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Press Summary (English)
Press Summary (Chinese)
CACC 253/2024, [2026] HKCA 1396
On appeal from [2024] HKCFI 1468 & [2024] HKCFI 3298
IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE
HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION
COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO 253 OF 2024
(ON APPEAL FROM HCCC NO 69 OF 2022)
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BETWEEN
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HKSAR |
Respondent |
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and |
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YEUNG Suet-ying Clarisse (楊雪盈) |
1st Applicant (D10) |
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WONG Pik-wan (黃碧雲) |
2nd Applicant (D17) |
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CHOW Ka-shing (鄒家成) |
3rd Applicant (D37) |
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YU Wai-ming Winnie (余慧明) |
4th Applicant (D47) |
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HO Kwai-lam (何桂藍) |
5th Applicant (D33) |
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LAM Cheuk-ting (林卓廷) |
6th Applicant (D38) |
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NG Gordon Ching-hang (吳政亨) |
7th Applicant (D5) |
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CHENG Tat-hung (鄭達鴻) |
9th Applicant (D8) |
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HO Kai-ming Kalvin (何啟明) |
10th Applicant (D14) |
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CHAN Chi-chuen Raymond (陳志全) |
11th Applicant (D36) |
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LEUNG Kwok-hung (梁國雄) |
12th Applicant (D41) |
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| Before: |
Hon Poon CJHC, Pang JA and Tam J in Court |
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Dates of Written Submissions:
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26 March 2026 (D14); |
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27 March 2026 ((i) Joint submissions by D5, D17, D37, D38 & D47, (ii) D8 & D41, (iii) D10, (iv) D33 and (v) D36); |
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10 April 2026 (Respondent); |
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16 April 2026 (Reply by D36); and |
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17 April 2026 ((i) Joint reply by D5, D17, D37, D38 & D47; (ii) Reply by D10 and (iii) Reply by D33) |
| Date of Decision: |
10 August 2026 |
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D E C I S I O N
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The Court:
Introduction
1. By a judgment handed down on 23 February 2026 (“Judgment”),[1] the Court of Appeal [2] refused to grant leave to D5, D8, D14, D17, D33, D36, D37, D38, D41 and D47, and leave out of time to D10, to appeal against conviction and dismiss their appeals in CACC 253/2024.[3] We will refer to them as the applicants below.
2. The applicants now apply for a certificate that points of law of great and general importance raised by them in their respective notices of motion are involved in the Judgment, pursuant to section 32(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance, Cap 484.[4] Their applications are opposed by the respondent.
Judgment
3. At [45] of the Judgment, the Court distilled five broad common grounds of appeal. In Part C, the Court discussed the 1st to 3rd Common Grounds and identified at [48] the issue of construction raised: what is the proper meaning of “other unlawful means” in NSL 22? Applying the contextual and purposive construction, the Court held that on a proper construction, “other unlawful means” in NSL 22 covers “acts not just by the use of force or the threat of force, but also other unlawful means.”[5]
4. The Court rejected the applicants’ arguments (1) the ejusdem generis rule applies to the construction of “other unlawful means” in NSL 22 so that it is confined to “the use of force or the threat of force”;[6] and (2) that “other unlawful means” is confined to criminal acts.[7]
5. At [98] of the Judgment, the Court identified four principal issues raised by the 4th and 5th Common Grounds:
(1) whether the Scheme constitutes an unlawful means within the meaning of NSL 22;
(2) whether the Course of Conduct is a prohibited act within the meaning of NSL 22(3);
(3) whether the non-intervention principle applies; and
(4) what the specific intent to subvert the State power for the present offence entails.
6. After examining the constitutional order of the HKSAR, the constitutional functions of the LegCo, and highlighting the constitutional duty of LegCo members to uphold the Basic Law in performing their functions,[8] the Court held that the Scheme is an unlawful means;[9] that the Course of Conduct is a prohibited act;[10] that the non-intervention principle does not apply;[11] and that an accused will have the specific subversive intent if he intends to trigger the mechanism to bring about the consequences in BL 50 ‑ 52 with the purpose of the Scheme and the Course of Conduct in mind.[12]
Points raised by the applicants
7. Since the applicants are separately represented, the points raised by them inevitably vary in terms of formulation but for present purposes may be categorized into five broad points:
(1) what is the proper construction of “other unlawful means” in NSL 22;
(2) whether the triggering of the mechanism under BL 50 ‑ 52 constitutes “other unlawful means” within the meaning of NSL 22;
(3) what are the constitutional duties, powers and functions of LegCo members, and whether the Course of Conduct is a prohibited act within the meaning of NSL 22(3);
(4) whether the principle of non-intervention is applicable;
(5) whether the intention to trigger the mechanism under BL 50 ‑ 52 constitutes the specific intent to subvert the State power under NSL 22.
It can be readily seen that these points largely mirror their grounds of appeal but some of them appear to have been couched without sufficient regard to the factual context of the present case and the Court’s findings on those matters in the Judgment.
Our certification
8. Having read the parties’ written submissions, we consider the main issues involved in the Judgment, repeated at [3] and [5] above, are of great and general importance. They touch upon the elements of a NSL 22 offence, both in terms of actus reus and mens rea, and the duties of LegCo members in performing their constitutional functions, especially in connection with the examination of budgets and the invocation of the mechanism in BL 50 – 52. They merit the consideration by the Court of Final Appeal, in particular when it is the first occasion they are to be determined by our apex Court.
9. We will accordingly certify the following questions under section 32(2) of the Hong Kong Court of Final Appeal Ordinance:
(1) On a proper construction, what is the meaning of “other unlawful means” in NSL 22, in particular:
(a) whether the ejusdem generis rule applies so that it is confined to “acts by force or threat of force”; and
(b) whether it is confined to criminal acts.
(2) Whether the Scheme constitutes an unlawful means within the meaning of NSL 22;
(3) Whether the Course of Conduct is a prohibited act within the meaning of NSL 22(3);
(4) Whether the non-intervention principle applies in the present case;
(5) Whether an accused will have the specific subversive intent if he intends to trigger the mechanism to bring about the consequences in BL 50 ‑ 52 with the purpose of the Scheme and the Course of Conduct in mind.
(Jeremy Poon)
Chief Judge of the
High Court
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(Derek Pang)
Justice of Appeal
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(William Tam)
Judge of the Court
of First Instance
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Mr Anthony Chau, DPP, Mr Derek Lau, SADPP, Mr Andy Lo, ADPP, Ms Karen Ng, SPP and Ms Jennifer Tsui, SPP, of the Department of Justice, for the Respondent
Mr Cheung Yiu-leung and Mr Elson Tong, instructed by Chiu, Szeto & Cheng, for the 1st Applicant (D10)
Mr Erik Shum, Ms Christy Wong and Mr Isaac Wu, instructed by Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, for the 2nd Applicant (D17) and the 6th Applicant (D38)
Mr Steven Kwan and Mr Donald Ting, instructed by Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, for the 3rd Applicant (D37)
Mr Robert Pang SC and Ms Yvonne Leung, instructed by O Tse & Co, for the 4th Applicant (D47)
Mr Trevor Beel and Ms Pricilla Lau, instructed by Ho, Tse, Wai & Partners, for the 5th Applicant (D33)
Mr Steven Kwan and Ms Yvonne Leung, instructed by Ho Kan Lawyers, for the 7th Applicant (D5)
Mr Hectar Pun SC, Mr Anson Wong Yu Yat and Ms Ferrida Chan, instructed by Kenneth Lam, Solicitors, for the 9th Applicant (D8) and the 12th Applicant (D41)
Mr Emanuel Law and Ms Karman Wan, instructed by O Tse & Co, for the 10th Applicant (D14)
Mr David Ma and Ms Denise Or, instructed by O Tse & Co, for the 11th Applicant (D36)
[1] [2026] HKCA 284. For present purposes, we will adopt the abbreviations and nomenclatures used in the Judgment.
[2] Differently constituted: Poon CJHC, Pang JA and Anthea Pang JA (who has already retired).
[3] By the Judgment, we also refused the applications for leave to appeal against sentence by the same applicants except D33 in CACC 253/2024, and D27 in CACC 263/2024; and dismissed the case stated by the SJ against the acquittal of D16 in CACC 268/2024. This Decision does not concern those applications and the case stated.
[4] Section 32(2) reads: “Leave to appeal shall not be granted unless it is certified by the Court of Appeal … that a point of law of great and general importance is involved in the decision …”
[5] Judgment, Parts C1 ‑ C3.
[6] Judgment, Part C4.1.
[7] Judgment, Part C4.2.
[8] Judgment, Parts D2 ‑ D4.
[9] Judgment, Part D5.
[10] Judgment, Part D6.
[11] Judgment, Part D7.
[12] Judgment, Part D8.
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