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HCAL 2337/2018
[2021] HKCFI 284
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST NO. 2337 OF 2018
BETWEEN
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Nguyen Thi Dang |
Applicant |
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Torture Claims Appeal Board/
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office |
Putative Respondent |
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and |
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Director of Immigration |
Putative Interested Party |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord. 53 r. 3)
Following:
Order by Deputy High Court Judge C P Pang:
Leave to apply for Judicial Review be refused.
Observations for the Applicant:
Introduction
1. This is an application for leave to apply for judicial review against the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board/ Non‑refoulement Claims Petition Office (“the Board”) confirming the decisions of the Director of Immigration (“the Director”) refusing the applicant’s claim of non-refoulement protection.
2. The applicant, born in 1960, is a national of Vietnam. On 20 April 2015 she was arrested by the police. She was subsequently convicted of offences including using a forged identity card and unlawful remaining in Hong Kong and sentenced to imprisonment for a total of 15 months. She lodged a non-refoulement claim on 21 June 2015.
3. The facts of the case and the basis for the applicant’s non-refoulement claim are summarized at para [30-35] of the decision of the Board. Put simply, the claim was based on the fear that, if refouled, the applicant would be harmed or even killed by her creditor as well as her husband. She claimed that in 2013 she borrowed a loan of 100 million Vietnamese Dong from a notorious moneylender, Le, to start her poultry business. In 2014, she borrowed a further 100 million Vietnamese Dong from him. In October 2014 her business failed due to both economic downturn and a virus that destroyed her livestock. She was unable to repay the money she owed. In December 2014, her creditor and his followers slapped her in the face and hit her with a wooden stick. Also in December 2014, the moneylender and his men came to her home again when she was out but her husband was at home. Her husband, who was drinking alcohol, blamed her for the trouble and started to beat her and on occasions forcing her to sleep with the pigs in the farm yard without food. She therefore approached an agent to escape Vietnam which she did in March 2015.
The Director’s decisions
4. By notices of decision dated 25 August 2016 and 4 July 2017 respectively, the Director rejected the applicant’s non-refoulement claim on all applicable grounds for reason that the claim was not substantiated. The first decision covered torture risk[1], BOR 3 risk[2], and persecution risk[3]. The second decision covered BOR 2 risk[4]. Having taken into account all relevant circumstances, the Director assessed the level of risk of harm as low. He found that state protection is available to the applicant and internal relocation a reasonable alternative to her. The applicant lodged an appeal/ petition to the Board against the Director’s decisions.
The Board’s decision
5. The applicant attended a hearing before the Board on 16 August 2017.
6. By a decision dated 15 October 2018, the Board rejected the appeal/ petition confirming the Director’s decisions. The Board’s decision covered all applicable grounds.
7. The Board gave detailed reasons for rejecting the applicant’s claim at paragraphs [63-81] of its decision. In a nutshell, the reasons can be summarized as follows:
(1) the Board considered that the applicant had been inconsistent in respect of a number of core aspects of her claim [65];
(2) the nature of the inconsistencies led the Board to conclude that she had fabricated key aspects of her claim. The Board was not satisfied that she had any debt to a moneylender or the assault by the creditor took place [78];
(3) it also did not accept the claim in respect of violence from her husband [79];
(4) the applicant failed to demonstrate that she is at risk of any form of harms of a proscribed kind [81].
8. Accordingly, the Board dismissed the applicant’s appeal on all applicable grounds.
Application for leave to apply for judicial review
9. The applicant filed a Form 86 on 24 October 2018 for leave to apply for judicial review of the decision of the Board.
10. No request for oral hearing has been made. The application is therefore considered on the papers.
11. In the Form 86 and supporting affirmation, the applicant did not set out any proper grounds for the relief sought. She only repeated her claim in her affirmation saying that the decision of the Board is unfair.
Discussion
12. The relevant principles regarding non-refoulement claims have been set out comprehensively in Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524 at paragraph 14. In particular, the role of the court in a judicial review is not to provide a further avenue of appeal. The primary decision makers are the Director and the Board. While the court in non-refoulement cases will adopt an enhanced standard in scrutinizing the decision of the Board due to the seriousness of the issue at hand, it should not usurp the role of the Board. Assessment of evidence, country of origin information, risk of harm, state protection and viability of internal relocation are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director. The court will not intervene by way of judicial review unless there are errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality in the decision of the Board.
13. When the applicant pursued the appeal to the Board, the Director’s decision was superseded by the Board’s decision and is no longer susceptible to judicial review: Re Moshsin Ali [2018] HKCA 549. Therefore, while the court will examine the decisions of the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, it is unnecessary to delve into the decision of the Director. This decision will only focus on discussing the Board’s decision.
14. In the present case, the Board in fact rejected the applicant’s appeal/ petition on the ground that it rejected her account of primary facts based on the major inconsistencies and contradictions in her evidence. On the factual findings, there would be no factual basis in support of any of the applicable grounds.
15. As explained above, the assessments of evidence and risk of harm are primarily within the province of the Board and the Director. This court will not interfere with their decisions unless there is a public law ground for the court to do so.
16. The applicant stated no grounds of the judicial review in Form 86. She mentioned nothing in the form or in the affirmation to suggest how the Board erred in the public law sense. In the absence of any error of law or procedural unfairness being shown by the applicant, I do not find any reasonably arguable basis to challenge the findings of the Board.
17. Further, even if one givesher account the most favourable interpretation, the alleged past ill-treatment or experience were of low intensity and frequency. The evidence can hardly establish that the applicant would be at real risk of being subjected to any type of ill-treatment or proscribed harm, if refouled.
18. Having considered the decisions of both the Director and the Board with rigorous examination and anxious scrutiny, I do not find any error of law, irrational findings, or procedural unfairness in their decisions. Nor do I see any failure on their part to apply high standards of fairness.
19. For the reasons given, there is no prospect of success in the applicant’s intended application for judicial review.
Disposition
20. Accordingly, application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused.
Dated 9 February 2021
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(Chung Lai Fan, Christine) |
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for Registrar, High Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
Notes for the Applicant:
If leave has been granted, the Applicant or the Applicant’s solicitors must: |
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a) serve on the respondent and such interested parties as may be directed by the Court the order granting leave and any directions given within 14 days after the leave was granted (Order 53, rule 4A);
b) issue the originating summons within 14 days after the grant of leave and serve it in accordance with Order 53, rule 5; and
c) supply to every other party copies of every affidavit which the Applicant proposes to use at the hearing, including the affidavit in support of the application for leave (Order 53, rule 6(5)). |
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Sent to the Applicant
on 9 February 2021
Nguyen Thi Dang
Applicant’s ref. no:
Nil. |
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Sent to the Putative Respondent / the Putative Respondent’s solicitors / such Putative Interested Parties as may be directed by the Court / the Putative Interested Parties’ solicitors on 9 February 2021
Torture Claims Appeal Board/
Non-refoulement Claims Petition Office
Putative Respondent’s ref. no.:
USM 4637/16/9/16/V410
Director of Immigration
Putative Interested Party’s ref. no.:
QA T/C 816/16 (Formerly RBCZ 12322/15) and RBCZ 9002520/17
Department of Justice,
Senior Assistant Law Officer
(Civil Law)
(Civil Litigation Unit 2) |
Form CALL-1
[1] This refers to the risk of torture under Part VIIC of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.
[2] This refers to the risk of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under Article 3 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
[3] This refers to the risk of persecution with reference to the non-refoulement principle under Article 33 of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.
[4] This refers to the risk of violation of the right to life under Article 2 of Section 8 of the Hong Kong Bill of Rights Ordinance, Cap 383.
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