SHAHZAD RAMEEZ v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD

HCAL 113/2020

[2026] HKCFI 715

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 113 OF 2020

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D E C I S I O N

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Background

1.  By way of summons filed on 11 December 2025 (“the Summons”), the applicant applies for an extension of time to appeal against my order made on 15 July 2025, which dismissed the applicant’s application for leave to apply for judicial review in respect of the Torture Claims Appeal Board’s decision dated 8 January 2020.

2.  Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, Cap 4A, stipulates that “Where an application for leave is refused by a judge …, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order”.

3.  In Re Li Jing [2015] 2 HKLRD 933, it was held that the time for lodging an appeal against the refusal of granting leave to apply for judicial review started to run from the date of the making of the order, not from the date when the sealed order was issued, nor from the date when the sealed order was mailed, and no account should be taken of the fact that the applicant received the sealed order late (see also Re Gurung Min Bahadur [2018] HKCA 226).

4.  As my order was made on 15 July 2025, the last day for the applicant to lodge an appeal was on 29 July 2025. The time for appealing against my order has therefore expired, and the applicant requires leave from this court to appeal out of time.

The applicable law

5.  In considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted (see Jagg Singh v Torture Claims Appeal Board and another [2020] HKCA 844).

6.  However, the crucial consideration in such an application is whether the applicant can show that there is a reasonable prospect of success in the intended judicial review (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), and the court will not grant extension for a hopeless appeal to be pursued (see Re Adumekwe Rowland Ejike [2019] HKCA 702).

Discussion

7.  In the Summons, as well as in his supporting affirmation dated 11 December 2025, the applicant did not give any reason why he was late in lodging his intended appeal nor provide any grounds of appeal.

8.  At the hearing of the Summons on 27 January 2026, the applicant claimed that he did not receive my decision until sometime around 11 December 2025 when the Immigration Department informed him about my decision and someone printed out my decision for him, and hence he filed the Summons immediately on 11 December 2025.

9.  When I asked the applicant for his grounds of the intended appeal, he merely said that he was married and has a family here and he has updated information relating to his non-refoulement claim.

10.  The delay in the present case is significant and I do not accept the explanation given by the applicant for his delay. The applicant admitted at the hearing of the Summons that my decision was sent to his correct address and he and his wife were living there. The applicant provided no reason at all why he did not receive my decision at his correct address, but just claimed that he was waiting for my decision for a few months.

11.  The applicant also said that he had to report to the Immigration Department once every two weeks. There was no reason for the Immigration Department to inform him about my decision only in December 2025 and not earlier, as the Director of Immigration should have received my decision shortly after 15 July 2025 and could have informed the applicant about my decision around July or August 2025 when he went for the reporting.

12.  Moreover, the arguability of the intended appeal is an important consideration (see Re Gurung Min Bahadur, supra), but the applicant provided no valid ground for his intended appeal at all. What he said at the hearing concerning his family and updated information cannot amount to any valid ground for his intended appeal against my decision nor for the intended judicial review, as it is not for the court to receive new evidence at this stage.

13.  For this application to be successful, the applicant must demonstrate that this court had made errors of law or failed to take account of relevant matters already placed before this court or was otherwise plainly wrong (see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524).

14.  The applicant failed to demonstrate any of the above, and hence there is simply no valid ground for the intended appeal.

15.  In the circumstances, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the intended appeal and I am not prepared to grant any extension of time for the applicant to pursue such a hopeless appeal.

Conclusion

16.  For reasons aforesaid, the Summons is dismissed.