appraised that there was more than negligible risk and therefore ought to have taken reasonable measures to prevent exposing its employees to such unnecessary risk. Secondly, D failed to provide a safety helmet and the instruction and training to P to wear it to protect himself from injury caused by falling objects when cleaning the rear lanes.

15.  D’s defence case, though canvassed at trial with different expressions concerning “foreseeable risk” or “low risk”, is essentially that there was no negligence on the part of D as “the risk of objects falling from height and hitting someone at public street was so low that it was reasonable for employers not to take any specific steps to guard against such risk”[11].

16.  D particularly relied on (a) the undisputed evidence of Wong, who has more than 20 years’ experience in his work with cleaning companies in Hong Kong, that he has not heard of any accident in which a street cleaning worker in Hong Kong was hit by a falling object, (b) P’s own evidence that he has not heard about such a kind of accident himself, and (c) as a matter of common knowledge, pedestrians and workers working at public streets (like postmen, pamphlet distributors, delivery workers etc) rarely if ever wear helmets on public streets.

17.  Mr Ho referred to the well-known statement of Lord Reid, in the context of a claim by an employee against his employer, in Morris v West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co Ltd [1956] AC 552, at 574 that :

“… it is the duty of an employer, in considering whether some precaution should be taken against a foreseeable risk, to weight, on the one hand, the magnitude of the risk, the likelihood of an accident happening and the possible seriousness of the consequences if an accident does happen, and, on the other hand, the difficulty and expense and any other disadvantage of taking the precaution.”

18.  Mr Ho emphasized that reasonable foreseeability of an accident alone was not sufficient to found liability, the Court has to consider the chances of an accident happening, the potential seriousness of an accident and the measures which could be taken to minimize or avoid accident. He cited the following cases as illustrations and submitted that “the employer is not obliged to take precaution against every conceivable foreseeable risk. It also depends on the chance of such risk materializes and results in injuries”[12]:

(a) Lewis v Wandsworth London Borough Council [2020] EWHC 3205 (QB), in which the local authority was found not liable to the user of a public park who was struck by a cricket ball hit beyond the boundary of a pitch situated within the park, against the background that cricket had been regularly played there since 1897 with no record of any previous incident.

(b) Brewer v Delo [1967] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 488, in which a golfer hooked his drive off the tee and the ball hit the eye of another player 200 yards away and it was held that the risk of such an accident happening was either unforeseeable or was so small that a reasonable man would be justified in disregarding it.

(c) Gillon v Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police 1997 SLT 1218 in which the Chief Constable was held not liable to a police officer standing on the track next to the pitch at a football match watching an incident in the crowd when a player accidentally careered off the pitch and collided with her causing injury, since the risk was so minimal it could safely be ignored.

(d) Blair-Ford v CRS Adventures Ltd [2012] EWHC 2360, where a teacher attending a residential activity course with pupils suffered serious injury when he participated in an event which involved throwing a Wellington boot backwards through his legs, but “the execution on the throw brought together a combination of circumstances which cumulatively could not have been foreseen”, was at most “a mere possibility which would never have influenced the mind of a reasonable man” and “a tragic and freak accident for which no blame can be established.”

19.  These cases plainly were decided on their own facts. In the paragraph in Charlesworth & Percy on Negligence 15^th ed next to one cited by Mr Ho, that is [8-14], the learned authors went on to note the cases decided otherwise, thus :

“… However, golf course owners were liable to a pedestrian, who was struck on the head by a golf ball, while walking along a narrow public lane: about 6000 shots a year went over the fence onto the lane, so that, although there was no previous history of accident, it was nevertheless a foreseeable happening [Lamond v Glasgow Corp 1968 S.L.T. 291]. Also, where occupiers allowed children to play football on a piece of open grassland from which, from time to time, balls were kicked out onto the road, so that on one such occasion a passing motorcyclist was struck and killed as a result of his being knocked off his machine, they were held to have failed to take reasonable care [Hilder v Associated Portland Cement Manufacturers Ltd [1961] 1 W.L.R. 1434]. The proximity of the road, the amount of traffic, the age of the children, the nature of their amusements and the frequency with which the green was used, were all matters which a reasonable man must have considered. The risk of damage to persons using the road as a result of the children's activities was not so small that it could be safely disregarded.”

20.  Indeed, in Lewis v Wandsworth London Borough Council at [11(iii)], Stewart J distilled from Bolton v Stone [1951] AC 850 one of the important principles, which was that “there needs to be careful analysis of the facts”.

21.  That takes me to 2 relevant factual matters in the present case, one by way of background and not controversial, the other was an aspect of P’s duties which was disputed.

22.  The first matter is that Wong accepted in evidence that since 2019, the unhygienic conditions of rear lanes in various older districts in Hong Kong, like Tsim Sha Tsui, Yau Ma Tei, Mongkok, Sham Shui Po and such, had been publicized in the news and media and the Government through FEHD began to focus on cleansing these rear lanes with a view to deliver evident results. He said in evidence that one of his duties was to accompany officials from FEHD to conduct periodic random checks on the cleanliness of areas D was responsible for and, though not exclusively, but particularly, to check the rear lanes. He added that therefore he himself would conduct similar random checks on behalf of D to ensure.

23.  The second matter is this. Though it is common ground that P was instructed to clean the Rear Lane, neither party specified what P’s other duties were and how frequently P was assigned to clean rear lanes. When this was discussed in P’s opening, Mr Wong indicated that he would seek leave to provide top-up evidence in chief by P to the effect that since P was employed by D on 1 May 2020 and until the occurrence of the accident, P and another Nepali colleague had been assigned by Foreman Chan to cleanse the same 4 close-by rear lanes in the “油尖旺(南)” area (one of them being the Rear Lane), that each working day they would cleanse these 4 rear lanes one by one and return to the them and cleanse another round, for about 3 to 4 rounds a day, essentially to ensure that they remained clean all day. A short adjournment was then given for counsel to take instructions and for the parties to consider. D then indicated no objection with the condition that similar leave would be given to Wong to provide top-up evidence in chief on the same topic. On that footing and also in view of D’s agreement to produce Abid’s photos, after P finished giving evidence Mr Wong indicated that P would not call Abid. P gave oral top-up evidence to the effect as described. He was then cross-examined thereon rather intensively by Mr Ho, among other topics.

24.  Wong began his evidence the next day. He was given ample opportunities in top-up evidence in chief to respond to P’s case and evidence on P’s routine duties. All Wong was able to say was that he did not “agree” that such was the arrangement regarding P’s work duties, as such seemed to him would not be very efficient use of man-power, and that he would have thought the efficient way was having a group of workers cleaning a locality (including the open streets and rear lanes there) and then moved on from there to the next locality. Wong also said that at the material time D employed about 150 workers for “油尖旺(南)” and “油尖旺(北)” areas, and the daytime shift for these 2 areas would consist of about 100 workers. In cross-examination, Wong said that the work assignments of workers were delegated to and decided by the foremen, each of whom would oversee about 30 to 40 workers. He had been asked several times about the work duties of P, he accepted that he did not have any knowledge on the assignment or duties of individual workers, not to say P’s in this specific instance, and he did not mention any documents or records that would record individual worker’s specific daily duties or assignments. Also, in his witness statement, Wong has already said that D tried to contact Foreman Chan to be a witness but was unable to as Foreman Chan has left the employment of D in April 2022.

25.  I was favourably impressed by P as a direct and truthful witness and find him as one.

26.  Mr Ho submitted that the duties so described by P was implausible and P’s evidence thereon should be rejected in that (a) such assignment of duties were inefficient, as Wong said, (b) cleaning the same rear lanes about 4 times a day did not make sense as few people go to rear lanes, (c) it did not make sense that if P’s duties were to clean rear lanes, that he was assigned only to clean these 4 specific ones as there should be a few dozen rear lanes in the area, and (d) if 2 workers cleaned 4 rear lanes, it would have meant that D needed to employ more manpower to handle the area.

27.  There was simply no evidence on the total number of rear lanes to be cleaned in that area to support points (c) and (d) above. Bearing in mind the undisputed backdrop that FEHD was rather keenly focused on cleansing the rear lanes and was taking measures to ensure that such maintenance of cleanliness was evident to the public, I think the so-called “efficient” work arrangement of cleaning the public streets together with the rear lanes in the same locality by one group of workers which would move along different localities would not be best able to achieve such focus, but on the contrary, such an arrangement as recounted by P would. In all, I do not accept D’s submission that such arrangement of job duties recounted by P was implausible, but rather, I find it probable in the circumstances.

28.  As said, I find P a truthful and credible witness and his evidence thereon was not at all shaken by the intensive cross-examination. I have no hesitation in accepting his evidence regarding his work duties as described above.

29.  For completeness, I would mention that in his Closing Submissions (and not earlier when leave to give top-up evidence was discussed) D complained that P’s such case on his routine duties was not pleaded, that D was prejudiced in that D was deprived of an opportunity to adduce “duty list” or to call a co-worker to shed light on P’s duties. As have mentioned, D raised no objection when such leave was discussed and the parties conducted the trial on that footing, Wong made no mention about any documentary evidence recording the daily duties of individual workers, and apparently attempts had already been made by D to locate witnesses (when D was still challenging that the accident might have been caused by a fall) but none was located or called by D. I thus find no substance or merits in D’s belated complaints.

30.  I thus find that P’s work duties at the material times, which he was obligated as an employee to perform as instructed, consisted of cleansing the 4 rear lanes for a greater part of the 11 working hours each working day.

31.  Moreover, to perform the work, his gaze would be on the ground most of the time and, while in any particular rear lane, he would not be moving too much around at pace like a passer-by but would be relatively stationary. I mention these rather obvious matters as it seems to me that, all things being equal, his chance of being hit by any falling object while in any of the rear lanes would therefore be higher than, say, any passer-by, or as Mr Ho mentioned, any delivery worker or postman, who though works on a public street, would be moving around rather constantly.

32.  In considering the chance or likelihood of any accident or injury caused by a falling object, Mr Ho argued by analogy transposing the usual lack of such a risk on a public street to that in respect of rear lanes in the Tsim Sha Tsui area. Mr Ho also argued that the Court could not assume that a rear lane is necessarily riskier in that regards, as there was no statistic evidence or “qualitative evidence” showing the same.

33.  With respect, Mr Ho conveniently and completely disregarded the actual surroundings of the Rear Lane as established by evidence. I have referred to the photos proffered by P and Abid and the only small photo adduced by D depicting the other section of the Rear Lane, and made my findings on the actual surroundings of the Rear Lane. Based on such findings, I further find that there were foreseeable, and I would even say lurking, risks of an accident and injury caused by objects falling onto the Rear Lane from height.

34.  Moreover and speaking more generally, there are plainly many differences in the physical features of the general surroundings of a public street from those of a rear lane in Tsim Sha Tsui, including, (a) a rear lane in Tsim Sha Tsui is very likely to be narrow, while in all probabilities a street is much wider than a rear lane, (b) a rear lane is usually enclosed on both sides by the perimeter walls of buildings while most public streets are not, and (c) the pedestrian walkways of streets are usually canopied where there are buildings erected, while rear lanes are not.

35.  In my judgment, the actual surroundings of the Rear Lane and these general differences in features are sufficient for me, without labouring further, to reject D’s such arguments attempting to ask the Court to make a finding equating the levels of risk of an accident or injury from falling objects between a public street and the rear lanes in Tsim Sha Tsui.

36.  Weighing the factors as spelled out in the statement of Lord Reid in Morris v West Hartlepool Steam Navigation Co Ltd, I take the view that the magnitude of the risk and the likelihood of an accident happening was clearly higher in the case of rear lanes in Tsim Sha Tsui as compared to a public street, and clearly not remotely small in the case of the Rear Lane, that the likelihood was further made higher when taking into consideration the long hours P was required by D to perform street cleaning in the rear lanes each day and day in and day out, that the possible consequence of such an accident and injury could be serious and most importantly, the expenses and difficulty to avoid such risk of accident and injury, as was common ground, was minimal in that these safety helmets were not at all expensive to procure and the instruction and training to ensure a worker wore one was simple and straightforward.

37.  Thus, I hold that the risk was one that a reasonably careful employer should not have disregarded or ignored, and that D was negligent in failing to ensure the reasonable safety of P while at work.

38.  Mr Ho accepted that in the event the Court found that the risk was one that D should not disregard or ignore and should have taken precaution against, then D should, as part of the performance of the duty D owed as employer to P, to conduct a risk assessment, which, as was common ground, D has failed to. In this regard, therefore, I also hold that D has failed in its duty and was negligent.

39.  I also record that at trial, D no longer pursued the plea of contributory negligence on the part of P. I thus hold D 100% liable.

Quantum

40.  The parties disputed on (a) the amount of damages for PSLA, (b) the period over which P should be awarded pre-trial loss of earnings, (c) whether damages for loss of earning capacity should be awarded, and if so, how much, and (d) whether the usual interest should not accrue on the amount of HK$115,000 since 20 January 2021 as the same was the employees’ compensation already received by P latest on that date, which is common ground.

41.  The parties have agreed on (a) the amount of HK$15,965 as P’s monthly income for the purpose of calculating loss of earnings, and (b) all special damages totalling to HK$30,393.

42.  The parties have adduced the single joint expert report of Dr Brian Choa, a specialist in neurology, without calling him. Dr Choa examined P on 21 March 2024.

43.  P was diagnosed in QEH as suffering from scalp laceration on the forehead. The wound was sutured, and he was discharged the same day. He attended Yau Ma Tei Jockey Club Clinic on 14 June 2020 and 16 June 2020 for dizziness and was referred to Accident and Emergency Unit of Hospital Authority for further assessment. On 17 June 2020, he attended QEH. He was admitted. Computed tomography of brain was performed showing no intracranial haemorrhage or skull fracture. He was discharged the same day. He was followed up in QEH last on 14 July 2020. He was given sick leave by that clinic and QEH until 30 June 2020.

44.  P then consulted Dr David Ip, an orthopaedic surgeon and a specialist in rehabilitation, on 30 June 2020. Dr Ip reported that P suffered from extensive inflammation and early sepsis of the head wound for which P was treated with antibiotics. Dr Ip also treated P with low-level laser therapy which P said in evidence that it helped his pain and discomfort. P continued to consult Dr Ip and was granted sick leave by him until 6 February 2022.

45.  P in cross-examination readily agreed that he first consulted Dr Ip because he was no longer given sick leave after 30 June 2020.

46.  P complained to Dr Choa about generalized heavy feeling in his head, and when severe would cause nausea and blur his vision, and about radiating discomfort to neck and shoulder, but these symptoms would respond to painkillers, and has improved since early days after the accident. Apart from this, P also complained of dizziness, often loss of focus and absent-mindedness, and these, together with the onset of headache, have stopped him from working at a height. Dr Choa opined that P came across as honest, and has cooperatively performed MMSE and related tests. Dr Choa further opined that P’s headache and dizziness can be considered as non-specific features following head trauma not amounting to concussion, and was supported by Romberg’s test and was genuine. He opined that his dizziness and fear of height could be treated with preventive medication which should help resolve them in the long run.

47.  He opined that generally sick leave of not exceeding 3 months should be appropriate, but he immediately added that “one has to defer to the judgment of his medical attendants at the time”.

48.  I accept and place weight on Dr Choa’s opinion set out above, particularly that the symptoms described to him by P were genuine, that P’s prognosis was good and his dizziness and fear of height would likely be resolved in the long run.

49.  Both Mr Wong and Mr Ho cited to me cases and the amounts of their awards on PSLA, which I have considered but do not find it necessary to recite. The amount of HK$300,000 PSLA advocated by Mr Wong is clearly too high, while I think the amount of HK$120,000 contended for by Mr Ho seems to me a bit low. Accepting Dr Choa’s opinion, I note that P has been suffering from minor headache and heaviness and dizziness, minor though they have been, for a long duration of about 4 years when examined by Dr Choa and would be suffering them for a while before they would be fully resolved. In my view, an award of HK$160,000 as PSLA would be reasonable.

50.  On loss of pre-trial earnings, P sought the same from the date of accident up to 31 May 2021 (about 11¾ months). Mr Ho contended that P should be awarded only 3 months’ of loss of earnings.

51.  It seems to me reasonably clear that Dr Choa was not specifically opining that 3 months’ was appropriate for P in the present instance. All he said was that generally such should not exceed 3 months, but he further said that the judgment of the treating doctors should be considered and even deferred to.

52.  It is P’s evidence, and I take note, that despite the sick leave granted by Dr Ip was still continuing, he resumed work on 1 April 2021^[13], and then worked as a full-time cleaning worker since 1 June 2021 earning on average about HK$14,887 a month.

53.  Considering all the matters in the round, I would award P pre-trial loss of earnings for a period of 7 months, together with MPF: HK$15,965 x 7 x 1.05 = HK$117,343.

54.  I would not award any amount for loss of earning capacity as (a) Dr Choa opined that P’s prognosis was good and his headache and dizziness should be resolved in the long run with the suitable medication, and (b) P was able to and has begun to work as a construction worker since November 2022 earning around HK$30,000 a month.

55.  D’s submission on not awarding interest on the EC payment already received was not seriously resisted by P. As a matter of principle, interest is generally awarded to compensate for the deprivation of the use of the money. As the amount of HK$115,000 was already received by P latest on 20 January 2021, I accept Mr Ho’s submission that no interest should accrue on that amount after its receipt.

Disposal

56.  I give judgment to P and assess damages at the total sum of HK$307,736 (HK$160,000 + HK$117,343 + HK$30,393) from which the EC payment of HK$115,000 should be deducted, making the net amount to be HK$192,736. I will enter judgment against D for this net amount, with interest (a) on general damages at 2% per annum from the date of writ to the date of this judgment, (b) on pre-trial loss of earnings and special damages at half judgment rate from the date of the accident to 20 January 2021, and then after, interest at the same rate be accrued on the balance of such damages after netting HK$115,000 from 21 January 2021 to the date of this judgment, and (c) then after on all sums due but unpaid at judgment rate from the date of this judgment until full payment.

57.  Costs should generally follow the event and I order on nisi basis, to become absolute within 14 days, that P do have the costs of this action, with certificate for counsel, to be taxed if not agreed.

58.  I thank Mr Wong and Mr Ho for their assistance.