YUENG KWOK LEUNG AND ANOTHER v. GOLDEN KINGDOM INVESTMENT LTD

DCCJ 3085/2025

[2026] HKDC 609

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 3085 OF 2025

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JUDGMENT

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A.  INTRODUCTION

1.  This Action concerns an adverse possession claim over the yellow portion as delineated and shown in the plan attached to the Amended Statement of Claim (“the Subject Land”). The Subject Land is part of the land known as All That Remaining Portion of Section B of Lot No 385 in D.D. No 257, ie Lot 385B RP (“the Defendant’s Land”).

2.  The Plaintiffs, Mr Yeung Kwok Leung (楊國良) and Ms Yeung Lai Mui (楊麗梅), commenced this Action as the executors of the estate of their father, Mr Yeung Kut Cheung (楊吉祥) (“the Deceased”, “the Estate”), who passed away on 27 June 2017.

3.  The Defendant, Golden Kingdom Investment Limited (金帝國投資有限公司), is the registered owner of the Defendant’s Land, having acquired the Land on 4 May 2021.

4.  The Plaintiffs on behalf of the Estate contend that the Deceased has acquired possessory title to the Subject Land through adverse possession for a continuous period of over at least 12 years since April 2000[1]. They seek declaratory relief to this effect under Sections 7 and 17 of the Limitation Ordinance (Cap 347) (“LO”).

5.  The Defendant denies the Plaintiffs’ claim. In the Defendant’s Re-re-Amended Defence and Counterclaim (“D&CC”), the Defendant initially counterclaimed against the Plaintiff for, inter alia, damages for trespass over the Subject Land and mesne profits. As indicated by the Defendant in its written closing submissions, upon the Plaintiffs’ confirmation that they are only suing on behalf of the Estate, the Defendant no longer pursues its counterclaim.

B.  AGREED FACTS

6.  By an Agreed Statement of Facts dated 8 September 2025, the Plaintiffs and the Defendant agreed the following facts.

7.  The Defendant’s Land (Lot 385B RP) comprises about 160 square metres, of which 123.6 square metres was the Subject Land.

8.  Since 2000, if not earlier, the Subject Land, together with a piece of Government land, was developed as a rectangular lawn which had been used as a garden.

9.  By a Deed Poll dated 18 February 2002 (Memorial No SK508618), All That Remaining Portion of Lot No 385 in Demarcation D.D. No 257 (“Lot 385 RP”) was carved out into All That Section B of Lot No 385 in D.D. No 257 (“Lot 385B”) and Lot 385 RP.

10.  By an Assignment dated 21 September 2006 (Memorial No 06100501120019), Onsite Technology Limited (“Onsite”) assigned Lot 385B to the Defendant.

11.  By a Deed of Rectification dated 21 May 2007 (Memorial No 07052501120063), the boundary of Lot 385B and Lot 385 RP was rectified.

12.  By an Assignment dated 21 May 2007 (Memorial No 07061201020073), the Defendant assigned Lot 385B to a Lai Kut Cheung (“Mr Lai”) at a consideration of HK$600,000.

13.  By a Deed Poll dated 12 May 2009 (Memorial No 09062601580021), Mr Lai divided Lot 385B into three separate sections/portions, including Lot 385B RP.

14.  By an Assignment dated 21 February 2018 (Memorial No 18031302500034), Mr Lai assigned Lot 385B RP to a Chow Ying Ho at the consideration of HK$550,000.

15.  By an Assignment dated 4 May 2021 (Memorial No 21051201810024), the Defendant purchased the Defendant’s Land.

16.  On 9 March 2000, the Deceased purchased the piece of land known as All That Section A of Lot No 376 in D.D. No 257 (“the Deceased’s Land”) and became a registered owner thereof on 10 April 2000. The Plaintiff’s Land is situated next to the Defendant’s Land.

C.  THE PARTIES’ CASE

C1.  The Plaintiffs’ Case

17.  The Plaintiffs’ case can be summarised as follows.

18.  In about April 2000, the Deceased purchased the Deceased’s Land with a three storeys village small house built on it (“the House”). Immediately thereafter, the Deceased became aware of Lot 385B which was in front of the Deceased’s Land. The Deceased intended to purchase Lot 385B to use it as the front garden of the House. The Deceased negotiated with an estate agent, Mr Lee Kwok Wah, who claimed that he was the owner or had the right in Lot 385B for the Deceased to acquire at a consideration of HK$50,000.

19.  For the purposes of the above intended purchase, on 18 February 2002, the Deceased and Onsite (as the vendor of Lot 385B) entered into an Agreement for Sale and Purchase of Lot 385B for a consideration of HK$50,000 (“the 2002 SPA”). However, the transaction fell through. On 30 April 2002, Onsite executed a Memorandum of Recission of the 2002 SPA.

20.  Notwithstanding the Deceased’s failure to acquire Lot 385B, the Deceased without the consent of the registered owner(s) of the said lot occupied and possessed Lot 385B or the Subject Land and used it as the front garden of the House and for storage.

21.  Since the Deceased’s purchase of the Deceased’s Land in April 2000 and by reason of his above failed purchase of Lot 385B, the Deceased had intended to possess and occupy the Defendant’s Land or the Subject Land for use as the front garden of the House and for storage purpose.

22.  Since about 2000, the Deceased started to fence off the Defendant’s Land or the Subject Land for his own use by levelling the land and growing trees, plants and grass on it, and placing flowerpots on it.

23.  Since about 2000, the Plaintiffs fenced off the Subject Land by building low walls with metal gates which allow access to the Deceased Land, the Defendant’s Land and the House only by unlocking the padlock installed at the gate with keys held by the Plaintiffs and/or the Plaintiffs’ family.

24.  The Deceased/Estate had obtained possessory title to the Subject Land through exclusive possession and continuous occupation by the Deceased since about 2000 until his death in 2017, and by the 1^st Plaintiff since about 2000 until 2005 when he moved out, and by the younger son of the Deceased (“the Younger Son”) since about 2002 up to the present[2].

25.  During the period of possession, exclusive use and control of the Subject Land by the Plaintiffs through their predecessors in title, neither the Defendant nor the predecessors in title or anyone claiming title through it has made any objection in respect of the possession. Even if there were any such objection, the Deceased and the Plaintiffs had ignored the objections and continued to occupy and use the Subject Land exclusively.

26.  The Plaintiffs (ie the Deceased/the Estate) and/or their predecessors in title have not paid any rent or licence fees to the Defendant or its predecessors in title or anyone claiming title through them for the use of the Subject Land. They are willing to pay the Government rent or rates in respect of the Defendant’s Land or the Subject Land, but there has not been any demand for payment of said Government rent or rates.

27.  By reason of the aforesaid, the Deceased/the Estate has acquired possessory title in the Subject Land by adverse possession of the same for a period of at least. The Defendant’s title to the Subject Land has been extinguished by virtue of Sections 7 and 17 LO.

C2.  The Defendant’s Case

28.  The Defendant denies the Plaintiff’s claim.

29.  The Defendant avers that the Deceased’s execution of the 2002 SPA for the purchase of Lot 385B (of which the Subject Land forms part) shows that the Deceased acknowledged the interest of Onsite in Lot 385B and contradicts any intention on the Deceased’s part to possess Lot 385B or the Subject Land adversely.

30.  The Defendant denies that the Deceased or the Plaintiffs had fenced off the Subject Land or the Defendant’s Land with low walls and metal gates, or that the metal gates were padlocked at all material times.

31.  In the D&CC at §(10), the Defendant avers that the respective former owners of Lot 385 RP or the Defendant’s Land had taken various actions to demand the Deceased and/or the Plaintiffs to give vacant possession of Lot 385 RP and/or the Defendant’s Land. However, in the Defendant’s written closing submissions[3], the Defendant concedes that the above acts would not stop time from running in the event that the Court finds that there was adverse possession over the Subject Land.

32.  The Defendant avers that only since January 2022, the Rating and Valuation Department started to issue demand note to the Defendant for Government rent payable for property described as “32 Tsam Chuk Wan (DD 257 Lot 385 SB RP), Surf Villa, Starry House, G/F, Sai Kung”.

D.  AGREED ISSUES

33.  By an Agreed List of Factual and Expert Issues in Dispute dated 8 September 2025 (“the Agreed List”), the parties identified the following factual issues for the Court’s determination[4]:

(1)  Issue 1: Whether the Deceased since about 2000 until his death in 2017, the 1^st Plaintiff since about 2000 until 2005, and the younger sons of the Deceased since about 2000 up the present (collectively, “the Occupiers”) had been in continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the Subject Land for not less than 12 years before the commencement of this Action on 9 February 2022?

(2)  Issue 2: Whether the Occupiers had the continuous requisite intention to possess the Subject Land?

(3)  Issue 3: Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to any declaratory relief as claimed?

E.   THE DEFENDANT’S PRELIMINARY CHALLENGES

34.  The Defendant raises 2 preliminary challenges against the Plaintiffs’ case by suggesting that the Plaintiffs’ pleaded case is one of joint adverse possession by the Deceased, the 1^st Plaintiff, and the Younger Son. As the Deceased had passed away in 2017, by reason of survivorship, the Estate could not have any possessory title to the Subject Land. Further, as the Younger Son is not a party to the Action, no declaration should be granted due to non-joinder of the Younger Son.

35.  In response, the Plaintiffs contend that their claim on behalf of the Estate is based on a case where the Deceased was the only person who had adversely possessed the Subject Land for at least 12 years before the commencement of the Action. The 1^st Plaintiff and the Younger Son’s occupation of the Subject Land was only background facts of the case.

36.  Having considered the SOC as a whole, I am prepared to allow the Plaintiffs to run their case on the basis that the Deceased was the only one who had adversely possessed the Subject Land.

37.  In §6 of the SOC, the Plaintiffs pleaded that it was the Deceased who had the intention to adversely possess the Defendant’s Land /the Subject Land.

38.  In §10 of the SOC, while the Plaintiffs seem to suggest that 1^st Plaintiff and the Younger Son were also in exclusive possession and occupation of the Subject Land at different periods of times, there is no plea of intention to adversely possess on the part of the 1^st Plaintiff or the Younger Son.

39.  In the reliefs, the Plaintiffs did not seek any declaration that the 1^st Plaintiff in his personal capacity or the Younger Son has been in adverse possession of the Subject Land, or that the 1^st Plaintiff in his personal capacity or the Younger Son has obtained any possessory title to the Subject Land.

40.  Hence, it is sufficiently clear to me that the Plaintiffs as the executors of the Deceased’s Estate are making their claim on the basis that the Deceased was the only person who had adversely possessed the Subject Land from 2000 until he passed away in 2017.

41.  In the light of the Plaintiffs’ confirmation of its case, Issues 1 and 2 should be revised as follows:

“Issue 1: Whether the Deceased since about 2000 until his death in 2017 had been in continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the Subject Land at least 12 years before the commencement of this Action on 9 February 2022?

Issue 2: Whether the Deceased since about 2000 until his death in 2017 had the continuous requisite intention to possess the Subject Land for a period of at least 12 years before the commencement of this Action?”

42.  Having dealt with the Defendant’s preliminary challenges, I will proceed to deal with the 3 agreed factual issues below.

F.  LEGAL PRINCIPLES

43.  The law on adverse possession has been summarised in Wong Yuk Lin v Chan Tim Yiu Raymond DCCJ 1146/2021 (unrep, 30/10/2023) per DDJ Queenie Lau at §§23-37:

(a)  The burden is on the person claiming adverse possession to prove both exclusive physical control and the requisite intention. Although the normal civil standard of proof applies, the evidence of exclusive possession and intention must be compelling in order to commensurate with the serious consequences of finding that the holder of the paper title has been disposed;

(b)  Factual possession signifies an appropriate degree of physical control. It must be a single and conclusive possession. The alleged possessor must exercise exclusive physical control. The question of what acts constitute a sufficient degree of exclusive physical control must depend on the circumstances, but the alleged possessor needs to show that he has been dealing with the land in question as an occupying owner might have been expected to deal with it and that no one else has done so.

(c)  Not every use or occupation of land can satisfy the requirement of factual possession for the purposes of adverse possession. For example, using the land without excluding others from entering the land is insufficient. However, setting up physical barriers to exclude others from entering the land is a classic way of establishing exclusive occupation. Even if there is no locked gate or door, the control of access to the disputed land is generally an unambiguous assertion of control. In other words, whether other persons have free or unrestricted access to the property can be relevant to the question of whether a person can succeed in establishing adverse possession.

(d)  Maintaining the relevant property, paying utilities and rates and government rent, and paying insurance cover, are examples of acts which a court may consider to be consistent with someone who had regarded the property as his.

(e)  Animus possidendi involves the intention, in one’s own name and on one’s own behalf, to exclude the world at large, including the owner with the paper title if he be not himself the possessor, so far as is reasonably practicable and so far as the process of the law will allow.

44.  It is not a must for the person claiming adverse possession to show complete enclosure. In case of absence of physical barriers, one must examine what steps were taken by the person claiming adverse possession to exclude others. What should be considered is whether the Deceased/other occupiers had established exclusive possession of the Subject Land when there was no complete fencing and other people, including agents or people authorised by the registered owner were free to roam around: see Gotland Enterprises Limited v Kwok Chi Yau & Ors, CACV 260/2014 (unrep, 19/1/2016), per Lam VP at §§37, 39; Wu Yim Chung v Lo Wai Ching & Ors [2022] HKCA 100 at §39.

45.  In Wong Chee Sing v Hung Wah & Anor [2025] 3 HKLRD 202 at §§24-47, the Court of Appeal explained the requirements of factual possession and intention to possess as follows:

Factual possession

(a)  What is required is physical custody and control.

(b)  The test is what the adverse possessor did, not what he could have done.

(c)  Whether the adverse possessor had bought the property or just the contents inside or whether he had mistakenly believed that he had bought the property does not in any way weaken his claim if there were physical possession and control by him to the exclusion of others including the paper title owner. The subjective intention of the paper owner is irrelevant.

Intention to possess

(d)  Enclosure may indicate such an intention.

(e)  Where the evidence establishes that the person claiming title has occupied the land and made full use of it in the way in which an owner would, normally he will not have to adduce additional evidence to establish that he had the intention to possess.

(f)  It is in cases where the acts in relation to the land of a person claiming title by adverse possession are equivocal and are open to more than one interpretation that those acts will be insufficient to establish the intention to possess. But it is different if the actions of the occupier make it clear that he is using the land in the way in which a full owner would and in such a way that the owner is excluded.

46.  What amounts to factual and exclusive possession depends on the facts of the case. Erection of fences, building, planting trees, locking or blocking of the only means of access etc. can be evidence of exclusive possession: see Lau Kwai Ping Joyce v Fulland International Limited [2020] HKCFI 1501 at §§20-30 per Marlene Ng J, Powell v McFarlane (1977) 38 P&CR 452 at 447-478 per Slade J, Jourdan on Adverse Possession (2^nd ed.), §§13-01 to 13-59.

47.  The requisite period is 12 years for possession commenced (and hence right of action accrued) on or after 1 July 1991: see section 7(2) LO.

Issue 1:  Whether the Deceased since about 2000 until his death in 2017 had been in continuous and exclusive possession of the Subject Land for at least 12 years before the commencement of this Action on 9 February 2022?

48.  There is no serious dispute between the parties that the Deceased had developed the Subject Land (together with a piece of the Government Land next to it) into a lawn[5] since 2000 and had been using it as a garden in front of the House[6] (“the Garden”): see Identification Plan in Exhibit A to the Joint Surveyors’ Expert Report dated 13 November 2023, enclosed (“the Plan”, “the Joint Expert Report”).

49.  The parties’ disputes lie in whether the Deceased had exclusive possession of the Subject Land by having exclusive access to it.

50.  According to the Plaintiffs, since around 2000, a gate (GA1 in the Plan) (“the Gate”) has been installed, blocking access to the Garden from the open space Lot 385SB ss 1 (“the Open Space”) through the staircase (ST1). The Deceased and his family members were the only ones who held the keys to the Gate. It follows that since around 2000, only the Deceased and his family members had access to the Garden as well as Footpath 1 (FP1) and Footpath 2 (FP2), which demonstrated the Deceased’s exclusive possession of the same (being the major part of the Subject Land).

51.  On the other hand, the Defendant contends that the Subject Land can be accessed by the world at large through other routes, namely:

(a)  For period from 2000 to 2001: From the Road (RD 1) to the end point right outside the north-western corner of the House (H1) (“E Point”)[7], to the Footpath (FP1) and the Garden (LA1) (“Route 1”); and (b) from the Road (RD 1) to the footpath in front of the house on Lot 376 RP (H2) (“House 2”) to the Footpath (FP1) and the Garden (LA1) (“Route 2”);

(b)  From 2001 to 2011: Using Route 1 only. Route 2 is no longer available after the construction of the wall (WA2) in 2001, as observed by the experts in §9.1.3 of the Joint Expert Report.

From 2000 to 2011 – the Garden can be accessed through Route 1

52.  Having considered the evidence, I accept the Defendant’s case that from 2000 to 2011, the Garden can be accessed by the world at large through Route 1.

GA 3 was only built in 2012

53.  During the 1^st  Plaintiff’s oral evidence, the 1^st  Plaintiff for the first time mentioned that a gate was built at the north of the House (GA 3) in 2003, blocking access to the Garden from RD 1 since 2003. When being cross-examined as to why he did not mention GA 3 in his Witness Statement, the 1^st Plaintiff said that he did not consider it necessary to mention GA 3 as it was located in the back garden, which he considers to be unrelated to the Garden. I do not find the 1^st Plaintiff’s explanation credible. Enclosure is an important indicator of exclusive possession, the 1^st Plaintiff is clearly aware of that, as he specifically mentioned the Gate in his Witness Statement and said that only the Deceased and his family held the keys of the Gate. Had GA 3 existed as early as in 2003, the 1^st Plaintiff would have mentioned that in his witness statement.

54.  Further, as shown in the aerial photos, GA 3 only appeared for the first time in 2012. As both the Plaintiffs and the Defendant’s surveyor experts observed in the Joint Expert Report at §9.1.14 “In May 2012…a new linear ground feature, possibly a gate (GA 3) was observed at Road RD 1 at the northern side of House H1”. While there is always a possibility that GA 3 might have been obscured by trees or shadows at the time when an aerial photo was taken, given that GA 3 did not feature in any of the aerial photos before May 2012, it is more likely than not that GA 3 did not in fact exist before May 2012.

55.  During oral evidence, the 1^st Plaintiff claimed that he could see GA 3 in the aerial photos dated 9 August 2004 and 8 February 2006 and marked the location of GA 3 by a circle (see Exhibit D1 and D2, aerial photos with the 1^st Plaintiff’s marking). However, when the Plaintiffs’ expert was shown the same aerial photos, he was unable to identify GA 3 in the said photos.

56.  I note that GA 3 featured in the survey sheet dated July 2005, and was recorded to exist in the subsequent survey sheets up to 2018. However, this is inconsistent with the aerial photos, which only show that GA 3 has existed since 2012. As the experts pointed out in the Joint Expert Report §8.2.4, the survey sheets should be used as a supplement to the aerial photographs. When the features shown on the aerial photos and those on the survey sheets are in conflict, the aerial photos should prevail.

57.  For the above reasons, I find that GA 3 was only built sometime in 2012.

TS1

58.  During cross-examination, the 1^st Plaintiff raised another new assertion that in 2007, the occupier of House 2 built a temporary structure at the north of House 2 (TS1) (“TS1”). Since then, cars cannot gain access to the Garden through Route 1, as Route 1 was blocked by TS1. Individuals who wish to use Route 1 would have to climb over TS1. The 1^st Plaintiff went on to say that due to the construction of TS1, the Deceased’s car could not move out through Route 1 anymore and was stationed near E Point from 2004 to 2015/2016. The 1^st Plaintiff said that he and the Deceased did not ask the occupier of House 2 to let their car pass TS1 as the occupier is a foreigner and they did not know him. The 1^st Plaintiff said that individuals could not walk pass TS1 either and they had to climb over TS1 if they wanted to walk to the Garden through Route 1.

59.  I do not believe the 1^st Plaintiff’s above evidence.

60.  First, the 1^st Plaintiff failed to proffer any credible explanation as to why the above new assertions were only raised in his oral evidence. If TS1 has the effect of blocking vehicular and pedestrian access to the Subject Land through RD 1, it must be an important piece of information which the 1^st Plaintiff would have mentioned in his witness statement.

61.  Second, contrary to the 1^st Plaintiff’s assertion that TS1 was built in 2007, TS1 was not shown in the aerial photos in 2007 and 2008. TS1 was only first observed in the aerial photo in December 2009.

62.  Lastly, it is inherently improbable that the Deceased would be content for his car to be blocked by TS1 for over 10 years. Even though the occupier of House 2 may be a foreigner, this should not stop the Deceased from confronting the occupier if TS1 had indeed obstructed the Deceased from driving his car.

The 2002 SPA

63.  The Plaintiffs refer to Clause 16 of the 2002 SPA as evidence of the Deceased’s factual possession of the Subject Area since February 2001. Clause 16 provides that:

“Apart from the warranties mentioned herein, [the Defendant’s Land] is a bare site as is shown and coloured “Brown” and marked “B” on the plan annexed hereto which has been encroached with fence by the [Deceased] for use as a garden adjacent to the property erected on Section A of Lot No. 376 in Demarcation District No. 257 for at least 1 year and is and shall be sold on an ‘as is’ basis…”

64.  However, Clause 16 only says that the Defendant’s Land has been encroached by the Deceased with fence, it does not say whether the Defendant’s Land/the Subject Land was completely enclosed, or whether the Deceased had exclusive physical control over the Defendant’s Land/the Subject Land.

65.  Given my finding above that from 2000 up to 2011, the Subject Land can be accessed by the public at large through RD 1 without any barrier. There is no evidence that the Deceased had put up any signs along RD 1 or the entrance to the Subject Land connected to RD 1 deterring the public from entering the Subject Land. I am not satisfied that the Deceased was exercising exclusive control over the Subject Land for the period from 2000 to 2011. It follows that the Plaintiffs have failed to show that the Deceased had factual possession of the Subject Land for the period from 2000 to 2011.

66.  For the reasons set out above, the answer to Issue 1 is “No”. As the Plaintiffs cannot show that the Deceased had factual possession of the Subject Land for the requisite period of 12 years, the Plaintiffs’ case fail on this ground alone. For completeness, I will go on to deal with Issue 2.

Issue 2:  Whether the Deceased since about 2000 until his death in 2017 had the continuous requisite intention to possess the Subject Land for a period of at least 12 years before the commencement of this Action?

67.  In §6 of the SOC, the Plaintiffs pleaded that “Since or about the purchase of [the Deceased’s Land] in April 2000 and by reason of his unsuccessful purchase of [the Plaintiff’s Land]…the [Deceased] intended to adversely possessed (sic) and occupied (sic) the Defendant’s land or [the Subject Land]…”  (emphasis added).

68.  As the English Court of Appeal observed in Edginton v Clark & Anor [1964] 1 QB 367 at p. 376 per Upjohn LJ, an intended purchaser by making an offer to purchase a piece of land acknowledges that as between himself and the vendor, the vendor has a better title to the land. Hence, at the time when the Deceased entered into the 2002 SPA with Onsite (the then registered owner of Lot 385B, of which the Subject Land forms part), he acknowledged that Onsite had better to title to the Subject Land. The next question would be, after the transaction under the 2002 SPA fell through, when did the Deceased start to have the intention to possess to the exclusion of the world (including the registered owner of the Subject Land)?: see Yu Fung Company Ltd v Olympic City Properties Limited & Anor HCMP 1084/2008 (unrep, 30/7/2015) per DHCJ Leung at §72.

69.  There is no direct evidence from the Deceased as to his intention with respect to the Subject Land after the 2002 SPA was rescinded by Onsite. As I have found above, since the abortion of the 2002 SPA up to and including 2011, the Subject Land was not completely enclosed but could be accessed by the world at large. In the circumstances, it is equivocal whether the Defendant had the intention to possess the Subject Land to the exclusion of the world.

70.  The 1^st Plaintiff’s evidence is unclear as to whether the Deceased had told him that the Deceased considered himself to be adversely possessing the Subject Land after the 2002 SPA was rescinded:

(a)  During the 1^st Plaintiff’s cross-examination, he for the first time said that the Deceased had the intention to possess the Subject Land in 2004 to 2005. However, this is not stated anywhere in the SOC or the 1^st Plaintiff’s witness statement;

(b)  While the 1^st Plaintiff claimed that the Deceased conveyed to him the intention to adversely possess the Subject Land in 2004 to 2005, sometime after the 2002 SPA was rescinded, when being asked by this Court what exactly did the Deceased tell him, the 1^st Plaintiff only said that the Deceased told him the 2002 SPA got cancelled and he was not clear about the reason and did not know what to do.

71.  For the above reasons, I find that the Plaintiffs have failed to adduce compelling evidence to show the Deceased’s intention to possess for the requisite period of 12 years. The answer to Issue 2 is “No”.

Issue 3:  Whether the Plaintiffs are entitled to any declaratory relief as claimed?

72.  As I have found that the Plaintiffs have failed to show the requisite factual possession and intention to possess on the part of the Deceased, the Plaintiffs are not entitled to any of the declaratory reliefs claimed. The answer to Issue 3 is “No”.

G.  DISPOSITION

73.  I will dismiss the Plaintiffs’ claims in the Action.

74.  Costs should follow the event, I will grant a Costs Order Nisi that Plaintiffs shall pay to the Defendant the costs of this Action (including any costs reserved), with Certificate for 1 Counsel.

75.  Unless there is an application made by summons for the variation of the above Costs Order Nisi within 14 days after the handing down of this Decision, the said Costs Order Nisi shall become absolute.

76.  Lastly, I thank Counsel for their assistance.

Identification Plan in Exhibit A

to the Joint Surveyors’ Expert Report dated 13 November 2023