LIANG, HUI MIN MICHAEL v. VIVIEN JOYCE HUI YAN LIANG

DCCJ 362/2024

[2026] HKDC 1469

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

CIVIL ACTION NO 362 OF 2024

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BETWEEN

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DECISION ON COSTS

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Introduction

1.  This decision deals with the question of costs arising from two court applications. The first is the summons for further and better particulars filed by the Plaintiff (“P”) on 16 December 2025 (“P’s FBP Summons”). The second is the summons to amend the Defence filed by the Defendant (“D”) on 18 December 2025 (“D's Amendment Summons”).

2.  Both parties seek summary assessment for both summonses against each other. D contends for costs on an indemnity basis.

3.  Master C H Lai issued directions for the question of costs to be decided on paper which I received on 29 July 2026, and shall now decide.

Background

4.  The underlying dispute in this case is about who owns a wedding gown designed by Guo Pei (the “Gown”). The dispute is between P and D, who is P’s former daughter-in-law. D was married to P’s son from 19 September 2020 until around late November 2023.

5.  P’s position is that he is the owner of the Gown. Alternatively, the Gown was a conditional gift, and when the condition was not met, ownership reverted to him. P also contends D wrongfully took possession of the Gown from 5 July 2023 without his consent.

6.  D’s position is that she purchased the Gown herself. Alternatively, P gave it to her as an outright gift.

7.  The present dispute arises from D’s averment in her Defence that “the issue as to the ownership and distribution of the Wedding Gown have been dealt with in the divorce proceedings FCMC … /2023” (D’s “Averment”).

8.  On 14 November 2025, P’s solicitors wrote to D’s solicitors asking for further details about D’s Averment.

9.  D’s solicitors gave several holding replies. On 9 December 2025, D’s solicitors finally responded saying D would apply to delete the Averment from her Defence, and that P’s request for particulars was therefore unnecessary.

10.  P’s solicitors replied on 11 December 2025 saying this response was unsatisfactory (“P’s Inquiry Letter”). P explained three things. First, simply deleting the Averment could amount to an admission by withdrawal, which required a proper explanation. Second, the deletion “reeked of brinksmanship and bad faith”, especially since no explanation was given for withdrawing what had been a central part of D’s case. Third, P needed to understand whether D was still saying the ownership of the Gown had been dealt with in the divorce proceedings. P specifically asked for D’s explanation to be given on oath.

11.  D’s solicitors did not respond for the next 5 days. P then filed and served P’s FBP Summons on 16 December 2025.

12.  D filed and served D’s Amendment Summons on 18 December 2025. Pausing here, D’s solicitors separately sent a letter on the same day stating the issues raised in P’s Inquiry Letter “… shall be resolved at our client’s amendment application”.

13.  P filed an affirmation dated 18 December 2025 in support of P’s FBP Summons (“P’s Affirmation”). On 19 December 2025, P’s solicitors asked D’s solicitors whether D would file an affirmation in support of D’s Amendment Summons. D’s solicitors confirmed they would not be filing any affirmation on 22 December 2025.

14.  P then filed another affirmation on 26 January 2026 opposing D’s Amendment Summons. It is clear that P’s opposition was based on the concerns outlined in P’s Inquiry Letter, amongst other matters.

15.  D then filed an affirmation in response on 9 March 2026 (“D’s Response Affirmation”). D denied acting in bad faith and provided explanation for why she wanted to delete the Averment.

16.  P’s solicitors wrote again on 13 March 2026 noting D’s explanation was still unsatisfactory. P again asked D to confirm her position on whether the FCMC proceedings had dealt with the Gown.

17.  D’s solicitors responded on 17 March 2026 saying that the amendment caused P no prejudice, and so P should not have opposed it in the first place. D also said she was never obliged to explain anything on oath and that she would be seeking indemnity costs. The next day, D’s solicitors sent a further letter to P’s solicitors noting that any further explanation was unnecessary and a waste of costs, and that P was acting with an ulterior motive to interrogate on matters no longer relevant to this action.

18.  On 19 March 2026, P agreed to D’s Amendment Summons and withdrew the FBP Summons, leaving only the question of costs to be decided.

Legal Principles

19.  The starting point is well-established: costs follow the event. The effective winner is generally entitled to their costs. Where a party withdraws or concedes an application, they should ordinarily pay the other side’s costs. That said, the Court does not apply this principle mechanistically. Where a party seeks a different costs order, the burden is on that party to demonstrate why a departure from the general rule is warranted by reference to exceptional circumstances. See for e.g. Perrine Chamonix Ltd v Star League Ltd (unrep. HCA 1139/2017, 13 September 2017) at §§24 to 28 (per DHCJ W Wong SC), and Vasily Trubnikov v Evgeny Volosov & Ors [2025] HKCFI 3051 at §§6-8 (per DHCJ G Chow).

Analysis

20.  P withdrew his own application and consented to D’s Amendment Summons. On the face of it, this would normally mean P should pay costs.

21.  However, P argues that he was the effective winner and/or that the Court should depart from the usual rule. The burden rests on P to demonstrate this.

22.  P submits that he substantially achieved what he set out to accomplish, having extracted from D, in D’s Response Affirmation, an explanation on oath as to the reasons why D sought to delete the Averment.

23.  Specifically, D has now affirmed the FCMC proceedings were concluded at the time D originally filed her Defence. However, those proceedings were re-opened by P’s son on 10 July 2024. D says this is why she now seeks to delete the Averment. D also denied acting in bad faith, and said the lack of detail was due to the confidential nature of FCMC proceedings.

24.  Pausing here, P observes D’s explanation does not sit comfortably. D says the Averment needed to be deleted because the FCMC proceedings were re-opened on 10 July 2024. Yet if that were so, the deletion should have been made when D first amended her Defence on 9 September 2024. It was not deleted until a year later, and only after P pressed for particulars. In this regard, I note P had invited D to respond by letter dated 13 March 2026 (again by oath). P had preserved the point that there remains an open question as to whether D’s position is that the Gown had been dealt with or is currently being dealt with in the FCMC proceedings. As a side note, P’s counsel has explained that P is now asking his son in regards to whether there would be leave to disclose the relevant FCMC documents. Although P remained unsatisfied with D’s explanation, it appears that by 19 March 2026, he made a considered decision not to continue with the summonses and did not press for further answer. P’s solicitors recorded that D remained evasive as to her position on whether the Gown had been or is currently being dealt with in the FCMC proceedings. No doubt this would be used to challenge D at trial or at a later stage in proceedings.

25.  D has argued that there is no prima facie case of bad faith, and no prejudice caused to P under D’s Amendment Summons. At §§21 to 29 of the Defendant’s Written Submissions dated 18 May 2026, a number of claims were targeted at P being “disingenuous” and “phishing”. Indeed, D contends “[i]t is for P to justify its opposition of the amendment with properly articulated allegation [sic] of bad faith, which P failed to do.” I consider P had sufficiently articulated his position in the circumstances. P’s basis had remained consistent since P’s Inquiry Letter. I also refer to §§8 to 24 of P’s Skeleton Submissions on Costs dated 4 May 2026.

26.  I do not accept the argument that P’s consent to the amendment was a “clear concession that his own stance was doomed to fail all along” or “acknowledgement of defeat”. Taking a global view, I accept P’s explanation that the consent was largely a result of D’s explanation in D’s Response Affirmation (albeit, an unsatisfactory one for P). This is what P had been seeking from the outset.

27.  I have also considered D’s argument that “… an affirmation is not required for amendment application ‘as a rule’ ”. This is not a blanket rule: see Hong Kong Civil Procedure 2026 (vol.1) at §20/8/4. D expressly chose and stated that she would “resolve” the issues raised in P’s Inquiry Letter through D’s Amendment Summons. Having made that choice, she responded to P’s affirmation in opposition.

28.  Standing back, I am satisfied that P has demonstrated exceptional circumstances necessary to justify an award of costs in his favour.

29.  I should add that I had looked at whether it would be appropriate to hive off costs from a particular time or by reference to specific issues. Having regard to the way in which this matter has developed as a whole, I have on balance decided against taking that course. I order that D do pay the costs of and incidental to P’s FBP Summons and D’s Amendment Summons, including the costs of these written submissions, forthwith to be summarily assessed.

30.  Both parties have made comments with regard to each other’s bill of costs. I shall take a broad-brush approach here, and summarily assess at HK$100,000.

31.  Lastly, I wish to express my thanks to counsel on both sides for their able submissions.

DISPOSITION

32.  The Defendant do pay the costs of and incidental to the Plaintiff’s Summons dated 16 December 2025 and the Defendant’s Summons dated 18 December 2025 including the costs of these written submissions forthwith summarily assessed at HK$100,000.