KEIRON PETER ARCH ROCHESTER v. GLORY SKY PRECIOUS METALS LTD

HCA 395/2019

[2023] HKCFI 905

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 395 OF 2019

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DECISION

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THE APPEAL

1.  On 13 June 2022, the defendant took out a summons, seeking to strike out Paragraph 59 of the plaintiff’s witness statement (“the S/O Statement Summons”).

2.  On 24 June 2022, the defendant filed another summons (“the S/O FBP Summons”), and applied to strike out:

(1)  the reference to “and further detailed in paragraphs 55 to 66 of the Plaintiff’s Witness Statement served on the Defendant on 5 May 2020” in Answer (a)  of the Plaintiff’s Answers to the Defendant’s Request for Further and Better Particulars of the Statement of Claim filed on 15 January 2021 (Paragraph (i)  of the Schedule (“the Schedule”)  attached to the S/O FBP Summons); and

(2)  the reference to “and confirmed by the Plaintiff in his Witness Statement” in the Answer to Request 15 of the Plaintiff’s Answers to the Defendant’s Request for Further and Better Particulars of the Plaintiff’s Answer filed on 15 January 2021 filed on 14 December 2020 (Paragraph (ii)  of the Schedule).[1]

3.  The S/O Statement Summons and the S/O FBP Summons were dismissed by Master Jeffrey Chau on 5 October 2022 (“the Decision”).

4.  This is the defendant’s appeal against the Decision.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

5.  It is well established that an appeal against Master’s decision is dealt with by way of an actual rehearing of the application which led to the order under appeal, and the judge treats the matter as though it came before him for the first time.  The judge will give the weight it deserves to the previous decision of the Master, but he is in no way bound by it.  The judge in chambers is in no way fettered by the previous exercise of the Master’s decision. (Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023, Volume 1, paragraph 58/1/2).

THE PLAINTIFF’S CLAIM

6.  To put the defendant’s application in proper context, it will be useful if I summarise the plaintiff’s claim against the defendant herein which I do as follows:

(1)  The plaintiff lives in Australia and has no experience in trading or investing in precious metals.

(2)  The defendant is a company incorporated in Hong Kong.  At all material times, it engaged or purported to engage in providing investment and/or management and/or advisory and/or trading services in gold derivatives.

(3)  On around 15 August 2016, the plaintiff befriended one Ms Choi through WeChat.

(4)  Ms Choi, through WeChat messages, represented to the plaintiff that the defendant was experienced in gold derivatives’ trading and the risk of losses would always be minimised by reason of the skills and experience of the defendant’s analysts/consultants.

(5)  In reliance of the aforesaid representations, the plaintiff opened trading accounts with the defendant.  He also authorised Ms Choi to be his representative for, inter alia, purchase and sale of metals.

(6)  Ms Choi further informed the plaintiff about an annual trading event held by the defendant known as Semi Fund System Scheme (“the Scheme”), and represented that the Scheme would have a guaranteed double returns with low investment risk.

(7)  During the period between 30 December 2016 and 7 February 2017, the plaintiff remitted a total sum of USD1,294,518.10 to the defendant’s bank account for the purpose of trading.

(8)  The plaintiff found subsequently that he had suffered significant losses on his investment.

(9)  In around May 2018, the plaintiff was informed by a former employee of the defendant that the Hong Kong Police was investigating into a “conspiracy to defraud” case against the defendant and the latter’s involvement in a gold derivatives’ trading scam.  The said former employee also told the plaintiff that the Scheme did not exist at all and the trades were not conducted in the open market.

(10)  The plaintiff then reported the case to the Police and commenced this action against the defendant, and sued the latter for breach of contract, misrepresentation, negligence, breach of fiduciary duties and money had and received.

PROCEDURAL CHRONOLOGY OF THIS ACTION

7.  The following procedural chronology is relevant in the deliberation of this appeal:

10 May 2019		Filing of Statement of Claim
10 Jun 2019		Filing of Defence
5 Jul 2019		Filing of Reply
5 May 2020		Parties exchanged witness statements
31 Jul 2020		The defendant filed summons for further and better particulars (“FBP”)  of, inter alia, paragraph 29 of the Statement of Claim (“D’s First FBP Request”)
4 Dec 2020		Master KW Wong ordered the plaintiff to provide Answer to D’s First FBP Request (“the FBP Order”)
15 Jan 2021		The plaintiff filed and served Answer to D’s First FBP Request (“the First Answer”)
19 Nov 2021		The defendant filed summons for FBP of the First Answer (“D’s Second FBP Request”)
14 Dec 2021		The plaintiff filed and served Answer to D’s Second FBP Request (“the Second Answer”)
4 Jan 2022		By consent, the defendant’s summons for D’s Second FBP Request was withdrawn
14 Feb 2022		The defendant filed summons to strike out paragraph 18 of the Reply (“the S/O Reply Summons”)
11 Mar 2022		Upon the plaintiff’s undertaking to amend the Reply by deleting paragraph 18 thereof, no substantive order was made on the S/O Reply Summons
13 Jun 2022		The defendant filed the S/O Statement Summons
24 Jun 2022		The defendant filed the S/O FBP Summons
9 Sep 2022		The plaintiff filed Hearsay Notice
5 Oct 2022		Master Jeffrey Chau’s Decision
19 Oct 2022		The defendant filed Notice of Appeal before Judge in Chambers against the Decision (“the Notice of Appeal”)
1 Nov 2022		The defendant served the Notice of Appeal on the plaintiff
22 Nov 2022		Leave to set down the action for trial within 42 days was granted by Master Hui
25 Nov 2024		Commencement of the trial

DISCUSSION

Procedural objection

8.  The Notice of Appeal was filed on 19 October 2022.

9.  Order 58 rule 1(3)  of the Rules of the High Court (Cap.4A, Laws of Hong Kong)  (“RHC”)  provides that:

“Unless the Court otherwise orders, the notice must be issued within 14 days after the judgment, order or decision appealed against was given or made and must be served within 5 days after issue and an appeal to which this rule applies shall not be heard sooner than 2 clear days after such service.” (emphasis added)

10.  Taking into account the effect of Order 3 rule 2(5)  of the RHC, the Notice of Appeal should have been served no later than 26 October 2022.

11.  However, the Notice of Appeal was not served until 1 November 2022.  There was therefore a delay of 4 working days (excluding Saturday and Sunday).

12.  However, the defendant has not applied for any extension of time for service, nor did it explain why the Notice of Appeal was not served within time. 

13.  Mr Brown for the plaintiff therefore submitted that the appeal herein is not properly constituted and should therefore be dismissed on this ground alone. 

14.  On the other hand, the defendant submitted that the late service of the Notice of Appeal is only an irregularity, and that, more importantly, the plaintiff has not taken out any application by summons to set aside the Notice of Appeal or the appeal, nor did the plaintiff file any evidence to show that he has been prejudiced by such late service.  The defendant’s solicitor also drew this Court’s attention to the fact that the plaintiff has taken “fresh step after becoming aware of the irregularity” in attending a hearing on 22 November 2022 in which he had obtained leave to set the action down for trial (presumably the defendant was arguing that the plaintiff has as a result waived the irregularity).

15.  With respect, I am of the view that the defendant’s arguments are misconceived.

16.  While I agree that the Notice of Appeal has not been nullified as such by reason of its being served after the stipulated 5-day period, I do not agree that it should be treated as if it had been served within time unless the plaintiff applies to set it aside.  In my view, it must always be incumbent on the defendant, which is the party in default, to apply for leave to serve the Notice of Appeal out of time retrospectively, which should be supported by an affirmation which contains the explanation of the lateness.  However, as aforesaid, the defendant did not take any of those steps, but rather attempted to shift the burden onto the plaintiff.

17.  I have not lost sight of the fact that the plaintiff has not explained how he had been prejudiced by the defendant’s late service, and this Court should always bear in mind the primary aim in exercising powers of the Court is to secure the just resolution of disputes in accordance with the substantive right of the parties[2].  However, the fact is that the defendant has not made any application for extension of time.  In such circumstances, time cannot be extended, unless this Court extends such time on its own motion.  But the question is: why should this Court assist the defendant in such a way?  It is particularly unfair to the plaintiff when there is absolutely no hint as to why the time limit under Order 58(1)(3)  has not been complied with, even though the delay was short. 

18.  Further, the exercise of the Court’s power in favour of the defendant in such circumstances would send a very wrong message to other litigants that they need not comply strictly with the rules.

19.  The defendant’s argument that the plaintiff has waived the irregularity is also not accepted.  I do not agree that the plaintiff’s taking of a step in the action as a whole, rather than in the appeal which is the subject matter under the Notice of Appeal, would have the effect of waiving the irregularity. 

20.  For the above reasons, I accept the plaintiff’s argument that this appeal should be dismissed on this ground alone.

21.  However, in case I am wrong, I will now proceed to consider the merits of the defendant’s appeal.

The S/O Statement Summons

22.  To recap, under the S/O Statement Summons, the defendant seeks to strike out paragraph 59 of the plaintiff’s witness statement which is a very lengthy paragraph.  It reads[3]:

“The Scam[4] was widely publicised in the media during this time and several media articles (such as below)  extensively covered the details of the Scam, including the hiring of young, attractive women by Glory Sky to sweet-talk and lure its victims into investing substantial amounts of monies by promising them high returns with low risks:

(1)  an article titled ‘10 ‘sweet-talking, pretty girls’ among suspects arrested over London gold trading scams, Hong Kong police say’ dated 12 July 2018 published in South China Morning Post, reporting as follows:

‘[…] the syndicate hired young, attractive girls, mostly secondary school graduates, and disguised them as ‘star financial consultants’ to fish for victims on social media. The girls then sweet-talked the men into paying to trade gold on the London market with low risks but high returns. Some even promised to develop love relationships…Some victim hadn’t even met the so-called financial stars before they agreed to open accounts, signed documents to authorise brokers to trade on their behalf and passed the account password to the girls…

The men transferred money directly to the companies’ bank accounts but were soon notified about losses – which was when the girls pushed them to upsize the deals to cover their losses…

[…] According to a source, the companies in question were Noble Holdings Group and Glory Sky Group […]’

(2)  an article titled ‘26 arrested over alleged WeChat investment scams’ dated 12 July 2018 published in Asia Times, reporting as follows:

‘…At around noon, the police Commercial Crime Bureau (CCB)  raided the offices of Glory Sky Group and Noble Holdings Group […]

Seven women and 19 men were arrested for conspiracy to defraud. They include an 18-year-old female financial adviser and a 53-year-old senior executive from Glory Sky Group surnamed Yang…

It was reported that the two companies recruited good-looking men and women, who found their victims on social media and lured them into investing in gold. Disguised as investment managers or financial advisers, the scammers generated commission from the large number of unnecessary transactions put through the victim’s accounts…’

(3)  an article titled ‘Girls and gold ‘scammers’ busted’ dated 13 July 2018 published in The Standard, reporting as follows:

‘At least two allegedly fraudulent investment firms that used pretty women to lure male customers to buy London Gold have been raided by police. […]

On Wednesday, a joint police operation was launched in which 300 officers from crime, technology crime and tactical units searched Glory Sky Group’s headquarters in North Point […]

Commercial Crime Bureau chief superintendent Anthony Tsang Ching-fo said […] ‘I’d like to highlight that officers did not find a dealing room at one of the companies, meaning it does not do investment work at all.’ […]

Chief Inspector Marina Yin Hin-yu said the companies were subsidiaries of two financial groups.

She said the companies hired young and pretty women, who called themselves successful managers of London Gold or investment managers, and approached victims through WeChat.

[…]

Yin said after some time, the managers told victims their investment had flopped and that they lost all their money.

[…]

Yin revealed that the female managers made false statements when selling London Gold. They claimed the investment was low-risk and promised a high return.

In fact, they used the investment on high-leverage products or made frequent transactions that created huge service charges and drained the amount from the victims’ accounts, she said.’

Everything reported in these articles resonated with my circumstances and it became clear that I had been a victim of the Scam in that [Ms Choi] had befriended me with suggestions of more than friendship purely for the purposes of getting me to transfer money to Glory Sky.  Glory Sky does not appear to have had any qualified investment professionals handling my investment and Glory Sky (including [Ms Choi])  did not care if I suffered a total loss of my hard-earned savings.  I also realised that top-level executives of Glory Sky had been involved in the Scam.”

23.  In support of its striking out application, the defendant relied heavily on what Godfrey J (as he then was)  said in Jademan (Holdings)  Ltd. v Francis, Leung Pak-to & Others [1989] 2 HKLRD 151:

“[The plaintiff] makes reference to a number of newspaper reports concerning the matters with which the court is now concerned. I must protest at this. The court is not in the least concerned with what newspaper reporters say about events at which they claim to have been present. Whether at a trial or an interlocutory hearing, such material should find no place whatever. The exhibition of newspaper cuttings is not evidence. It is not of the slightest assistance to the court. I pay no attention to these reports.”[5]

24.  It was therefore argued that since the contents of the three newspaper articles are not evidence, for they may not be true, they should not be kept in the plaintiff’s witness statement. 

25.  I agree with the defendant that, if the plaintiff’s intention of relying on those newspaper articles is to prove the truth of their contents, then that should not be allowed.  However, it has been made clear by the plaintiff’s solicitors in their letter dated 8 December 2020 that:

“[…] our client is relying on the media publications for proof that your client’s investigations by the Hong Kong police was widely publicised in the media and to show that the content of such publications resonated with him and alerted him to the police investigation against your client. This is clear from paragraph 18 of the Reply[6] and paragraph 59 of our client’s witness statement. This is an entirely legitimate use of the media publications.

Our client is not seeking and does not intend to rely on the media publications to prove the truth of their contents and does not rely upon them as proof. Our client has already reported the matter to the police and the police have confirmed the existence of an ongoing investigation of your client. It is, in fact, remarkable that your client has not admitted to the existence of the police investigation in its Defence.

For the reasons above, we do not consider it is necessary to delete any references to the media publications whether in the pleadings or in our client’s witness statement […]”

26.  The same stance has been reiterated in the plaintiff’s hearsay notice filed on 9 September 2022, in which it was stated in the footnote thereof that:

“[…] the Plaintiff is not relying on the [newspaper articles] to prove the truth of the matters stated in these documents, but only to prove the existence of the said documents”

27.  In such circumstances, with respect, I would follow the approach adopted by Ng J in Re New Resources Holdings Ltd [2016] 3 HKLRD 518, in which his Lordship held that it would be up to the party’s legal advisers to decide how to use the newspaper articles in the proceedings so long as they are not using those materials to prove the truth of their contents.  At the end of the day, how useful those materials will be for the limited purpose is a matter of weight which can be decided after the substantive hearing.  It is not a matter of admissibility.[7]

28.  It is also important to note the defendant’s argument as follows:

“[…] if the Plaintiff really wants to prove ONLY the existence of the 3 published articles, then the serving of the Hearsay Notice would achieve that purpose, the whole of paragraph 59 of the Plaintiff’s Witness Statement would not be necessary in order to achieve that purpose, at any rate, it would definitely not be necessary, to recite the contents of the 3 published articles in the Plaintiff’s Witness Statement.”[8] (original emphasis by the defendant’s solicitor)

29.  It should therefore be borne in mind that the defendant is not seeking to strike out any part of the plaintiff’s list of documents which contains the three newspaper articles quoted above.  In arguing that the plaintiff’s filing of the Hearsay Notice would have achieved the purpose of proving the existence of those articles, the defendant has in effect recognised that the newspaper articles in questions will be included in the trial bundle and will be placed before the trial judge for consideration. Viewed in such light, it is difficult to understand what the defendant can achieve in substance by striking out the quotations of those newspaper articles from the plaintiff’s witness statement. 

30.  The S/O Statement Summons should therefore be dismissed.

31.  Mr Brown for the plaintiff also invited this Court to dismiss the S/O Statement Summons on the ground that the striking out application should have been made when the defendant took out the S/O Reply Summons on 14 February 2022 because the subject matter of that summons also concerned the newspaper articles.  It was argued that the unnecessary duplicity of the S/O Statement Summons and the delay in taking it out (18 months since the letter of the plaintiff’s solicitors dated 8 December 2020 was issued)  are adequate grounds to have it dismissed on a case management basis.  I agree that from a case management perspective, the defendant should have taken out the two striking-out summonses at the same time so that the Court could have dealt with them at one go.  However, on my part, I would not go as far as to say that the S/O Statement Summons should be dismissed on this basis.  After all, as accepted by the plaintiff, the consideration between the two applications (striking out a pleading vs striking out a witness statement)  is not entirely the same.

The S/O FBP Summons

32.  Both D’s First FBP Request and D’s Second FBP Request concern paragraph 29 of the Statement of Claim[9] which reads:

“In or around May 2018, the Plaintiff was contacted by a former employee of the Defendant who informed the Plaintiff about an investigation by the Hong Kong police (the ‘Police’)  relating to a conspiracy to defraud case against the Defendant and the Defendant’s involvement in a gold derivatives’ trading scam, whereby several victims had been lured by the Defendant into fraudulent precious metal transactions which resulted in victims eventually losing all their capital as a result of significant investment losses (the ‘scam’). The former employee further informed the Plaintiff that the Defendant had no SFS Scheme and that the trades were not conducted on the open market but were only placed on the Defendant’s internal system, with the collective funds then being traded on the open gold derivatives market. The former employee also provided the Plai8ntiff with a hotline number set up by the Police to complain about the Scam”

Paragraph (i)  of the Schedule

33.  By virtue of D’s First FBP Request, the defendant asked for the following particulars:

“(a)  full particulars of the Defendant’s involvement as alleged by the said employee or as understood by the Plaintiff in the alleged gold derivatives’ trading scam”

34.  The plaintiff then provided the following answer:

“The full particulars of the Defendant’s involvement in the gold derivatives’ trading scam as far as the Plaintiff can provide are set out in paragraphs 29, 30, 46 to 49 of the Statement of Claim filed on 10 May 2019 and further detailed in paragraphs 55 to 66 of the Plaintiff’s Witness Statement served on the Defendant on 5 May 2020.

To summarise the additional particulars provided in the Plaintiff’s Witness Statement:

[…][10]”

(emphasis is mine, indicating the part of the particulars which the defendant now seeks to strike out)

35.  In support of the striking out application, the defendant’s solicitor submitted that:

(1)  In the present case, the plaintiff sues the defendant for unjust enrichment, and the “unjust factor” relied on is “fraud”;

(2)  Particulars of fraud must be provided and should be pleaded distinctly: Order 18 rule 12 of the RHC;

(3)  Giving particulars by making reference to and by incorporating a large number of paragraphs in the plaintiff’s witness statement is a violation of, or non-compliance with, the FBP Order, and has offended a very basic rule of pleading under Order 18 rule 7 of the RHC;

(4)  The so-called summary of additional particulars is in fact almost an actual (though not verbatim)  reproduction of paragraphs 55 – 66 of the plaintiff’s witness statement, which is redundant.  Not everything contained in paragraphs 55 – 66 of the said statement is necessary, or material or relevant fact, but evidence by which facts are to be proved which has no place in pleadings or particulars of pleadings;

(5)  Hence, the plaintiff should not be allowed to just refer to a large number of paragraphs in the plaintiff’s witness statement for it is the duty of the plaintiff to identify and particularise the “unjust factor” distinctly, and it is not allowable for the plaintiff to leave “fraud” to be inferred from the facts.  Further, every pleading must contain, and contain only, a statement in a summary form of the material facts, and the statement should be as brief as the nature of the case admits.

36.  The applicable legal principles are trite.  It suffices for me to refer to paragraph 18/19/8 of the Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2023, volume 1, at page 551:

“[…] The mere fact that a pleading contains some unnecessary matter is not sufficient ground for an application under this rule. A statement will not be struck out merely because it is unnecessary, so long as it is otherwise harmless (Rock v Purssell (1887)  84 LTJ 45 (Chitty J)). Similarly, a pleading will not be struck out unless it is clear on the face of the allegations that they are irrelevant. It is no part of the defendant’s duty to reform the plaintiff’s pleading; but if wholly immaterial matter be set out in such a way that the applicant must plead to it, and so raise irrelevant issues which may involve expense, trouble, and delay, then the irrelevant matter will be struck out, as it will prejudice the fair trial of the action. (See Rassam v Budge [1893] 1 QB 571)  So a mass of evidence pleaded unnecessarily may be struck out (Davy v Garrett (1878)  7 Ch D 473). Also, where averments are made in the pleading which are plainly incompatible with the nature of the claim, the offending parts will be struck out (Willy Fine Ltd v Janyet Investments Ltd (No 2) (HCA 4430/2001, [2003] HKEC 316)).

Where a pleading is defective only in not containing particulars to which the other side is entitled, application should be made for particulars under O.18 r.12, and not for an order to strike out the pleading under this rule. In Incorporated Owners of Kwun Tong Industrial Centre v Fels Construction Techniques Ltd (HCCT 101/2000, [2002] HKEC 429), the plaintiff had failed to plead full particulars in a construction action (although the best available at that particular stage of proceedings). Some of the information omitted, however, was already within the knowledge of the defendant applicant and some was only to be available after discovery or exchange of expert reports. The court held that pleading in this way was neither vexatious, embarrassing or prejudicial nor an abuse of process. […]” (emphasis added)

37.  It is in fact not entirely clear whether the defendant is complaining that the Amended Statement of Claim (together with the FBP)  lacks particulars or contains too many particulars. 

38.  Insofar as it is the defendant’s complaint that the plaintiff has not sufficiently pleaded fraud and the elements of unjust enrichment, I disagree.  See, for example, paragraphs 24, 37 and 47 of the Amended Statement of Claim.

39.  Further, if the defendant considered that the particulars provided by the plaintiff by virtue of the Second Answer were insufficient, it would not have agreed to withdraw the summons for D’s Second FBP Request on 4 January 2022 upon perusal of the plaintiff’s Second Answer.

40.  In any event, I do not understand why, if that is the complaint, the defendant would seek to strike out the particulars which the plaintiff provided.

41.  It is even more puzzling for the defendant to apply to strike out just the reference to paragraphs 55 to 66 of the plaintiff’s witness statement, but at the same time content with the plaintiff keeping the summary of the additional particulars which the defendant’s solicitor observed that were largely the same with the said paragraphs of the plaintiff’s witness statement. In this respect, I ask the same question: what can the defendant achieve by striking out just one part of the particulars?

42.  In any event, as referred to above, the mere fact that a pleading contains some unnecessary matter is not a sufficient ground for striking out. A statement will not be struck out merely because it is unnecessary, so long as it is otherwise harmless.  This is exactly the case here.

Paragraph (ii)  of the Schedule

43.  Having received the First Answer from the plaintiff, the defendant made D’s Second FBP Request on the plaintiff’s said Answer.  Request 15 thereof reads:

“full particulars of how the said Ms Choi had allegedly befriended the Plaintiff with suggestions of more than friendship, under paragraph (a)(4)”

44.  The plaintiff answered:

“Full particulars of how the said Ms Choi had allegedly befriended the Plaintiff with suggestions of more than friendship have already been pleaded at length in the Statement of Claim and confirmed by the Plaintiff in his Witness Statement. The chats between the Plaintiff and Ms Choi have been disclosed under Item 28 of [the Plaintiff’s List of Documents] and Item 2 of [the Plaintiff’s Supplemental List of Documents]. The Plaintiff has no further particular to provide.”

(emphasis is mine, indicating the part of the particulars which the defendant now seeks to strike out)

45.  Reading the above Answer objectively, I agree with Mr Brown for the plaintiff that the plaintiff actually has refused to provide the defendant with further particulars, and the defendant has misunderstood the plaintiff’s Answer.

46.  The striking out application in relation to this item is therefore misconceived.

47.  For the sake of completeness, I should also mention that the defendant has taken out the S/O FBP Summons around 6.5 months after the plaintiff’s provision of the Second Answer.  While I agree that the defendant should and could have made the application earlier, I do not think the delay has been to such an extent that the S/O FBP Summons should be dismissed on this basis.  I therefore reject Mr Brown’s argument in this regard.

ORDER

48.  By reasons of the aforesaid, the appeal is dismissed.

COSTS

49.  I make a costs order nisi that the defendant shall pay the plaintiff’s costs of the appeal, to be assessed on party and party basis.

50.  The above order nisi shall become absolute in the absence of application to vary (which, if any, shall be made by letter, and will be disposed of on paper)  within 14 days hereof.

51.  The plaintiff’s costs shall be summarily assessed in lieu of taxation.  Unless any application for variation of the aforesaid costs order nisi is made within time:

(1)  The plaintiff shall lodge and serve his statement of costs within 7 days after the expiry of the said 14-day period;

(2)  The defendant shall lodge and serve its statement of objection within 7 days thereafter;

(3)  Summary assessment of the plaintiff’s costs will be conducted on paper (no matter whether any statement of objection is lodged by the defendant within time)  thereafter.  The costs assessed shall be paid by the defendant within 14 days after assessment.