RE RAZA HASAN

HCAL 441/2019

[2022] HKCFI 2807

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 441 OF 2019

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D E C I S I O N

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Introduction

1.  This is the Applicant’s application by summons filed on 29 June 2022 (the “Summons”) for extension of time to appeal the order of this Court dated 27 April 2022 (the “Order”) refusing him leave to apply for judicial review (the “leave application”) of the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office (the “Board”) dated 12 February 2019 (the “Decision”).

2.  Under Order 53, rule 3(4) of the Rules of the High Court, where an application for leave to apply for judicial review is refused by a judge, the applicant may appeal against the judge’s order to the Court of Appeal within 14 days after such order. In Jagg Singh and Torture Claims Appeal Board / non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office[1], the Court of Appeal held that in considering whether to extend time for appealing a decision refusing leave to apply for judicial review, the court will take into account: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3) the prospect of the intended appeal; and (4) the prejudice to the respondent if an extension of time were granted.

Length of delay and reasons for the delay

3.  By 29 June 2022 when the Summons was filed, 2 months and 2 days had lapsed since the date of the Order. The application is more than one and half months out of time. In his supporting affirmation, the Applicant alleged that he never received the Order and claimed that he was advised by the Immigration Department to appeal the Order, suggesting that he was informed about the Order by the Immigration Department, presumably upon his routine reporting to that department. The Court noted that the address he gave in his Summons is different from the address to which the Order was sent. Possibly, he did not receive the Order because he had moved without updating his new address with the Court. To assist him in presenting a proper case for extension of time, this Court gave them directions by letter dated 13 July 2022 to file a statement within 14 days of the letter setting the date and circumstances when the Order was brought to his attention and his changes in address since 18 February 2019 when he made the leave application. The Order was sent to his address as stated in his Summons. He was also asked to furnish the grounds of his intended appeal. He did not respond.

4.  In the absence of any response from him, the only irresistible inference from the circumstances is that the Applicant did not receive the Order because he had moved without updating his new address with the Court. In Re Karamjit Singh[2] and Re Hasmi Rizwan Imran[3], the Court of Appeal held that it is the applicant’s duty to report his change of address to the Court. If he did not, he has to bear the consequence of his neglect. Hence, there is no valid explanation for the very substantial delay.

Prospect of success of the intended appeal

5.  Despite the Court’s specific request for the grounds of his intended appeal, the Applicant did not respond. The inference is that he has no arguable grounds of appeal. Without even knowing what his grounds of appeal are, it is very difficult to assess the prospect of success of the intended appeal.

6.  The role of the court in judicial review is not to re-assess the non-refoulement claims afresh. The primary decision-makers in a non-refoulement claim are the Director and the Board. They alone assess the evidence and find facts including those relating to the matters allegedly giving rise to the non-refoulement claim, risk of harm, availability of state protection and viability of internal relocation. In a judicial review of that decision, the court will scrutinize the Board’s decision, and intervene by way of judicial review, only for errors of law, procedural unfairness or irrationality: see Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration[4]. Thus, in the absence of any specific grounds challenging the Court’s decision in refusing leave to apply for judicial review and in an application to appeal that decision out of time, the best the court can do is to re-assess the decision focusing on the above vitiating elements.

7.  I have rigorously re-examined the Form Call-1, the Decision, the papers and the evidence with anxious scrutiny. I am satisfied that the Board had correctly set out the law and key legal principles relating to the four applicable grounds under the USM; the issues; the burden of proof and standard of proof; and observed a very high standard of fairness. I am satisfied that the Board’s Decision has not been so vitiated. On the material now available, the Applicant’s intended appeal has no prospect of success at all.

Prejudice to the respondent

8.  The prejudice to the proposed respondent and to public administration if a challenge is allowed to proceed in the absence of a properly formulated ground of appeal with some prospect of success is obvious. His application is an abuse of legal process and would encourage other claimants to indulge in such abuse. It would cause unnecessary waste of judicial and public resources and delay the genuine non-refoulement claimants’ access to the court. It would render it difficult for the Director to perform his duty of maintaining immigration control. Above all, it would make it difficult or unduly burdensome for Hong Kong to honour its international obligations under the various conventions to protect people from persecution, torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. To allow his application may subject the whole system of non-refoulement protection to serious abuse to the prejudice of Hong Kong.

Conclusion

9.  The is no valid explanation for the substantial delay and no arguable ground of appeal. It is a clear abuse of legal process to challenge a decision without proper and good grounds of appeal and which is bound to fail. Despite having been given a last opportunity to furnish his grounds of appeal, the Applicant has failed to do so. The only reasonable inference is that he has no explanation for the delay and no arguable ground of appeal. His application is an abuse of legal process. To allow such a challenge to proceed when it is already out of time would encourage other claimants to indulge in such abuse and create prejudice to the intended respondent and to the administration. For all these reasons, the application for extension of time to appeal is refused.