Case Details
Listing:
RAJAPAKSHAGE TSUITHA UDAYANGANI RAJAPAKSHA AND OTHERS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
RAJAPAKSHAGE TSUITHA UDAYANGANI RAJAPAKSHA AND OTHERS v. TORTURE CLAIMS APPEAL BOARD / NON-REFOULEMENT CLAIMS PETITION OFFICE[Decision on Leave Application]
[2026] HKCFI 4508 · HCAL 882/2022
Court of First Instance
HCAL 882/2022
[2026] HKCFI 4508
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW LIST No 882 of 2022
BETWEEN
| |Rajapakshage Tsuitha Udayangani Rajapaksha |1st Applicant |
| | | |
| |Rankothge Binuthi Sasnuli Rankoth, |2nd Applicant |
| |suing by her mother and next friend, | |
| |Rajapakshage Tsuitha Udanyangani Rajapaksha, | |
| |the 1st applicant | |
| | |3rd Applicant |
| |Rajapakshage Rankothge Sayul Bimneth Rankoth, | |
| |suing by his mother and next friend, | |
| |Rajapakshage Tsuitha Udanyangani Rajapaksha, | |
| |the 1st applicant | |
| | | |
| |and | |
| |Torture Claims Appeal Board / |Putative |
| |Non-Refoulement Claims Petition Office |Respondent |
| | | |
| |and | |
| | | |
| |Director of Immigration |Putative |
| | |Interested |
| | |Party |
| | | |
Application for Leave to Apply for Judicial Review
NOTIFICATION of the Judge’s decision (Ord 53 r 3)
Following:
| |consideration of the documents only; or |
|Π|consideration of the documents and oral submissions by the |
| |Applicant in open court; |
Order by Deputy High Court Judge Levy:
1. The title of the proceedings be amended in as follow:
2nd applicant: Rankothge Binuthi Sasnuli Rankoth, suing by her mother
and next friend, Rajapakshage Tsuitha Udanyangani Rajapaksha, the 1st
applicant
3rd applicant: Rajapakshage Rankothge Sayul Bimneth Rankoth, suing by
his mother and next friend, Rajapakshage Tsuitha Udanyangani
Rajapaksha, the 1st applicant
2. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd applicants’ application for leave to apply for
judicial review be dismissed.
Introduction
1. By A “notice of application for leave to apply for judicial review” in
the prescribed Form 86 filed on 5 September 2022, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd
applicants applied for leave to apply for judicial review (“Leave
Application”). The intended judicial review was against the decision
of the Torture Claims Appeal Board / the Non-Refoulement Claims
Petition Office (“Board”) dated 18 July 2022 (“Board’s Decision”)
dismissing the appeals by the 1st, 2nd and 3rd applicants against the
decisions of the Director of Immigration (“Director”) respectively
dated 27 July 2018 and 20 July 2021 respectively rejecting the 1st and
2nd applicants’ and the 3rd applicant’s non-refoulement claim on all
applicable grounds. The Board’s Decision can be viewed at the
following hyperlink: -
https://legalref.judiciary.hk/doc/judg/html/vetted/other/en/2022/HCAL000882_
2022_files/the_Board's_Decision.pdf
2. The 1st applicant is the mother of the 2nd and 3rd applicants. The 2nd
applicant (a girl) was born in Sri Lanka, is now 14 years old. The 3rd
applicant (a boy) was born in Hong Kong, and is now almost 7 years
old. The biological father of the 2nd and 3rd applicants is not the
1st applicant’s husband, known as Dhammika (“Husband”). An application
for judicial review by a child claimant should only proceed in
accordance with the regime under O.80 r 2 of the Rules of the High
Court with the appointment of next friend and acting by a solicitor
(unless the Official Solicitor is appointed as next friend): see Fabio
Arlyn Timogan v Evan Ruth [2020] HKCA 971 at [57]. The applicants’
applications for legal aid were not successful.
3. At the request of the applicants for an oral hearing, the court
scheduled a hearing on 23 July 2026 which were attended by all the
applicants in person. Despite the non-compliance with the requirement
stated in the preceding paragraph, this court would treat the non-
compliance with the rule as a mere irregularity, and proceeded with
the hearing: see Fabio (supra). However, the title of the proceedings
should be amended as follows.
2nd applicant: Rankothge Binuthi Sasnuli Rankoth, suing by her
mother and next friend, Rajapakshage Tsuitha Udanyangani
Rajapaksha, the 1st applicant
3rd applicant: Rajapakshage Rankothge Sayul Bimneth Rankoth, suing
by his mother and next friend, Rajapakshage Tsuitha
Udanyangani Rajapaksha, the 1st applicant
4. All the previous filing shall deem to have been so amended.
5. The basis of the 3 applicants’ claims were that, if refouled to Sri
Lanka, they would be harmed or killed by (i) Minster EG, a member of
Parliament for the United National Party (“UNP”). Minster EG wanted to
compel the Husband, who worked for Minister MS (member of Parliament
and of the United People’s Freedom Alliance (“UPFA”), to give evidence
against MS; and (ii) Minister MS due to the perceived or imputed
perception of the knowledge of the Husband of Minister MS criminal
activities and/or information prejudicial to Minister MS. The Board’s
reasoning and findings were set out in detail in the Board’s Decision
and it is not necessary for me to repeat them. Unless otherwise
specified, I shall also adopt the Board’s abbreviations and
descriptions stated in the Board’s Decision.
Discussion
6. The leave application operates as a ‘filtering’ process. Hence there
is no requirement or expectation to give elaborate reasons for my
decision.[1] It is therefore sufficient to state my observations
after considering the Board’s Decision and the applicant’s materials
adduced.
7. In a proper Form 86, an applicant is required to identify the grounds
of judicial review clearly and succinctly[2], and further to make full
and frank disclosure of all material facts to be verified by an
affidavit. The Form 86 and the supporting affirmation provided no
such grounds.
8. At the hearing, this court asked the 1st applicant whether she had any
grounds she wished to submit in support of the Leave Application in
respect of herself and on behalf of the 2nd and 3rd applicants. All
the 1st applicant stated was that she/they had fear of going back to
Sri Lanka. The 1st applicant also stated that she could not take her
children back home. The father of the 2nd and 3rd applicants are now
applying for dependent visas to enable them to stay in Hong Kong.
9. As the Courts have repeatedly stated, a finding of fact is exclusively
within the realm of the Board, which a court in a judicial review will
not interfere with unless such finding involved an error of law,
procedural unfairness or irrationality.[3] In the present case, the
applicants and the Director were both legally represented throughout
before the Board. The Board found that the both the 1st applicant and
the 2nd applicants had Sri Lanka nationality. As for the 3rd
applicant, who was born in Hong Kong to Sri Lanka parents, the Board
determined his claims against Sri Lanka as the country of reference on
the basis that it was the country against which the 1st applicant,
from whom the 3rd applicant claims largely derived, has made claims.
Despite some shortcomings in the 1st applicant’s evidence, the Board
accepted the 1st applicant’s account as to past events. However, the
Board found that the 1st applicant would not be subjected to any
future risks of harm from:
i) Minister MS. The Board considered that this claimed risk to have
been entirely speculative. The Board found that it had not been
claimed that there was in the past any threat levelled against
the 1st applicant, either directly or indirectly.
ii) Minister MG and his Associates. Based on the COI that showed
that Minister MG was no longer an MP, and that Minster MS also
lost his seat in 2015, the Board found that the political
revilry between them would have lost its relevance, and also
that any information which the Husband might have possessed
would have been stale and of little use. Thus, the Board did
not accept that Minister MG or his associates still wished to
find the Husband or hold any adverse interest in the 1st
applicant.
iii) The police. The Board found that there was no evidence that the
1st applicant was formally wanted by police. Given the fact
that Minister MG had lost his seat, the Board did not find that
it was not likely that he could influence the police to do his
bidding by harming the 1st applicant.
iv) Sexual assaults. The Board found that the one incident of sexual
assaults by the bodyguards of Minister MG were opportunistic and
spontaneous with the purpose of pressuring the 1st applicant to
reveal the Husband’s whereabouts. As it had been found that
there was no long any adverse interest in the Husband, the Board
therefore found that the 1st applicant would not likely be
subjected to harm of sexual assaults by these men. As for the
threat of sexual assaults in Sri Lanka, the Board found that the
1st applicant did not face any personal risk of such violence.
v) The family and local community as a single mother. Based on the
COI, the Board found that some community welfare services would
be available to assist the 1st applicant. In any event, the
Board found that there was no evidence that her family did not
accept her because of having given birth to children out of wed-
lock.
10. Concerning the specific risk to the 2nd and 3rd applicants, the Board
was not satisfied that they would face, through the 1st applicant, any
derivative risk of harm claimed by the 1st applicant discussed in the
preceding paragraph. Having considered the 1st applicant’s evidence
that her sisters were generally supportive, the relevant COI that
suggested the illegitimacy of a child did not have any bearing
availability of education or health care facilities, and that the lack
of personal risk of being subjected to children trafficking, the Board
found that the 2nd and 3rd applicants would unlikely face any specific
risks of harm if refouled to Sri Lanka.
11. After having assessed the applicants’ claims both individually and
cumulatively, the Board was not satisfied that the applicants had
established their claims, and therefore dismissed the appeals by the
1st, 2nd and 3rd applicants. These are findings of fact, which the
court in a judicial review will not interfere with, subject to there
being any public law errors.
Regarding the 1st applicant
12. Bearing in mind the enhanced standard that should be adopted in
scrutinizing the Board’s Decision, this court is satisfied that the
Board correctly applied the law relating to all the grounds and
observed a high standard of fairness. I am satisfied that the Board
was entitled to reach the conclusion that the 1st applicant would
unlikely face risk of harm due to the change of the political scene in
Sri Lanka. The 1st applicant has not advanced any grounds, whether
written or oral, in support of the Leave Application. The 1st
applicant has not shown any errors of law or procedural unfairness or
irrationality in the Board’s Decision. The 1st applicant’s intended
challenge to the Board’s Decision is not reasonably arguable with
realistic prospects of success such that would enable this court to
grant leave.
Regarding the 2nd and 3rd applicants
13. At the time of the hearing before the Board, the 2nd applicant and the
3rd applicant were both legally represented. The Board had also
separately considered the relevant risks each of them would face if
they were refouled in accordance with the principles set out in Re
Jasvir Singh [4], following Fabio Arlyn Timogan (supra.). Applying a
high standard of fairness, the court, after having taken a rigorous
examination with anxious scrutiny, is satisfied the Board had achieved
high standards of fairness in dealing with claims of each of the 2nd
and 3rd applicants in finding that they would not be subjected to the
risks claimed through the 1st applicant. This court is unable to
find any underlying matters that may support minor-specific non-
refoulement grounds which had not been advanced before the Board. The
1st applicant had not advanced any grounds that their children would
be subjected to any risks of harm specific to each of them. In the
circumstances, their Leave Application should also be dismissed.
Order
14. The title of the proceedings be amended in accordance with [3] above
on the court’s own motion.
15. The 1st, 2nd and 3rd applicants’ application for leave to apply for
judicial review be dismissed.
Dated the 14th day of August 2026
| |(Alfred Chan) |
| |for Registrar, High |
| |Court |
Where leave to apply has been granted, Applicants and their legal advisers
are reminded of their obligation to reconsider the merits of their
application in the light of the Respondent’s evidence
|Notes for the Applicant:| | |
| | | |
| | | |
|If leave has been | | |
|granted, the Applicant | | |
|or the Applicant’s | | |
|solicitors must: | | |
|a) serve on the |Sent to the Applicant|Sent to the Putative |
|respondent and such | |Respondent / the |
|interested parties as |on 14/8/2026 |Putative Respondent’s |
|may be directed by the | |solicitors / such |
|Court the order granting|Rajapakshage Tsuitha |Putative Interested |
|leave and any directions|Udayangani |Parties as may be |
|given within 14 days |Rajapaksha, |directed by the Court / |
|after the leave was | |the Putative Interested |
|granted (Order 53, rule |Rankothge Binuthi |Parties’ solicitors on |
|4A); |Sasnuli Rankoth, |14/8/2026 |
| | | |
|b) issue the originating|Rajapakshage |Torture Claims Appeal |
|summons within 14 days |Rankothge Sayul |Board/Non-refoulement |
|after the grant of leave|Bimneth Rankoth |Claims Petition Office |
|and serve it in | |Putative Respondent’s |
|accordance with Order | |ref. no.: |
|53, rule 5; and | |USM 12942/18/8/212/S281 |
| |Applicant’s ref. no: |USM 12943/18/8/213/S282 |
|c) supply to every other|Nil. |USM 18378/21/7/178/S390 |
|party copies of every | | |
|affidavit which the | |Director of Immigration |
|Applicant proposes to | |Putative Interested |
|use at the hearing, | |Party’s ref. no.: QA T/C|
|including the affidavit | |713/18 (formerly RBCZ |
|in support of | |13425/16) (T7S6), QA T/C|
|the application for | |714/18 (formerly RBCZ |
|leave (Order 53, rule | |13426/16), QA T/C 768/20|
|6(5)). | |(formerly RBCZ 10675/20)|
| | | |
| | | |
| | |Department of Justice, |
| | |Senior Assistant Law |
| | |Officer |
| | |(Civil Law) |
| | |(Civil Litigation Unit |
| | |2) |
Form CALL-1
-----------------------
[1] Re Zunartyah [2018] HKCA 14 at [23].
[2] Ho Loy & Another v Director of Environmental Protection, HCAL
21/2015, 22 December 2016 at [142].
[3] Re Lakhwinder Singh [2018] HKCA 246; Re Daljit Singh [2018] HKCA 328;
!(,69:Cabyz¥§¨«²´µ½¾íÝíÝβ힌žŒ|žŒžŒ|ÝjZjZjííG$hñ9åh%8kPJaJmH nH
sH tH
hñ9åh%8kPJ\?aJmH sH "hñ9åh%8kPJ\?aJmH o([pic]sH
hñ9åh%8k5?PJaJmH sRe Mudannayakalage Chaminda Pushpa Kumara [2018]
HKCA 400; and Nupur Mst v Director of Immigration [2018] HKCA 524.
[4] [2012] HKCA 53.