Case Details
Listing:
AL MOMIN CHOWDHURY v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
AL MOMIN CHOWDHURY v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 6221 · HCAL 393/2023
Court of First Instance
HCAL 393/2023
[2026] HKCFI 6221
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 393 of 2023
BETWEEN
| |Al Momin Chowdhury |Applicant |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | |Putative |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Respondent |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office | |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | |Putative |
| |Director of Immigration |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|(|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by counsel for|
| |the Applicant in |
open court;
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. Leave is granted to the applicant to issue a judicial review
application against the Board’s Decision.
2. The applicant shall within 14 days file and issue an originating
summons, which copy together with all the relevant documents shall
be served on the Board as respondent and the Director as an
interested party.
Observations for the Applicant:
A. Introduction
1. By a “Notice of application to apply for leave to judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 15 March 2023, the applicant applied for
leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave Application”). The intended
judicial review was against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board
/ the Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (“Board”) dated 2 March 2023
(“Board’s Decision”) dismissing the applicant's appeal against a decision
of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) dated 31 January 2022
(“Director’s Decision”) rejecting the applicant's subsequent non-
refoulement claim (“Subsequent Claim”) on all applicable grounds[1]. The
Board’s Decision can be viewed at the following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2023/HCAL000393_
2023_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The applicant was privately represented by counsel, Ms Aria Cheung.
On 6 January 2026, the court granted leave to the applicant to amend his
Form 86. At the hearing on 25 August 2026, the court granted the applicant
leave to amend his Form 86 (“Amended Form 86”).
3. At the hearing, Ms Cheung confirmed that the applicant’s intended
challenge to the Board’s Decision is only in relation to “persecution
risk”, and that there is no challenge in relation to the other 3 risks
which the Board has rejected in the Board’s Decision.
B. Background
4. The applicant was a national of Bangladesh. He was arrested on 2
September 2012 for illegally remaining in Hong Kong. The applicant’s
previous non-refoulement claim was dismissed by the Director on 9 September
2016, and his appeal against the decision of the Director was also
dismissed by the previous Board (“Previous Board”). The applicant’s
subsequent challenges to the decision of the Previous Board in the
High Court and the Court of Appeal all failed and the findings made by the
Previous Board remain undisturbed (see Board’s Decision [31]). The
applicant lodged a request for making a subsequent claim on 3 February
2020, and the Director on 31 August 2020 allowed the applicant’s request to
file the Subsequent Claim.
5. The applicant was born into a Muslim family in B. Baria, Bangladesh.
When the applicant started university in 2007 in Dhaka, he started to
question his own Islamic faith. Due to his debates and discussions in the
university, he encountered attacks. The applicant then left university and
returned home before he left his family to stay briefly with his university
Professor. He went to Chittagong, and opened his own book shop. The
applicant became more fervent about his disbelief in Islam, which resulted
in more attacks and vandalizing of his book shop. The applicant then left
Chitagong and moved to Dhaka before leaving Bangladesh on 31 March 2012.
He stayed in Mainland China from 1 April 2012 to 15 July 2012, and arrived
in Hong Kong on 15 July 2012 before he was arrested by the police on 2
September 2012.
6. The basis of his previous claim was that he would be harmed or even
killed by his previous attackers and other followers of the Islamic
religion as he no longer followed the religion.
7. In the Subsequent Claim, the basis of the applicant’s fear was that,
if refouled, his life would be in danger due to a false charge registered
against him after views disrespectful to Islam and Prophet Muhammad were
found to have been posted purportedly in his Facebook account. The
applicant claimed that the said Facebook post (“Post”) was in fact posted
by his Bangladeshi friend whom he met in Hong Kong by using the applicant’s
account. After the Muslims in his home village had seen the Post, they
mobbed the house (“House”) of the applicant’s father. After the matter was
reported to the local police, the police attended (“Police Visit”) the
House. According to the FIR, the applicant was charged with the offence
under s 28(1)/34 of the Digital Security Act of 2018 (“DSAct”) described as
“offence of offending the religious sentiment by posting in the Facebook
and using hacking”[2]. Unless otherwise specified, I shall adopt the
Board’s abbreviations and descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
A. Proper approach in leave application
8. It is trite that a leave application operates as a ‘filtering’
process. Hence, there is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate
reasons for my decision.[3] It is therefore sufficient to state my
observations in respect of each of the applicant’s grounds stated below
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
C. Applicant’s grounds of review
9. In the Amended Form 86, the applicant advanced three grounds in
support of the Leave Application. He averred that the Board erred in:
1) Ground 1: Its rejection of the material evidence;
2) Ground 2: Its conclusion on the applicant’s credibility; and
3) Ground 3: Having failed to properly assess the risk of harm in light
of the charge under the DSAct.
D. Ground 1: Board’s rejection of the material evidence
E.1 Material evidence
10. In [82] of the Board’s Decision, the Board found a number of
inconsistencies in the documents the applicant’s legal representative
submitted to the Director in support of the Subsequent Claim - (i) the FIR,
(ii) 2 notarized statements (“Statements”) purportedly from 2 different
Bangladeshi advocates; and (iii) an affidavit ( “Affidavit”) from the
applicant’s father – the 'Translated English copy Notarized (and attested)
Affidavit' dated 7 October 2019 and the 'original Bengali language
Notarized (and attested) Affidavit’ dated 5 December 2018 ( respectively “
Translated Affidavit” and “Original Affidavit” )
E.2 FIR
11. On the heading under the FIR, “Date and Time of incident: on
20 September 2019… at 12:35 hours”; and in the 1st column under the heading
“Date and time when report” “1 October 2019 at 21:30 hours” were recorded.
In the statement prepared by a police officer attached to the FIR (“FIR
Statement”), it stated
“On 1/10/2019… following the order given by Senior Officials, I
together with Constable … Constable… and Constable… in accordance with
the CC given by this Police Station arrived at the [House] at 14:30
hours in the afternoon and saw that, some religious minded people
belonging to this village and other locations have surrounded the
[House] and were pelting brickbats and stones thereby causing chaos
and they were chanting slogans of various kinds... After the mob was
calmed down, the police came to know from them that while [the
applicant] was residing abroad on 20/9/2019… at 12:35 hours had given
some very heinous descriptions against Islamic faith from his mobile
ID and by hacking through mobile, he had posted some disgusting and
objectionable comments on his own face book ID against the prophet of
Islamic faith which thereby has against the prophet of Islamic faith
which thereby has caused grave injury to Islamic religious
sentiments.”
12. From the information appearing in the FIR, the Board found (at [55]
and [70] of the Board’s Decision) several inconsistencies with regard to
the dates of the report and the “incident”. The Board believed that the
“incident” appearing in the FIR was “the incident occurred at the [House]”.
The Board found that it appeared “self-contradictory as regards when the
incident actually occurred, when it was reported to the police, and when it
was investigated”. Further, the Board believed that it would not have been
possible that the police arrived at the House “at 14:30 on 1 October 2019”
as it thought that the matter had not been reported to the police until
10:30 on that day.
13. In the FIR Statement, it was also stated that the police “confiscated
2 conserved mobile sets” (underline added). The Board believed that the 2
“conserved mobile sets” were mobile phones. The Board concluded that this
reported action of the police lacked logic as the applicant was residing
abroad (in Hong Kong) at the time, and therefore undermined the credibility
of the entire FIR (Board’s Decision [71]).
14. The applicant contended that the date and the timing stated in the
FIR were logical. It was contended that the Board made a mistake by
regarding the date of the “incident” to have been when the House was
mobbed. It is obvious from the contents of the FIR Statement that the
police referred to the “incident” as the date when the Post was found to
have been posted, “20 September 2019”. Further, the Board had also been
mistaken regarding the date of when the matter was reported to the police.
The applicant contended that “1 October 2019” should have been read as the
date when the DSAct charge was reported; while 2 October 2019 was more
likely to have been the date of dispatch of the report from the police
office to the Court Officer, and not the date of dispatch from the police
station[4].
15. It was submitted that the questions the Board asked of the applicant
revealed a bias in having overlooked the possibility of error and differing
conventions by the Bangladeshi police.
16. The applicant felt aggrieved that the Board had failed to give the
applicant the benefit of the doubt after the Board had acknowledged (at
[70] of the Board Decision) the possible logical explanation that could
reconcile the apparent contradiction.
“If the incident to which the FIR relates is the alleged posting of
the material contrary to the Digital Security Act, which is said to
have occurred on 20 September 2019, it is possible to reconcile some
of these inconsistencies, and to read the document as comprising a
report from an investigating officer following his visit to the house
on 1 October 2019”.
17. It was therefore submitted that the Board’s conclusion was
irrational.
18. Further, the applicant contended that the Board’s finding that the
seizing of the mobile phones was illogical is erroneous. This is because
it was not reasonable for the Board to ask the applicant for an explanation
for the seizing of the phones when the Board knew that the applicant was
not present during the Police Visit. Secondly, the applicant averred that
the Board’s finding that the seizing of the mobile phones from the father’s
home was illogical was purely speculative. It is submitted that it is
trite that a decision-maker is not entitled to make his/her own
assumptions, conjecture or speculations as to what ought to have happened
or to use one’s common sense[5].
E.3 The Affidavit
19. The applicant relied on the Affidavit[6] to corroborate his claims.
The Board had concerns about the veracity of the Affidavit. The concerns
mainly stemmed from the discrepancies between the dates of the attestation
and stamping of the Original Affidavit (5 December 2019), which was 2
months after the Translated Affidavit (7 October 2019). The Board was not
satisfied with the applicant’s explanation in attributing this as a
translation error. The Board was therefore not satisfied that the
Affidavit could be given any credence.
20. The second concern was due to the Board’s doubt on the father’s
capacity to give instructions and swear as to the veracity of the contents
of the Affidavit when he had just suffered a serious stroke and was in
hospital. The Board therefore found that that the Affidavit was not based
upon any instructions to the advocate by the applicant’s father, but was
rather concocted by the applicant’s friend, Sohel, with the assistance of
the advocates[7].
21. The applicant averred that the Board’s rejection of the Affidavit was
irrational and wrong. The Board had similarly made the same error of
applying its own common sense and assumption in speculating that the stroke
suffered by the applicant’s father must have rendered him incapable of
giving instructions to advocates. Since the Board knew that the applicant
did not have first-hand knowledge of the condition of his father, the
applicant therefore submitted that it was unfair for the Board to require
him to offer an explanation of the discrepancies the Board identified.
E.4 The Statements
22. The 2 Statements are respectively dated 2 and 5 December 2019. Since
the name of the advocate was crossed out, it is not clear if the Statements
were made by the same person. In the earlier Statement, the advocate
confirmed the Post and the charge under DSAct as well as the threat by the
religious Muslims. The later Statement alluded to the existence of an
active warrant for the applicant’s arrest due to the charge under the
DSAct. After referring to the relevant provisions of the DSAct, the
advocate stated that he believed that the applicant would be arrested and
placed in jail custody and even killed if found in Bangladesh.
23. Similarly, the Board placed no weight on the Statements. This is
because the Board was of the view that they were based upon information
provided to the advocates, not upon their own knowledge of the relevant
matters. Since the printed copies of the purported Post were said to be
freely circulating in the applicant's neighbourhood at home, the Board
found it inexplicable that the advocates (including the applicant) had not
seen the Post even if it might have been deleted from the Facebook[8].
24. The applicant averred that there was no evidential basis for the
Board to presume that the Post was in circulation such that the applicant
and the advocates who made the Statements would have seen it. It is
therefore suggested that the Board made the same error in applying its own
assumption and common sense, which is not permissible.
E. Ground 2: Irrational credibility finding
25. In finding that the applicant’s evidence not credible, the Board took
into account the findings of the Previous Board as to the credibility of
the applicant’s previous claim. The Board specifically rejected the
applicant’s evidence regarding the posting of comments falsely attributed
to him by a former friend who returned to Bangladesh from Hong Kong as
incredible. The Board found that there were inconsistencies in the
applicant’s evidence between the evidence when he first raised these claims
in February 2020, stating that his former friend had been arrested for
posting comments disrespecting Islam and the Prophet Mohammad, and had
claimed, under interrogation, that the applicant had hacked his Facebook
account and posted these comments on it. These assertions were repeated in
the Statements as well as the Affidavit. On the other hand, in the FIR
Statement, the police recorded that the applicant had posted the insulting
comments by his own Facebook ID. In his interview with the Immigration
officer, the applicant also claimed that his photo was attached to the
Post.
26. The Board further disbelieved the applicant’s evidence about his
relationship with his family as it found that the applicant had also given
inconsistent evidence. Whilst the applicant had stated in his interview
with the Immigration Department in July 2021 that he had been in recent
contact with his father about two weeks before the interview. However, at
the hearing, he denied having had any contact with his father since leaving
Bangladesh. He said that the only contact was through his friend Sohel,
and that his father only provided the Affidavit for his claims because he
did not want him back in Bangladesh[9].
27. The applicant averred that the Board was irrational and unfair to
have required the applicant to provide unrealistic degrees of precision and
detail as to the Post when the applicant himself had very limited knowledge
of the circumstances of the creation of the Post. It was submitted that
the existing charge against the applicant under DSAct is sufficient to
prove that the applicant would face actual risk of persecution and harm if
he was to return to his country.
28. As for the finding of the inconsistencies regarding the applicant’s
evidence about the relationship with his father, the applicant averred that
the Board had mis-read the applicant’s answers given at the interview. The
question asked of the applicant at the interview was the last time he had
contact with “family members in Bangladesh”[10] instead of with the father
as the Board had wrongly understood. The applicant therefore faulted the
Board for having nitpicked the applicant’s evidence, and failed in its duty
of making joint endeavours to clarify the relationship with his father.
F. Ground 3: Having failed to properly assess the risk of harm in light of
the charge under the DSAct
29. In this ground, the applicant averred that the Board did not refer to
any reasons or materials the applicant submitted when it came to the
conclusion that the applicant would not face any risk of persecution if
refouled. In support, the applicant cited 2 articles of COI in the
footnote items 13 and 14 in the Amended Form 86. It was suggested that the
COI showed that there were widespread arrests under the DSAct including of
those who had been accused of ‘hurting religious sentiments” in a post on
Facebook.
30. At the hearing, since the publication date in item 14 of the footnote
was after the Board’s Decision, Ms Cheung conceded that the applicant would
not be able to rely on it. However, the applicant would continue to rely
on item 13- the “Human Rights Watch World Report 2023”- as it was released
on 12 January 2023, before the Board’s Decision. In conclusion, the
applicant argued that the Board had failed to properly consider the
relevant COI material and to exercise its duty of joint endeavour
investigation. The applicant averred that the COI suggests that the
applicant could be at risk of harm as a result of having posted critical
religious commentary or being perceived by the authorities as a blasphemer
of Islam under the DSAct.
G. Discussion
H.1 Whether the Board was wrong to reject the material evidence
31. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the Board
was entitled to attach no weight to the Affidavits and the Statements.
Whilst the applicant was right to criticize the Board in having speculated
on the health condition of the applicant’s father, however, it should be
noted that the Board’s major concern was due to the unexplained discrepancy
in relation to the dates between the Original Affidavit and the Translated
Affidavit. I therefore reject the applicant’s arguments in relation to the
Affidavit.
32. Similarly, the applicant was correct in pointing out the Board’s
error in making subjective assumption regarding the supposedly wide
circulation of the Post. However, the Board’s rejection of the Statements
was not based on this assumption. The Board decided to place no weight on
the Statements due to the fact that the contents contained in the
Statements were entirely hearsay. Having carefully considered that the
wide-circulation comment is only a red-herring, and the nature of the
Statements, I do not accept the applicant’s contentions regarding the
Statements.
33. Insofar as the FIR is concerned, it appears that the Board has
misapprehended the contents of the FIR and the FIR Statement. I accept the
applicant’s contention at [29] of the Amended Form 86 that the incident
logically referred to the date of the act of the publication of the Post,
rather than the date when the House was mobbed by the religious Muslims. I
am also in agreement with the applicant in [30] of the Amended Form 86 that
“2 October 2019” was likely to have been the date of dispatch of the report
from the police office to the court officer. The Board’s reading of the
FIR in believing that police were sent from the police station to check the
report on 2 October 2019 was likely to have been erroneous.
34. Since the contents of the FIR were capable of being read in the way
the applicant contended, the Board should have considered all relevant
considerations including taking into account every factor that might tell
in favour of the applicant. In this regard, the Board has not applied the
highest standard of fairness in giving the benefit of doubt in construing
the contents most favourable to the applicant.
35. The Board’s adverse finding in relation to the seizing of the mobile
phones by the investigating office is arguably erroneous. Quite apart from
the unfairness of the Board in having erred in applying its own assumptions
as to what ought to have happened, the Board seems to have also
subjectively assumed that “conserved mobile sets” were the same as mobile
phones. This should have called for further inquiry instead of using the
Board’s own conjecture. A high standard of fairness would have required
the Board to scrutinize whether “conserved mobile sets” were in fact mobile
phones.
36. In the circumstances, I find that the Board was not entitled to
reject the FIR. It follows that when assessing the relevant risk of harm,
the Board would have to consider the consequences the applicant would
likely encounter in Bangladesh in light of the charge he reportedly faced
under the DSAct. The Board’s rejection of the FIR is erroneous,
unreasonable and procedurally unfair.
H.2 Ground 2: whether the Board was irrational in its finding on the
applicant’s credibility
37. I do not accept the applicant’s contentions in this regard. In the
next answer the applicant gave to Question 9 in the same interview as to
how the applicant’s father knew the applicant’s mobile phone number in Hong
Kong, the applicant answered that he contacted his father through his
friend’s mobile phone because his father could not operate the phones
efficiently. This follow-up question implicitly shows that there were
contacts between the applicant and his father. In any event, in rejecting
the applicant’s evidence, the Board had also taken into account the
findings of the Previous Board as to the applicant’s credibility. Hence, I
am not satisfied that the applicant’s arguments in this regard are correct.
38. In the present case, the applicant’s evidence on the publication of
the Post and the charge under the DSAct was entirely hearsay. Subject to
the discussion above regarding the FIR, the Board was entitled to reject
the applicant’s claims.
H.3 Ground 3: the Board’s failure to properly assess the risk of harm
39. In finding that the applicant did not face any risk of serious harm
in [85] of the Board’s Decision, the Board had considered the COI in
relation to the likely harm arising from anti-Islam beliefs and such
blogging activities. The applicant submitted that given the fact the COI
indicated that outspoken activists could still be caught by the DSAct, the
Board had failed to properly assess the risk of persecution faced by the
applicant who was accused of having posted comments of this nature in the
Post.
40. In considering the validity of this ground, it is necessary to
consider it in the context of persecution risk. In the decision of the
Previous Board[11], the adjudicator set out this risk in great detail. In
gist, it requires a Board to consider if the person
“who: “... owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality
and is unable· or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country; or, owing to such fear, is
unwilling to return to it-...”
It “… requires consideration of several elements of the above
definition. … it frequently involves targeting people or groups for
serious human rights violations and serious or intolerable harm.
Persecution may be directed against a person as an individual or as a
member of a group because of something perceived about them or
attributed to them and has traditionally taken a variety of forms of
serious social, political and economic discrimination. However, such
harm or threats of harm will only amount to persecution where it is so
oppressive or likely to be repeated or- maintained that the person
threatened cannot be expected to tolerate it. In addition, it must
have an official quality to it, in the sense that it is official, or
officially tolerated or uncontrollable by the authorities of the Risk
State. However, the threat of harm need not arise from the government
directly, but can be perpetrated by non-governmental entities. In
those circumstances, it may be enough that the government is unable or
unwilling to provide protection from persecution… [arising from] a
person's race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular
social group or political opinion. Fourth, a person's fear of the
persecution must be a ‘well-founded fear’. In other words, there must
be an objective basis for holding such a fear. A person has a ‘well-
founded fear’ of persecution if they have genuine fear founded upon a
"real chance" or a ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’ of being
persecuted for one of the reasons outlined above. A fear is well-
founded where there is a real substantial basis for it but not if it
is based on mere speculation. A "real chance" is one that is not
remote, insubstantial or far-fetched. 16. Finally, the person must be
unable, or unwilling because of their fear, to avail themselves of the
protection of their country or countries of nationality or,…, or
unwilling because of their fear; to return to their country of former
habitual residence.”
41. It should be noted that the basis of the applicant’s claim of the
risk of persecution is quite different to his previous claim, which mainly
stemmed from his anti-Islam view (see [6] above). In the present case, the
basis of fear arose from the adverse comments of the Prophet Mohammad
contained in the Post purportedly posted by the applicant. Hence, the
focus of scrutiny should have been more on examining the risk of harm
arising from such Post, particularly the criminal liability in a charge
under the DSAct. The Board’s reference to the COI referred to in the
Previous Board’s decision is therefore not apposite for the present case.
Rather, the Board should have considered the relevant COI in relation to
the risk the applicant might likely face in view of the Post.
42. It is trite that a consideration of the relevant COI is relevant to
the understanding of country conditions at the time of the alleged harm in
the past as well as at the time of the assessment of the relevant risk of
harm in a non-refoulement claim[12]. A high standard of fairness requires
a decision-making Board to demonstrate that it properly and independently
assessed COI and made its own findings, and that a failure to comply with
such duty is procedurally unfair[13].
43. In the present case, none of the COI considered by the Previous Board
and the “current COI” mentioned in [85] of the Board’s Decision would have
been about any risk of prosecution arising from charges under the DSAct.
For this reason, there is no valid finding on state protection. It is
reasonably arguable that the Board’s Decision on this aspect is erroneous
in law, unreasonable, tainted by procedural unfairness and/or does not meet
the required high standards of fairness.
H. Whether the applicant would likely face the risk of persecution if
refouled?
44. Since the FIR was vital evidence showing that the applicant faced a
charge under the DSAct, and thereby the risk of persecution he would likely
face, the Board’s rejection of the FIR has precluded it from properly
assessing the risk of persecution. The Board should have been required to
examine the risk of persecution with reference to the law discussed in [40]
above against the evidence as revealed in the FIR and the relevant COI.
Had a proper scrutiny been done, the Board would have likely found that the
applicant would have likely had well-founded fear of persecution in light
of the DSAct he might be facing if refouled.
J. Conclusion
45. In the premises, and for all the given reasons, I am of the view that
the applicant’s Leave Application is reasonably arguable on the applicant’s
Ground 1, in relation to the FIR; and Ground 3, in relation to the COI as a
consequence of the purported Post, thus meeting the threshold for leave to
be granted as laid down in Po Fun Chan v Winnie Cheung (2007) 10 HKCFAR
676.
46. Accordingly, I grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial
review of the Board’s Decision limited to the FIR and COI in relation to
the consequences of the purported Post, and I direct that he shall within
14 days file and issue an originating summons, which copy together with all
the relevant documents shall be served on the Board as respondent and the
Director as an interested party.
Order
47. Leave is granted to the applicant to issue a judicial review
application against the Board’s Decision.
48. The applicant shall within 14 days file and issue an originating
summons, which copy together with all the relevant documents shall be
served on the Board as respondent and the Director as an interested party.
|Dated the 13th day of November 2026 | |
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal
advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of
their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the |Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such |Applicant’s solicitors|Respondent / the |
|interested parties as | |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the |on 13/11/2026 |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting| |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions|Al Momin Chowdhury |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days | |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was |Applicant’s solicitors|the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule |ref. no: |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); |MK/CRIM/2180/26 |13/11/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating| |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days | |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave| |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 4899/16/9/278/B651, |
| | |USM 19978 |
|c) supply to every other| | |
|party copies of every | |Director of Immigration |
|affidavit which the | |Putative Interested |
|Applicant proposes to | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|use at the hearing, | |957/21 (formerly RBCZ |
|including the affidavit | |10995/20), RBCZ |
|in support of | |9002251/17 (Formerly |
|the application for | |RBCZ 2000710/14), QA T/C|
|leave (Order 53, rule | |2109/15 (formerly as |
|6(5)). | |RBCZ 2000710/14), QA T/C|
| | |1068/12 (formerly as |
| | |RBCZ 865/12) |
| | | |
| | |Department of Justice, |
| | |Senior Assistant Law |
| | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
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[1] The applicable grounds are risk of torture under Part VIIC of the
Immigration Ordinance (“torture risk”) , BOR 2 risk (this refers to the
risk of violation of the right to life under Art. 2 of s.8 of the Hong Kong
Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap. 383 (“HKBOR”), BOR 3 risk (this refers to
the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment
under Art 3 of HKBOR) and persecution risk (This refers to the risk of
persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Art. 33
of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967
Protocol) (“RC”)under the USM (This refers to the Hong Kong Government’s
Unified Screening Mechanism (“USM”) implemented since 3 March 2014 to
process claims for non-refoulement protection. For a detailed description
of the USM, see the judgment of Zervos J in HKSAR v Vu Thang Duong & Anor
[2015] 3 HKC 293.
[2] HB326.
[3] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at §23.
[4] Amended 86 at [29] and [30]. HB16.
[5] Taizul Islam v Winston Leung [2016] HKCFI 1866 at [61].
[6] HB484.
[7] Board’s Decision at [73].HB33.
[8] See Board’s Decision at [74].
[9] Board’s Decision [76]-[78].
[10] HB39
[11] Previous Board decision, [12]to [16] HB338-339.
[12] Secretary for Security v Sakthevel Prabakar, (2004) 7 HKCFAR 187 at
[55].
[13] A, B, C, D and E v Torture Claims Appeal Board, [2024] HKCA 471 at
[33] – [34].