RE MATIBAG RONNEL PAET

CAMP 244/2023, [2025] HKCA 1117

On intended appeal from [2023] HKCFI 129

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 244 OF 2023

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 634 of 2019)

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JUDGMENT

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Hon Chu VP giving the Judgment of the Court:

1.  On 15 August 2025, this Court handed down our judgment ([2025] HKCA 745) refusing to extend the time for the applicant to appeal the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan given on 13 January 2023 which refused to give him leave to apply for judicial review.

2.  On 21 August 2025, the applicant filed a Notice of Motion to apply for leave to appeal against our judgment to the Court of Final Appeal.  He has also put in a written submission to support the application.

3.  Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining applications for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on paper without an oral hearing.  We have therefore proceeded to determine the applicant’s application on the basis of the documents in the case.

4.  The background to this case and the applicant’s claim has been set out in our judgment.  We will not repeat them.

5.  Section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap. 484 provides that leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.

6.  The Notice of Motion stated the applicant “would like to reject and review the decision made by the court” and that his dangerous situation has been disregarded.     

7.  In his written submission, the applicant made the following points:

(1)     As a foreigner, he does not have any understanding of the judicial system and in many cases court letters have not been sent to applicants successfully leading to significant delay.  The Court should therefore understand that these things are possible. 

(2)     The Court should not reject his application for time extension simply because his case has little chance of success.  The Court should grant any applicant the right of access to all available resources and opportunities without fear or favour.  The evaluation of the chance of success is arbitrary and based on assumption.  If he has a chance of an oral hearing he may have a chance of success.

(3)     The problem with the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) is that does not have properly understand the local context as its knowledge is only from the COI and other general reports which are inadequate.  The Board’s assessment is erroneous and its procedure is problematic.

(4)     The Court cited Re Kham Kamal Ahe [2019] 377 in saying that there has to be merits for an extension of time to be given.  However, this is a violation of his right to appeal. Also whether there are merits depend on the circumstantial evidence and can be subjective.  Objectively, he did not receive any of the letters due to no fault of his.  Yet he was punished and denied a time extension for something beyond his control.

8.  The matters set out in the Notice of Motion and written submission do not afford any basis for granting leave to appeal.   Importantly, they all concern the applicant’s claim and personal circumstances, and do not show that the intended appeal involves any question of great general or public importance. 

9.  Further, the matters raised are unarguable. 

10.  First, while the applicant has a right to appeal against the refusal of leave to apply for judicial review, he is required by the law to lodge the appeal within 14 days from the refusal of leave: see Order 53 rule 394) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap. 4A.  It is because the applicant did not file a notice of appeal within the time prescribed by law that he needs a time extension.  The Court has a discretion over whether to grant the time extension, and the applicable legal principles, which are long established, have been set out in [12] of our judgment.  Apart from the length of and the reasons for the delay, the Court must also take into account the merits of the intended because it is futile and a waste of time and judicial resources to extend the time for appeal when the intended appeal has no prospect of success.  The applicant’s complaint that he has been denied his right of appeal or access to court is untenable. 

11.  Second, it is evident from our judgment that we refused the applicant’s renewed application primarily because he has failed to show his intended appeal has any prospect of success: see [15] to [17] of our judgment.

12.  Third, the applicant’s complaint about the Board’s assessment and use of COI is a new ground which was neither raised in the Court of First Instance in his application for leave to apply for judicial review and application for time extension, nor before the Court of Appeal in his renewed application for time extension.  It is not permissible for the applicant to rely on new grounds in the present application, especially when the new ground is fact-sensitive.  His complaint is in any event vague and devoid of particulars or supporting evidence.    

13.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

14.  As the statutory requirements for giving leave to appeal are not met, we dismiss the Notice of Motion.