FITRIANI v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6166 · HCAL 320/2025
Court of First Instance
HCAL 320/2025
[2026] HKCFI 6166
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO 320 OF 2025
BETWEEN
| |Fitriani |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board |Putative |
| | |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Order 53, rule 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Michael WONG:
1. On this court’s own motion, the name of the putative respondent be
amended to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.
2. The applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review
be dismissed.
Observations for the applicant:
The Leave Application
1. By way of Form 86 dated and filed on 3 February 2025, the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“the Leave
Application”) in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal
Board (“the Board”) dated 23 August 2024 (“the Board’s Decision”).
The Board’s Decision can be viewed in the following hyperlink:-
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2025/HCAL00
0320_2025_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The Board rejected the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement
protection in Hong Kong on all the applicable grounds under the
Unified Screening Mechanism (“the USM”). Hence, the Board dismissed
the applicant’s appeal/petition against the decision of the Director
of Immigration (“the Director”) dated 6 June 2024 and confirmed the
same, which rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim.
Amendment
3. In Form 86, the applicant named the Board as the putative respondent
but spelt the Board’s name wrong.
4. Thus, this court makes an order on its own motion to amend the name of
the putative respondent to “Torture Claims Appeal Board”.
Late application
5. By virtue of Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap
4A, the applicant had to make the Leave Application within 3 months
when the grounds for the Leave Application first arose, ie when the
Board’s Decision was made.
6. However, the applicant filed Form 86 on 3 February 2025, which was
more than 5 months after the Board’s Decision (made on 23 August
2024). The applicant was hence late for more than 2 months in making
the Leave Application, and this court has to consider whether there is
any good reason to extend the time for the applicant to make the Leave
Application.
7. As held in AW v Director of Immigration [2016] 2 HKC 393, the criteria
for granting an extension of time are:
(i) the length of the delay;
(ii) the reason for the delay;
(iii) the merits of the intended application; and
(iv) any prejudice to the putative respondent and to public
administration.
8. The applicant did not apply for extension of time or provide any
explanation for the delay when she filed the Leave Application.
9. At the oral hearing before this court on 29 October 2026, the
applicant first explained the delay by saying that she was not
notified of the deadline for making an application for leave to apply
for judicial review. However, when this court asked the applicant
when she received the Board’s Decision, she replied that she received
it in March or April 2025.
10. A delay of more than 2 months is substantial, and the explanations
given by the applicant are clearly not satisfactory. First, the
explanation that she was not notified of the deadline for making the
Leave Application cannot help her. Ignorance of the court procedures
is generally not an excuse. Secondly, it was simply impossible for
the applicant to make the Leave Application on 3 February 2025 and
attached a copy of the Board’s Decision to her supporting affirmation
dated 3 February 2025 when she allegedly received the Board’s Decision
only in March or April 2025.
11. More importantly, there is no merit of the intended judicial review at
all as discussed below. Thus, this court is not prepared to extend
the time for the applicant to file the Leave Application. The Leave
Application can be dismissed on the ground of being made out of time
alone.
12. However, for the sake of completeness, this court will still examine
the merits of the Leave Application.
The applicant’s case
13. It is not necessary for this court to repeat the details of the
applicant’s case here as the same were set out in the Board’s
Decision, which can be viewed in the hyperlink above.
14. In sum, the applicant claimed for non-refoulement protection because
if refouled to Indonesia, she would be harmed or killed by her
husband’s creditor as she did not repay the debt for her husband.
Oral hearing
15. The applicant requested for an oral hearing of the Leave Application,
and her case was heard on 29 October 2026.
16. The applicant confirmed that she would rely on the grounds stated in
her supporting affirmation dated 3 February 2025 for her intended
judicial review. When this court asked the applicant to elaborate on
the said grounds, she merely said that she wanted to continue with her
medical treatment and undergo an operation in Hong Kong.
17. The applicant also told this court that the Board was aware of her
medical condition. However, her grounds for claiming non-refoulement
protection was only based on her fear of her husband’s creditor
arising from his debt. The applicant did not rely on her health
problems as a ground for her non-refoulement claim.
Grounds for judicial review
18. The applicant is required to identify clearly the grounds for the
intended judicial review (see Ho Loy & Another v Director of
Environmental Protection, HCAL 21 of 2015, dated 22.12.2016).
19. The applicant did not identify any ground for the intended judicial
review in Form 86.
20. In her supporting affirmation, the applicant mentioned that she had
many objections, the adjudicator did not give her true decision and
she wanted to talk to the adjudicator again.
21. As aforesaid, at the oral hearing, the applicant only said that she
wanted to continue with her medical treatment and undergo an operation
in Hong Kong, and did not elaborate on any of the matters contained in
her supporting affirmation.
Discussion
22. First of all, the applicant’s assertion in her supporting affirmation
that she had many objections was advanced without any particulars.
She did not state what objections she had in respect of the Board’s
Decision, or how the Board had erred in its determination of her non-
refoulement claim and/or her appeal/petition.
23. In respect of her complaint that the adjudicator did not give her true
decision, the applicant again failed to specify what she meant by a
“true decision”. The mere fact that the Board found the applicant’s
appeal/petition failed on all the applicable grounds under the USM
cannot in itself be interpreted as the Board not giving her a true
decision.
24. The applicant’s subjective wish to talk to the adjudicator again is
not a ground for judicial review at all.
25. As to what the applicant said at the oral hearing, namely that she
wanted to continue with her medical treatment and undergo an operation
in Hong Kong, these matters were not presented to the Board for
assessment of the applicant’s non-refoulement claim and/or her
appeal/petition, even though the applicant said that the Board was
aware of her health problems.
26. As held by the Court of Appeal in Trinh Thuy Huyen v Torture Claims
Appeal Board [2024] HKCA 1090, the Board had no duty to make
investigation into any matter without the applicant raising it and it
should not be considered by this court at this stage. There was
nothing in the Board’s Decision to show that the Board was aware of
the applicant’s medical condition. Thus, the applicant cannot rely on
a new claim as a ground to challenge the Board’s Decision.
27. Therefore, the grounds that were contained in the applicant’s
supporting affirmation and what she raised at the oral hearing before
this court cannot be valid grounds for her intended judicial review.
28. The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-
refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a claim for
non-refoulement are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the
evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters
allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm,
availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation.
The court will scrutinize the Board’s decision and intervene by way
of judicial review only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or
irrationality (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA
524).
29. Thus, the applicant cannot ask this court to re-assess her non-
refoulement claim. Nevertheless, this court will examine and
scrutinize the Board’s Decision for any errors of law, procedural
unfairness and irrationality, despite the lack of any valid ground
being advanced by the applicant for the intended judicial review.
30. In assessing the appeal/petition by the applicant, the Board held an
oral hearing on 12 August 2024. The applicant was present and was
thus given the opportunity to present her case to the Board in person.
31. As can be seen from the Board’s Decision, the Board had given a
detailed analysis of the applicant’s claims and its reasoning in
rejecting the applicant’s claim for non-refoulement protection.
32. The Board had laid out its assessment of the applicant’s credibility
in paragraphs 30 to 37 of the Board’s Decision, and it is not
necessary to repeat the same here.
33. In gist, the Board did not find the applicant to be telling the truth.
The Board found that the applicant’s case was both vague and
unbelievable in both her oral evidence and her written case. The
discrepancies in the applicant’s evidence were too numerous and
impossible to be reconciled, rendering her evidence unreliable.
Although the Board accepted that the applicant’s husband might have
borrowed some money, be it from the creditor or not, all the other
matters including the stated threats by the creditor were not
accepted.
34. Nevertheless, in assessing the applicant’s claim against all the
applicable grounds under the USM, the Board had, despite its findings,
given consideration to her case by taking it at its highest and on the
basis that her story was true to the extent that the stated threats
had been issued towards her. However, the Board still found that the
applicant’s claims failed on all the applicable grounds (see
paragraphs 41 to 43 of the Board’s Decision).
35. In short, the Board found that the applicant’s dispute with her
husband’s creditor was a private dispute that had nothing to do with
the state or any of the Convention reasons. Apart from the alleged
threats by the creditor, nothing happened to her husband and children
and they remained unharmed throughout. The applicant never suffered
any physical harm from the said creditor. Taking into account of the
frequency, intensity and mode of past ill treatment from the creditor,
if any, the Board considered that the alleged ill treatment did not
attain a minimum level of severity.
36. Moreover, the applicant had never availed herself of the protection
from the police or other public authorities in her country. There was
no evidence to indicate state acquiescence in the applicant’s case.
The Board did not accept that the applicant would not be accorded
appropriate protection if there was a genuine need for her to seek
assistance after she returned to Indonesia.
37. In addition, the Board found that even if the applicant would be
subjected to any real risk of harm, her problem with the creditor was
limited to her local area. The Board found no solid evidence to
support the claim that the creditor could search for the applicant
throughout the whole country.
38. The Board therefore concluded that the applicant’s case did not
warrant non-refoulement protection on any of the applicable grounds
under the USM.
39. On the issue of internal relocation, although the Board did not see
the question of it arose due to its findings as summarised above, the
Board did explicitly state in paragraph 59 of the Board’s Decision
that if it were necessary for the applicant to get out of the place
where she used to live and to keep away from the creditor, the
applicant could relocate to other places in Indonesia.
40. Thus, the Board found that the applicant had no real risk of any of
the proscribed forms of harm upon her return to Indonesia.
41. The finding of facts, including the assessment of evidence and risk of
harm, was solely within the ambit of the Board in dealing with the
applicant’s appeal/petition. The Board was entitled to make its own
decision. This court finds nothing wrong or unreasonable in the way
the Board reached its conclusion.
42. Having rigorously examined the Board’s Decision and the evidence with
anxious scrutiny, this court is satisfied that the Board had correctly
set out the law and key legal principles relating to the applicable
grounds under the USM, the burden of proof and the standard of proof.
The Board also correctly identified the issues and observed a very
high standard of fairness. This court could detect no error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The
Board’s Decision does satisfy the enhanced Wednesbury test, ie it is
not Wednesbury unreasonable or irrational for the Board to reach its
decision.
43. As held by the Court of Final Appeal in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung
(2007) 10 HKCFAR 676, for the court to grant leave to apply for
judicial review, the claim has to be a reasonably arguable claim which
enjoys realistic prospects of success. It is the view of this court
that the applicant has failed to establish such a claim and hence
leave must be refused.
Conclusion
44. For reasons aforesaid, the Leave Application is dismissed for being
made out of time and also for lack of merits.
Dated the 4th day of November 2026
| |(Gladys LEE) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the applicant | | |
|or his solicitors must:| | |
|a) serve on the |Sent/Handed to the |Sent/Handed to the |
|respondent and such |applicant/the |putative respondent / |
|interested parties as |applicant’s solicitors|the putative |
|may be directed by the |on: 04/11/2026 |respondent’s solicitors |
|Court the order | |/ such putative |
|granting leave and any | |interested parties as |
|directions given within| |may be directed by the |
|14 days after the leave|Applicant’s ref. no: |Court / the putative |
|was granted (Order 53, |Nil |interested parties’ |
|rule 4A); | |solicitors on: |
| | |04/11/2026 |
|b) issue the | | |
|originating summons | |Torture Claims Appeal |
|within 14 days after | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|the grant of leave and | |Claims Petition Office |
|serve it in accordance | |Putative respondent’s |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | |ref. no.: |
|and | |USM 23917 |
| | | |
|c) supply to every | |Director of Immigration |
|other party copies of | |Putative interested |
|every affidavit which | |party’s ref. no.: |
|the Applicant proposes | |QA T/C 864/24 (formerly |
|to use at the hearing, | |as RBCZ 5000781/24) |
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | |Department of Justice, |
|application for leave | |Senior Assistant Law |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1