TALWINDER SINGH v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 2000/2020

[2026] HKCFI 1984

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 2000 OF 2020

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BETWEEN

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 19 January 2026 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 4 November 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board dated 28 September 2020.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 4 November 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 18 November 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons, the applicant did not give any reason for his delay in lodging the appeal, nor any ground for the intended appeal. In his supporting affirmation dated 19 January 2026, the applicant did not give any reason for his delay or any ground for the intended appeal either. He only alleged in his affirmation that: (1) he was informed by his family members that it was dangerous for him to return to India as he would be killed; (2) he was unrepresented and had no means to instruct a private lawyer; and (3) he is a patient of Scalp Mass and sometimes he forgets things as his brain is not working.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 26 March 2026, when the applicant was asked why he was late in lodging the appeal, he replied that he had some problems with his brain, he was receiving treatment, his memory was not sharp and he forgot things easily. When I asked why he wanted to appeal, the applicant just said that his life was still in danger and he could not go back. When I further asked what his grounds of appeal were, the applicant said that I did not listen and assess his case properly and I did not ask him anything about what he had written in his file.

9.  It is clear that the applicant did not provide any good reasons for his delay in lodging the intended appeal. If his memory was not good, he should have made sure that he had some means to remind himself to lodge the intended appeal in time, instead of leaving it to be forgotten.

10.  What he said about his danger is just the basis of his non-refoulement claim, which cannot be a valid ground for appeal. As held by the Court of Appeal in Re Saldua Dorothy Trifalgar [2022] HKCA 627, general assertions of fear if refouled do not constitute proper ground of appeal.

11.  His allegations that I did not listen and assess his case properly are just general allegations without any particulars. Such general allegations cannot be valid grounds for the intended appeal at all. As held by the Court of Appeal in Ahmed Md Rafique v Torture Claims Appeal Board [2026] HKCA 451, “It is incumbent on the applicant to point out the Judge’s errors with sufficient particulars and specifics.”

12.  As to the allegation that I did not ask him anything about what he had written in his file, it is not a valid ground for appeal either, as it was for the applicant to establish his case for the intended judicial review. I had no duty to make enquiries of him at all. In any event, at the oral hearing before me on 19 August 2025, I did ask the applicant for the grounds of his intended judicial review. The applicant did reply that he did not want to go back to India, he was beaten up and threatened in Hong Kong by a man named Ahman and a few other people living downstairs in the same building, his enemies could do anything to him at any moment and he was very scared. Thus, the applicant did have the opportunity to inform me whatever he wished to say.

13.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

14.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above. Hence, there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal or the intended judicial review.

15.  In the circumstances, there is no proper excuse for the applicant’s delay in lodging the appeal and there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review. I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

16.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.