Case Details
Listing:
OUNJAI RATPATSORN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
OUNJAI RATPATSORN v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 5109 · HCAL 379/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 379/2023
[2026] HKCFI 5109
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 379 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Ounjai Ratpatsorn |Applicant |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Intersted Party|
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following;
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|(|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Andrew Li:
1. Extension of time to file the Form 86 be refused;
2. The Applicant’s Form 86 be amended to name only the Torture Claims
Appeal Board as the putative respondent and the Director of
Immigration as the putative interested party; and
3. The application for leave to apply for judicial review be dismissed.
Observations for the Applicant:
INTRODUCTION
1. By a Form 86 filed on 13 March 2023 (“the Form 86”), the applicant
applied for leave to apply for judicial review of a decision by the
Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 22 March 2019 (“the
Board’s Decision”), which affirmed a decision by the Director of
Immigration (“the Director”) dated 30 April 2018 in refusing the
applicant’s non-refoulement protection claim. She named the Board and
the Director as the proposed respondents but neither of them was
listed as interested parties.
2. I amended the Form 86 on my own motion to name only the Board as the
putative respondent and the Director as the putative interested party.
3. The applicant requested for a hearing and she attended the same.
4. I noticed that the Board’s Decision was dated 22 March 2019 while the
Form 86 was filed almost 4 years later on 13 March 2023 only. Under
Order 53, rule 4(1) of the Rules of the High Court (Cap 4A), an
application for leave to apply for judicial review should be made
promptly and in any event within three months from the date when
grounds for the application first arose. There was no explanation for
the serious delay in filing the application nor was there any
application to ask for an extension of time under the Form 86 or in
the affirmation filed in support of the application.
5. At the hearing, when asked for the explanation for the serious delay
in her application, the applicant mentioned that she was pregnant at
the time and the child was born with a congenital heart condition.
Further, she said she was not familiar with the legal process.
6. I do not accept any of the above as good reasons for her serious delay
in making the application. In the circumstances, the court would
refuse any extension of time to file the leave application.
BACKGROUND
7. The applicant is a national of Thailand. She seeks non-refoulement
protection on the basis that if she is refouled, she would be harmed
by her former lover. Her personal background, the relevant facts and
relevant procedural history have been sufficiently set out in the
Board’s Decision, which can be accessed through a hyperlink[1]. I
shall not repeat the same herein.
DISCUSSION
8. In a judicial review, this court does not provide a further avenue of
appeal. Though in non-refoulement case an enhanced standard in
scrutinizing the decision of the Board is required given the
seriousness of the issue at hand, this court should not usurp the role
of the Board, which together with the Director are the primary
decision-makers. This court will not intervene by way of judicial
review unless there are errors of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the decision of the Board (Nupur Mst v Director of
Immigration [2018] HKCA 524, [14(1)]). There must be a reasonably
arguable claim with a realistic prospect of success before leave for
judicial review will be granted (Peter Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung &
Anor (2007) 10 HKCFAR 676).
9. In the Form 86 and her affirmation filed in support of the
application, the applicant has specified the following grounds: -
1) The decisions of the Director and the Board were not reasonable
or fair according to the Wednesbury test and that the Board
“failed to give him (sic) sufficient time and chance to arrange
relevant evidence to his (sic) non-refoulement claim as well as
his (sic) appeal.” [1];
2) The Director has “failed to appreciate or give the proper
importance or weightage to the presence of state Acquiescence”
in the applicant’s case in her decision [2];
3) The Director has failed to “take such argument into account or …
has failed to give enough weight to such argument before
reaching the Decision.”… “that although the Director had listed
relevant COI which support the Applicant’s aversions that the
police in his (sic) country would not be able to protect. The
Director failed to consider or give enough weightage to that
evidence and ruled otherwise.” [3];
4) The director shown an “unfair attitude” towards the applicant
and “failed to attain the high standard of fairness required by
the Wednesbury test in the decision with the arguments put
forward” by the applicant [4];
10. In so far as the above purported grounds of review were made against
the Director (including Ground [1], [2], [3] and [4] above), it has
been held that the Director’s decision is not susceptible to judicial
review once an appeal to the Board had been pursued: See Re Raschpal
Singh [2020] HKCA 978, per Lam VP (as he then was) at §§40-41. As all
the above grounds (expect part of Ground [1]) were made against the
Director and not the Board, strictly speaking there is no need for me
to consider them. Nonetheless, I would still look at the Board’s
Decision carefully to see if any arguable grounds for judicial review
may exist.
11. Looking at the Board’s Decision, the Board bore in mind the correct
legal principles in respect of each of the four applicable grounds
under the USM [51-71].
12. It took into consideration the applicant’s case [2-19] and evidence
[20-40], including the relevant COI.
13. After thoroughly analysing and assessing the above [41-49], the Board
came to the findings and conclusions that none of the grounds was made
out.
14. Having looked at the Board’s Decision carefully, I do not find there
was anything unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense.
15. As the allegation of failing to appreciate or failed to give
sufficient or proper weight to the presence of the state’s
“acquiescence” was made against the Director only, it cannot be made a
subject of judicial review as the Director’s decision is not
susceptible to judicial review as explained above. Even if it was
made against the Board, it clearly would not stand.
16. Further, I do not find the Board has failed to consider or give enough
weightage on the COI and failed to take into account of the
applicant’s personal background and experience. To the contrary, I
find the Board has taken into account fully of the applicant’s
personal background and experience and has meticulously set out and
analysed the evidence produced by the applicant, including the oral
evidence she gave at the hearing.
17. Lastly, I do not find the Board has adopted any improper or unfair
procedures when assessing the explanations provided by the applicant.
18. Despite rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I could not find
any errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the
Board’s Decision. In my view, the applicant’s intended challenge
against the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable and has no
realistic prospect of success.
CONCLUSION
19. For the above reasons, I am not satisfied that this court should
intervene by way of judicial review. I therefore dismiss the
application.
Dated the 18th day of September 2026
| |(Cheung Ho Yat, Annson) |
| |for Registrar, High Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the | | |
|Applicant: | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |on 18/9/2026 |Respondent / the Putative |
|interested parties as | |Respondent’s solicitors / |
|may be directed by the |Ounjai Ratpatsorn |such Putative Interested |
|Court the order | |Parties as may be directed |
|granting leave and any |Applicant’s ref. no.:|by the Court / the Putative|
|directions given within|Nil. |Interested Parties’ |
|14 days after the leave| |solicitors on 18/9/2026 |
|was granted (Order 53, | | |
|rule 4A); | |Torture Claims Appeal Board|
| | |/ Non-Refoulement Claims |
|b) issue the | |Petition Office |
|originating summons | |Putative Respondent’s ref. |
|within 14 days after | |no.: |
|the grant of leave and | |USM 11634/18/5/219/TH33; |
|serve it in accordance | |USM 11635/18/5/220/TH34 |
|with Order 53, rule 5; | | |
|and | |Director of Immigration |
| | |Putative Interested Party’s|
|c) supply to every | |ref. no.: |
|other party copies of | |QA T/C 958/18 (formerly |
|every affidavit which | |RBCZ 11491/17); QA T/C |
|the Applicant proposes | |959/18 (formerly RBCZ |
|to use at the hearing, | |25/18) |
|including the affidavit| | |
|in support of the | |Department of Justice, |
|application for leave | |Senior Assistant Law |
|(Order 53, rule 6(5)). | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
____________________________________________________________________________
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1]
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL000379_
2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf