CHUK LAM MING TONG LTD v. POON HIAO YEN AND OTHERS

HCA 2291/2015

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE

HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION

COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE

ACTION NO 2291 OF 2015

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D E C I S I O N

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1.  The 3^rd defendant, Ho Kwai Yee (何桂儀), issued two summonses returnable before me to-day.

2.  The first summons was issued on 5 June 2017, asking to amend the order which I made by consent on 24 October 2016 by changing “the Register” to “the purported Registers”.  The order which I made read as follows:

“ The Defendants do make photocopy and keep a copy of the following documents to be countersigned and certified as true copies by the Plaintiff’s and the Defendants’ solicitors within 7 days from today:

(a) The purported Plaintiff’s register of members (as stated in paragraph 11(c)(ii) of the Defence and Counterclaim).

(b) The purported Buddha hall register of members (as stated in paragraph 11(c)(i) of the Defence and counterclaim).

(collectively as ‘the Register’).”

3.  It is plain and obvious from §1 of the consent order that “the Register” is an abbreviation for (a) and (b).  “The Register” in the context of this order is an abbreviation, not a definition, and it plainly refers to the two purported Registers. 

4.  The plaintiff’s application to amend is obviously without merit and I dismiss it with costs to be paid forthwith and summarily assessed by me.    

5.  The second summons issued by the 3^rd defendant is dated 8 June 2017.  It asks for:

(1) §1: to permit the 3^rd defendant to be deleted from the consent order and to make an express note in the order that she does not agree to the order and reserves all her rights;

(2) §2: to permit her, within 14 days, to go to C. W. Chan & Co to inspect and copy the purported Register; and

(3) costs.

6.  Prior to the hearing on 24 October 2016, C. W. Chan & Co (“the Firm”) appeared on the record as solicitors for the 3^rd defendant.

7.  If the 3^rd defendant had wished the Firm to cease acting for her, she could have filed a notice to act in person, whereupon the Firm would cease to represent her.  She could also have asked another firm of solicitors to file a notice to act in place of the Firm. She could have, but did neither of the above.  The Firm could also ask for an order to cease acting for her.  They could not just cease acting.  They had to apply to the court, and if the court permitted, an order would be made, and on compliance with formalities, the Firm would cease to act for her.  There were simple steps by which the 3^rd defendant could have isolated herself from the other defendants and the firm of solicitors.  None of the above happens. 

8.  It is now almost seven months from making of the order.  There is no basis for her application which is thoroughly unmeritorious.  It calls to be dismissed.

9.  If she had wished to obtain a copy of the Register, she could have made a written request to the Firm, with an undertaking to pay reasonable expenses.  If the Firm should decline her application without valid grounds, she could have applied to the Master.  There is no reason to go straight to the judge. 

10.  I dismiss the summons issued on 8 June 2017, with costs to the plaintiff and the Firm, to be summarily assessed be me.

(Submissions on costs)

11.  I dismiss both summonses with costs to be paid forthwith.  I assess the plaintiff’s costs on the first summons at $4,000 and the second summons at $2,000, making a total of $6,000.  I assess the Firm’s costs at $2,000 for each summons, making a total of $4,000.