RE SHERPA SHOVE

HCAL 6/2014

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST

NO 6 OF 2014

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D E C I S I O N

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Introduction

1. On 15 January 2014, Sherpa Shove, the applicant, filed a Form 86 to commence judicial review proceedings seeking to challenge a number of decisions relating to his residential status in, and to his deportation from Hong Kong.  The main basis of the application is a constitutional argument relating to the right of abode of a non‑Chinese prior to and after 1 July 1997. 

Prolix application

2. The Form 86 is 76 pages in length and accompanied by voluminous papers and materials that the court has had to read and consider.  There are 879 exhibits consisting of 2533 pages. I will say more about the prolix grounds and voluminous material filed in this application as it created difficulties discerning the issues in this case.

3. It was submitted by the applicant that this material was included in order to comply with the duty of full and frank disclosure.  This is a misunderstanding of the duty imposed on parties to make full and frank disclosure.  It is not a duty to include in the material before the court anything that is conceivably related to the subject matter of the application.  It should be material that is pertinent and meaningful to the issue that the court is asked to decide.  As stated by Reyes J in Hysan Development Co Ltd v Town Planning Board [2012] HKEC 1266 at paragraph 203, the duty of full and frank disclosure requires discrimination and discernment in the preparation of the evidence accompanying a leave application and should be no more than what is necessary for the court fairly to understand the facts and issues in a case.  See also CDGH v DGH Jr [2014] 2 HKLRD 551 at paragraphs 10 and 11, J v Secretary for Justice [2013] HKEC 366 at paragraphs 35 to 38.  It is therefore incumbent on an applicant to ensure that all the material facts are disclosed in the Form 86 in order to give a true and accurate picture of the case and the issues involved.  The material facts should be appropriately stated and supported by sworn evidence with appropriate reference to exhibits, and should not involve the court scouring through exhibits in order to ascertain facts and determine whether or not they are material. 

The application for leave

4. The applicant seeks relief in relation to numerous decisions commencing with the decision of the Director of Immigration (the Director) dated 1 December 2000 refusing him right of abode;[1] the decision of the Commissioner of Registration dated 15 and 27 December 2000 refusing to issue to the applicant a Hong Kong Permanent Identity Card with a right of abode endorsement;[2] the Deportation Order issued against the applicant by the Secretary for Security on 28 July 2006; the authorisation of the Secretary for Security on 28 July 2005 for the applicant’s detention by the Director of Immigration pending deportation;[3] the orders of the Director of Immigration for the following periods of the applicant’s detention pending deportation: (a) 3 August 2005 to 20 September 2007; (b) 4 March to 1 June 2010; (c) 2 July 2011 to 28 June 2012; (d) 29 September 2012 to 8 April 2013; (e) 14 December 2013 to date.

5. The applicant also seeks the following numerous declarations:

(1)  A declaration that the applicant had acquired right of abode under the former status as a Hong Kong belonger and a Hong Kong permanent resident, or alternatively as a Hong Kong permanent resident by virtue of section 2A of the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115, which entitled him to right of abode.

(2)  A declaration that as a person with right of abode the applicant is not amenable to a deportation order or any decision by the Secretary for Security, the Director of Immigration, the Commissioner of Registration, or any other government official inconsistent with his right of abode.

(3)  and (4) A declaration that Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Schedule 1 of the Immigration Ordinance do not apply to a person with a right of abode, including the applicant.

(5)  A declaration that the decision of the Director of Immigration dated 1 December 2000 refusing him right of abode was unconstitutional and unlawful.

(6)  A declaration that the decision of the Commissioner of Registration dated 15 and 27 December 2000 (later amended to 27 December 2000 only) refusing to issue the applicant a permanent identity card with the endorsement of a right of abode was unconstitutional and unlawful.

(7)  and (8) A declaration that the deportation order issued against the applicant by the Secretary for Security and the authorisation of the Secretary for Security for the applicant’s detention by the Director of Immigration pending deportation dated 28 July 2005 was unconstitutional and unlawful.

(9)  A declaration that the orders of the Director of Immigration for the applicant’s detention during various periods from 3 August 2005 to 4 February 2014 were unconstitutional and unlawful and an award of damages arising therefrom.

6. The hearing of the leave application was adjourned to 1 April 2014 for the applicant to amend the Form 86 by including in the relief, an extension of time or any other amendments to the relief and to file any relevant information or material in support of any of these matters by 17 March 2014.  I also directed that the applicant file any relevant legislation or authority in support of the constitutional arguments that the applicant has advanced in the application.  Whilst I was provided with the relevant legislation and commentary or opinion in relation to the legal issues raised in the application, there was a dearth of authority submitted to the court to support the legal contentions that were advanced on behalf of the applicant.

Extension of time

7. The applicant’s written submissions for an extension of time relied solely on the principle that this application involved a constitutional challenge where out of time applications were more readily granted.  See Leung v Secretary for Justice [2006] 4 HKLRD 211.  The constitutional argument concerns the validity of Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Schedule 1 to the Immigration Ordinance, Cap 115.  There are a series of official decisions that the applicant challenges on the basis of the constitutional argument which are clearly out of time and where no action was taken in relation to the decisions during the relevant period.  Applications for leave to judicially review an official decision are required to be made without undue delay and within three months from the date when the grounds for the application first arose.  From my assessment of the case advanced on behalf of the applicant, it would appear that the official decisions stand or fall depending upon the outcome of the constitutional argument.  As I will explain later in my decision, I have decided on the material submitted to me that the constitutional argument is reasonably arguable and that leave should be given.  I refuse leave on the official decisions that have been listed in this application but clearly if the applicant is successful on the constitutional argument it would result in certain consequential declarations or orders.  However, it will be necessary to further address the issue of appropriate relief if the constitutional argument is successful at the substantive hearing of the judicial review.

8. The applicant’s case on the constitutional argument is that he acquired right of abode from three legal bases prior to the change of sovereignty which were intact as at 30 June 1997 and to which the constitutional transition scheme of the Basic Law applied and thereby conferred upon him right of abode in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR).  The applicant seeks to challenge the validity of Paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 of the Immigration Ordinance, which excludes the applicant’s right of abode, as being inconsistent with the constitutional transition scheme of the Basic Law.  The applicant also seeks to challenge the validity of Paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 of the Immigration Ordinance, which deprives permanent residents of non‑Chinese origin of the right of abode under certain circumstances, as being inconsistent with Article 24 of the Basic Law.

Background facts

9. The applicant is a Nepalese national who claims he has right of abode in Hong Kong.  He claims he first acquired the right of abode under the status of a Hong Kong belonger, and later under the status of a Hong Kong permanent resident.  It is argued on behalf of the applicant that these rights were obtained prior to the change of sovereignty on 1 July 1997 and continued under the transition scheme of the Basic Law and section 23 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance Cap 1. 

10. On a cursory examination of the papers, it is immediately apparent that this application for leave for judicial review concerns a wide range of mostly old decisions by a number of different decision‑makers. But the real issue in this case is whether or not the applicant has right of abode in the HKSAR and therefore not amenable to a deportation order.

11. In setting out the background facts I will do so by providing a chronology of relevant events in order to understand the time frame and when the relevant issues arose in relation to this case.

12. The applicant was born in Hong Kong on 27 February 1981.  His father was a Nepalese national who was then serving as a Gurkha soldier with the British Army that was stationed in Hong Kong at the time.  The applicant’s older brother and younger sister were also born in Hong Kong in 1979 and 1985 respectively.

13. It appears that under a tri‑partite agreement signed between the governments of the United Kingdom, India and Nepal, Gurkha soldiers remained as Nepalese nationals throughout their service with the British Army.  It also appears that this stipulation did not extend to the family members that accompanied Gurkha soldiers.

14. In late 1985, the applicant’s father was relocated to Brunei where he was stationed until his discharge in 1998.  At this time, the rest of the family moved back to Nepal.

15. In 1996, the applicant’s father through a friend made enquiries with the Birth and Deaths Registry in Hong Kong to obtain the birth records of his two sons.  The Registry comes under the Immigration Department.  On 24 June 1996, two applications were filed for a search of the applicant’s record of birth and for a copy of the applicant’s birth certificate in the name of Sherpa Shere born on 27 February 1981 in the Gallipoli Family Hospital, Hong Kong.[4]  In the search application the names of the applicant’s father and mother were set out in full.  It transpired that the applications failed to return a positive result as it was later discovered that the applicant was registered in the name of Sherpa Shove and not Sherpa Shere as was recorded in the Records Office, British Gurkhas Pokhara, Nepal.

16. A request was made by the Director for further and better particulars in respect of the applicant’s applications.  Finally on 7 October 1998, the Records Office issued a clarification that Sherpa Shere and Sherpa Shove were names of one and the same person.  The point is made on behalf of the applicant that if the Director had taken the further step of clarifying the single difference of the first name of the applicant, then the circumstances may have been different for the applicant as it might have enabled him to return to Hong Kong at a time when he could have applied and obtained the right of abode.

17. These enquiries were made in order for the applicant and his older brother to return and settle in Hong Kong.  However because of the confusion over the applicant’s name and the time it took to clarify the issue, it was not until 13 June 2000 that the applicant was granted a visa to come to Hong Kong.  It is stated that he came back on 29 August 2000, at the age of 19 years, with a view to settle in Hong Kong.

18. In an internal memo of the Immigration Department dated 17 April 2000, it is noted that from the information and records of the applicant that he might have a claim to the right of abode or right to land in Hong Kong.  In a follow‑up memo dated 29 April 2000 it was noted that the applicant satisfied to be a Hong Kong permanent resident immediately before 1 July 1997 and that he might have a claim as a permanent resident under Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 1 to the Immigration Ordinance.

19. It appears that in June 1999, the applicant took steps to apply for and obtain a Permanent Identity Card.  In a letter from the Director to the applicant dated 2 November 1999, reference is made to the application for verification of eligibility for Permanent Identity Card received by the Department on 21 June 1999 but according to the applicant there is no documentation of his application in the papers supplied by the Director.  The only record of such an application was once submitted to the Director on 1 September 2000.  The applicant takes issue over this matter.

20. The Director issued a one‑entry visa dated 13 June 2000 to the applicant, directing him to enter Hong Kong on or before 13 September 2000.  The applicant arrived in Hong Kong as a visitor on the strength of the visa on 29 August 2000 and was permitted to remain in Hong Kong until 29 October 2000.

21. On 2 September 2000, the applicant applied to the Director for verification of his eligibility for the issue of a Hong Kong Permanent Identity Card.  It was confirmed in an internal memo dated 23 November 2000 that the applicant was a permanent resident of Hong Kong before 1 July 1997 by virtue of Paragraph 2 of the former Schedule 1 of the Immigration Ordinance.[5]

22. In a letter dated 1 December 2000, the Director informed the applicant that he was a non‑Chinese national who was a Hong Kong permanent resident having right of abode in Hong Kong immediately before 1 July 1997 under the law then in force.  The letter of the Director read as follows:[6]

“I refer to your application for verification of eligibility for Hong Kong permanent identity card received by this Department on 2 Sept 2000.

According to the information provided, we considered that you are a non‑Chinese national and was a Hong Kong permanent resident having the right of abode in Hong Kong immediately before 1 July 1997 under the law as then in force. A person not of Chinese nationality and was a Hong Kong permanent resident before 1 July 1997 can continue to have the status of permanent resident of the HKSAR if he can fulfil the transitional provisions under paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 1 to the Immigration Ordinance. However, as you did not return to settle in Hong Kong on or before 31 December 1998 and had been absent from Hong Kong for a continuous period of 36 months or more, you cannot become a permanent resident of the HKSAR.

As a result, your claim to the permanent resident status cannot be established. If you have further documents to substantiate your claim to the permanent resident status, you may make an application for permanent identity card for a formal determination. If you wish to do so, please contact the undersigned at (Tel.no) for details.

Nevertheless, a non‑Chinese citizen who loses the status as a permanent resident will acquire the right to land in HKSAR under Section 2AAA of the Immigration Ordinance. Therefore, you will have the right to land in Hong Kong and will be able to enter Hong Kong freely to live, study or work without any restriction.

  Please attend this office at the following address between 10‑11a.m. on 15 Dec 2000 with the original copies of the documents listed on the attached sheet for verification and further formalities.”

23. In the letter the Director noted that the applicant’s status as a permanent resident could not be established as he failed to fulfil the transitional provisions under Paragraph 6(1) of Schedule 1 to the Immigration Ordinance then in force.  Paragraph 6(1) reads:

“A person who is not of Chinese nationality and who was a permanent resident of Hong Kong before 1 July 1997 is taken to be a permanent resident of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region under paragraph 2 (d) and exempt from the requirements under paragraph 3 if-

(a) he was settled in Hong Kong immediately before one July 1997;

(b) after he sees to be settled in Hong Kong immediately before one July 1997 he returns to settle in Hong Kong within a period of 18 months commencing on one July 1997; or

(c) after he ceased to be settled in Hong Kong immediately before one July 1997 he returns to settle in Hong Kong after the period of 18 months commencing on one July 1997 but only if he has not been absent from Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than 36 months.”

24. It is acknowledged by the applicant that he had been away from Hong Kong for more than 36 months and had not returned to Hong Kong within the period of 18 months commencing on 1 July 1997.  He therefore failed to meet the requirements as set out in Paragraph 6(1)(c) of Schedule 1.

25. On 15 December 2000, the Director advised the applicant that his claim to permanent residence status was not established and that a non‑Chinese citizen who loses the status as a permanent resident will acquire the right to land in the HKSAR under section 2AAA of Immigration Ordinance and will be able to enter freely to live, study or work without any restriction.[7]

26. On 27 December 2000, the applicant applied for an identity card.[8]

27. During the period of time that the applicant has been in Hong Kong, he has been convicted of a number of criminal offences, particulars of the which are set out below:

(i)  8 November 2002 – Theft on 17 September 2002.  Sentenced to 1 month imprisonment.[9]

(ii)  23 December 2002 – Possession of dangerous drugs on 5 August 2002.  Sentenced by way of fine of $500.[10]

(iii)  12 May 2003 – Theft on 6 March 2003.  Sentenced to 3 months’ imprisonment suspended for 12 months.[11]

(iv)  24 November 2003 – Theft on 25 August 2003 and Failing to surrender on 8 October 2003.  Sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment.[12]

(v)  28 January 2005 – Theft on 4 October 2004. Sentenced to 15 months’ imprisonment.[13]

(vi)  14 April 2009 – Burglary on 29 October 2008. Sentenced to 24 months’ imprisonment.[14]

(vii)  15 June 2011 – Theft on 22 May 2011.  Sentenced to 42 days’ imprisonment.[15]

(viii)  6 September 2012 – Theft.  Sentenced to 1 month imprisonment.[16]

28. As a result of the applicant’s perceived status and the convictions for criminal offences, a Deportation Order was the subject of a warning which was eventually issued against the applicant.  A chronology in relation to the Deportation Order is set out below.

(i)  24 November 2003 – Deportable offences committed by the applicant.[17]

(ii)  16 February 2004 – Warning letter liable to deportation.[18]

(iii)  28 July 2005 – Deportation Order which was served on 4 August 2005.[19]

(iv)  1 February 2006 – Petition to Permanent Secretary for suspension/rescission of deportation order.[20]

(v)  14 Jun 2006 – Petition refused.[21]

(vi)  23 August 2006 – Petition to the Chief Executive.[22]

(vii)  5 September 2006 – Further representations to Permanent Secretary.[23]

(viii)  17 April 2007 – Permanent Secretary refused to reconsider the case.[24]

(ix)  25 May 2007 – Request for reasons from Permanent Secretary refused.[25]

29. After unsuccessfully resisting the Deportation Order, the applicant made a claim under Article 3 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT) which was processed between 2007 and 2011, the relevant dates being as follows:

(i)  2 May 2007 – Application under Article 3 of CAT.

(ii)  4 March 2011 – The CAT claim was dismissed.

(iii)  17 August 2011 – The Petition against the failed CAT claim was refused.

30. After the failed CAT claim, the applicant made a refugee claim, with the relevant dates being as follows:

(i)  2 August 2011 – Application as a refugee

(ii)  11 October 2012 – Application refused

31. After the failed refugee claim, the applicant instituted Habeas Corpus proceedings which were dismissed on 21 December 2012.

32. It is necessary to set out the relevant dates for the grant of legal aid for judicial review and the preparation and filing of the application for leave for judicial review.  The relevant dates being as follows:

(i)  12 March 2013 – Application granted.

(ii)  18 March 2013 – Junior counsel assigned.

(iii)  15 April 2013 – Senior counsel assigned.

(iv)  8 and 22 May 2013 – Supply of materials.

(v)  15 January 2014 – Form 86 filed.

The constitutional argument

33. Mr Robert Lee, SC, leading Dr Stephen Tang, submitted that the applicant acquired “right of abode” in the HKSAR as a Hong Kong belonger and later as a Hong Kong permanent resident which he retained as at 30 June 1997.  He submitted that because the applicant was born in Hong Kong as a British subject, he acquired the status of a Hong Kong belonger which entitled him to right of abode under the Immigration Ordinance then in force.  He lays the foundation of his argument by relying on the Immigration Ordinance that was enacted in 1971 (the 1971 Ordinance) in which a Hong Kong belonger was defined, amongst other things, as “(a) a British subject who was born in Hong Kong; …”  He argued that as the applicant was born in Hong Kong as a British subject he was therefore a Hong Kong belonger in accordance with this definition.  See Registrar of Births and Deaths v Syed Haider Yahya Hussain & Anor (2001) 4 HKCFAR 429.

34. Mr Lee also argued that as at the applicant’s date of birth, under the 1971 Ordinance, a Hong Kong belonger was entitled to the right to land (section 8(1)) which in turn provided that a condition of stay had no effect in respect of such person (section 8(2)), and a removal order could not be made against such person; and there was no power to make a deportation order against a Hong Kong belonger (section 20). 

35. It is on the basis that the applicant was a British subject under the British Nationality Act 1948 that it is argued that he is a Hong Kong belonger.  On 1 January 1993, the definition of a Hong Kong belonger was amended by the Immigration (Amendment) (No 2) Ordinance, 78/1982 (the 1983 Ordinance).  This amendment was made to facilitate the transition to a new scheduled definition to correspond with the provisions of the British Nationality Act 1981 where the concept of British Dependant Territories citizen was introduced. 

36. Section 2 of the 1983 Ordinance provided:

“ ‘Hong Kong belonger’ means a person who –

(a) immediately before 1 January 1983 was –

(i) a British subject who was born in Hong Kong;

…

(b)  on or after 1 January 1983 belongs to a class or description of persons mentioned in the First Schedule;”

37. The First Schedule of the 1983 Ordinance provided that persons who were Hong Kong belongers under section 2(1) included any person who immediately before 1 January 1983 was a Hong Kong belonger and any person who is or becomes a British Dependant Territories citizen under, amongst others, sections 15(1)(b) or (2) and 23(1), (3) or (4) of the 1981 Act. 

38. It is argued by Mr Lee that the First Schedule defined a Hong Kong belonger, as is relevant to the applicant’s case, under two limbs being any person who was a Hong Kong belonger immediately before 1 January 1983 and anyone who was a British Dependent Territories citizen.  It is under the second limb that Mr Lee argued that the applicant also acquired right of abode.  In section 23 of the British Nationality Act 1981, it provides that a person shall become a British Dependant Territories citizen if immediately before the commencement he was a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies who had that citizenship by his birth, naturalisation or registration in a dependant territory.  

39. Mr Lee submitted that by virtue of section 23, the applicant became a British Dependant Territory citizen as he was a “citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies” acquired by birth in a dependant territory. He further submitted that by virtue of being a British Dependant Territory citizen his Hong Kong belonger status under Paragraph 2(d) continued by Paragraph 2(a) of the Schedule enacted by the Immigration (Amendment) (No 2) Ordinance (31/87) (the 1987 Ordinance) where Hong Kong Permanent Resident was defined as:

“1. Any person who is wholly or partly of Chinese race and has at any time been ordinarily resident in Hong Kong for a continuous period of not less than 7 years.

2. Any person who is a British Dependent Territories citizen and who –

(a) belongs to a class or description of persons specified in Article 2 of the Hong Kong (British Nationality) Order 1986 (L.N. 233 of 1986) as having a connection with Hong Kong; or

(b) is such a citizen by virtue of his having a connection with any of the British Dependent Territories (other than Hong Kong) mentioned in Schedule 6 to the British Nationality Act 1981 (1981 c.61 U.K.) and has at any time been married to a person specified in subparagraph (a).

3.  Any person who is a Commonwealth citizen and who immediately before 1 January 1983 had the right to land in Hong Kong by virtue of section 8(1)(a) as then in force.”

40. Mr Lee also submitted that the applicant fell within Article 2 Hong Kong (British Nationality) Order 1986 and therefore acquired the status of a Hong Kong permanent resident under Paragraph 2(a) of the Schedule in the 1987 Ordinance. He argued that this further entitled the applicant to right of abode. He acknowledged that whilst Article 3 of Order 1986 provided that the status of a British Dependant Territories citizen ceased on 1 July 1997, the right of abode already acquired by the applicant while he was a Hong Kong permanent resident did not cease and remained intact.

41. It is further argued on behalf of the applicant that his right of abode acquired under his status as a Hong Kong belonger continued by virtue of section 23 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance, Cap 1, as a freestanding right that was preserved.  Section 23 provides:

“Where an Ordinance repeals in whole or in part any other Ordinance, the repeal shall not-

(a) revive anything not in force or existing at the time at which the repeal takes effect;

(b) affect the previous operation of any Ordinance so repealed or anything duly done or suffered under any Ordinance so repealed;

(c) affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under any Ordinance so repealed;

(d) affect any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any Ordinance so repealed; or

(e)  affect any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid; and any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed, as if the repealing Ordinance had not been passed.”

42. It is also argued that the applicant as from 1987 enjoyed dual rights of abode in Hong Kong as a Hong Kong belonger since 1981 and Hong Kong permanent resident since 1987, and there was nothing before or after 1 July 1997 that extinguished or diminished such rights of abode that he had acquired.

43. It is finally argued that there is a third source of conferment of right of abode to the applicant under section 2A of the 1987 Ordinance which provided that a Hong Kong permanent resident enjoyed the right of abode in Hong Kong.  Mr Lee submitted that section 2A was adopted as part of the laws of the HKSAR by Article 160 of the Basic Law. 

44. It is submitted that the Basic Law permits more than one source of right of abode in HKSAR and that with the change of sovereignty a former right of abode may be continued by Article 160 of the Basic Law, or by section 23 of the Interpretation and General Clauses Ordinance.  It is further submitted that a right of abode may also be conferred by section 2A of the Immigration Ordinance, in addition to such right as conferred by the second clause of Article 24 of the Basic Law.  It is therefore argued on behalf of the applicant that Paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 does not apply to the applicant’s right of abode under the status of Hong Kong belonger and that Paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 applies to the permanent residents of HKSAR as defined under the second clause of Article 24 of the Basic Law and does not apply to the applicant as a Hong Kong permanent resident.  It is further argued that in the event that Paragraphs 6 and 7 extinguish or diminish such right it is unconstitutional.

Conclusion

45. As I stated at the outset, I have come to the view that the constitutional argument is reasonably arguable with realistic prospects of success.  It is on this argument and basis that I grant leave.  I also grant the applicant’s application to amend the Form 86 in the terms submitted.  I consider the appropriate respondent in these proceedings to be the Director only.  I direct that an early hearing date for the substantive application be fixed and appropriate directions for filing of submissions or any further evidence then will be accordingly issued.

[1] B1, 96

[2] B1, 100

[3] B1, 335-341

[4] B1, 7 and 9

[5] B1, 88

[6] B1, 96

[7] B1, 98

[8] B1, 100-102

[9] B1, 139 and 141

[10] B1,.137 and 139

[11] B1, 140 and 141

[12] B1, 165, 168 and 182

[13] B1, 188 and 191

[14] B3, 1061 and 1083

[15] B4, 1562

[16] B5, 2015

[17] B1, 165-172

[18] B1, 262-263

[19] B1, 325-326

[20] B2, 532-535, Petition summarised in memo dated 23 May 2006.

[21] B2, 536-537

[22] B2, 580-585

[23] B2, 602-606

[24] B2 p.723-724

[25] B2 p.768-769