RE BEPARI AOWAL

CAMP 112/2019

[2019] HKCA 1406

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

MISCELLANEOUS PROCEEDINGS NO. 112 OF 2019

(ON AN INTENDED APPEAL FROM HCAL NO. 216 OF 2017)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Yeung VP (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  By a judgment dated 11 November 2019 ([2019] HKCA 1223), the Court of Appeal refused to grant an extension of time for the applicant to appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Woodcock (“the Judge”) dated 28 July 2017 in which the Judge refused to grant leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dated 12 May 2017.

2.  By a notice of motion dated 11 November 2019, the applicant now seeks leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal on the grounds that:

“Today 11.11.2019 The Honourable Judges cancel my CAMP, I am very upset about the decision. Now I have no way except going to the Court of Final Appeal. I think for the great interest of tortured people. The Court of Final Appeal will give me good decision.”

3.  Pursuant to the directions made by the Registrar of Civil Appeals on 14 November 2019, the applicant lodged his written submission on 25 November 2019.  In his written submission, he repeated the background of his case as put before the Board and the Judge.  He further complained that neither the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) nor the Board investigated his case properly and he urged the Court to consider his case and grant him leave to apply for judicial review.

4.  The Registrar further directed that unless the court otherwise directs, the notice of motion shall be determined on paper only without an oral hearing.  As it is appropriate to do so, this application is processed on paper without an oral hearing.

5.  Under section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484, leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal may be granted if the question involved in the appeal is one which, by reason of its great general or public importance, or otherwise, ought to be submitted to the Court of Final Appeal for decision.  Here, the applicant’s case was dismissed for his unwillingness and failure to adduce any oral or documentary evidence at the Board’s hearing to substantiate his claim and it was open to the Board to come to its findings and conclusions.  Unless the applicant could raise valid public law grounds against the Board’s decision, the Court had no basis to intervene.  As set out in [16] of our judgment, we agreed with the Judge’s decision that there was no error of law or procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board and the applicant’s case was plainly not arguable.  In our judgment, the grounds of appeal as set out in the notice of motion and the written submissions are general and vague assertions and cannot constitute viable grounds of appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.

6.  For the reasons that we gave in our judgment of 11 November 2019, we do not see any prospect of success in the applicant’s intended appeal against the Judge’s decision and order. None of the questions raised by the applicant in the notice of motion and his written submissions involves an arguable point or a question of great general or public importance.  We do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b) either.  The statutory criteria for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal is not met.

7.  Accordingly, we refuse to give the applicant leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal and dismiss his notice of motion.