RE PERUMAL DINESH

CACV 135/2019

[2020] HKCA 205

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF APPEAL

CIVIL APPEAL NO 135 OF 2019

(ON APPEAL FROM HCAL 544/2017)

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J U D G M E N T

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Hon Barma JA (giving the Judgment of the Court):

1.  On 1 August 2019, this court (Cheung and Barma JJA) handed down a judgment dismissing the applicant’s appeal against the decision of Deputy High Court Judge Bruno Chan (“the judge”) on 15 March 2019 refusing leave to the applicant to apply for judicial review. The applicant had sought to review the decision of the Torture Claims Appeal Board (“the Board”) dismissing his appeal from the decision of the Director of Immigration rejecting his non-refoulement claim.

2.  The facts and issues in the appeal, as well as the court’s reasons for dismissing it, are set out in our judgment.[1]  We will not repeat them here.

3.  The applicant subsequently applied, by a Notice of Motion dated 13 August 2019, for leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant stated in the Notice of Motion that:

“(1)  I would like to inform the court that there is some error in law in my decision. Decision maker just relied on COI information and my previous facts which were favor on rejecting my claim.

(2)  The learned judges were wrong as a matter of law for not having applied the principle of irrationality to the decision made by the Director of Immigration on the 1.08.2019, refusing my application for judicial review.

(3)  There is some error in my decision. Actual life occur different situation than mentioned in COI information. Officers and courts prefers to ignore the overwhelming of the evidence of the violence towards minorities searching for unrealistic silver lining.

(4)  Procedural unfairness”

4.  The applicant lodged a written submission in support of the application on 26 August 2019.  In the written submission, the applicant referred to a number of cases on high standard of fairness.

5.  Having considered the applicant’s Notice of Motion and written submission, we see no reason to depart from the usual practice of determining an application of this kind on the papers.  We have, therefore, determined the applicant’s application on the basis of the Notice of Motion and written submission.

6.  The matters stated by the applicant in the Notice of Motion and written submission do not constitute grounds for granting leave to appeal to the Court of Final Appeal.  The applicant has failed to identify any question of great general or public importance for the Court of Final Appeal to determine, as required by section 22(1)(b) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.  Nor is any such question apparent to us from the matters he has raised in the Notice of Motion and written submission.  

7.  The applicant did not provide any particulars for the grounds raised in the Notice of Motion.  As for the cases referred to in the submission, the applicant did not explain how they are relevant to his case.  In our view, these grounds are not reasonably arguable before the Court of Final Appeal. 

8.  We also do not see any basis for granting leave on the “otherwise” limb under section 22(1)(b).

9.  For these reasons, the Notice of Motion dated 13 August 2019 is dismissed.