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FCMC 11073 / 2015
[2018] HKFC 101
香港特別行政區
區域法院
婚姻訴訟編號2015年第11073號
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| 主審法官： |
區域法院暫委法官謝沈智慧內庭聆訊（非公開） |
| 聆訊日期： |
2017年12月6日至2017年12月8日 |
| 判決書日期： |
2018年6月29日 |
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判決書
（附屬濟助和資產轉移）
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1. 這是呈請人 (妻子) 申請附屬濟助的審訊。
背景
2. 妻子現年69歲 ，答辯人 （丈夫）73歲。他們於1971年結為夫婦 ，育有3名兒子。家庭子女均已成年及自立。
3. 2001年4月26日，夫婦兩人購入位於將軍澳的第一個家庭資產（前婚姻居所）。直至丈夫於2013年中私自賣出該物業，該物業一直用作兩人的婚姻居所。
4. 前婚姻居所是一個私人機構參建的居屋屋苑。沒有爭議的是居屋有轉讓限制。業主將物業於公開市場發售前，必須先向香港房屋委員會付款解除轉讓限制，俗稱“補地價”〔見C275〕。
5. 該物業以$779,000購入。雙方同意當時$77,900的首期是由妻子的兄長借出。丈夫亦不爭議該借款由妻子獨力清還。購買前婚姻居所的餘款（$701,000）則以東亞銀行承造的按揭貸款支付〔C279〕，按揭供款為每兩個星期$1,753.60。縱使丈夫是該按揭的借款人及每次的還款往丈夫的東亞銀行户口中扣除〔LYY-4〕，事實上直至2012年2月2日，該按揭還款由妻子獨力支付。每次還款前，妻子均透過自動櫃員機將供款存入丈夫的東亞銀行的户口内〔見LYY-5及LYY-6〕。
6. 2005年3月24日，夫婦兩人購入位於天水圍的第二個家庭資產（天水圍物業）。雙方似乎沒有爭議，購入該物業的原因是丈夫“摸貨”失敗，而被逼“上會”。當時雙方同意以一間雙方擁有，名為HTF Ltd的有限公司持有該物業。購入價為港幣$1,220,000。
7. 購入天水圍物業之後，丈夫便再沒理會按揭還款。2005年至2006年期間，該物業每月的按揭還款超過港幣$10,000。雖然該物業一直用作出租，以收取租金收入，但租金並不足以支付按揭。按揭還款由妻子獨力補貼。
8. 2006年12月，妻子再沒財政能力獨自支付天水圍物業的按揭還款。於是HTF Ltd以港幣$1,180,000將該物業轉讓予夫妻兩人的幼子名下，由幼子向銀行借款，以獲取較優惠的按揭利率。縱使該物業轉讓予幼子，事實上所有轉讓的費用均由妻子支付。轉讓後的按揭還款亦仍由妻子負責。租金亦繼續用作支付按揭還款。幼子是本案的介入人。他承認只是以受託人持有該物業，亦願意遵守法庭就該物業所作的命令。
9. 2013年5月27日，丈夫私自決定售賣前婚姻居所，與買方簽訂買賣合約，作價港幣$3,190,000，成交日期為2013年6月28日。2013年5月尾，丈夫才突然告知妻子，前婚姻居所已出售，並須於6月28日前遷出。妻子拒絶搬遷，並表示如出售婚姻居所便要離婚。同日，丈夫建議、草擬及簽署一份「聲明書」〔聲明書〕，確認雙方分產。根據該聲明書，天水圍物業全歸妻子，而前婚姻居所則全歸丈夫〔C259〕。同年6月，妻子賠款予租客，遷入天水圍物業，並一直以此為居所。丈失獨自遷入一個位於都會駅的租用單位，兩人正式分居。
10. 2013年7月，妻子用積蓄以港幣$689,771.38清還天水圉物業按揭〔P1〕。分居兩年後，妻子於2015年8月26日作出離婚呈請。
論點
11. 夫妻兩人均同意法庭應以『清楚了斷』的方式（Clean Break）處理本案的附屬濟助申請。不受爭議的是丈夫於2013年5月30日草擬及簽署一份「聲明書」。
12. 丈夫指該「聲明書」只是權宜之計，用作誘導妻子遷出，好讓他依計出售前婚姻居所。他稱並非自願簽署「聲明書」，要求法庭拒納其内容。他承認獨自獲取出售前婚姻居所的收益，但指淨收益只是港幣$935,814.97。他同意在婚姻資產作出分配時，法庭應將他已收取的淨收益計算在內。
13. 妻子則指丈夫私自出售前婚姻居所，引致婚姻破裂。丈夫不但從沒就購買任何家庭資產付出分毛，還在妻子不知情下，多次以前婚姻居所獲取貸款，最後更獨吞售樓收益。丈夫在本訴訟中一直拒絕披露所得貸款的金額、目的及去向。他對售樓淨收益的解釋亦强差人意。妻子指「聲明書」由丈夫依他自己的意願草擬。丈夫亦已獲取價值較高的物業，而妻子因相信兩人已分配資產，不但接納少於一半的婚姻資產，還以自己的積蓄清還天水圍物業的按揭。妻子指丈夫現在要求法庭推翻「聲明書」内的分產協議實在有違公平原則。她要求法庭裁定她獲得天水圍物業的全部業權。
14. 綜合上述爭論，本案的論點是:
(1) 家庭資產的價值;
(2) 雙方的“需要”;
(3) 丈夫售出前婚姻居所後所獲淨收益的金額;
(4) 丈夫有否克盡披露責任;
(5) 丈夫在什麽情況下簽署「聲明書」;
(6) 法庭應否執行「聲明書」;
(7) 及/或法庭應如何分配婚姻資產。
適用的法例
15. 香港法例第192章《婚姻法律程序與財產條例》第6條訂明:
“在批予離婚判令、婚姻無效判令或裁判分居判令時，或在其後的任何時候(如屬離婚判令或婚姻無效判令，則不論是在該判令轉為絕對判令之前或之後)，法庭可在不抵觸第10及25(1)條的條文下，作出下列任何一項或多項命令 ——
(a) 命令婚姻的一方須將指明的財產轉讓給另一方或任何家庭子女，或為該子女的利益而轉讓給在命令中指明的人，而此項財產乃本段最初所述的婚姻一方有權憑管有權或復歸權而享有的；
(b) 命令為着婚姻的另一方和家庭子女的利益，或為着此二者之一或其中任何人的利益，就命令所指明的財產作出令法庭滿意的授產安排，而此項財產乃婚姻一方有權憑上述權利而享有的；
(c) 命令為着婚姻的雙方和家庭子女的利益，或為着此二者之一或其中任何人的利益，將任何向婚姻雙方作出的婚前或婚後授產安排(包括藉遺囑或遺囑更改附件而作的授產安排)更改；
(d) 命令取消或削減婚姻任何一方根據任何此等授產安排而獲得的權益；
(e) 命令出售在命令中指明的財產，而該財產或該財產的出售收益，是婚姻的一方或雙方憑管有權或復歸權而享有實益權益的，並且就該等出售收益的運用作出命令，
而即使並無家庭子女，法庭仍可根據（c）段作出命令。”
16. 上述法例第7條規定:
“(1) 法庭在決定應否就婚姻的一方而根據第4、6或6A條行使權力，以及若行使該等權力則應採取何種方式時，有責任顧及婚姻雙方的行為和案件的所有情況，包括顧及下列事宜 ——
(a) 婚姻雙方各別擁有的或在可預見的將來相當可能擁有的收入、謀生能力、財產及其他經濟來源；
(b) 婚姻雙方各自面對的或在可預見的將來相當可能面對的經濟需要、負擔及責任；
(c) 該家庭在婚姻破裂前所享有的生活水平；
(d) 婚姻雙方各別的年齡和婚姻的持續期；
(e) 婚姻的任何一方在身體上或精神上的無能力；
(f) 婚姻雙方各別為家庭的福利而作出的貢獻，包括由於照料家庭或照顧家人而作出的貢獻；
(g) 如屬離婚或婚姻無效的法律程序，則顧及婚姻的任何一方因婚姻解除或廢止而將會喪失機會獲得的任何利益(例如退休金)的價值。”
適用的案例－資產分配
17. 於LKW v DD FACV 16/2008一案內，終審法院解釋法庭於處理附屬濟助爭議時適用的法律原則及程序。處理這類案件的基礎原則如下：
(1) 以公平為目的；
(2) 排除歧視；
(3) 平均分割準則；
(4) 排除細緻入微的審查往事；
18. 就“平均分割準則”，終審法院於上述案例的第59-61段有以下的解釋：
“Miller/McFarlane案裡，這個“準則”概念發展成為在下文詳述的“平等分享原則”。但是，本席須要强調，對婚姻的每一方在婚姻期間擔當的角色給予平等地位不是必然，甚至不是通常，表示雙方的資產應該平均分割。因此，White案裡李啟新勳爵說：
“在時候，法官在考慮法律條文後，結論是把可供分割的資產作大致平均的分割；但更多時候並不如此。更多的情况是法官考慮過所可情况後，作出的裁定意味着一方分得的將比另一方的多。”
Miller/McFarlane案裡，他闡述平等分享原則如下:
“他們的伴侶關係結束時，每一方都有權後這個伴侶關係的資產中分得同等份額，除非有充分理由不這樣做。為求公平，這是必不可少的。不過，本席要強調“除非有完分理由不這樣做”這個平均準則只是作為輔助，不要奉為規則。”
有一些討論是關於可否把這個“準則”當作“出發點”，抑或只可以在考慮過第7條所述各事項之後才可以運用這“準則”。本席認為這個問題很大程度上已流於字面意義的爭拗。一旦明白“平均分割準則”和“平等分享原則”只是作為對理解相關概念的輔助工具，並無隱含任何法律上的推定或舉證責任，那麽法官何時運用或者運用多少次這些輔助工具去檢查他們初步得出的結論，使無關重要。這個思考過程的性質是有重複性的，所以關於“出發點”的爭論沒有甚麼實際意義。”
19. 終審法院亦於上述案例的第71至86段列出法庭考慮過程的步驟：
“步驟1：確定資產
考慮過程的第一步是確定，截至聆訊日期計算，婚姻的每一方的經濟資源。…目的當然是考慮到所有貝關鍵性的負債後，計算出淨經濟資源。在這階段，法庭無須試圖區分婚姻財產和非婚姻財產，該步驟最佳是在考慮如何分配資產時才進行〔如有必要〕。…雙方都有一個重要的責任，就是須使法庭得到關於他們的資產的足夠資料。他們必須作出詳盡和坦向的披露。任何一方做不到這點便可能使法庭作出對其不利的推斷，並且決意斷定資產屬他或她所有，或者作出對其不利的訟費命令。
步驟2：評估雙方的經濟需要
第二步是法庭評估雙方的經濟需要。如上文所述，法庭考慮第7條所述各事項時，通常到這一步便停止，因為總資產可能不夠使法庭進展到下一步，或者甚至不夠滿足雙方的需要。如果是這樣，便沒有條件運用任何分享原則。舉例來說，要照顧妻子和子女的需要可能已經立即佔去多過一半總資產。在此情况下，“需要”，就因沒有任何其他選擇，便成為決定性因素。如果只有少量資產，或許不可以有“清楚了斷”，而可能需要法庭作出定期付款命令。…
Miller/McFarlane案裡，李啟新勳爵就“需要”有下列言論：
“婚姻結束時，要體現公平，就要在對雙方的資產作出分割時，基本上要應付雙方的居住和經濟需要，並需考慮多個方面，如雙方的年齡、未來的謀生能力、家庭的生活水平、任何一方是否有殘疾等。這些各種各樣的需要大多會是婚姻引起的，但有一些不屬這一類；伴隨年齡和殘疾而來的需要則屬於後者。”
步驟3：決定運用分享原則
如果照顧到雙方的需要之後會有剩餘資產，一般來說，下一步應該是法庭把分享原則運用於雙方的總資產，而把先前考慮過的“需要”的問題按照這個原則處理…换言之，法庭不應即刻作出分配，而應該回到“需要”，把“需要”和下文該論的第四部和第五部裡的所有其他重要因素一併處理。…
法庭考慮第7條所述各事項進展到第三階段時，須決定運用分享原則，及採用這個觀點，即是除非有可以表達清楚的充分理由不作出平均分割，否則總資產應該在雙方之間平均分割。不過，須要強調一點，如李啟新勳爵指出，法庭常常最終不會決定平均分割。
步驟4：考慮有沒有充分理由不作出平均分割
第四步是考慮有沒有充分理由不依從平均分割原則。任何程度的不依從都表示婚姻其中一方的份額會增加或減少，而相應地另一方的份額會減少或增加。法庭須解決的問題是在案件的情況裡，應否把天秤從平均這一點移至别的一點。這問題必然是複雜的，牽涉一連串有不同的爭論點。
那麼，有甚麼理由可以是法庭不作出平均分割的充分理由？參考第7條的條文和體會隱含的目的，即分配資產要公平，就會找到答案。包含在第7〔1〕條〔a〕段至〔g〕段的各事項中任何一事項都可以提供適合的理由：第7〔1〕條裡提及的“雙方的行為”和“所有情況”也可以。“所有情況”這個無所不包的類别表示在婚姻關係的背景裡，對終局的經濟安排是否公平有影響的任何事情都是有關聯的。
有一點是重要的需要強調，就是這些因素，無論是個别一個還是合起來，都有可能導致法庭不作出平均分割，但即使法庭裁定這些因素之中有一個或多過一個適用於某案件，這並不必然表示會不作出平均分割。對這些因素給予甚麼分量是由法庭酌情決定的，而法庭如何酌情決定是第五步的事情…必須注意的每宗案件的考慮過程都是緊扣該案的案情，並且是酌情處理的，千萬不可機械式地運用分享原則。
步驟5：決定結果
法庭經過...簡稱為“第四步”的程序後，就算察覺案情裡具備一個或多過一個談論過的因素，分割雙方資產時，也不是必須不作出平均分割。對這些因素給予多少分量是由法庭決定的。當法庭退後一步來察看裁定為有關聯的各個因素整體產生的影響，可能會決定某些因素的分量足以使法庭不作出平均分割。法庭如何判決是根據案件的案情由法庭酌情決定的。如果法庭不作出平均分割，使應該說明根據甚麽作此決定，因為說明理由有助於查核案件的結果是否公平。”
20. 終審法院於LKW v DD一案内列出一些能對分享原則的運作有影響的因素:
(1) 資產的來源;
(2) 行為;
(3) 經濟需要;
(4) 婚姻持續期;
(5) 為家庭福利作出的貢獻;
(6) 補償
21. 就資產來源，現時的案例說明有兩種資產可能以來源為理由而不把它們包括在分享原則裡。第一類是其中一方在婚姻期間得到的財產，而這些財產的來源是和婚姻完全無關的，例如從饋贈得來，或承繼得來。第二類是從某些業務或投資得來的資產，而這些業務或投資是由其中一方單獨處理的〔有時稱為“單方資產”〕。
22. 於White v White [2001] 1 AC 596一案内，李啟新勳爵舉出屬於第一類資產的兩個例子，即“在婚姻期間，其中一個配偶從饋贈或承繼得來，或以信託的受益人身分得來的財產”及“結婚之前得到的財產”。如果是一段短暫的婚姻，法庭很可能傾向於把其中一方在結婚前得到的資產，或者在婚姻期間從完全和婚姻無關的來源得到的資產當作可以不包括在分享原則裡的非婚姻財產。但是，如果婚姻經歷了長時間，這些因素的分量便很可能大大減少。如果婚姻其中一方在分居之後，在沒有得到另一方任何幫助或貢獻的情況下得到某些資產，法庭很可能會運用酌情權不把這些資產用作平均分割。不過，如果在上述第二步，法庭唯一或最重要的關注是要設法滿足雙方的經濟需要，那麼雖然某些財產是在雙方分居之後才得到，這未必可以使法庭不把這些財產包括在判給額裡面。
23. 對於單方資產，法官之間有意見不一之處。Hale勳爵傾向把婚姻其中一方單獨經營的業務或單獨進行的投資產生的資產，視為可能不用作平均分割的財產。可是她亦表明，“資產的來源可以考慮，但其重要性會隨着時間的過去而淡化”。Hale勳爵續指“這只是承認一點，即婚姻財產這個觀念仍然以各别分開的財產為出發點，是故仍然有空間某一方獲取和保留各别分開的財產，而這些財產不是自動用來在雙方之間平均分配的。”可是李啟新勳爵在這一點不同意Hale勳爵的意見。他說：
“法庭應以極度遲疑的態度考慮是否引入，或再度引入‘家庭’資產和‘業務或投資’資產之間之分别。所有情况下，當法庭要決定如何做法才可達至公平，雙方的財產的性質和來源都是要考慮的事情…然而，‘業務和投資’資產和‘家庭’資產一樣，都可以是婚姻夥伴關係的經濟成果。平等分享原則適用於前者也適用於後者。分享原則的基礎理由對‘業務和投資’資產和‘家庭’資產同樣適用。”
24. 事實上，意見分歧之處頗為狹窄。分歧只是關於婚姻短暫的情況裡應如何處理。於LKW v DD一案內，終審法院表示暫時傾向認為李啟新勳爵的處理方法較可取。另外，終審法院亦指，這些細緻的討論一般不適用於婚姻居所及打算給家庭使用和專用於家庭的其他資產。
25. 在LKW v DD一案内，終審法院指出第7(1)條規定法庭行使酌情權時有責任顧及雙方的行為。因此原則上這個因素可能，單獨一個或結合别的因素，導致法庭不作出平均分割。不過法庭不願意容許雙方像檢驗遺體般對婚姻進行檢驗以找出對方的錯處，或者“互相指責，一連多日糾纏於他們的瑣碎爭執”。於Wachtel v Wachtel [1973] 1 ALL ER 113，第119頁内，Omrod法官指出“行為”必須“兼備“明顯和嚴重〞兩點，以致如果法庭命令婚姻的一方須贍養行為屬於這個類别的另一方，這會違反任何人的公正意識”。該原則於英格蘭上訴法庭裡獲得民事庭庭長Denning勳爵的贊同。Hale勳爵亦於Charman v Charman (N0.4) [2007]1 FLR 1246案再說明該原則。
26. 就經濟需要作為重要因素，終審法院於LKW v DD指，婚姻的一方承受的負擔或責任可能比另一方承受的遠為沉重，最常見的是涉及照顧子女。Hale勳爵把下列情說作為需要的例子；其中一方沒有能力重新找到工作，或重新找到工作的能力減少了；或者其中一方承擔照顧年老親人的責任；或其中一方因身體上或精神上不健全而有特别需要。
27. 第7(1)(d)條規定法庭行使酌情權時必須考慮婚姻的持續期。這個因素對法庭應否不作出平均分割可以有十分重要的影響。雖然分享原則對長久和短暫的婚姻都適用，但當一段短暫的婚姻結束，公平的處理方法可能是其中一方脱離這段關係時應該得到少過一半總資產。在長久婚姻結束後，比起在短暫婚姻結束後，較有可能採用平均分割方式處理：見LKW v DD 第108-109段。
28. 就貢獻作為重要因素，終審法院指出第7(1)(f)條規定法庭有責任顧及雙方各自為家庭的福利作出的貢獻，包括由照料家庭或照顧家人而作出的貢獻。這是法庭處理經濟給養時的中心指導因素。一般來說，婚姻雙方的貢獻是被視為運用分享原則時不可缺少的一部分。除非有充分理由，法庭須依從的平均分割準則不明言地承認婚姻雙方各自的貢獻，雖然性質不同，都應該平等對待。有時其中一方試圖說服法庭他或她為家庭福利作出的貢獻比對方作出的大很多〔又稱為“特殊”或“特出”貢獻〕，以致有充分理由不依從平均分割準則。終審法院指，能以“特殊”或“特出”貢獻為理由適當地提出爭論點去支持法庭不依從平均準則的情况，即使有，也是稀有和特殊的情況：見LKW v DD第110-117段。
29. 至於補償作為重要因素，終審法院指該類補償在一般情況下在運用分享原則時已經被考慮在內。只有在特殊情況下，根據案件的特別案情，才應該在已經考慮在內的金額之外為這種補償給予分别的判給額。
適用於婚前或分居協議的法律原則
30. 於Hyman v Hyman (1929) AC 601英格蘭上議院訂明有關分居協議的法律原則:
“However, this may be, it is sufficient for the decision of the present case to hold, as I do, that the power of the court to make provision for a wife on the dissolution of her marriage is a necessary incident of the power to decree such a dissolution, conferred not merely in the interests of the wife, but of the public, and that the wife cannot by her own covenant preclude herself from invoking the jurisdiction of the court or preclude the court from the exercise of that jurisdiction…this by no means implies that, when this application is made, the existence of the Deed or its terms are not the most relevant factors for consideration by the court in reaching a decision.”
31. 於Wright v Wright (1970) 1 WLR 1219 ，英國上議院的Sir Gordon Willmer裁定：
“I think, approaching the matter de novo and in the absence of authority, that the proper view is to say that this was an agreement entered into with full knowledge of all the circumstances and on the advice of both parties’ legal advisers. It is therefore something which considerable attention must be paid. I accept that it would not be right to say that it has to be construed like a statute, or that it absolutely forbids any possible award of maintenance, except upon the strictest proof of the existence of the circumstances mentioned…the existence of this agreement, having regard to the circumstances in which it was arrived at, at least makes it necessary for the wife, if she wants to justify an award of maintenance, to offer prima facie proof that there have been unforeseen circumstances, in the true sense, which make it impossible for her to work or otherwise maintain herself. If that be right, I think that it is quite plain that the wife here did not ever given such prima facie proof.”
32. 於Brockwell v Brockwell (5th November 1975) (unreported) 英格蘭的Stamp法官指出:
“Nevertheless, the wife ought, in my judgment, to have the opportunity of showing that in all the circumstances, and notwithstanding the agreement, the court should exercise in her favour this discretion to award her some lump sum payment…When people make an agreement like this it is a very important factor in considering what is the just outcome of the proceedings.”
33. 英格蘭上訴法院於Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 (CA) 一案内訂明法庭應怎樣處理分居協議。案中的夫婦於1976年分居。按妻子的要求，雙方的律師討價還價後撰寫分居協議。丈夫在沒有壓力下簽署分居協議。根據協議丈夫須支付10萬英磅的資產權益、每年1萬6千英磅的定期付款及子女的贍養費。妻子則同意放棄任何整筆付款及物業轉讓。丈夫履行協議條款，但妻子卻於離婚訴訟中要求整筆付款。妻子稱當時害怕財雄勢大的丈夫，亦不想失去子女的撫養權，因此在種種壓力下才簽署分居協議書。上訴法院裁定妻子未能提出理據以使法庭容許她不履行協議。Omrod法官指出:
“To decide what weight should be given in order to reach a just result, to a prior agreement not to claim a lump sum, regard must be had to the conduct of both parties, leading up to the prior agreement, and to their subsequent conduct, in consequence of it. It is not necessary in this connection to think in formal legal terms, such as misrepresentation or estoppel, all the circumstances as they affect each of two human beings must be considered in the complex relationship of marriage. So the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement are relevant. Undue pressure by one side, exploitation of a dominant position to secure an unreasonable advantage, inadequate knowledge, possibly bad legal advice, an important change of circumstances, unforeseen or overlooked at the time of making the agreement, are all relevant to the question of justice between the parties. Important too is the general proposition that, formal agreements, properly and fairly arrived at with competent legal advice, should not be displaced unless there are good and substantial grounds for concluding that an injustice will be done by holding the parties to the terms of their agreement. There may well be other considerations which affect the justice of this case, the above list is not intended to be an exclusive catalogue…There can be no doubt that in this case, as in so many, there is a disparity of bargaining power. The crucial question, however, for present purposes is not whether the husband had a superior bargaining power, but whether he exploited it in such a way which was unfair to the wife, so as to induce her to act to her disadvantage. It is at this point that this case becomes so puzzling. At no time has the wife alleged that the husband put accept his terms during the negotiations which led up to the deed, and the judge expressly found as a fact that the husband ‘… did not make threats with the intention of forcing his wife to take far less than a court would award her after a decree’…”
34. 於L v C [2007] HKCA 209一案內，夫妻兩人於1965年認識及開始同居，他1991年才結婚。兩人一同經營業務，白手興家。1999年8月，兩人分居；當時他們已是億萬富翁。妻子於2001年6月12日提出離婚呈請，兩人均要求附屬濟助。案件的論點在於兩人在展䦕訴訟前曾簽署兩份瓜分大部分資產的協議書。後來丈夫指在受壓下才簽署協議書，試圖推翻協議。法庭裁定應遵守協議内容，但在考慮餘下資產時會衡量協議書是否公平。法庭亦裁定協議下，妻子獲得的資產價值比丈夫少，因此於處理餘下資產時作調整。原訟庭法官亦裁定妻子的披露不盡不實，因此將其可得的附屬濟助下調。當時法官考慮的因素如下：
“The judge commenced his analysis by directing his mind to the key question, namely, the effect of the two agreements. He found that:
(1) the agreements did not purport to be in full and final settlement of all possible claims for ancillary relief;
(2) at the time the agreements were concluded the husband and wife had the benefit of legal advice;
(3) the parties had acted upon the agreements and had arranged their affairs accordingly;
(4) the agreements had been concluded after the parties had separated;
(5) the wife had been given the choice of assets within the groups provided;
(6) there had, by agreement, been no valuation of the assets;
(7) the arrangements were intended as a clean break;
(8) the agreements were not intended as a mere interim measure but that rather ‘at the time of the agreements, the parties intended the arrangements under the agreements to be irreversible and permanent;
(9) despite the husband’s contention of duress, there was nothing unfair in the circumstances leading to the conclusion of the agreements – a conclusion that is, in my judgment, of vital importance to this appeal; and
(10) that it would be ‘unfair to redistribute what had been allocated under the agreements. ”
35. 對於兩人獲取的資產價值的分歧，原訟庭法官指：
“The disparity in the values of the assets distributed: it is quite clear from the authorities that disparity by itself cannot be a ground for disregarding the Agreements. This is particularly so in the present context as the valuations of businesses are problematic and the businesses have changed much on account of efforts of the parties after the Agreements…As observed in the authorities, the benefit derived from an agreement of this nature should not be measured purely from a monetary angle…The lack of comprehensive valuations before the Agreements: this might have a bearing on the adequacy of knowledge of the parties before entering into the Agreements. However, it would defeat the purposes of settlement if one must have left no stone unturned in the valuation of assets before an agreement can be regarded as binding. Under the law, parties are free to settle even though there was no valuation by either or both parties. It is a question of balance…Parties should decide for himself or herself whether he or she should go through such exercises before settling or waiving the same.”
36. 丈夫不服判決，提出上訴。上訴法院指出：
“In deciding whether to exercise such powers in relation to a party to the marriage and if so in what manner, the court is enjoined by section 7…
As for conduct of the “conduct of the parties and of the circumstances of the case”, the fact that in relation to a significant part of the assets under consideration the parties concluded an agreement is recognized as part of the conduct and circumstances to which, by reason of this provision, the court is to have regard…
When parties who are sui juris freely enter upon a bargain for the division of matrimonial assets then, absent unfair or unconscionable factors attaching to the circumstances in which that agreement came to be concluded and absent unforeseen circumstances arising after the conclusion of the agreement such as to cause manifest prejudice to one of the parties, the courts will hold the parties to their bargain. For reasons of policy, the courts will not permit the parties by agreement to oust the jurisdiction of the court in matters touching upon matrimonial finance or to control the exercise of the court’s jurisdiction once that jurisdiction is invoked (Hyman v Hyman), and the courts will be astute in maintaining their supervisory jurisdiction (Pounds v Pounds), even in the absence of provisions seeking to oust jurisdiction. In matrimonial matters, the courts have a particular role in ensuring protection for parties to a marriage that has broken down. The fact that there has been an agreement for the division of assets is not of itself determinative of an application, for the statute enjoins the Court to have regard to all the circumstances that prevail at the time the court is required to make its determination for ancillary relief, and an agreement is but one of those circumstances, though it may transpire to be an important one. Precisely because agreements for the division of assets tend to be concluded against an emotionally charged backdrop, steeped in present and future uncertainty, the courts will take particular care to examine an assertion that an agreement should be accorded no or little weight because of this or that unconscionable aspect to the circumstances in which it was concluded. So too, because of the way in which the statutory duty is framed, it si incumbent on a court, even though there exist no circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement that should vitiate it, nonetheless to examine the present condition of the parties to determine whether justice demands a different dispensation. The subject matter is peculiarly fact-sensitive. Many questions will arise: the availability of legal advice at the time of the negotiations and conclusion of the agreement; whether those negotiations and the conclusions reached were attended by undue pressure, including self induced pressure; whether there is some factor in the relationship between the parties, such as the exploitation of a dominant position, or the use of children as a weapon wielded against one of the parties; whether judgement has been impaired by emotion or fear or misapprehension of the factual or legal position; whether the parties have acted upon the agreement reached and whether there has arisen since the making of the agreement a fresh unforeseen event by reason of which it may be unconscionable to hold the parties to the strict letter of the agreement. If one or more such circumstances are shown, then the court in the exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction might well interfere with the dispositions effected under the agreement.
Yet there is a starting position, which is also born of policy considerations. It is that the court should uphold agreements between husband and wife concluded before or at the time of divorce ad should allow one of the parties to depart from the agreement only if that party demonstrates good and substantial grounds for so doing (Edgar v Edgar). That policy consideration is one that itself recognises the considerable trauma that attends prolonged and costly matrimonial disputes, and the obvious advantage in settlement rather than in the litigious cauldron that stirs bitterness, prolongs uncertainty, and is the enemy of the clean break that ensures to the advantage of the husband, wife and children. Matrimonial law is a flexible tool, precisely because the personal element s at its centre and because personal and family circumstances and needs are complex, varying from setting to setting and from individual to individual. To this fact the statute gives due recognition by the wide discretion it confers, but the courts have articulated principles within which that discretion is to be exercised, else the certainty and finality that serves the interests of the family and the autonomy that should be accorded to individuals “to organize their lives as they see fit and to pursue their own sense of what is mutually acceptable in their own individual circumstances” are rendered much more difficult to attain.
…Yet it seems to me that that uncertainty is lessened to a degree that is acceptable and manageable if one proceeds on the basis that an agreement is ‘presumptively dispositive’, the burden being on the party seeking to achieve a different disposition to show good and substantial cause why the compact should not be respected, and in recognizing that the scope for so doing is one directed at an injustice in the circumstances in which the agreement came to be concluded or in clear injustice occasioned to one of the parties by reason of events unforeseen at the time of the agreement were the agreement to be enforced to its letter. The courts should be reluctant to second-guess the initiative of the parties in reaching an agreement, particularly so where they had the benefit of independent legal advice, and especially so where there is no evidence suggesting that they did not appreciate the ramifications of what they were doing: Hartshorne v Hartshone; and the courts should be slow to undermine such agreements sumply because it may be said ‘with the benefit of hindsight that they should have done it differently’: Miglin. If this approach is adopted, then, so it seems to me, the agreement is given the respect it deserves and the notion that one accords it not too much weight becomes an inappropriate one. The courts must be astute in this field to guard against the manipulative litigant who seeks to undo an agreement…and to bear in mind the factors, quite clear now as a result of developed authority, which might go to vitiate such an agreement.
…Agreements by which parties to a marriage conclude a settlement for the distribution of their assets and for periodical payments in the event of a divorce have been referred to in these proceedings as Edgar agreements…The case was decided against the background of section 25(1) of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 which contained a provision markedly similar to section 7 of the Ordinance.
…Given the use…of the phrase ‘unfair advantage’ as a test by which to measure the proper standing of the agreements, I think it desirable to note the context in which the same phrase was addressed by Oliver J in Edgar:
“if by those references, [to “equal bargaining power” and “disparity of bargaining power”] the Judge meant no more than that one must look in every case at all the circumstances to see whether there was some unfair or unconscionable advantage taken of some factor or of some relationship between the parties which enables the court to say that an agreement was not truly entered into by one party or the other as a free agent, then I have no quarrel with them. If however he meant that the court must engage in an exercise of dissecting the contract and weighing the relative advantages and bargaining position on each side in order to ascertain whether there is some precise or approximate equilibrium, then I respectfully disagree. Men and women of full age, education and understanding, acting with competent advice available to them, must be assumed to know and appreciate what they are doing and their actual respective bargaining strengths will in fact depend in every case on a subjective evaluation of their motives for doing it. One may, of course, find that some unfair advantage has been taken of a judgment impaired by emotion, or that one party is motivated by fear induced by some conduct of the other or by some misapprehension of a factual or legal position, but in the absence of some such consideration as that, and these are examples only, the mere strength of one party’s desire for a particular result or the mere fact that one party has greater wealth than the other cannot, I think, affect the weight to be attributed to a freely negotiated bargain.”
In this regard it is worth adding that recognition that divorces are accompanied by emotional stress should not without more be elevated ‘to a presumption that parties in such circumstances are incapable of assenting to a binding agreement’: see Miglin
…Smith v Smith [2000] 3 FCR 374…Thorpe LJ…remarking that though counsel for the husband had said that the judge’s task was to ask whether the agreement was just at the date it was made:
“That is a fallacy. The duty of the judge was to adjudicate upon the wife’s entitlement to financial provision under the statute and particularly to reach a determination that applied all the relevant [statutory] criteria to the circumstances of the case. Of course, the agreement was within that range but it was no more than one ingredient within a complex equation.”
There is a useful distillation of the authorities and their effect in X v X (Y and Z Intervening) [2002] 1 FLR 508, a distillation that I would respectfully endorse…Having conducted a detailed analysis of the cases, including of course Edgar, Munby J said:
In exercising its duty under section 25 the task of the court is to reach a just result…
The fact that the parties have made their own agreement is a “very important” factor in considering what is the just and fair outcome. The amount of importance will vary from case to case.
The court will not lightly permit parties who have made an agreement between themselves to depart from it. The court should be slow to invade the contractual territory, for as a matter of general policy what the parties have themselves agreed should, unless on the face of it or in fact contrary to public policy or subject to some vitiating feature of the type referred to by Ormrod LJ, be upheld by the courts.
A formal agreement, properly and fairly arrived at with competent legal advice, should be upheld by the court unless there are “good and substantial grounds” for concluding that an “injustice” will be done by holding the parties to it…
The mere fact that one party might have done better by going to court is not of itself generally a ground for permitting that party to resile from what was agreed.
The court must nonetheless have regard to all the circumstances. The circumstances are to be judged in their totality and with a broad perspective rather than individually one by one.
In particular the court must have regard to the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement, the extent to which the parties themselves attached importance to it and the extent to which the parties themselves have acted upon it.
The relevant circumstances are not limited to the purely financial aspects of the agreement: social, personal and, I would add, religious and cultural considerations, all have to be taken into account.
The court should bear in mind the undesirability of stirring up problems with parties who have come to an agreement.
On the contrary the court should if possible, and consistent with its duty under s.25 seek to bring about family peace and finality.
I have there emphasized the phrase “the circumstances surrounding the making of the agreement”…The courts look to circumstances personal to the parties, most particularly in the context of marital disruption, at the time of the agreement or at the time of the court assessment, by reason of which it would clearly be unjust to hold the parties to the agreement made. These, in my judgment, are characteristics quite different from a mere evaluation of the agreement assets conducted for no purpose other than to ascertain whether there is a disparity, for such an exercise goes merely to the question whether the parties might have struck for themselves a better bargain.
I cannot agree with the trial judge that there was any unfair advantage taken by one party over another. The mere fact of a disparity in value is not the taking of an unfair advantage. These were agreements entered into and thereafter acted upon, voluntarily by mature and astute business people well attuned to the mind-set of the other, who were thoroughly familiar with the assets in question, and who acted at their own pace and each with the benefit of independent legal advice. Such suggestions as were made at trial that the agreements were entered into in circumstances of undue pressure were rejected by the judge and there is no appeal against that finding. There was no suggestion of an impaired judgment of which an unfair advantage might have been taken, no question of any misrepresentation, no exploitation of a dominant bargaining position, no children in the background whose welfare might be the cause of partisan or self induced pressure, no suggestion of a misapprehension of the factual or the legal position, no hint of hardship or indeed of circumstances unforeseen or of lives unfolding in an unexpected manner…
“Where, as in the present case, the parties have anticipated with accuracy their personal and financial circumstances at the time of distribution, and where they have truly considered the impact of their choices, then, without more, a finding that their agreement operates unfairly should not be made lightly.” ”
37. 於Radmacher (formerly Granatino) v Granatino [2011] 1 ALL ER 373一案内，英國的Supreme Court裁定訴訟雙方不能以協議禠奪法庭分配資產的權力。法庭沒有責任執行任何婚前或婚後協議。可是當法庭考慮資產分配的，法庭應對該類協議予以適當的比重。
38. 於上述案例內，德籍的妻子出身富裕。1997年妻子與法籍丈夫邂逅。當時兩人均居於倫敦。1998年兩人訂婚時，丈夫應妻子的要求，答應簽署婚前協議書，表明如日後離婚，雙方均不會獲得任何經濟利益。其實當時丈夫已是成功的投資銀行家。雙方於1998年8月1日簽署婚前協議書。簽署儀式前的一個星期，丈夫收到以德文撰寫的最終草擬協議書。該協議書訂明受德國法律約束。丈夫清楚明白協議書的基本内容，他並不知悉公證人希望他獲取協議書的譯本，以考慮其內容。簽署協議書之前，妻子並沒披露其資產；丈夫亦沒聽取法律意見。兩人於11月28月結成夫婦，婚後育有兩名子女。2003年，丈夫離職攻讀博士學位。後來兩人婚姻破裂，妻子與子女於2006年10月遷離婚姻居所。於離婚訴訟内，丈夫向妻子索取經濟給養。法庭裁定，雖然在英國法律下，婚前協議並非有效的合約，但法例下法庭須考慮所有因素，因此丈夫應得的附屬濟助須反映他曾經簽署婚前協議。可是法庭裁定該協議有以下的缺失：
(1) 丈夫沒有獲取獨立的法律意見;
(2) 就算丈夫有“需要”，協議亦防止他獲得任何附屬濟助;
(3) 妻子沒有披露資產;
(4) 協議前沒有討價還價;
(5) 兩人育有兩名子女。
39. 法庭遂下令妻子支付整筆付款、於德國提供位所及支付子女與丈夫一起時的定期付款。妻子不服判決，提出上訴。上訴法院同意應對婚前協議予以決定性的比重，除了關乎子女的贍養費，妻子上訴得值。丈夫不服判決，提出上訴。最高法院裁定上述婚前協議是有缺失，但下級法院並沒足夠反映婚前協議。丈夫有良好的工作能力，因此沒有需要。丈夫為了自己的興趣，而非為家庭的福利而選擇重返校園。因此沒有補償的因素。結婚前丈夫承諾不可分割妻子從家人所得的財富，因此他應履行承諾。最高法院訂明法庭於衡量這類協議的比重時的法律原則:
“Although a court considering the grant of ancillary relief was not obliged to give effect to ante or post nuptial agreements, for the parties could not by agreement oust the jurisdiction of the court, appropriate weight had to be given to such agreements. The old rule that such agreements providing for future separation were contrary to public policy had become obsolete. If a nuptial agreement was to carry full weight, both the husband and wife had to enter into it of their own free will, without undue influence or pressure, and informed of its implications. Sound legal advice was desirable for it would ensure that a party was fully aware of the implications and full disclosure of any assets owned by the other party might be necessary to ensure that. However, if it was clear that a party was fully aware of the implications and indifferent to detailed particulars of the other party’s assets, there was no need to accord the agreement reduced weight because he or she was unaware of those particulars. What was important was that each party should have all the information that was material to his or her decision, and that each party should intend that the agreement should govern the financial consequences of the marriage coming to an end. In future it would be natural to infer that parties who entered into ante-nuptial agreement to which English law was likely to be applied intended that effect should be given to it. In relation to the circumstances attending the making of the agreement, the court might take into account a party’s emotional state and what pressure he or she had been under to agree, although that could not be considered in isolation from what would have happened had he or she not been under those pressures. The circumstances of the parties at the time of the agreement, such as their age and maturity, would be relevant. Another important factor might be whether the marriage would have gone ahead without an agreement, or without the terms which had been agreed. The weight to be accorded to a nuptial agreement would be reduced if its terms were unfair from the start, but that question would often be subsumed in practice in the question of whether the agreement operated unfairly having regard to the circumstances prevailing at the time of the breakdown of the marriage. The court should give effect to a nuptial agreement that was freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless, in the circumstances prevailing, it would not be fair to hold the parties to their agreement;
(2) Authority established that the overriding criterion to be applied in ancillary relief proceedings was that of fairness, and identified the three strands of need, compensation and sharing that were relevant to the question of what was fair. The question of the circumstances in which it would be fair to hold the parties to a nuptial agreement would necessarily depend upon the facts of the particular case. However, it was safe to give some guidance in relation to the situation where there were no tainting circumstances attending the conclusion of the agreement…Of the three strands, needs and compensation could most readily render it unfair to hold the parties to an ante-nuptial agreement. The parties were unlikely to have intended that their agreement should result in one partner being left in a predicament of real need, while the other enjoyed a sufficiency, and such a result was likely to render it unfair to hold the parties to their agreement. Equally if the devotion of one partner to looking after the family and the home had left the other free to accumulate wealth, it was likely to be unfair to hold the parties to an agreement that entitled the latter to retain all that he or she had earned. Where, however, those considerations did not apply and each party was in a position to meet his or her needs, fairness might not require a departure from their agreement as to the regulation of their financial affairs in the circumstances that had come to pass. Thus it was in relation to the third strand, sharing, that the court would be most likely to make an order in the terms of the nuptial agreement in place of the order that it would otherwise have made.”
40. 於SPH v SA (2014) 17 HKCFAR 364一案内，終審法院指:
“…the parties entered into an agreement prior to their marriage varying their matrimonial property rights under German law, and when they were about to divorce the parties entered into a separation agreement restricting W’s rights to claim maintenance.
Consequently, the appeal has a much wider significance, since it involves the potential impact of these agreements in Hong Kong should the proceedings continue here. Such agreements were once considered at common law to be contrary to public policy because, not only were they seen somehow to affect the institution of marriage itself, they ousted the jurisdiction of the court to grant ancillary relief, but they have been the subject of a slow evolution in English law, and also reflected in Hong Kong law, to the point where, although not regarded as definitively binding, they have substantial legal effects. The two crucial decisions were, first Edgar v Edgar [2980] 1 WLR 1410 (CA), on the effect of post nuptial agreements or separations…which was applied in Hong Kong by the Court of Appeal in L v C [2007] 3 HKLRD 819, and, second, Radmacher v Granatino…[2011] A.C. 534 in which the UK Supreme Court gave qualified effect to ante- or pre-nuptial agreements…
Separation or post-nuptial agreements were the subject of the leading English decision in Edgar v Edgar [1980] 1 WLR 1410 which decided that, although separation afreements did not override the powers of the court to grant ancillary relief, they carried considerable weight in relation to the exercise of the court’s discretion when granting such relief. Such an agreement should be upheld unless there were vitiating factors or a compelling case of unforeseeable circumstances.
In Hong Kong the Court of Appeal conducted an extensive review of the English cases in L v C [2007] 3 HKLRD 819 and confirmed that when parties who are sui juris freely enter upon a bargain for the division of matrimonial assets then, in the absence of unfair or unconscionable circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the agreement and material and drastic unforeseen circumstances arising thereafter such as to cause manifest prejudice to one of the parties, the courts will hold the parties to their bargain. Determining whether injustice would be done under the agreements involved more than simply ascertaining whether there was any disparity in the value of the assets. The court would only allow one of the parties to depart from an agreement if that party demonstrated good and substantial grounds for doing so.
In Radmacher v Granatino…The UK Supreme Court decided that, although it was the court and not any prior agreement between the parties which would determine the appropriate ancillary relief when a marriage came to an end, the rule that agreements providing for the future separation of the parties to a marriage were contrary to public policy was obsolete and no longer applied; the court should give weight to an agreement, made between a couple prior to and in contemplation of their marriage, as to the manner in which their financial affairs should be regulated in the event of their separation in circumstances where it was fair to do so; in appropriate circumstances, the court could hold the parties to the agreement even when the result would be different from that which the court would otherwise have ordered…
In particular, an agreement would carry full weight only if each party had entered into it of his or her ow free will, without undue influence or pressure, having all the information material to his or her decision to enter into the agreement and intending that it should be effective to govern the financial consequences of the marriage coming to an end; and the court should give effect to an agreement which was freely entered into by each party with a full appreciation of its implications unless the circumstances prevailing it would not be fair to hold the parties to the agreement. Enforcement of the agreement could be rendered unfair by the occurrence of contingencies unforeseen at the time of the agreement or where, in the circumstances prevailing at the time of separation, one partner would be left in a predicament of real need while the other enjoyed a sufficiency. ”
證供的分析
41. 於審訊中，雙方均專注於法庭是否應執行“分產協議”。雙方似乎認為如法庭不接納“分產協議”才應考慮法例第7條的因素。因此，本席才大篇幅地列明上述案例。總括而言，就算雙方曾簽署分居或分產協議，法庭仍須考處法例第7條的因素，而分居或分產協議是其中一個因素。若協議在公平的情況下簽署，法庭應予以大比重。如其中一方不願意遵守協議，該方負有舉證責任，說服法庭協議在不公平情況下簽署。否則，法庭便應執行協議的條款。就算協議下雙方所得的資產金額有别〔disparity〕，或少於法庭認為適當的金額，法庭也不應拒絶執行協議。
證供的分折
婚姻資產
42. 沒有爭議的是夫婦兩人分居前，最主要的婚姻資產是前婚姻居所及天水圍物業。2013年5月27日，丈夫單方面決定出售前婚姻居，售價為港幣$3,190,000。雙方同意天水圍物業現時的價值為港幣$3,787,000。
43. 雙方不爭議出售前婚姻居所的律師費及雜費為$9,400及解除前婚姻居所轉讓限制補地價金額為港幣$927,670。餘下售樓收益〔$2,252,930〕的去向則有爭議。
44. 2001年4月26日，夫婦兩人購入前婚姻居所。直至丈夫於2013年5月私自賣出該物業，該物業一直用作兩人的婚姻居所。該物業以港幣$779,000購入。雙方同意當時$77,900的首期是由妻子的兄長借出。丈夫亦不爭議該借款由妻子獨力清還。購買前婚姻居所的餘款（$701,000）則以東亞銀行承造的按揭貸款支付〔C279〕，按揭供款為每兩個星期$1,753.60。縱使丈夫是該按揭的借款人及每次的還款往丈夫的東亞銀行户口中扣除〔LYY-4〕，事實上直至2012年2月2日，該按揭還款由妻子獨力支付。每次還款前，妻子均透過自動櫃員機將供款存入丈夫的東亞銀行的户口内〔見LYY-5及LYY-6〕。
45. 訴訟開始及經分別4次要求披露後，妻子才知悉原來早於2006年10月12日，丈夫私下向通達財務有限公司借款。該借貸合約登記在前婚姻居所上。2011年12月丈夫突然向香港房屋委員會查詢有關補地價的事宜〔C282〕，並於2012年2月2日，丈夫以前婚姻居所向達通財務有限公司〔達通〕獲取2項按揭貸款（Legal Charge and Second Legal Charge），兩項貸款均是“All moneys”。同日，東亞銀行的按揭貸款及丈夫與達通簽訂的貸款協議被解除。丈夫亦支付港幣$927,670給香港房屋委員會補地價〔C284-285〕以解除該物業的轉讓限制。2012年9月27日，丈夫將前婚姻居所先後按給恆生銀行（Mortgage）及向Aeon借款，兩項貸款均是“All moneys”。同日，丈夫清還之前從達通獲取的兩項按揭。妻子指於本訴訟中，丈夫沒有盡披露責任，一直拒絶披露該些貸款下獲取的金額、用途及下落。
46. 丈夫曾解釋借款原因及部份售樓收益的去向。雖然婚姻居所在發出呈請書之前3年內出售，丈夫於其2016年3月17日的經濟狀況陳述書内完全沒提及該物業或售樓收益[B/69]。他更訛稱天水圍物業乃前婚姻居所。後來他才承認，婚姻期間夫婦兩人從沒居於天水圍物業。丈夫從沒解釋因何誤導法庭。
47. 於本案内，妻子一直追問多項貸款的用途及售樓收益的去向。丈夫於2016年7月31日存檔的確認書內聲稱出售前婚姻居所是“生意失該造成的後果。而生意失誤主因是資金斷裂。資金斷裂的催生者是兩個反對生意的家人〔包括妻子〕”[B/126]。於該確認書内，丈夫不但沒有解釋售樓收益的去向，還稱造成失誤的是妻子反對生意。
48. 後來，於2016年9月2日存檔的文件中，丈夫完全改變說法，指財困是由百利金融破產案引致，因此才出售前婚姻居所。丈夫稱他與深圳人仕合伙名為外匯金手指的外匯自動操盤業務；該業務是美國百利金融集團的經紀人，他本人每月收入高達3萬美元。百利金融於2012年7月破產。他指因此引致應付而未付的款項及損失，只好向財務公司以高息貸款。該貸款年息高，手續費也高，遂其後一年演變成不可不賣前婚姻居所的局面[B/138] 。由於前婚姻居所是居屋，補地價金額近100萬元。丈夫稱出售前婚姻居所後的淨收益不及60萬元。
49. 妻子即於2016年10月4日向丈夫發出問卷，要求他交代前婚姻居所售樓收益去向[B/198-199]。2016年10月12日，丈夫於回覆書內聲稱售樓淨收益只有港幣$640,000。他說由於這種補地價連同相關服務都由一家服務商包辦，不需丈夫提供現金。他又稱疏忽之下，沒有保存相關證明。當時他仍不肯清楚交代售樓收益的詳情，亦拒絕提供律師樓的證明文件[B/205]。
50. 直至2017年4月11日存檔另一份的回覆書，丈夫才首次披露出售前婚姻居所收益的去向及聲稱用途[B/128-129]。於2017年7月6日的誓章內，丈夫披露進一步有關前婚姻居所出售的過程及交代售樓收益明細、去向、聲稱用途及有關文件[B/146-148;150-152] 。
51. 2017年7月6日，丈夫於誓章第11段[B/147]稱，樓價尾數為港幣$2,871,000，當中$1,830,588.03用作償還恆生銀行的欠款；$382,297用作償還Aeon的欠款；$9,400用作支付律師費和雜費。丈夫指他所得的尾數為$648,714.97。加上丈夫之前收取的訂金$319,000，他指淨收益為$967,714.97。
52. 於2017年8月28日的誓章第9段[B/178]内，丈夫聲稱由於美國百利金融集團2012年7月破產，引致外匯金手指業務損失超過港幣200萬元。因此他最終被迫將前婚姻居所作按揭貸款。
53. 本席同意丈夫一直沒有盡披露責任，他對資產去向的解釋亦令人難以信服：
(1) 於其2016年3月17日的經濟狀況陳述書内，丈夫對前婚姻居所或售樓收益[B/69] 不但隻字不提，還訛稱天水圍物業乃前婚姻居所。後來他才承認，婚姻期間夫婦兩人從沒居於天水圍物業。丈夫從沒解釋因何誤導法庭；
(2) 最初丈夫指財困的原因是妻子不同意其業務而引致資金斷裂及生意失誤。就算妻子拒絕以家庭資產支持丈夫開展或擴充業務，丈夫頂多只會缺乏資金，並不會引致“生意失誤”。丈夫完全沒解釋妻子如何可令他的“生意失誤”和是什麽失誤；
(3) 後來丈夫完全改變其說法，指財困是由美國百利金融集團破產而引致。該說法與上述的指稱南轅北轍，但他從沒向法庭解釋為何會出現分歧;
(4) 據丈夫2017年8月28日的誓章第9段[B/178]，他之所以被以前婚姻居所作按揭，是因為美國百利金融集團2012年7月倒閉。但事實上，丈夫早於2011年12月已向房屋署要求補地價，移除售樓限制；
(5) 另外，丈夫是於2012年2月以前婚姻居所作按揭。可是根據其2017年7月6日的誓章第24-26段[B/151-152]，於2011年，他的業務不但順利展開，收入更漸見豐厚，建立了多個外匯金手指工作坊以作配合。他稱2012年7月，外匯自動操盤業務的月入佣金高達差不多3萬2千美元。該說法與他指是因為業務失誤才用前婚姻居所作按揭的解釋截然不同；
(6) 被盤問下，面對按揭與美國百利金融集團倒閉的時間差異時，丈夫又再提供另一個解釋，指借款是用作擴充業務；
(7) 丈夫同意金融經紀業是受到嚴密監管的行業；所有經紀均必需領有牌照。沒爭議的是美國百利金融集團是美國第2大非結算期貨經紀公司，也是全球最大的外匯經紀公司之一。丈夫承認他從來沒有任何有關牌照。他無法解釋是如何作為美國百利金融集團的金融經紀及從該集團賺取佣金；
(8) 於審訊期間，妻子指丈夫的“金手指”其實只是普通的USB記憶體，完全沒有其他作用。丈夫將USB鍍上黃金，只用作吹噓自己的身份。這方面的證供從沒受到質疑，甚至沒有半句盤問；
(9) 丈夫同意金融經紀受嚴密監管，包括財務文件及記錄的保存。可是丈夫卻沒有、或拒絶、或未能提供任何與外匯自動操盤業務的任何財務報表、文件或記錄；
(10) 丈夫自稱是經紀，替客人操盤賺取佣金。炒賣股票、外匯和期貨的客人均是自負盈虧；不管客人是賺或蝕，經紀也會獲得佣金。因此丈夫沒有理由須負起客人的損失；
(11) 丈夫指美國百利金融集團倒閉後，他有提交申索申請[C/245-249;369-373]。可是他未能提供任何證據顯示他以經紀身分申索賠償。他唯一能提供的是妻子名下户口的申索表格，而涉及金額只是1至2萬美元；
(12) 事實上，就算根據他於2016年3月17日的經濟狀況陳述書，丈夫也只是指美國百利金融集團欠他11,184.91美元，而非他指稱的200萬港元；
(13) 文件上，丈夫一直指損失200萬港元是因支付“應付而未付的款項”而引致；而這些欠款是由美國百利金融集團倒閉而引致。於法庭上，他又指部份是他投資於經紀業務的損失，包括數十萬元的裝修費用。他還向法庭展示指稱為“外匯金手指工作坊”的照片[C/353-354]。可是他於第一份經濟狀況陳述書内則指“外匯向動操盤代客服務：網上客人，沒有營業地址”[B54] ；
(14) 丈夫指美國百利金融集團倒閉前，他每月賺取的佣金高達3萬美元，但該些佣金從來沒有於其披露的任何一個銀行户口中出現；
(15) 丈夫指因美國百利金融集團倒閉而蒙受200萬元的損失。可是他一直未提供任何文件支持該說法。
54. 綜觀所有證供，丈夫的“業務”及“損失”均為他自圓其說的指稱〔bare allegations〕，不但沒有任何證供的支持，更與他本身證供有分歧。況且，丈夫的說法自相矛盾，違反常理。本席裁定丈夫並非可信的證人，拒納其證供。
55. 丈夫承認以港幣319萬元出售前婚姻居所。扣除補地價的$927,670及$9,400的律師費及雜費，餘款為$2,252,930。丈夫律師於結案陳詞稱丈夫曾支付$31,900的地產經紀佣金。妻子一直追問售樓收益的下落。丈夫最終作解釋時稱樓價尾數為$2,871,000，當中$1,830,588.03用作償還恒生銀行的按揭，$382,297支付Aeon的欠款，$9,400支付律師費及雜費，丈夫收取的只有$648,714.97的餘款及最初收取的$319,000；因此他的得益只有$967,714.97[B/147]。很明顯，丈夫從沒提及曾支付任何地產經紀佣金。丈夫的律師指前婚姻居所的部份按揭由丈夫支付，因此法庭應從出售該物業的售價扣除丈夫的付款。首先，丈夫指稱一時大意，沒有保留付清按揭的文件。就算他所言屬實，也可從銀行或處理按揭的律師獲取文件副本。本席裁定丈夫拒絶透露他支付的按揭餘額。
56. 因丈夫拒絕盡其披露責任，法庭將對其作負面推論。法庭亦只可依賴僅有及可信的證供。沒有爭議的是前婚姻居所以$779,000購入。首期是$77,900，餘款$701,000。妻子指支付按揭供款總額為$530,328.80。她亦承認最後由她支付的供款是2012年3月1日。因此按揭餘額為$170,771.20 〔$779,000 - $77,900 - $530,328.80〕。
57. 扣除上述不受爭議的支出，售出前婚姻居所後丈夫所獲淨收益為$2,082,158.80〔$3,190,000 - $927,670 - $9,400 - $170,771.20〕。
財政狀況的披露
58. 丈夫承認自2006年始，便以前婚姻居所獲取貸款。妻子要求丈夫披露自2006年的銀行月結單，月結單從沒顯示這些貸款。换言之，貸款被存入未披露的户口内。丈夫亦拒絕披露貸款金額或用途。他於本案內的披露不盡不實，本席對其財政狀況作負面推論。法庭裁定除了他從出售前婚姻居所獲得的收益外，仍有其他未披露的資產。
夫婦兩人的需要
59. 丈夫於1944年出生，現年74歲。妻子生於1948年，現年70歲。换句話說兩人已界退休之年。兩人的需要相約，主要所需包括住宿及生活費。根據丈夫的第一份經濟狀況陳述書，他每月的支出為3,000元；離婚後預期增加的支出是住宿2,000元[B/68]。可是於第二份經濟狀況陳述書又指每月所需為$16,600[B/119]。其中最主要的支出為租金$12,000。丈夫沒有提供任何關於指稱合適物業的資料，例如呎數及區域。前婚姻居所為一所居屋，以前是一家五口的居所。出售前婚姻居所後，兩人唯一的物業是天水圍物業。沒有爭議的是天水圍物業一直出租，租金為$4,300。丈夫現指天水圍物業的價值其實比前婚姻居所更高。在此情況下，丈夫要求$12,000月租完全不合理。
簽署「聲明書」的情況
60. 夫妻兩人均要求“清楚了斷”〔clean break〕。雙方同意多年來，雙方一直居於前婚姻居所。雖然雙方對丈夫通知妻子出售前婚姻居所的確實日期有爭議，但沒有爭議的是：
(1) 丈夫從沒與妻子商討，便出售該物業；
(2) 丈夫是簽約出售前婚姻居所後，即2013年5月尾，才告知妻子;
(3) 當時丈夫指2013年6月須交吉，一家人須於交吉前遷出。换言之，妻子與幼子在毫無準備下，必須在3個星期内遷出；
(4) 當時妻子並不知悉丈夫已用前婚姻居所獲取貸款；
(5) 妻子獲悉丈夫已出售前婚姻居所時十分氣憤，並表示如出售前婚姻居所便要離婚。她亦拒絶遷出；
(6) 丈夫自行草擬及簽署「聲明書」〔C/259〕，内容如下：
“我聲明〔天水圍物業〕物業權益乃我委託〔幼子〕為受託人代貸及代管物業租金和支出。
由2010年起〔夫妻〕爭議之下口頭協議分產情況如下：－
〔天水圍〕物業之權益全歸〔妻子〕所有。而我名下的物業〔前婚姻居所〕居屋單位則歸我本人所有。
特此再次聲明。
〔丈夫的簽署〕
2013.5.30.
同意.”
(7) 當時天水圍物業仍有近70萬元的按揭貸款;
(8) 之後，丈夫按「聲明書」出售前婚姻居所及獨得售樓收益。妻子亦因「聲明書」遷出前婚姻居所，並賠款予租客，遷入天水圍物業;
(9) 因相信兩人已分產，妻子於2013年7月用積蓄$689,771.38清還天水圍物業的按揭。
61. 丈夫現欲推翻「聲明書」；舉證責任在於丈夫去證實他在不自願情況之下簽署「聲明書」。妻子於2015年8月26日作出離婚呈請。訴訟開始後，丈夫不但對前婚姻居所隻字不提，還於經濟狀況陳述書內，偽稱天水圍物業為前婚姻居所。他更從沒提及「聲明書」，或指稱是在任何不自願的情況下簽署該文件。直至妻子追問出售前婚姻居所收益的去向及要求法庭執行「聲明書」的條款時，丈夫才於2016年9月4日〔即訴訟開始超過1年後〕的“說明書”内聲稱簽署「聲明書」是“權宜之計”。當時他亦只說是“平息”妻子的不滿〔B/138〕。於該“說明書”內從沒提及受到任何壓迫。直至2017年7月6日存檔的誓章，丈夫才指在“迫於無奈的情況下才被迫簽下該同意書”。他所指的壓迫是妻子拒絕遷出前婚姻居所，令他不能交吉，更須負上毁約的責任〔B/153〕。
62. 沒有爭議的是售前婚姻居所之前，購買前婚姻居所的訂金及按揭還款均由妻子獨自承擔。妻子多年來以勞力賺取生活費用。盤問下，丈夫亦𠄘認，除了支付按揭還款，妻子還獨力支付家庭開支。换言之，前婚姻居所基本上是代表了妻子畢生的積蓄。丈夫在毫無商討下，突然宣佈已將前婚姻居所出售；妻子生氣及拒絶遷出根本是意料中事。丈夫亦正正因此而先斬後奏，造成米已成炊的局面，以毀約賠償作籌碼，迫使妻子遷出及出售前婚姻居所。丈夫現指稱受到妻子的欺壓才不自願地簽署「聲明書」，實在是本末倒置。
63. 丈夫指「聲明書」第2段指稱「由2010年起…夫婦爭議之下口頭協議分產情況如下」並非事實。丈夫更續稱由2010年起，直至他出售前婚姻居所為止，夫婦兩人之間完全沒有任何分配家庭資產的爭議〔B/154〕。首先，丈夫承認該「聲明書」是“由他提出及草擬”。如兩人從沒因家庭資產發生爭議或達成口頭協議，丈夫根本完全沒有原因指是因為妻子及兒子反對其生意，令資金斷裂。這與上述撰寫該「聲明書」第2段。他對此亦從沒解釋。另外丈夫於2016年7月31日存檔的誓章内稱用前婚姻居所獲取按揭的說法有分歧。
64. 丈夫亦指簽署「聲明書」時，夫婦兩人仍未分居，也未申請離婚，因此無需與妻子訂立任何分居或分產協議〔B/153〕。前婚姻居所是妻子畢生的積蓄，也是一家人的居所。丈夫在沒有妻子同意下突然出售前婚姻居所，令婚姻完全破裂。妻子指當時已表明，如出售前婚姻居所便要離婚。這證供從沒受到質疑，丈夫的律師甚至對這說法沒有任何盤問。很明顯，丈夫當時知悉婚姻已破裂，無可挽救，兩人亦即將分開。因此他才自行用“分產”一詞描述雙方的協議。
65. 丈夫稱他是無奈的情況下才“被逼”簽署「聲明書」〔B/153〕。妻子在驚聞惡耗後表示反對出售前婚姻居所，並要求丈夫作交代。從來沒有證供顯示妻子開出任何條件才應允遷出前婚姻居所，更沒證供丈夫被逼簽署「聲明書」。相反地，丈夫承認「聲明書」全由他建議、草擬及簽署。這全是丈夫開出的條件。況且，當時天水圍物業乃有近70萬元的按揭欠款。如妻子佔盡上風，大可要求獲取售樓收益及天水圍物業。事實是，妻子無奈地被丈夫擺佈。
66. 於本案內，丈夫的證供自相矛盾，違反常理，全無信服力可言。丈夫律師指就算法庭拒納丈夫的證供，妻子也同意她拒絕遷出時，丈夫十分驚慌。丈夫由2011年尾已精心䇿劃出售前婚姻居所。他並非真的驚慌，而是恐怕他的詭計不能得呈。
67. 丈夫續指當時雙方均沒披露經濟狀況，亦沒法律意見，因此「聲明書」在不公平情況下簽署。根據上述案例，有合適的法律意見較為理想，但這並非執行分居協議的先決條件。丈夫完全看不起妻子以勞力賺取的微簿收入，更未懂欣賞妻子為了家庭，節儉的性格，還揶揄妻子是“很好的守財奴”〔B/142〕。他知悉兩個物業已是主要婚姻資產。事實上，當時丈夫根本對財政披露毫無興趣。
68. 雙方曾於陳詞内就簽署「聲明書」時兩個物業的價值爭議。首先，妻子於2017年9月4日的誓章指時前婚姻居所的市值約300萬元，而天水圍物業的市值則為200萬元〔B/168〕。丈夫從沒於任何誓章質疑該估值，審訊期間辯方律師亦沒作出任何盤問。况且，根據案例，夫婦雙方有權協商分配產的安排。如分居協議在公平情況下簽署，法庭無須亦不應該考究資產的價值及協議内容是否公平。就算法庭認為有另外較合適的分配方式，也不應干預兩人的協議。丈夫已獲取超過200萬元。法庭不接納他自稱的足襟見肘。
69. 綜觀上述所有的證供，雙方簽署「聲明書」的情況對丈夫完全沒有不公平。丈夫亦從沒提出簽署「聲明書」後出現任何未能預見的情況。法庭看不到任何原因拒絶執行「聲明書」内的協議。
命令
70. 基於上述因素，法庭下令：
(1) 天水圍物業的全部業權歸妻子所有；
(2) 妻子承認仍保存三隻包金的手指。法庭下令妻子14日内將該三隻“金手指”歸還予丈夫的律師。雙方可保留其名下的其餘資產；
(3) 本案訟費〔包括所有保留訟費〕由丈夫支付。丈夫本身的訟費根據法律援助署規例評定。
呈請人：由鄧滿喜律師事務所轉聘林紹欣大律師代表出席聆訊
答辯人：由張恩純，葉健民律師行代表出席聆訊
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